{ "id": 4220710, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SCOTT ALLEN FISHER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Fisher", "decision_date": "2013-08-06", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1404", "first_page": "463", "last_page": "477", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 N.C. App. 463" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638109, 12638110 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0591-01", "/se2d/643/0591-02" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637346 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 S.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642284 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/668/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3735709, 3746742, 3747631 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0371-03", "/nc/361/0371-01", "/nc/361/0371-02" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3744223 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568202, 8568236, 8568172, 8568112, 8568149 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0296-04", "/nc/289/0296-05", "/nc/289/0296-03", "/nc/289/0296-01", "/nc/289/0296-02" ] }, { "cite": "151 S.E. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564471 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 S.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "citing Luther v. Contracting Co., 268 N.C. 636, 642, 151 S.E. 2d 649, 653-54 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553213 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321", "parenthetical": "citing Luther v. Contracting Co., 268 N.C. 636, 642, 151 S.E. 2d 649, 653-54 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 S.E. 2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710863 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "citing Odom, 307 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E. 2d at 378-79, and quoting State v. Black, 308 N.C. 736, 741, 303 S.E. 2d 804, 806-07 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696125 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "citing Odom, 307 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E. 2d at 378-79, and quoting State v. Black, 308 N.C. 736, 741, 303 S.E. 2d 804, 806-07 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L. Ed. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 S. Ct. 381", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6468801, 6468547, 6469476, 6468711, 6469608, 6469353, 6468967, 6468624, 6468240, 6468465, 6469044, 6468343, 6469144, 6469246 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/1018-07", "/us/459/1018-04", "/us/459/1018-13", "/us/459/1018-06", "/us/459/1018-14", "/us/459/1018-12", "/us/459/1018-08", "/us/459/1018-05", "/us/459/1018-01", "/us/459/1018-03", "/us/459/1018-09", "/us/459/1018-02", "/us/459/1018-10", "/us/459/1018-11" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S. Ct. 381, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" }, { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S. Ct. 381, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" }, { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S. Ct. 381, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154240 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S. Ct. 381, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 S. Ct. 96", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 840", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9118465, 9118499, 9118373, 9118213, 9118315, 9118412, 9118254, 9118191, 9118352, 9118287, 9118166, 9118236, 9118269, 9118143 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0840-13", "/us/534/0840-14", "/us/534/0840-11", "/us/534/0840-04", "/us/534/0840-09", "/us/534/0840-12", "/us/534/0840-06", "/us/534/0840-03", "/us/534/0840-10", "/us/534/0840-08", "/us/534/0840-02", "/us/534/0840-05", "/us/534/0840-07", "/us/534/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135908 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 S.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Hardy, 353 N.C. 122, 131, 540 S.E.2d 334, 342 (2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 840, 122 S. Ct. 96, 151 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683", "parenthetical": "holding that, in a case in which the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter based on an accidental shooting which occurred while the defendant was hunting, the trial court erred by denying the defendant's request for an instruction concerning foreseeability" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521769 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "717 S.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "711 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486024 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 S.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 195, 376 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 L. Ed. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 S. Ct. 378", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "718 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "other citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560126 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68", "parenthetical": "other citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31", "parenthetical": "quoting Williams v. Boulerice, 268 N.C. 62, 68, 149 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1966) (other citations omitted)" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535497 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771-72", "parenthetical": "quoting Williams v. Boulerice, 268 N.C. 62, 68, 149 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1966) (other citations omitted)" }, { "page": "771-72" }, { "page": "771-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686938 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "citing State v. McGill, 314 N.C. 633, 637, 336 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54033 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "citing State v. McGill, 314 N.C. 633, 637, 336 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 S.