{ "id": 4220961, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MASON JAMEL HOWARD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Howard", "decision_date": "2013-06-18", "docket_number": "No. COA 12-996", "first_page": "103", "last_page": "117", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 N.C. App. 103" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "175 S.E. 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621595 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803", "parenthetical": "quoting Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8958518 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699", "parenthetical": "quoting Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541401 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640370 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640283 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641744 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638717, 12638718, 12638719 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109-110", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0105-01", "/se2d/646/0105-02", "/se2d/646/0105-03" ] }, { "cite": "713 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "721 S.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348-49" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "349" }, { "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that this requirement equates to criminal intent to conceal" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596402 ], "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that this requirement equates to criminal intent to conceal" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/199/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-269", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a1)", "parenthetical": "making it unlawful to \"willfully and intentionally\" carry a concealed weapon" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "335 U.S. 469", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6159942 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/335/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11202004 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957169 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437253 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "holding that when the defendant in a rape case admitted he had intercourse but alleged it was consensual, identity was not at issue" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2644209 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "holding that when the defendant in a rape case admitted he had intercourse but alleged it was consensual, identity was not at issue" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155039 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E.2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596105 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 S.E.2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913-14" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "\"[The Court of Appeals] has no authority to overrule decisions of [the] Supreme Court and [has] the responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.\" (quotation marks and citation omitted) (second and third alterations in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529622 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118", "parenthetical": "\"[The Court of Appeals] has no authority to overrule decisions of [the] Supreme Court and [has] the responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.\" (quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "applying the \"similarity\" requirement when the trial court admitted prior bad act testimony to show knowledge, identity, and common scheme or plan" }, { "page": "365, 367", "parenthetical": "allowing testimony about a prior arrest for illegal possession of prescription drugs because specific intent to possess prescription drugs is an element of the offense" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "applying the \"similarity\" requirement when the trial court admitted prior bad act testimony to show knowledge, identity, and common scheme or plan" }, { "page": "16, 18" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155327 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11220679 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "729 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71", "parenthetical": "\"New trials are not awarded because of technical errors. The error must be prejudicial.\" (quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "725 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" }, { "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4768569 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160151 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467-68", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4836, 5158, 4882, 5207, 5176 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1023-04", "/us/494/1023-03", "/us/494/1023-05", "/us/494/1023-02", "/us/494/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492599 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3744653 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387-88", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "describing temporal proximity and similarity as two separate requirements" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511282 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569839 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 S.