{ "id": 4221679, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEFFERY JAMES BARRETT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Barrett", "decision_date": "2013-08-06", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1530", "first_page": "655", "last_page": "669", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 N.C. App. 655" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633560 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 468-69, 349 S.E.2d 566, 573-74 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "\"A clerical error is '[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake ... in writing or copying something on the record, and not from judicial reasoning or determination.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168425 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95", "parenthetical": "\"A clerical error is '[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake ... in writing or copying something on the record, and not from judicial reasoning or determination.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731290 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "709 S.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "731 S.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding inconsistences and contradictions between trial testimony and testimony admitted for purposes of corroboration to be minor and insignificant, not prejudicial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529593 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding inconsistences and contradictions between trial testimony and testimony admitted for purposes of corroboration to be minor and insignificant, not prejudicial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" }, { "page": "86-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569170 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" }, { "page": "632" }, { "page": "632-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518569 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8319426 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 468-69, 349 S.E.2d 566, 573-74 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155594 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2403141 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 S.E.2d. 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" }, { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "citation and brackets omitted" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151348 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" }, { "page": "704" }, { "page": "704" }, { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154240 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516-17", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0506-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1092, "char_count": 30428, "ocr_confidence": 0.73, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1397226247553429 }, "sha256": "ae5fb91dac4622389288cb26e9766204dd5a69b5775a413e332f7926ee67dda4", "simhash": "1:c32b22ec32e60dfb", "word_count": 5054 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:27.138557+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge DAVIS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEFFERY JAMES BARRETT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nWhere the victim\u2019s pre-trial statements were admitted to corroborate her trial testimony and generally tracked her trial testimony, we find no error. Where the fact that law enforcement had a record of defendant\u2019s date of birth as a result of prior unrelated arrests was admitted into evidence, we find no prejudicial error. Where there is no indication the trial court committed a clerical error in its written judgment precluding defendant from residing with his minor children, we overrule defendant\u2019s argument. However, we remand for correction of a clerical error on the special conditions of probation form where the trial coxirt failed to mark the box indicating that a reportable conviction involved the sexual abuse of a minor.\nOn 3 December 2009, defendant Jeffery James Barrett was arrested and subsequently indicted on charges of taking indecent liberties with a child and giving fortified wine to a person under twenty-one years of age. A trial commenced in Union County Superior Court during the session beginning 20 August 2012, the Honorable Anna M. Wagoner, Judge presiding.\nAt trial, the State presented evidence which showed that on 21 August 2009, the victim, a fifteen year old girl named Lucy, was living with her adoptive mother and two older foster brothers in Wingate, N.C. One of the foster brothers was defendant Jeffery Barrett, who was thirty-nine years old.\nOn 21 August 2009, defendant invited Lucy to watch a ballgame at Walter Bickett Stadium in Monroe, N.C. When they arrived at the ballpark around 9:30 p.m., the game had ended. Defendant then drove to a gas station/convenience store and purchased an apple-flavored drink that he shared with Lucy. Lucy testified the beverage tasted like alcohol and made her feel \u201c[w]oozy.\u201d Defendant then drove Lucy to Dickerson Park, an area with which Lucy was unfamiliar. At the park, defendant told Lucy \u201cI want to show you something.\u201d Defendant lowered the back of Lucy\u2019s car seat and started to kiss her neck. Defendant repeated \u201cI want to show you something[.]\u201d Lucy testified that when she asked what it was, defendant touched her breast and rubbed her vagina, through her clothing. Lucy testified that she asked him to stop more than two times, but defendant continued. Defendant then told Lucy he wanted to lick her, at which point Lucy pushed defendant off of her and ran from the car, out of the park. Lucy ran until she came to a police station, which she found locked, then continued running until she came to a convenience store.\nA store clerk, Estella Segura, testified that she was working at the Sunoco gas station on Franklin Street in Monroe during the evening of 21 August 2009. She identified Lucy as the young woman who came into the store that evening.