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161365 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Robledo, 193 N.C. App. 521, 525, 668 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2008)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. App. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3821770 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374-75", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Robledo, 193 N.C. App. 521, 525, 668 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2008)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/210/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 S.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168856 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 S.E.2d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Lowry, 198 N.C. App. 457, 465, 679 S.E.2d 865, 870, cert. denied, 363 N.C. 660, 686 S.E.2d 899 (2009)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151610 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327-28", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0322-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1430, "char_count": 38214, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.369138703753311e-08, "percentile": 0.3368215675894618 }, "sha256": "e8daccdf3045dac6e73bfcd6260c01b89dd9e0e58a6daf47b64eea4e7dbb737c", "simhash": "1:a39a4223d67d1672", "word_count": 6243 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:27.138557+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SCOTT ALLEN FISHER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nDefendant Scott Allen Fisher appeals from a judgment sentencing him to a term of 19 to 23 months imprisonment based upon his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence and committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that \u201cforeseeability was an essential element of proximate cause where the decedent froze to death.\u201d After careful consideration of Defendant\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s judgment in light of the record and the \u00e1pplicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s judgment should remain undisturbed.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\n1. State\u2019s Evidence\nSixteen year old Michael Scott Rogers died on or about 20 February 2010 after attending a party hosted by Defendant at the residence in which he lived with his parents. Krista Rickards, who had known Defendant for several years, was at the party with several of her friends. Although she was under-aged, Ms. Rickards consumed mixed drinks at the party. Another guest, eighteen year old Brittany Phillipson, recalled that the guests were drinking and using marijuana in addition to \u201cpills and other stuff.\u201d\nAccording to Ms. Rickards, Mr. Rogers was \u201cvery intoxicated\u201d and belligerent, telling his fellow guests that he had been in two mental institutions and that he was addicted to drugs. While she was at the party, Ms. Phillipson saw Mr. Rogers on the floor and bleeding as a result of the fact that Defendant had \u201ckicked or stomped\u201d his face. At the time of her departure, Ms. Phillipson noticed that Mr. Rogers was \u201ckind of coming in and out of consciousness\u201d and that one of her friends was cleaning his face.\nAt around 11:00 p.m., Mr. Rogers made two calls to his mother. During the first call, his speech was slurred and he asked for his mother and stepfather, Robert Leonard, to come pick him up. At the time that he called back a few minutes later, Mr. Rogers was crying. When Ms. Leonard asked him where he was, Mr. Rogers replied \u201cI don\u2019t know. They done beat the hell out of me. I\u2019m laying here and I\u2019m bleeding all over, and I just pray to God they don\u2019t come back and kill me.\u201d After receiving this information and learning where Mr. Rogers was, Mr. Leonard arranged to pick Mr. Rogers up at Blantyre Baptist Church, which is located on Kings Road, a short distance from the site of the party and near the dividing line between Henderson and Transylvania Counties. After speaking with Mr. Rogers, Ms. Leonard called 911 and asked someone from the Sheriff\u2019s Department to meet them at the church. At about this time, the remaining guests concluded that investigating officers would soon arrive at the party and dispersed.\nThe night on which the party occurred was very cold, with temperatures in the 20s. Mr. and Ms. Leonard, as well as Mr. Rogers\u2019 father, Brian Rogers, arrived at Blantyre Baptist Church a few minutes after speaking with Mr. Rogers. However, Mr. Rogers never appeared at that location. As a result, the Leonards and Brian Rogers checked nearby houses and waited at the church for several hours.\nIn light of Mr. Rogers\u2019 failure to appear at the Blantyre Baptist Church, a number of law enforcement officers began searching for him. Sergeant Chris Hawkins of the Transylvania County Sheriffs Department spoke with someone who been guest at the party and who led him to Defendant\u2019s house, which was located about a quarter mile from Blantyre Baptist Church. At the time that he arrived at Defendant\u2019s residence, Sergeant Hawkins observed blood droplets in front of the house. In the meantime, after listening to a conversation between Mr. Rogers and a 911 dispatcher, Lieutenant Kevin Holden of the Transylvania County Sheriff\u2019s Department decided that Mr. Rogers needed to be found quickly so that he could be \u201cprovide[d with] immediate medical attention.