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851", "parenthetical": "holding that a defendant preserved his evidentiary argument by objecting to the evidence's admission and obtaining a ruling on admissibility during a mid-trial voir dire hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833", "parenthetical": "\"A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason... [or] upon a showing that [the trial court's decision] was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151090 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150837 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632-33", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" }, { "page": "158-59" }, { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541401 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0409-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1279, "char_count": 34213, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.60167783687625e-08, "percentile": 0.28857686297540897 }, "sha256": "8946638a7f98ccbb7edfe4d1245e42229228d2003dc42d85a577562c2687bac4", "simhash": "1:890a565a3e258cc7", "word_count": 5587 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:27.138557+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge GEER concurs.", "Judge HUNTER, Jr., Robert N., dissents in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MASON JAMEL HOWARD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nWhere defendant objected upon one basis before the trial court, he cannot \u201cswap horses\u201d and argue a different theory on appeal. Where defendant does not argue the objection made before the trial court on appeal, we must dismiss his appeal.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nAt about 10:53 P.M. on 20 November 2010, Kannapolis Police Department Officer Christopher D. Hill (Officer Hill) observed a Cadillac De Ville traveling east on Dale Earnhardt Boulevard in Kannapolis. Officer Hill stopped the vehicle because the license plate light was not working. Brandon Eugene Martin (Martin) was in the driver\u2019s seat, and Mason Howard (defendant) was in the front passenger seat. The vehicle was owned by Martin\u2019s girlfriend.\nOfficer Hill approached the vehicle and asked both Martin and defendant for identification. Defendant gave Officer Hill a North Carolina identification card; Martin provided a North Carolina driver\u2019s license. Martin and defendant told Officer Hill they were driving from Charlotte to Kannapolis for a cook-out. Officer Hill ran their names through the Kannapolis Police Department Communication Center. There was an outstanding warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest from Mecklenburg County for possession of a firearm by a felon. The information stated that defendant was considered armed and dangerous. Officer Hill called for backup and Officer Carpenter responded to the scene of the stop.\nWith Officer Carpenter present, Officer Hill approached the passenger side of the vehicle and asked defendant to exit the vehicle. When defendant stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Hill noticed an open vodka bottle in a paper bag at defendant\u2019s feet. Officer Hill advised defendant of the outstanding arrest warrant. Defendant was arrested and placed inside a patrol car.\nOfficer Hill called another Kannapolis police officer, Officer Hamilton, to bring a drug-sniffing dog to the scene of the stop. When Officer Hamilton arrived, he had Martin exit the vehicle and then led the dog around the vehicle. At the driver\u2019s side door, the dog indicated that the vehicle contained drugs. After the dog alerted to the presence of drugs, Martin admitted he had marijuana on the rear seat of the vehicle. Officer Hamilton then searched the vehicle and found thirteen grams of marijuana inside Martin\u2019s baseball cap on the driver\u2019s side rear seat. After Officer Hamilton confiscated the marijuana, Officer Hill searched the rest of the vehicle.\nWhen Officer Hill searched the front passenger area, he confiscated the open vodka bottle from the front floorboard. While collecting the vodka bottle, Officer Hill discovered a loaded 38-caliber revolver underneath the passenger seat where defendant had been sitting. After Officer Hill found the revolver, he placed Martin in handcuffs. Martin denied any knowledge of the revolver. Officer Hill charged Martin with: (1) driving while impaired; and (2) possession of marijuana. Martin was then taken to the Kannapolis Police Department for processing.\nOfficer Hill also took defendant to the Kannapolis Police Department to process him for the outstanding Mecklenburg County arrest warrant. A criminal record check at the police department revealed that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony in 2007: conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Officer Hill also discovered defendant had another outstanding Mecklenburg County arrest warrant for carrying a concealed weapon.\nOn 13 December 2010, defendant was indicted for: (1) possession of a firearm by a felon; (2) carrying a concealed weapon; and (3) possession of an open container of alcohol (for the vodka bottle).\nDefendant was tried at the 7 February 2012 Criminal Session of Cabarrus County Superior Court. The State called Officer Sean Parker (Officer Parker) of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department to testify about a previous encounter with defendant in Charlotte a few months earlier. The State offered Officer Parker\u2019s testimony pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. At the conclusion of a voir dire hearing, the trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objection, determining that \u201cthe probative value of the testimony outweighs any unfair prejudice to the defendant under Rule 403.\u201d\nThe jury found defendant guilty of: (1) carrying a concealed weapon; and (2) possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court dismissed the charge of possession of an open container of alcohol. Defendant was sentenced to an active sentence of 14-17 months for possession of a firearm by a felon and a consecutive active sentence of 45 days for carrying a concealed weapon.