{ "id": 4221601, "name": "HALIFAX REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Plaintiff v. DARRELL JAMES BROWN, M.D., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff v. SMITH CHURCH OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, P.C. and RICHARD MINIELLY, M.D., Third-Party Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Halifax Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Brown", "decision_date": "2013-06-18", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1480", "first_page": "43", "last_page": "48", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 N.C. App. 43" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639168 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted" }, { "page": "101", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528625 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted" }, { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" }, { "page": "460", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559308 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431", "parenthetical": "\"[O]ne who prevents the performance of a condition, or makes it impossible by his own act, will not be permitted to take advantage of the nonperformance.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567056 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633", "parenthetical": "\"[O]ne who prevents the performance of a condition, or makes it impossible by his own act, will not be permitted to take advantage of the nonperformance.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572254 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739573 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 612, "char_count": 12794, "ocr_confidence": 0.711, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13972088720230408 }, "sha256": "af2a08a7715910e7ed6379c5dbd553e7357562c648ec47818882a6965e7a451f", "simhash": "1:0fb8dc532d263444", "word_count": 2035 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:27.138557+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GEER and DILLON concur." ], "parties": [ "HALIFAX REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Plaintiff v. DARRELL JAMES BROWN, M.D., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff v. SMITH CHURCH OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, P.C. and RICHARD MINIELLY, M.D., Third-Party Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nDr. Darrell James Brown (defendant) appeals from 1) an order entered 29 August 2012 granting summary judgment in favor of Halifax Regional Medical Center, Inc. (plaintiff) and denying his motion for summary judgment and 2) an order entered 29 August 2012 granting a motion to dismiss and motion to remove in favor of Smith Church Obstertrics & Gynecology, PC. and Dr. Richard Minielly. After careful consideration, we affirm.\nI. Background\nDefendant is a medical doctor who specializes in the field of obstetrics and gynecology. In 2007, defendant and plaintiff entered into a Practitioner Incentive Agreement (the agreement) whereby plaintiff agreed to pay defendant an income subsidy of $195,804.10 and a relocation loan of $20,000.00, and defendant agreed to establish an OB/GYN practice in Roanoke Rapids. Under the terms of the agreement, to avoid repayment of the total money paid by plaintiff, defendant was required to maintain his practice for a period of one year beginning 18 June 2007. Then, according to the agreement, for each month defendant maintained his practice following this one year \u201csubsidy period,\u201d plaintiff agreed to forgive a portion of the money owed each month for 24 months, at which time defendant\u2019s indebtedness would be fully forgiven. Thus, in simple terms, to avoid repaying plaintiff for any of the money, defendant was required to maintain his practice from 18 June 2007 until 18 June 2010.\nDefendant sought to fulfill his obligations under the agreement by establishing his practice with Smith Church Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., which was owned by Dr. Richard Minielly (collectively, Smith Church). On 5 February 2007, defendant and Smith Church entered into an employment contract (the contract) whereby defendant would be employed by Smith Church and paid a sum of $250,000.00 per year, renewable automatically each year unless either party gave 90 days notice of termination. Defendant maintained his practice with Smith Church until 3 June 2009, at which time Smith Church terminated defendant\u2019s employment. Defendant then accepted a position in Duplin County, thus ceasing his practice in Roanoke Rapids effective on 19 June 2009.\nAs a result, plaintiff sent defendant a demand letter, seeking \u201cprompt repayment\u201d of \u201c$107,902.05, plus interest at the rate of 4.25% from June, 19, 2009, until paid.