\u201d After meeting Sergeant Hawkins at Defendant\u2019s house and examining the blood drops that Sergeant Hawkins had detected outside that structure, Lieutenant Holden determined that exigent circumstances justified the making of an entiy into the house for the purpose of determining whether Mr. Rogers was inside. Although they did not find anyone in the residence, the investigating officers did observe a bloodied towel during their attempt to find Mr. Rogers. Deputy Terrell Scruggs and Detective John Nicholson of the Transylvania County Sheriff\u2019s Department took possession of items found at Defendant\u2019s house and noted that the outside temperature was approximately 28 degrees Fahrenheit shortly before 5:00 a.m.\nAfter determining that Mr. Rogers was not in Defendant\u2019s house, Lieutenant Holden talked with Defendant\u2019s father, Shawn Fisher, by telephone and asked him to contact Defendant for the purpose of ascertaining if Defendant knew where Mr. Rogers was. A short time later, Mr. Fisher called back and reported that Defendant had told him that he had dropped Mr. Rogers off at the end of the Fisher\u2019s driveway. Although investigating officers searched the area in question, they did not find Mr. Rogers.\nAt that point, Lieutenant Holden had a second conversation with Mr. Fisher, who suggested that Defendant might be with a woman named Ashley who drove a silver Volkswagen and lived in an apartment on King Street in Brevard. As a result, investigating officers went to the King Street address, arriving shortly after 3:00 a.m. Upon arriving at the King Street apartment, they located the silver Volkswagen, upon which and in which Deputy Scruggs observed \u201cblood spatter spots\u201d and bloodstains.\nAfter entering Ashley\u2019s apartment, the investigating officers spoke with several people, including Defendant. Richard Thomas, who was one of the persons present in the apartment, told Lieutenant Holden that he had been at the party at Defendant\u2019s house; that he had gotten into a fight with Mr. Rogers; that, after the party had come to an end, they had driven Mr. Rogers a short distance; that Mr. Rogers had exited the car at the intersection of Highway 64 East and King Road and walked towards the bridge; and that the group had not seen him since that time. Defendant told Lieutenant Holden that he had been driving when Mr. Rogers left the car.\nAfter conversing with Mr. Thomas and Defendant, Sergeant Hawkins and Deputy Scruggs went to the intersection of King Road and Highway 64. At that point, the weather was \u201c[freezing cold.\u201d Upon reaching the intersection, Sergeant Hawkins searched a boat access area near Grove Bridge Road, which was just across the Henderson County line. After securing the silver Volkswagen, Lieutenant Holden joined the search.\nAt approximately 4:00 a.m., investigating officers found a broken taillight lens and more blood drops. In addition, the investigating officers observed oil near the blood spots and ascertained that the blood and oil which they discovered on the ground coincided with the locations of an oil leak and blood spots that were detected on the silver Volkswagen. Upon determining that they had crossed the county line, the investigating officers contacted Henderson County law enforcement officials. As a result, Corporal Breena Williams of the Henderson County Sheriff\u2019s Department was dispatched to the Grove Bridge boat access area at around 7:00 a.m. on 21 February 2010, at which point she collected physical evidence, including blood swabbings and pieces of a taillight lens.\nAfter agreeing to speak with investigating officers, Defendant was interviewed by Brian Kreigsman, who was, at that time, the chief detective for the Transylvania Sheriff\u2019s Department. Initially, Defendant told Detective Kreigsman that, when the party broke up, he gave Mr. Rogers a ride to the intersection of Highway 64 and King Road and that he had last seen Mr. Rogers walking from that location towards the Grove Bridge. As a result of the fact that investigating officers had found evidence at the boat access area, Detective Kreigsman challenged the truthfulness of Defendant\u2019s account. In response, Defendant \u201cadmit[ted] that, yes, they had gone to the bridge\u201d; that Defendant had been \u201cdriving the car\u201d; that, when they parked at the bridge, he \u201ccouldn\u2019t get [Mr. Rogers] out of the car\u201d; that Mr. Rogers \u201cwas spitting, wanting to fight\u201d; and that \u201cthey fought back and . . . punched and kicked him.\u201d However, Defendant claimed that Mr. Rogers \u201cwas still breathing\u201d at the time that Defendant got back into the car. In addition, Defendant provided a written statement in which he stated that \u201cI was chillin with some friends, and my next thing I know people hit [Mr. Rogers] a bunch. And we took him to the bridge and left, and I threw him out.\u201d Detective Kreigsman took \u201ca picture of [Defendant\u2019s] hand showing abrasions, bruising on his knuckles.\u201d\nIn the meantime, investigating officers continued to search for Mr. Rogers. Shortly before noon on 21 February 2010, Lieutenant Holden, while using binoculars to scan the area, saw Mr. Rogers\u2019 body, in \u201cjeans and no shirt, lying on his back in the field\u201d about a hundred yards from the boat access. The field in which Mr. Rogers\u2019 body was found was used to pasture pigs, which were precluded from interfering with his body by a guard dog. Agent Casey Drake of the State Bureau of Investigation, who assisted in the processing of the area where Mr. Rogers\u2019 body was found, observed that the field in question contained \u201cpigs of all sizes, miniature horses, [and] goats\u201d and was enclosed by two fences. An examination of Mr. Rogers\u2019 body revealed the presence of \u201cdried blood around his mouth and nose and face and bruises and scrapes all over him.