\nDefendant appeals.\nII. Standard of Review\n\u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented the trial court with a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not apparent.\u201d State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991); see also N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1).\nIII. Analysis\nIn his arguments on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Parker\u2019s testimony concerning defendant\u2019s prior acts. We disagree.\nThe trial court conducted a hearing outside of the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of Officer Parker\u2019s testimony concerning the incident that occurred on 14 July 2010 in Mecklenburg County.\nOfficer Parker testified that on 14 July 2010 he was dispatched to a breaking and entering in progress. When he arrived, Officer Parker saw defendant talking to another police officer. As Officer Parker approached, he saw defendant flee, tossing a black semi-automatic handgun into nearby bushes. Officer Parker chased defendant for about 200 yards. He eventually caught defendant and arrested him for: (1) possession of a firearm by a felon; (2) carrying a concealed weapon; and (3) resisting a public officer.\nFollowing the State\u2019s proffer, counsel for defendant made the following objection:\nMR. COOK: I apologize for my voice. I\u2019m having a difficulty this week. Thank you. No further questions, but, Your Honor, I do object to the proffer of all the evidence under 404(B) as being prejudicial. The prejudice to my client would outweigh the probative value in regard to the facts of this case.\nTHE COURT: You\u2019re making your objection under Rule 403.\nMR. COOK: I am.\nThe trial court made two rulings at the conclusion of the voir dire hearing: first, that the testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence; and second, that \u201cthe probative value of the testimony outweighs any unfair prejudice to the defendant under Rule 403.\u201d Defendant\u2019s objection to the evidence was only as to its prejudicial effect, not its admissibility. The objection was phrased in terms that the \u201cprejudice to my client would outweigh the probative valu\u00e9 in regard to the facts of this case.\u201d The court then specifically confirmed with counsel that the objection was being made under Rule 403.\nAlthough defendant mentioned Rule 404(b) in his objection, it is clear that the objection was made pursuant to Rule 403. As defendant did not object pursuant to Rule 404(b), such objection is not preserved on appeal, unless plain error is argued. See State v. Lawrence,_N.C. _,_, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012). Defendant has not argued plain error on appeal.\nDefendant objected pursuant to Rule 403. However, in his brief to this Court, defendant fails to argue error under Rule 403, and makes his entire argument under Rule 404(b). Any argument pertaining to Rule 403 is deemed abandoned. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\nA defendant cannot \u201cswap horses between courts in order to get a better mount[.]\u201d Wood v. Weldon, 160 N.C. App. 697, 699, 586 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2003) (quoting Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934)). Defendant cannot object under Rule 403 at trial and then argue under Rule 404(b) on appeal.\nBecause defendant failed to object under Rule 404(b) at trial, and failed to argue under Rule 403 on appeal, we dismiss defendant\u2019s appeal.\nDISMISSED.\nJudge GEER concurs.\nJudge HUNTER, Jr., Robert N., dissents in a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge." }, { "text": "\u25a0HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge,\ndissenting.\nI do not believe the majority opinion applies the correct standard of review. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.\nI. Standard of Review\nWhen reviewing evidentiary rulings under North Carolina Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403,\nwe conduct distinct inquiries with different standards of review. When the trial corut has made findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its 404(b) ruling, . . . we look to whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the conclusions. We review de novo the legal conclusion that the evidence is, or is not, within the coverage of Rule 404(b). We then review the trial court\u2019s Rule 403 determination for abuse of discretion.\nState v. Beckelheimer, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012). Thus, we engage in a de novo review of whether the circumstances satisfy the similarity, temporal proximity, and relevancy requirements of Rule 404(b). See id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 158-59. If we determine the trial court did not err in this determination, we then analyze whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding the danger of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the evidence\u2019s probative value. See id.\n\u201cUnder a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.\u201d State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009).\n\u201cAbuse of discretion results where the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988); see also White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (\u201cA trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason... [or] upon a showing that [the trial court\u2019s decision] was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d).\nIn light of these distinctions, I believe Defendant preserved his arguments under both Rule 404(b) and Rule 403.