\u201d Defendant did not pay, and on 4 August 2010 plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract. In his answer filed 12 October 2010, defendant denied any obligation to repay the money owed under the agreement. He alleged that he entered into the agreement with plaintiff under the belief that there \u201cwere unmet demands for obstetrical/gynecological practice\u201d in Roanoke Rapids, but that after the agreement was executed plaintiff further recruited another OB/GYN to practice in the area, which \u201coversupplied the community -with obstetrical/gynecological services and consequently, resulted in a much less demand\u201d for his services. Defendant further alleged that \u201c[d]ue to the oversupply of ob/ gyn positions in the community\u201d he was \u201cvirtually unable to start a practice of his own\u201d following his termination from Smith Church and therefore, he was forced to \u201clook for employment elsewhere\u201d which resulted in his employment \u201cwith University Health Systems in Duplin County[.]\u201d\nDefendant also filed a third-party claim against Smith Church for breach of contract and for interfering with his agreement with plaintiff. In the third-party claim, defendant alleged that Smith Church breached the employment contract by terminating defendant without notice and thereby interfered with his ability to comply with his agreement with plaintiff.\nOn 15 November 2010, Smith Church filed a motion to dismiss and motion to remove. Then on 30 August 2011, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant also filed a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff. On 29 August 2012, the trial court entered an order granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The trial court also ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $107,902.05 plus interest at a rate of 4.25% from 19 June 2009, until paid. That same day, the trial court also entered an order granting Smith Church\u2019s motion to dismiss the pending third-party claim. The trial court further granted Smith Chinch\u2019s motion to remove, to the effect that any further claims between Smith Church and defendant be sought according to the venue requirements of their contract. Defendant now appeals.\nII. Analysis\nA. Summary judgment\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and that summary judgment should have been granted in his favor. Defendant\u2019s primary argument is that he was excused from performing under the agreement with plaintiff, because plaintiff and Smith Church had a joint venture and Smith Church terminated defendant\u2019s employment. We disagree.\n\u201cOur standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that \u2018there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)).\nOur Supreme Court has held that \u201c [n] onperformance of a valid contract is a breach thereof... unless the person charged shows some valid reason which may excuse the non-performance; and the burden of doing so rests upon him.\u201d Sechrest v. Forest Furniture Co., 264 N.C. 216, 217, 141 S.E.2d 292, 294 (1965) (citation omitted). Here, it is not in dispute that defendant failed to fully perform his duties under the agreement in order to avoid repaying plaintiff. Defendant was required to maintain his practice in Roanoke Rapids until June 2010, but in June 2009 he began practicing in Duplin County. However, defendant argues that the actions of Smith Church, namely their termination of his employment with them, excused him from performing under the agreement because Smith Church and plaintiff were in a joint venture.\nThe crux of defendant\u2019s argument rests on two rules. The first is that a party who prevents performance of an agreement by the other party may not take advantage of the nonperformance. See Mullen v. Sawyer, 277 N.C. 623, 633, 178 S.E.2d 425, 431 (1971) (\u201c[O]ne who prevents the performance of a condition, or makes it impossible by his own act, will not be permitted to take advantage of the nonperformance.\u201d). The second is that \u201c[e]ach member of a joint adventure is both an agent for his coadventurer and a principal for himself[,]\u201d Pike v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1, 8, 161 S.E.2d 453, 460 (1968), and therefore responsible for the other\u2019s actions. Thus, what we must decide then is whether plaintiff and Smith Church were engaged in a joint venture.\nA joint venture is \u201can alliance between two or more people in pursuit of a common purpose such that negligence of one participant may \"be imputed to another.\u201d Slaughter v. Slaughter, 93 N.C. App. 717, 720, 379 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1989) (quotations and citation omitted). A joint venture exists when two or more parties join together to:\ncarry out a single business adventure for joint profit, for which purpose they combine their efforts, property, money, skill, and knowledge[.]. .. Facts showing the joining of funds, property, or labor, in a common purpose to attain a result for the benefit of the parties in which each has a right in some measure to direct the conduct of the other through a necessary fiduciary relation, will justify a finding that a joint adventure exists.\nPike, 274 N.C. App. at 8-9, 161 S.E.2d at 460 (quotations and citations omitted).\nHere, the record does not support defendant\u2019s assertion that a joint venture existed between plaintiff and Smith Church. First, by its basic definition, a joint venture is a plan carried out for profit. None of plaintiff\u2019s business is conducted for profit. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that it was a \u201cnon-profit coiporation\u201d and in his answer, defendant admitted that allegation. Further, the terms of the agreement make it clear that defendant was not recruited to establish a practice in Roanoke Rapids for any money-making reasons, but rather, to remedy a \u201clack of qualified physicians specializing in obstetrics/gynecology in the Community[.]\u201d\nSecond, as plaintiff correctly argues in its brief, it had no right to direct or control the conduct of Smith Church. For a joint venture to exist, one party must have \u201cthe legal right to control the conduct of the other with respect to the prosecution of the common purpose.\u201d Slaughter, 93 N.C. App. at 721, 379 S.E.2d at 101 (citation omitted). Here, the agreement between plaintiff and defendant makes no mention or even reference to Smith Church, and defendant was not required to establish his practice with them. Further, we can find nothing in the record which establishes any fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and Smith Church.\nIn sum, we conclude that plaintiff and Smith Church were not engaged in a joint venture. Therefore, the decision of Smith Church to terminate defendant\u2019s employment had no bearing on defendant\u2019s obligation to perform under his agreement with plaintiff.\nB. Motions to dismiss and remove\nNext, defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting Smith Church\u2019s motion to dismiss and motion to remove. We disagree.\nWith regards to the motion to dismiss, defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion because Smith Church never argued the motion. We conclude that defendant\u2019s argument is not supported by the record.\nAccording to its pleading, Smith Church based its motion to dismiss on the fact that \u201cDefendant Darrell James, M.D. executed a contract (Brown\u2019s Exhibit A) wherein he agreed in paragraph 12 that in the event \u2018. . . of a disagreement with respect to any matter whatsoever arising under this contract, the dispute shall be referred to an arbitration committee whose decision shall be binding on each of the parties hereto without further action or recourse.\u2019 \u201d Turning to the transcript, it is clear that Smith Church made this same argument at the hearing. Counsel for Smith Church argued that \u201cparagraph 12 ... clearly and unambiguously states that if there\u2019s a disagreement between these two parties, Smith Church and Dr. Brown, that\u2019s to be resolved by arbitration.\u201d Thus, defendant\u2019s argument fails.\nWith regards to the motion to remove, defendant argues that since there was a joint venture between plaintiff and Smith Church, plaintiff acted for Smith Church in choosing Duplin County as the proper forum and therefore Smith Church\u2019s motion to remove should have been dismissed. As we have already discussed, plaintiff and Smith Church were not engaged in a joint venture, therefore defendant\u2019s argument again fails.\nIII. Conclusion\nIn sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff or in granting Smith Church\u2019s motions to dismiss and remove. Accordingly, we affirm both orders.\nAffirmed.\nJudges GEER and DILLON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Joshua F. P. Long of WOODS ROGERS PLC, attorney for plaintiff", "E.C. Thompson, III, of THOMPSON & THOMPSON, PC., attorney for defendant and third-party plaintiff.", "Geoffrey P. Davis and Gilbert W. Chichester of CHICHESTER LAW OFFICE, attorneys for third-party defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HALIFAX REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Plaintiff v. DARRELL JAMES BROWN, M.D., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff v. SMITH CHURCH OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, P.C. and RICHARD MINIELLY, M.D., Third-Party Defendants\nNo. COA12-1480\nFiled 18 June 2013\n1. Contracts \u2014 breach\u2014not excused from performance\nThe trial court did not err in a breach of contract case by granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Defendant was not excused from performing under the agreement with plaintiff, where the decision of defendant\u2019s employer to terminate defendant\u2019s employment had no bearing on defendant\u2019s obligation to perform under his agreement with plaintiff.\n2. Contracts \u2014 breach\u2014motion to dismiss \u2014 motion to remove\nThe trial court did not err in a breach of contract case by granting third-party defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss and remove. Defendant\u2019s argument that defendant failed to argue its motion to dismiss in the trial court was not supported by the record. Furthermore, plaintiff\u2019s argument that there was a joint venture between plaintiff and third-party defendant failed.\nAppeal by defendant from orders entered 29 August 2012 by Judge John E. Nobles, Jr. in Duplin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 April 2013.\nJoshua F. P. Long of WOODS ROGERS PLC, attorney for plaintiff\nE.C. Thompson, III, of THOMPSON & THOMPSON, PC., attorney for defendant and third-party plaintiff.\nGeoffrey P. Davis and Gilbert W. Chichester of CHICHESTER LAW OFFICE, attorneys for third-party defendants." }, "file_name": "0043-01", "first_page_order": 53, "last_page_order": 58 }