\u201d\nDuring the course of their investigation, investigating officers took a statement from Ms. Rickards, who indicated that Defendant was angry at having to take Mr. Rogers to the church to meet his parents because he had been drinking and did not want to drive. Ms. Rickards spoke with Defendant by telephone several hours after the party ended, at which point he told her that \u201che had taken [Mr. Rogers] out into the middle of nowhere and beat the s**t out of him.\u201d When Ms. Rickards asked Defendant \u201cwhat he thought would happen when [Mr. Rogers] woke up, [Defendant] told [her] that he didn\u2019t know if he would.\u201d\nDr. Donald Jason, M.D., an expert in forensic pathology who performed an autopsy on Mr. Rogers\u2019 body, noted \u201cmany abrasions and bruises over [Mr. Rogers\u2019] face, chest, the back and the arms and the legs.\u201d However, Dr. Jason determined that Mr. Rogers did not have any fractures or internal injuries and characterized the abrasions and bruises as \u201csuperficial.\u201d Although toxicology reports indicated that Mr. Rogers had consumed alcohol, no traces of illegal drug use were detected. An internal examination revealed the presence of hemorrhaging to the stomach lining that was consistent with death resulting from exposure. According to Dr. Jason, Mr. Rogers \u201cdied of hypothermia\u201d \u201cbecause he was in a cold environment for a period of time[.]\u201d\n2. Defendant\u2019s Evidence\nOn 20 February 2010, Defendant was nineteen years old and lived with his parents. Defendant\u2019s parents were working out of town, so he asked some friends to come over to his residence. Defendant did not know Mr. Rogers and had not invited him to come to his home. At the time that Mr. Rogers arrived with Coley Hall, one of Defendant\u2019s friends, Mr. Rogers was acting \u201cwild.\u201d In addition, Defendant was intoxicated, having drunk about ten shots of vodka and smoked marijuana during the party.\nAs the party progressed, several female guests made complaints to Defendant about Mr. Rogers\u2019 behavior. In response to those complaints, Defendant and Mr. Thomas took Mr. Rogers aside and asked him to \u201ccalm down.\u201d At that point, Mr. Rogers became aggressive and had a brief fight with Mr. Thomas, which Defendant broke up after Mr. Rogers suffered a cut lip. Once the fight was over, Defendant took Mr. Rogers inside, cleaned his injury, and suggested that he rest in Defendant\u2019s bedroom before rejoining the party.\nAbout twenty minutes later, Mr. Rogers reappeared and announced that he had \u201ccalled the cops on you-all.\u201d Defendant was angered by Mr. Rogers\u2019 action given that he was on probation for felonious possession of marijuana. After Mr. Rogers spit in Defendant\u2019s face, Defendant \u201cthrew the first punch,\u201d at which point the two men \u201cgot into a little scuffle.\u201d As soon as Mr. Rogers fell, Defendant \u201chit him two to three more times\u201d and then \u201cgot up and walked outside.\u201d Although Defendant admitted having struck Mr. Rogers several times, he denied having kicked or stomped him in the face.\nAfter his fight with Mr. Rogers, Defendant asked everyone to leave. In light of that request, the party began to break up. Several minutes later, Mr. Rogers emerged from Defendant\u2019s house, took off his shirt, and \u201cproceeded to beat on his chest.\u201d At that time, Mr. Rogers was bleeding from the \u201clip and nose area.\u201d Although he was angry, Defendant told Mr. Rogers that he would take him home after his great-uncle \u201ccalmed [him] down.\u201d Upon receiving this information, Mr. Rogers got into a silver vehicle owned by Defendant\u2019s friend Ashley and driven by Mr. Hall. In the car, Defendant occupied the front seat while Mr. Rogers and two girls were seated in the back seat.\nAfter leaving Defendant\u2019s residence, the group traveled past Blantyre Baptist Church and turned onto King Road. As they drove down the road, Mr. Rogers was beating Defendant and Mr. Hall on the back of the head. Since Mr. Rogers wanted to get out of the car, Defendant directed Mr. Hall to drive to the boat access area near the Grove Bridge. Defendant selected this location because he knew that the area was lighted and because he was intoxicated and felt that the group was less likely to encounter law enforcement officers on a side road as compared to a principal highway.\nAs the group reached the boat access parking lot, Mr. Rogers, who was continuing to shout, got out of the car. Neither Defendant nor Mr. Hall fought with Mr. Rogers at the time they that let him out of the car. As they left the parking lot, Defendant, who had assumed responsibility for driving, backed the car into a telephone pole before taking the group to Brevard.\nSubsequently, Defendant received a phone call from his father, who inquired about Mr. Rogers\u2019 whereabouts. Defendant told his father where the group had let Mr. Rogers out of the car. Defendant denied knowing how blood got onto the car, that there was any plan to leave Mr. Rogers at Blantyre Baptist Church, conversing about the incident with Ms. Rickards, or speaking with Lieutenant Holden. However, Defendant did admit that he never called 911 in order to seek assistance for Mr. Rogers despite the fact that Mr. Rogers was intoxicated, shirtless, and had been in a fight at the time that they dropped him off at the boat access.\nAt around 11:30 p.m. on 20 February 2010, Mr. Fisher and his wife were driving their tractor-trailer rig in Pennsylvania, when Mr. Fisher received a phone call from his uncle, who lived next door to the family residence. Upon learning that there was a \u201cloud party\u201d at his residence, Mr. Fisher asked his uncle to break up the function. A few minutes later, Mr. Fisher spoke by phone with Lieutenant Holden, who told him that investigating officers were looking for Mr. Rogers. Mr. Fisher authorized investigating officers to look for Mr. Rogers in his house and then called Defendant, who told him that they had \u201cset [Mr. Rogers] out at the end of our road.