\nA. She came in - I guess she was running because she came in fast through the door. She was shaky, she was kind of like - looked like she was crying.\nQ. Did she seem upset?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Did she talk to you?\nA. Not too much. She just - what she said - she just told me what - what she - what happened....\nShe said her brother had tried to rape her.\nSegura called the police. Detective Katherine Hower with the Monroe Police Department received a call from the police communications center reporting a possible rape shortly before midnight. Det. Hower responded to the call, and spoke with Lucy at the convenience store and then again at the police station. Detective Hower testified to the events that occurred that night as they were related to her by Lucy.\nDetective Shannon Huntley, an officer in the Monroe Police Department who was assigned to the juvenile investigations unit, also interviewed Lucy and testified to statements Lucy made during the interview. Det. Huntley related that Lucy was enrolled in a school curriculum for exceptionally challenged children - \u201cchildren who either are handicapped or have cognitive disabilities or typically are lower functioning individuals.\u201d Det. Huntley testified that on 21 August 2009, Lucy was fifteen years old and defendant was thirty-nine years old.\nFollowing the presentation of the State\u2019s evidence, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of giving fortified wine to a person less than twenty-one years old. Defendant did not present any evidence. Following the close of all the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of taking indecent liberties with a child. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and sentenced defendant to an active term of seventeen to twenty-one months. The trial court then suspended the sentence and placed defendant on supervised probation for a period of thirty months, including special conditions. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant raises the following issues: (I) whether the trial court committed plain error by admitting prior statements made by Lucy for corroboration; (II) whether defendant was prejudiced by the admission of a reference to his prior unrelated arrests; and (III) whether a clerical error was made on defendant\u2019s judgment and commitment order.\nI\nFrst, defendant argues the trial court committed plain error by admitting prior statements made by the victim for corroboration where they directly contradicted trial testimony, added significant new evidence, and were offered for the truth of the matter asserted. We disagree.\nStandard of Review\nAt trial, the prosecutor for the State questioned store clerk Estelle Segura, Det. Hower, and Det. Huntley each about statements Lucy made on the night of 21 August 2009 or during the ensuing investigation. Defendant objected to each question as calling for a hearsay response. The trial court overruled each objection, allowing the witness to testify for purposes of providing corroboration. Following the testimony, defendant failed to object and move to strike the testimony on the basis of inconsistent or contrary testimony that failed to corroborate Lucy\u2019s trial testimony.\nNow, on appeal, defendant argues that the testimony admitted for purposes of corroboration directly contradicts Lucy\u2019s trial testimony, adds significant new evidence, and was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Because this argument against the admission of trial testimony was not presented before the trial court, we review it only for plain error.\n[T]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done, or where the error is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused, or the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial or where the error is such as to seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings or where it can be fairly said the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\nState v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 516-17, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (citation and quotations omitted) (original emphasis).\nAnalysis\n\u201cCorroborative testimony is testimony which tends to strengthen, confirm, or make more certain the testimony of another witness.\u201d State v. Williams, 363 N.C. 689, 703, 686 S.E.2d. 493, 503 (2009) (citation and quotations omitted). \u201cTo this end, trial judges in this state generally have wide discretion in admitting evidence which they determine to be helpful to a jury appraisal of credibility.\u201d State v. Stills, 310 N.C. 410, 415, 312 S.E.2d 443, 446 (1984) (citation omitted). \u201cIt is well established that a witness\u2019 prior consistent statements may be admitted to corroborate the witness\u2019 sworn trial testimony but prior statements admitted for corroborative purposes may not be used as substantive evidence.\u201d State v. Gell, 351 N.C. 192, 204, 524 S.E.2d 332, 340 (2000). \u201cIf the testimony offered in corroboration is generally consistent with the witness\u2019s testimony, slight variations will not render it inadmissible. Such variations affect only the credibility of the evidence which is always for the jury.\u201d Williams, 363 N.C. at 704, 686 S.E.2d at 503 (citation and brackets omitted).\n\u201cOur prior statements are disapproved to the extent that they indicate additional or \u2018new\u2019 information, contained in the witness\u2019s prior statement but not referred to in his trial testimony, may never be admitted as corroborative evidence.\u201d State v. Locklear, 172 N.C. App. 249, 256, 616 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2005) (quoting State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 468-69, 349 S.E.2d 566, 573-74 (1986)). Our North Carolina Supreme Court has held that allowing admission of prior statements that vary from witness testimony is not error if the two accounts \u201cgenerally tracked [each other] and [were] not contrary to or inconsistent with [each other].