\n\u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented the trial court with a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not apparent.\u201d State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991); see also N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1).\nDefendant did not need to object again at trial after objecting during the voir dire hearing. See State v. Randolph,_N.C. App._,_, 735 S.E.2d 845, 851 (2012) (holding that a defendant preserved his evidentiary argument by objecting to the evidence\u2019s admission and obtaining a ruling on admissibility during a mid-trial voir dire hearing). Here, Defendant preserved his argument by (i) objecting to Officer Parker\u2019s testimony during the voir dire hearing; and (ii) obtaining an evidentiary ruling.\nThe majority holds Defendant only preserved his argument for Rule 403 abuse of discretion review, not Rule 404(b) de novo review. I respectfully disagree.\nThe relevant part of the trial occurred as follows. During the voir dire hearing, the prosecutor stated, \u201cI will be proffering [Officer Parker\u2019s] testimony under Rule 404(B).\u201d Officer Parker then testified. Immediately afterward, the following exchange occurred:\n[Defense Counsel]: I do object to the proffer of all the evidence under 404(B) as being prejudicial. The prejudice to my client would outweigh the probative value in regard to the facts of this case.\nTHE COURT: You\u2019re making your objection under Rule 403.\n[Defense Counsel]: I am.\nThe trial court then explained its Rule 404(b) analysis and decided:\nThe Court\u2019s going to overrule the objection to the testimony. The Court will, if it becomes necessary, do a written order under Rule 404(B).\nThe Court finds that the probative value of the testimony outweighs any unfair prejudice to the defendant under Rule 403.\nOn 17 February 2012, the trial court entered a written order determining Officer Parker\u2019s testimony was admissible under both Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. The majority holds that \u201cDefendant\u2019s objection to the evidence was only as to its prejudicial effect, not its admissibility.\u201d I disagree. A Rule 404(b) objection does not preclude a simultaneous Rule 403 objection; in fact our Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged the two rules are often intertwined. See Beckelheimer,_N.C. at_, 726 S.E.2d at 159. I believe defense counsel's response to the trial court\u2019s Rule 403 inquiry simply expanded the scope of his objection, rather than invalidating his previous Rule 404(b) objection. Consequently, I would have held defense counsel properly preserved Defendant\u2019s Rule 404(b) argument by stating: \u201cI do object to the proffer of all the evidence under 404(B) as prejudicial.\u201d\nAdditionally, I believe reviewing Defendant\u2019s arguments under Rule 404(b) preserves the spirit and purpose of North Carolina\u2019s Rules of Evidence. Rule of Evidence 102 makes clear that the Rules \u201cshall be construed to secure fairness in administration... and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 102. Only reviewing the trial court\u2019s evidentiary decision under the Rule 403 abuse of discretion standard when Defendant explicitly cited Rule 404(b) in his objection fundamentally contradicts this purpose.\nOverall, the relevant interaction at trial is summarized as follows: (i) the prosecution offered Officer Parker\u2019s testimony under Rule 404(b); (ii) Defendant objected under Rule 404(b); and (in) the trial court ruled under Rule 404(b). Consequently, I would have engaged in de novo Rule 404(b) analysis on appeal. See id. Given this conclusion, I now address the merits of Defendant\u2019s arguments under de novo Rule 404(b) analysis.\nII. Rule 404(b) Analysis\nDefendant\u2019s convictions concern the revolver found under his seat on 20 November 2010. On appeal, Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting Officer Parker\u2019s testimony because the testimony: (i) was not needed to show knowledge of illegality; (ii) was not relevant to prove identity; and (iii) did not show a common scheme or plan. Defendant then argued this error was prejudicial. I would have vacated and remanded for new trial under Rule 404(b).\nNorth Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:\n(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. \u2014 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C. R. Evid. 404(b). However, North Carolina Rule of Evidence 403 excludes relevant evidence \u201cif its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 403.\nOur courts have characterized Rule 404(b) as a\ngeneral rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\nState v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990). Therefore, \u201cevidence of other offenses is admissible so long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the character of the accused.\u201d State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 206, 362 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1987) (emphasis added) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also N.C.R. Evid. 401 (\u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d).\nStill, our Supreme Court warns that \u201cRule 404(b) evidence . . . should be carefully scrutinized in order to adequately safeguard against the improper introduction of character evidence against the accused.\u201d State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154, 567 S.E.2d 120, 122 (2002). This is because:\n[w]hen evidence of a prior crime is introduced, the natural and inevitable tendency for a judge or jury is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation, irrespective of the accused\u2019s guilt of the present charge. Indeed, the dangerous tendency of Rule 404(b) evidence to mislead and raise a legally spurious presumption of guilt requires that its admissibility should be subjected to strict scrutiny by the courts.