\u201d\nAbout thirty minutes later, Mr. Fisher received another call from Lieutenant Holden, who told him that they had been unable to locate Mr. Rogers and asked him to contact Defendant again for the purpose of obtaining more specific directions. As a result, Mr. Fisher called Defendant and told him that the investigating officers were \u201cgetting concerned about [Mr. Rogers] and [] needed to know exactly where [the group] had set him out.\u201d At that point, Defendant told his father that they had let Mr. Rogers out of the car at the boat access. Upon obtaining this information, Mr. Fisher passed it along to Lieutenant Holden. According to Mr. Fisher, Defendant sounded intoxicated.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 19 January 2011, the Henderson County grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging Defendant with involuntary manslaughter. The charge against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 14 May 2012 criminal session of the Henderson County Superior Court. On 18 May 2012, the jury returned a verdict convicting Defendant as charged. At the conclusion of the ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court entered a judgment sentencing Defendant to a term of 19 to 23 months imprisonment. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nIn his first challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgment, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge that had been lodged against him. More specifically, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his dismissal motion on the grounds that \u201cthe evidence did not show that [Defendant] committed a culpably negligent act or omission that proximately caused [Mr. Rogers] to freeze to death.\u201d We do not find this argument persuasive.\n1. Standard of Review\nThe standard of review utilized in reviewing challenges to the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence is well established:\nWhen reviewing a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court determines whether the State presented substantial evidence in support of each element of the charged offense. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate, or would consider necessary to support a particular conclusion. In this determination, all evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State receives the benefit of every reasonable inference supported by that evidence. The defendant\u2019s evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not to be taken into consideration, except when it is consistent with the State\u2019s evidence, the defendant\u2019s evidence may be used to explain or clarify that offered by the State. Additionally, a substantial evidence inquiry examines the sufficiency of the evidence presented but not its weight, which is a matter for the jury. Thus, if there is substantial evidence \u2014 whether direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014 to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\u201d\nState v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 327-28, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). \u201cWhen reviewing a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, this Court determines only whether there is substantial evidence of (1) each essential element of the offense charged and of (2) the defendant\u2019s identity as the perpetrator of the offense. Whether the evidence presented at trial is substantial evidence is a question of law for the court.\u201d State v. Miles,_N.C. App_,_, 730 S.E.2d 816, 822 (2012) (citing State v. Lowry, 198 N.C. App. 457, 465, 679 S.E.2d 865, 870, cert. denied, 363 N.C. 660, 686 S.E.2d 899 (2009)), and State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651-52 (1982)), aff'd, _ N.C. _, _ S.E.2d _, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 342 (2013). \u201cAppellate review of a denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is de novo.\u201d State v. Boozer, 210 N.C. App. 371, 374-75, 707 S.E.2d 756, 761 (2011) (citing State v. Robledo, 193 N.C. App. 521, 525, 668 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2008)), disc. review denied,_N.C._, 720 S.E.2d 667 (2012). We will now proceed to apply this standard of review in evaluating Defendant\u2019s challenge to the denial of his dismissal motion.\n2. Correctness of Trial Court\u2019s Ruling\n\u201cThe elements of involuntary manslaughter are: (1) an unintentional killing; (2) proximately caused by either (a) an unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not ordinarily dangerous to human life, or (b) culpable negligence.\u201d State v. Hudson, 345 N.C. 729, 733, 483 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1997) (citing State v. McGill, 314 N.C. 633, 637, 336 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1985)). \u201cProximate cause is a cause that produced the result in continuous sequence and without which it would not have occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence could have foreseen that such a result was probable under all the facts as they existed. Foreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause. This does not mean that the defendant must have foreseen the injury in the exact form in which it occurred, but that, in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected. State v. Powell, 336 N.C. 762, 771-72, 446 S.E.2d 26, 31 (1994) (quoting Williams v. Boulerice, 268 N.C. 62, 68, 149 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1966) (other citations omitted)). The ultimate issue raised by Defendant\u2019s challenge to the denial of his dismissal motion is whether the record contains sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant committed a culpably negligent act which proximately resulted in Mr. Rogers\u2019 death.