\u201d Williams, 363 N.C. at 704, 686 S.E.2d at 503.\nDefendant cites State v. Burton, 322 N.C. 447, 368 S.E.2d 630 (1988); Stills, 310 N.C. 410, 312 S.E.2d 433; and State v. Fowler, 270 N.C. 468, 155 S.E.2d 83 (1967), as cases where the admission of a witness\u2019s out of court statements held inconsistent with a witness\u2019s trial testimony resulted in prejudicial error compelling a new trial.\nIn Burton, the defendant claimed that he shot two men in the defense of another who was being beaten while pinned to the ground. 322 N.C. 447, 368 S.E.2d 630. At trial, the State\u2019s witness testified that one of the defendant\u2019s victims was positioned on top of a man, trying to strike that man in the face when the defendant fired his gun. Id. at 449, 368 S.E.2d at 631. The State also admitted over objection following a voir dire an audio recording of the witness\u2019s statement to police made shortly after the shooting. In his statement to police, the witness reported that the defendant\u2019s victim was \u201cflat down on his back\u201d when he was shot. Id. at 449, 368 S.E.2d at 632. The Court reasoned that the witness\u2019s recorded police statement contradicted rather than corroborated his trial testimony, and moreover, the defendant was prejudiced by the error of admission as his only defense was that he acted in the defense of another. Id. at 451, 368 S.E.2d at 632-33.\nIn Stills, the defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with a minor and first-degree sexual offense. 310 N.C. 410, 312 S.E.2d 443. Two witnesses testified against the defendant on the basis of firsthand observation. The State also called six witnesses to give corroborating testimony. Over objection, some \u201ccorroborating\u201d witnesses testified to out-of-court statements made by other corroborating witnesses: in other words they were allowed \u201cto corroborate, the corroboration.\u201d Id. at 413, 312 S.E.2d at 445. The Court held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting \u201ccorroborative\u201d testimony that not only did not corroborate but in some instances contradicted the substantive testimony and introduced new evidence. Id. at 416, 312 S.E.2d at 447. The Court reasoned that while corroborating testimony could be corroborated, introducing hearsay statements \u201cthree or four times removed from the original declarant under the guise of corroborating the corroborative witness [was] unacceptable.\u201d Id.\nIn Fowler, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. 270 N.C. 468, 155 S.E.2d 83. At trial, one witness testified to observing the defendant shoot a police officer following a scuffle for the officer\u2019s gun. The State also called another officer who took the witness\u2019s statement after the shooting. Id. at 470, 155 S.E.2d at 85. The testimony of the officer-witness admitted for the purpose of corroboration, indicated that the defendant pointed the gun at the officer and told the officer that \u201che was sorry but he had to do this.\u201d Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that the officer witness\u2019s testimony expressed \u201cdeliberation and a pre-fixed purpose to kill\u201d which not only did not corroborate, but contradicted the other witness\u2019s trial testimony The Court determined that the erroneous admission of this out of court statement may have been the difference between a sentence of life in prison and the death penalty, and therefore, the defendant was granted a new trial. Id. at 471, 155 S.E.2d at 86-87.\nHere, defendant challenges as non-corroborative certain testimony by Det. Hower and Det. Huntley, each of whom related statements Lucy made to that officer during the police investigation.\nLucy testified that after she and defendant left the baseball field at Walter Bickett Stadium, defendant drove to a convenience store.\nA. Well, after he took me to the ballgame and everybody was leaving, then he drove to the store.\nQ. Okay, to - when you say a store, is it like a gas station store?\nA. A convenience store.\nDet. Hower interviewed Lucy the night of 21 August 2009. At trial, Det. Hower gave the following testimony regarding what Lucy had stated to her on that night.\nWhen they arrived at the ballgame, it was \u00e1pparent that it was over; everybody was coming out of the ballgame. So he promised her that he\u2019d take her to the next ballgame. At that time she stated that they rode around and he stopped at two different stores. They stopped at Morgan Mill Shell and at Five Points, which is close to the vicinity of where she was at at that time when I picked her up. She said he went into the store and purchased beer and something that tasted like apple juice.\nDet. Huntley testified that Lucy stated to her that \u201c[t]he ballgame was over. After the ballgame, they had ridden around and stopped at several convenience stores.\u201d Although the testimony of Det. Hower was more expansive, we do not find the testimony of Det. Hower or Det. Huntley to be contrary to Lucy\u2019s trial testimony.\nDefendant also challenges whether Det. Huntley\u2019s testimony describing the park corroborates Lucy\u2019s testimony. Lucy described the park defendant drove her to as follows:\nQ. Can you describe the park to us?\nA. No, I can\u2019t.\nQ. Okay. Was it - did it have houses around it?\nA. No.\nQ. Did it have any other type of building?\nA. No.\nQ. Do you remember if it had a swing set or any type of play set?\nA. Yeah.\nQ. What did it have?\nA. It had a swing set.\nQ. Do you remember, was it dark?\nA. Yes, it was dark.\nQ Could you see house lights or building lights around it?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Okay. So there was some type of building that you could at least see the lights [of] the park?\nA. Yeah.\nQ. Okay. Do you remember, was it heavy with trees? I mean was it pretty foresty [sic] or was it more like a yard?\nA. It was more like a yard.\nQ. Okay. Do you remember anything else from the park - bridge; any type of bridge or?\nA. No.