\nState v. Carpenter, 361 N.C. 382, 387-88, 646 S.E.2d 105, 109-110 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\n\u201cTo effectuate these important evidentiary safeguards, the rule of inclusion described in Coffey is constrained by the requirements of similarity and temporal proximity.\u201d Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 154, 567 S.E.2d at 123 (2002). Our Supreme Court has elaborated that:\n[w]hen the features of the earlier act are dissimilar from those of the offense with which the defendant is currently charged, such evidence lacks probative value. When otherwise similar offenses are distanced by significant stretches of time, commonalities become less striking, and the probative value of the analogy attaches less to the acts than to the character of the actor.\nState v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 299, 384 S.E.2d 470, 481 (1989), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023 (1990). Although similarities need not \u201crise to the level of the unique and bizarre,\u201d State v. Martin, 191 N.C. App. 462, 467-68, 665 S.E.2d 471, 475 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted), \u201cthere must be shown some unusual facts present in both crimes or particularly similar acts.\u201d State v. Moore, 309 N.C. 102, 106, 305 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1983).\nIf evidence satisfies the similarity, temporal proximity, and relevancy requirements of Rule 404(b), the trial court must then balance the evidence\u2019s probative value with the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. See State v. Glenn, _ N.C. App. _, _, 725 S.E.2d 58, 67 (2012). Thus, in making a Rule 404(b)/Rule 403 determination, the trial court analyzes three issues:\nFirst, is the evidence relevant for some purpose other than to show that defendant has the propensity for the type of conduct for which he is being tried? Second, is that purpose relevant to an issue material to the pending case? Third, does the probative value of the evidence substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403?\nId. (internal citations omitted).\nOn appeal, if this Court determines the trial court erred in its Rule 404(b)/Rule 403 determination, we only remand for new trial if the error was prejudicial. See Sisk v. Sisk,_N.C. App._,_, 729 S.E.2d 68, 71 (2012) (\u201cNew trials are not awarded because of technical errors. The error must be prejudicial.\u201d (quotation marks and citation omitted)). \u201cThe party who asserts that evidence was improperly admitted usually has the burden to show the error and that he was prejudiced by its admission.\u201d State v. Anthony, 133 N.C. App. 573, 579, 516 S.E.2d 195, 199 (1999). \u201cThis burden may be met by showing that there is a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached had the error not been committed.\u201d State v. Jones, 188 N.C. App. 562, 569, 655 S.E.2d 915, 920 (2008); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443 (2011).\nIn the present case, Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting Officer Parker\u2019s testimony under Rule 404(b) to show: (i) knowledge of illegality; (ii) identity; and (iii) common scheme or plan. He then contended this error was prejudicial. Although \"the majority dismisses the case because Defendant did not make any appellate arguments under Rule 403,1 would have analyzed the trial court\u2019s decision to admit Officer Parker\u2019s testimony under Rule 404(b). I believe the trial court should have excluded the testimony under Rule 404(b) for lack of similarity.\nA. Lack of Similarity\nDefendant\u2019s 14 July 2010 arrest is not sufficiently similar to the events of 20 November 2010 to satisfy Rule 404(b)\u2019s \u201csimilarity\u201d requirement. See Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 154, 567 S.E.2d at 123; State v. Ward, 199 N.C. App. 1, 15, 681 S.E.2d 354, 364 (2009) (applying the \u201csimilarity\u201d requirement when the trial court admitted prior bad act testimony to show knowledge, identity, and common scheme or plan).\nAlthough the trial court determined the events of 14 July 2010 and 20 November 2010 were \u201csimilar, frankly identical,\u201d they bear almost no factual similarities. First, Defendant\u2019s 14 July 2010 arrest occurred in Charlotte; his 20 November 2010 arrest occurred in Kannapolis, more than 20 miles away. Second, on 14 July 2010 Defendant was arrested while fleeing from the scene of a breaking and entering; on 20 November 2010 Defendant was riding in a car. Third, the gun involved in the 14 July 2010 arrest was a semi-automatic handgun; the gun involved in the 20 November 2010 arrest was a revolver. Fourth, on 14 July 2010 Defendant carried the gun in his waistband; on 20 November 2010 no evidence indicates Defendant even touched the revolver. Lastly, on 1 4 July 2010 the gun was found in bushes; on 20 November 2010 the gun was found under the car\u2019s passenger seat. In short, I find no similarities between the two incidents other than that they both involved a Mon and a firearm.\nAdditionally, my dissent is guided by our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Carpenter. See Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 118, 431 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1993) (\u201c[The Court of Appeals] has no authority to overrule decisions of [the] Supreme Court and [has] the responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.