\nThe record, when considered in the light most favorable to the State, contains evidence from which a reasonable jury might find (1) that Defendant became angry at Mr. Rogers during his party and \u201ckicked or stomped\u201d his face, leaving Mr. Rogers semi-conscious; (2) that Defendant was irritated that Mr. Rogers had arranged to meet his parents at Blantyre Baptist Church and at the necessity for him to be involved in taking Mr. Rogers there; (3) that, instead of taking Mr. Rogers at the church to meet his parents, Defendant drove Mr. Rogers to an isolated parking area at the boat access, at which point he \u201cbeat the s**t out of\u2019 Mr Rogers; (4) that Defendant abandoned Mr. Rogers at the boat access despite knowing that the temperature was in the 20s and that Mr. Rogers had been beaten, was intoxicated, and was not wearing a shirt; (5) that Defendant realized that his actions had placed Mr. Rogers in jeopardy, as evidenced by his statement to Ms. Rickards that he did not think Mr. Rogers would wake up and by his statement to Detective Kreigsman that Mr. Rogers was \u201cstill breathing\u201d when Defendant left him at the boat access area; and (6) that, even after being directly informed by his father that Mr. Rogers was missing and that investigating officers were concerned about him, Defendant lied about where he had last seen Mr. Rogers, effectively hindering the efforts being made to locate Mr. Rogers and to obtain medical assistance for him. We have no difficulty in concluding that the record contains sufficient evidence to permit a determination that Defendant\u2019s actions were culpably negligent and that \u201c[Defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected.\u201d Powell, 336 N.C. at 771-72, 446 S.E.2d at 31. As a result, we conclude that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the submission of the issue of Defendant\u2019s guilt of involuntary manslaughter to the jury.\nIn seeking to persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion, Defendant argues that, while he \u201cmay have struck, punched, and kicked\u201d Mr. Rogers, his assault on Mr. Rogers did not constitute a \u201cculpably negligent act\u201d because the \u201cblows did not cause the death.\u201d Although Mr. Rogers did not die as the result of the injuries that he received during the assault that Defendant committed upon him, this fact does not justify a decision to overturn the trial court\u2019s judgment given that the culpably negligent act which Defendant committed and which led to Mr. Rogers\u2019 death was his action in putting Mr. Rogers out of the car in an injured, intoxicated, and under-clothed condition on a very cold night. Similarly, Defendant\u2019s contention that, despite the fact that he \u201clet [Mr. Rogers] out of the car on a very cold night and left him at the river access knowing that [Mr. Rogers] was intoxicated and knowing he was not wearing a shirt,\u201d \u201cit was not reasonably foreseeable [that Mr. Rogers] would wander into a muddy pig field and die of hypothermia,\u201d is not persuasive given that Defendant\u2019s argument overlooks the fact that the foreseeability requirement \u201cdoes not mean that the defendant must have foreseen the injury in the exact form in which it occurred[.]\u201d Id. Although Defendant might not have foreseen that his decision to leave Mr. Rogers outside on a cold night in an injured, intoxicated, and partially clothed condition would result in his death, it is hard to reach any conclusion other than that some injury to Mr. Rogers was foreseeable, if not almost preordained, in light of that decision.\nThe deficiency in the logic upon which Defendant relies is illustrated in our recent decision in State v. Pierce,_N.C. App_, 718 S.E.2d 648 (2011), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 560, 723 S.E.2d 769, cert. denied,_U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 378, 184 L. Ed. 2d 223 (2012), in which the defendant drove away from a law enforcement officer\u2019s attempt to initiate a traffic stop. Another officer, who responded to the original officer\u2019s radio request for assistance, lost control of his car and died as a result of injuries sustained in a crash while driving to the assistance of his colleague. Defendant was convicted, among other things, of second degree murder as a result of his involvement in this incident. On appeal, Defendant argued that \u201cthere was insufficient evidence that his flight from [the original law enforcement officer] was the proximate cause of [the assisting officer\u2019s] death.\u201d We rejected this argument, stating that:\n[T]he evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, shows that [Defendant] fled from [the arresting officer\u2019s] attempted lawful stop[;] . . . that [the assisting officer] . . . sped to provide assistance and apprehend [Defendant]; [and] that on his way, [the assisting officer] . .. perished after unsuccessfully attempting to avoid [an] obstruction. In our view, this evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude (1) that [the assisting officer\u2019s] death would not have occurred had [Defendant] remained stopped after [the arresting officer] pulled him over, and (2) that an injurious result such as [the assisting officer\u2019s] death was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances. . . . [W]e overrule [Defendant\u2019s] argument that... there was insufficient evidence to show that [Defendant\u2019s] flight proximately caused [the assisting officer\u2019s] death.\nPierce,_N.C. App at_, 718 S.E.2d at 652-53. As a result, we held in Pierce that the State did not need to prove that it was foreseeable that another officer would decide to assist the original arresting officer and then die in a vehicular accident while coming to that other officer\u2019s aide in order for a guilty verdict to be properly returned; instead, we only required that it be foreseeable that \u201can injurious result,\u201d such as the assisting officer\u2019s death, was foreseeable. On the basis of similar logic, we conclude that \u201can injurious result\u201d such as Mr. Rogers\u2019 death from hypothermia or some similar injurious result was reasonably foreseeable as a result of Defendant\u2019s decision to leave Mr. Rogers at the boat access area under the circumstances described above.\nAlthough Defendant cites several cases in his brief addressing the sufficiency of the evidence of a defendant\u2019s guilt of involuntary manslaughter, each of these decisions involves accidental conduct on the part of the defendant, such as the defendant\u2019s involvement in a hunting accident. The present record is, however, devoid of any indication that Mr. Rogers\u2019 death stemmed from accidental or unintentional conduct on Defendant\u2019s part. Instead, the State\u2019s evidence tends to show that Mr. Rogers\u2019 death resulted from intentional conduct, including Defendant\u2019s decisions to beat Mr. Rogers until he was semi-conscious; to leave him at an isolated location in freezing weather and in an injured, intoxicated, and shirtless condition; and to lie to the investigating officers who were searching for Mr. Rogers. In other words, the culpable negligence that underlies Defendant\u2019s conviction stems from intentional, rather than unintentional, conduct on Defendant\u2019s part. Thus, we do not find cases addressing death caused by inadvertent or accidental actions to be particularly relevant, much less controlling, in addressing the issue that Defendant has brought forward for our consideration. As a result, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the submission of the issue of Defendant\u2019s guilt of involuntary manslaughter to the jury and that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant\u2019s dismissal motion.\nB. Foreseeability Instruction\nSecondly, Defendant argues that the trial court \u201ccommitted plain error by failing to instruct the jury that foreseeability was an essential element of proximate cause[.]\u201d More specifically, Defendant contends that \u201cthe court\u2019s failure to instruct the jury that foreseeability was an element of proximate cause is error so fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of justice and error which probably resulted in the jury reaching a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached.\u201d We do not believe that Defendant\u2019s argument has merit.\n\u201c \u2018A trial judge is required ... to instruct the jury on the law arising on the evidence. This includes instruction on the elements of the crime. . . . Failure to instruct upon all substantive or material features of the crime charged is error.\u2019 \u201d State v. Aguilar-Ocampo,_N.C. App _, _, 724 S.E.2d 117, 124 (2012) (quoting State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 195, 376 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1989)). As Defendant correctly observes, \u201c \u2018[fjoreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Leonard,_N.C. App_,_, 711 S.E.2d 867, 871 (quoting Powell at 771-72, 446 S.E.2d at 31), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 353, 717 S.E.2d 746 (2011). For that reason, a trial judge should, as a general proposition, incorporate a foreseeability instruction into its discussion of the issue of proximate cause when the record reflects the existence of a genuine issue as to whether the injury which resulted from a defendant\u2019s allegedly unlawful conduct was foreseeable. See State v. Hall, 60 N.C. App. 450, 455, 299 S.E.2d 680, 683 (1983) (holding that, in a case in which the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter based on an accidental shooting which occurred while the defendant was hunting, the trial court erred by denying the defendant\u2019s request for an instruction concerning foreseeability).\nAt trial, Defendant did not request an instruction concerning the foreseeability issue or object to the absence of a foreseeability instruction from the trial court\u2019s jury charge. In cases in which \u201ca defendant fails to request an instruction, \u2018we will review the record to determine if the instruction constituted plain error. . . .\u2019 \u201d State v. Ramseur,_N.C. App_, _, 739 S.E.2d 599, 606 (2013) (quoting State v. Hardy, 353 N.C. 122, 131, 540 S.E.2d 334, 342 (2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 840, 122 S. Ct. 96, 151 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2001)), disc. review denied,_N.C._,_S.E.2d_, 2013 N.C. Lexis 605 (2013). \u201cFor error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that. . . after examination of the entire record, the error \u2018had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u2019 \u201d State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S. Ct. 381, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)).\nThe plain error rule applies only in truly exceptional cases. Before deciding that an error by the trial court amounts to \u201cplain error,\u201d the appellate court must be convinced that absent the error the jury probably would have reached a different verdict. In other words, the appellate court must determine that the error in question \u201ctilted the scales\u201d and caused the jury to reach its verdict convicting the defendant. Therefore, the test for \u201cplain error\u201d places a much heavier burden upon the defendant than that imposed by N.C. [Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 15A-1443 upon defendants who have preserved their rights by timely objection.