\u201d (quotation marks and citation omitted) (second and third alterations in original)). In Carpenter, the defendant was a passenger in a car during a routine traffic stop. 361 N.C. at 383, 646 S.E.2d at 107. Police'officers suspected the car contained drugs, searched all the passengers, and found cocaine in the defendant\u2019s sweatshirt pocket. Id. at 384, 646 S.E.2d at 107. At the defendant\u2019s trial for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, the court admitted testimony that a police informant had previously purchased cocaine from the defendant at a residence during a sting operation. Id. at 384-85, 646 S.E.2d at 108.\nIn Carpenter, our Supreme Court determined \u201cthe State\u2019s efforts to show similarities between crimes establish no more than characteristics inherent to most crimes of that type.\u201d Id. at 390, 646 S.E.2d at 111 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, our Supreme Court reversed and remanded for new trial because \u201cthe State has failed to show that sufficient similarities existed for the purposes of Rule 404(b).\u201d Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 155, 567 S.E.2d at 123; State v. Flood,_N.C. App._,_, 726 S.E.2d 908, 913-14 (2012).\nTherefore, I would have held the trial court erred by failing to exclude Officer Parker\u2019s testimony for lack of similarity.\nB. Knowledge, Identity, and Common Scheme or Plan\nAlthough I believe the trial court should have excluded Officer . Parker\u2019s testimony for lack of similarity, I also note that the testimony has very little probative value under any permissible Rule 404(b) rationale.\nFirst, knowledge is not an element of possession of a firearm by a felon. In North Carolina, \u201c[w]here guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime charged, evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as tend to establish the requisite guilty knowledge, even though the evidence reveals the commission of another offense by the accused.\u201d State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 175, 81 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1954); see also Ward, 199 N.C. App. at 16, 18, 681 S.E.2d at 365, 367 (allowing testimony about a prior arrest for illegal possession of prescription drugs because specific intent to possess prescription drugs is an element of the offense).\nThe elements of possession of a firearm by a felon are: \u201c(1) [the] defendant was previously convicted of a felony; and (2) thereafter possessed a firearm.\u201d State v. Cunningham, 188 N.C. App. 832, 836, 656 S.E.2d 697, 700 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1 (2011). This offense does not require evidence of \u201cguilty knowledge.\u201d See McClain, 240 N.C. at 175, 81 S.E.2d at 367. Therefore, Officer Parker\u2019s testimony was not relevant to show knowledge of illegality.\nSecond, identity was not at issue in the instant case. Defendant does not contest that he was sitting in the passenger seat of the car stopped by Officer Hill on 20 November 2010. See State v. Pace, 51 N.C. App. 79, 83, 275 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1981) (holding that when the defendant in a rape case admitted he had intercourse but alleged it was consensual, identity was not at issue). Instead, Defendant argues the State did not meet its burden of proving he actually or constructively possessed the revolver. Thus, since Defendant\u2019s counsel acknowledged Defendant was present during the events of 20 November 2010, identity was not at issue here.\nThird, Officer Parker\u2019s testimony was not relevant to show a common plan or scheme because, as discussed previously, there were no unusual similarities between the events of 14 July 2010 and 20 November 2010. Instead, the only similarities were \u201ccharacteristics inherent to most crimes of that type.\u201d Carpenter, 361 N.C. at 390, 646 S.E.2d at 111 (quotation marks and citation omitted).\nIII. Prejudice\nSince I believe the trial court erred by admitting Officer Parker\u2019s testimony under Rule 404(b), I need not balance its purported probative value with the \u201cdanger of unfair prejudice\u201d under Rule 403. See Glenn, _N.C. App. at_, 725 S.E.2d at 67. However, I believe the trial court\u2019s error was prejudicial because \u201cthere is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2011); see also State v. Ferguson, 145 N.C. App. 302, 307, 549 S.E.2d 889, 893 (2001).\nIn the instant case, the State\u2019s only evidence that Defendant constructively possessed the revolver was that: (i) Officer Hill found the revolver under Defendant\u2019s seat; and (ii) Officer Parker previously arrested Defendant in an unrelated incident on 14 July 2010. The State acknowledged that the revolver was not registered to Defendant. Additionally, there was no evidence Defendant ever even touched the revolver. Given this lack of evidence, I believe there is a reasonable possibility the trial court would have reached a different result without Officer Parker\u2019s testimony.\nTo this effect, this Court has previously held that the \u201cmere fact that [a] defendant was in a car where a gun was found is insufficient standing alone to establish constructive possession.\u201d Cox,_N.C. App. at_, 721 S.E.2d at 349 (quotation marks and citation omitted)(alteration in original); see also State v. Clark, 159 N.C. App. 520, 525, 583 S.E.2d 680, 683 (2003); State v. Alston, 131 N.C. App. 514, 519, 508 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1998), superseded by statute on other grounds. \u201cWhere a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.\u201d In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). Here, without Officer Parker\u2019s testimony, the only evidence linking Defendant to the revolver is that Officer Hill found the weapon under Defendant\u2019s seat. Therefore, absent Officer Parker\u2019s testimony, there is a reasonable possibility the trial court would have reached a different result. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443 (2011).\nIn conclusion, I believe the instant case represents precisely the type of scenario Rule 404 seeks to remedy. Officer Parker\u2019s testimony provided little probative value for any permissible Rule 404(b) rationale. Instead, its main purpose was to show that because Defendant had previously been arrested for the crimes at issue, he has a propensity for those crimes. Rule 404 expressly rejects this purpose. See N.C. R. Evid. 404(b) (\u201cEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.\u201d). The United States Supreme Court further elaborates that:\n[t]he inquiry [into character] is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.\nMichelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). Here, the trial court \u201cden[ied] [Defendant] a fair opportunity to defend\u201d against his charges. Id. Therefore, because the trial court should have excluded Officer Parker\u2019s testimony for lack of similarity, I would have vacated and remanded for new trial.\n. I acknowledge that only four months separate the events of 14 July 2010 and 20 November 2010. However, I do not base my dissent on the Rule 404(b) \u201ctemporal proximity\u201d requirement. Instead, I focus solely on lack of similarity. See Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 154, 567 S.E.2d at 123 (describing temporal proximity and similarity as two separate requirements).\n. At trial, Agent Tanya Pallotta, a special agent and forensic scientist with the North Carolina State Crime Lab, testified that the revolver under Defendant\u2019s seat did not have any latent fingerprints.\n. Defendant was also convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. This offense does have a specific intent component. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-269(a1) (2011) (making it unlawful to \u201cwillfully and intentionally\u201d carry a concealed weapon); see also State v. Sauls, 199 N.C. 193, 154 S.E. 28 (1930) (holding that this requirement equates to criminal intent to conceal). Therefore, Officer Parker\u2019s testimony may have had limited probative value to show intent to conceal. However, since I believe the trial court should have excluded Officer Parker\u2019s testimony under Rule 404(b) for lack of similarity, I decline to balance this minor probative value with Rule 403 prejudice.\n. In fact, defense counsel repeatedly acknowledged at trial that Defendant was present during the events of 20 November 2010. For instance, when cross-examining Officer Hill, defense counsel asked: (i) \u201cDid you ever at any time notice Mr. Howard moving about the compartment in a way that alarmed you?\u201d; and (ii) \u201cit came to your knowledge [that Mr. Howard] was impaired by alcohol[?]\u201d Similarly, defense counsel asked Officer Carpenter about his supervision of Defendant while he was in custody.\n. \u201cActual or constructive possession\u201d is an element of \u201cpossession of a firearm by a felon.\u201d See State v. Cox,_N.C. App._,_, 721 S.E.2d 346, 348-49. Additionally, our courts have equated the \u201ccarrying\u201d aspect of \u201ccarrying a concealed weapon\u201d with actual or constructive possession. See State v. Best,_N.C. App._,_, 713 S.E.2d 556, 561 (2011).\n. At trial, the State introduced into evidence a firearms trace summary showing the revolver was last reported purchased by Charles Lamar Williams, Jr. in Charlotte in 1975. The summary did not indicate the revolver had ever been reported stolen.\n. In Cox, the defendant was a passenger in a car at a DWI checkpoint. Id. at_, 721 S.E.2d at 347. The driver pulled into a nearby driveway to avoid the checkpoint. Id. When police approached the car, they found a revolver in the nearby grass. Id. at_, 721 S.E.2d at 348. The defendant admitted he owned the gun and was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon. Id. at_, 721 S.E.2d at 349.\nIn that case, we first noted that \u201cthe State may not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of a defendant to prove his or her guilt; other corroborating evidence is needed to convict for a criminal offense.\u201d Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We then reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon because:\n[t]he mere fact that [a] defendant was in a car where a gun was found is insufficient standing alone to establish constructive possession. Thus, the mere fact that [a] defendant was in a car next to where a gun was found is not enough to establish constructive possession.\nId. (quotation marks and citation omitted)(second alteration in original).", "type": "dissent", "author": "\u25a0HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brent D. Kiziah, for the State.", "Bryan Gates for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MASON JAMEL HOWARD\nNo. COA 12-996\nFiled 18 June 2013\nAppeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 no objection at trial \u2014 no argument on appeal \u2014 dismissed\nDefendant\u2019s appeal in a possession of a firearm by a felon and carrying a concealed weapon case arguing that the trial court erred by admitting an officer\u2019s testimony concerning defendant\u2019s prior acts was dismissed. Defendant failed to object under Rule 404(b) at trial, and failed to argue under Rule 403 on appeal.\nJudge HUNTER, Jr., dissents in a separate opinion.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 February 2012 by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Cabarrus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 January 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brent D. Kiziah, for the State.\nBryan Gates for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0103-01", "first_page_order": 113, "last_page_order": 127 }