\nState v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E. 2d 80, 83 (1986) (citing Odom, 307 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E. 2d at 378-79, and quoting State v. Black, 308 N.C. 736, 741, 303 S.E. 2d 804, 806-07 (1983)). As a result of the fact that Defendant did not request the trial court to instruct the jury on the foreseeability issue or object to the omission of such an instruction from the trial court\u2019s charge, we review Defendant\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s instructions using a plain error standard of review.\nAn outcome is foreseeable when \u201ca person of ordinary prudence would reasonably have foreseen [it] as the probable consequence of his acts.\u201d Bogle v. Power Co., 27 N.C. App. 318, 321, 219 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1975) (citing Luther v. Contracting Co., 268 N.C. 636, 642, 151 S.E. 2d 649, 653-54 (1966)), disc. review denied, 289 N.C. 296, 222 S.E.2d 695 (1976). As we have previously discussed, the foreseeability component of the proximate cause requirement \u201cdoes not mean that the defendant must have foreseen the injury in the exact form in which it occurred, but that, in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected.\u201d Powell, 336 N.C. at 771-72, 446 S.E.2d at 31. At trial, Defendant admitted that he had fought with Mr. Rogers. In addition, the undisputed evidence established that Defendant left Mr. Rogers at a relatively isolated boat access late at night in below-freezing weather despite his knowledge that Mr. Rogers was bleeding, intoxicated, and shirtless. Even if the jury chose not to believe the evidence tending to show that Defendant had \u201ckicked or stomped\u201d Mr. Rogers\u2019 face and that he opined that Mr. Rogers might never \u201cwake up,\u201d we conclude that the State presented overwhelming evidence tending to show that Defendant \u201cmight have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected.\u201d Id. In addition, given the substantial and largely uncontradicted evidence tending to show that Defendant\u2019s actions were culpably negligent and the overwhelming evidence tending to show that \u201csome injurious result\u201d was foreseeable as a result of Defendant\u2019s conduct, we conclude that it is not probable that the jury would have reached a different result had a proper foreseeability instruction been given. As a result, Defendant has failed to establish that the omission of a discussion of the issue of foreseeability from the trial court\u2019s instructions constituted plain error, so Defendant is not entitled to relief based on this argument.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that neither of Defendant\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s judgment have merit. As a result, the trial court\u2019s judgment should, and hereby does, remain undisturbed.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STROUD concur.\n. Although Defendant argues both that his conduct was not culpably negligent and that his conduct was not a proximate cause of Mr. Rogers\u2019 death, the essential thrust of his argument with respect to both of these issues is that Mr. Rogers\u2019 death was not a foreseeable consequence of his conduct. As a result, Defendant ultimate makes only one, instead of two, arguments in support of his challenge to the denial of his dismissal motion.\n. As an aside, we note that the record contains evidence tending to show that Defendant did in fact foresee the possibility that the consequences of his actions would result in Mr. Rogers\u2019 death given his statement to Ms. Rickards that he did not think that Mr. Rogers would \u201cwake up.\u201d\n. In addition, Defendant directs our attention to cases from other jurisdictions addressing manslaughter charges that had been lodged against a defendant in a variety of factual contexts. \u201c[T]hese cases from other jurisdictions are certainly not controlling on this Court,\u201d Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 126, 638 S.E.2d 203, 212 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 371, 643 S.E.2d 591 (2007), and we are not persuaded by their holdings that Defendant is entitled to relief given the well-established principles of North Carolina law discussed in the text.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jason T Campbell, for the State.", "Duncan B. McCormick for Defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SCOTT ALLEN FISHER\nNo. COA12-1404\nFiled 6 August 2013\n1. Homicide \u2014 involuntary manslaughter \u2014 culpable negligence\u2014 foreseeability\nThere was sufficient evidence for foreseeability in an involuntary manslaughter prosecution where, after a party, defendant left the injured, intoxicated, and partially clothed victim outside on a cold night. Defendant might not have foreseen that his action would result in the victim\u2019s death, but some injury to the victim was foreseeable.\n2. Homicide \u2014 involuntary manslaughter \u2014 instructions\u2014foreseeability omitted \u2014 no plain error\nThere was no plain error in an involuntary manslaughter prosecution where the trial court did not instruct the jury that foreseeability was an essential element of proximate cause, but the State presented overwhelming evidence of foreseeability and it was not probable that the jury would have reached a different result had a proper instruction been given.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 May 2012 by Judge Bradley B. Letts in Henderson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 April 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jason T Campbell, for the State.\nDuncan B. McCormick for Defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0463-01", "first_page_order": 473, "last_page_order": 487 }