\nDet. Hower testified that in her interview with Lucy, Lucy described the park defendant took her to after the convenience store.\n[S]he was a little unsure of the park, so I had [Lucy] describe the park to me. [Lucy] described the park as being - having a ball field, it had picnic tables, it had a fence, but then it had a gate with buses. She also described it having a small bridge that you could walk over. Now, since I work that area, I knew that that sounded like Dickerson Park.\nWhile Det. Hower\u2019s testimony provided additional facts in describing the park, including the existence of a bridge which Lucy did not remember during her trial testimony, Det. How\u00e9r\u2019s testimony was not contrary to or inconsistent with Lucy\u2019s trial testimony.\nDefendant also challenges what he argues is an inconsistency between Lucy\u2019s testimony regarding defendant\u2019s position in the car at the time of the assault and the testimony of Det. Huntley. Lucy testified that she sat on a swing at the park and then told defendant she was ready to go home. She asked if she could drive.\nQ. ... So after he agreed to let you drive, you got back in the car?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And where were you sitting?\nA. In the driver\u2019s seat.\nQ. Okay. And where was the defendant?\nA. In the passenger seat.\nQ. Okay. And what happened at that point, once you got in the car?\nA. He let the seat back.\nQ. Okay. The - you mean like where your back is?\nA. Yeah.\nQ. So you kind of laid down a bit more?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Okay. And you said he started kissing on your neck?\nA. Yes.\nDet. Huntley testified as follows regarding Lucy\u2019s statement: \u201cShe said that they had went to the park, and then had proceeded to say [sic] that he told her that she could drive. And she got into the passenger seat. He reached over, laid the seat down....\u201d\nDespite the inconsistency between Lucy\u2019s testimony and Det. Huntley\u2019s testimony as to which seat Lucy occupied in the vehicle, Det. Huntley\u2019s testimony regarding the sequence of events occurring in the vehicle generally tracked Lucy\u2019s trial testimony and was not contrary to nor inconsistent in any significant way with Lucy\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant further argues that there was an inconsistency between Lucy\u2019s testimony and Det. Huntley\u2019s corroborating testimony regarding whether defendant was intoxicated.\nQ. Okay. [Lucy], that night when the defendant picked you up at your house, do you know, had he been drinking?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And was he acting in a way that indicated to you that he was drunk based upon your prior experiences with him?\nA. No.\nQ. No, he didn\u2019t.\nA. No.\nQ. So how do you know he was drunk?\nA. Because I could smell it on his breath.\nDet. Huntley testified, as follows: \u201cAnd she also said that in addition to what Detective Hower had written in her report, she had stated that Mr. Barrett -- she thought in her opinion that Mr. Barrett was under the influence of alcohol or that he was drunk.\u201d\nWe have reviewed all of defendant\u2019s challenges to the testimony of the corroborating witnesses and find that all of the challenges are to minor inconsistencies. See State v. Quarg, 334 N.C. 92, 431 S.E.2d 1 (1993) (finding inconsistences and contradictions between trial testimony and testimony admitted for purposes of corroboration to be minor and insignificant, not prejudicial). These inconsistences are far removed from those found to be the basis for prejudicial error in Burton, Stills, and Fowler. Further, as we have noted in Williams, \u201cslight variations . . . affect only the credibility of the evidence which is always for the jury.\u201d Williams, 363 N.C. at 704, 686 S.E.2d at 503 (citation omitted). Defendant\u2019s arguments are overruled.\nII\nDefendant next argues that testimony by a witness for the State referring to defendant\u2019s previous arrests served only to show a propensity for criminal conduct and thus was a violation of Rule 404(b). Defendant further contends that based on his previous argument - that the State\u2019s case-in-chief was comprised of inconsistent testimony - there is a reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different verdict had the testimony regarding defendant\u2019s prior arrests not been improperly admitted. We disagree.\nDefendant argues that the testimony admitted into evidence against him violated Rule 404(b) of our Rules of Evidence and was \u201c[i]mproperly admitted evidence of prior bad acts [and] is inherently prejudicial.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2011) (stating in part that \u201c[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.\u201d).\nCiting State v. Davis,_ N.C. App._, 731 S.E.2d 236 (2012), and State v. Gray,_N.C. App._, 709 S.E.2d 477 (2011), as cases where this Court has held that there existed a reasonable possibility of a different verdict had improperly admitted evidence been excluded at trial, defendant asserts that as in Gray, Lucy\u2019s \u201ctestimony was inconsistent internally and as presented over time through statements the child made to others who testified at trial.\u201d Defendant argues that testimony given by Det. Huntley indicating that he had prior arrests \u201cbolstered the State\u2019s hearsay evidence over [Lucy\u2019s] actual testimony and, consequently, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it not been improperly admitted.\u201d\nWe note for the record that the challenged evidence was not admitted as 404(b) evidence, but offered as proof of defendant\u2019s age. Defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of the General Statutes, section 14-202.1. Among other elements, the State had to prove-that defendant was \u201c16 years of age or more and at least five years older than the child in question[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1 (2011). In attempting to establish defendant\u2019s age, the following exchange took place between the prosecutor and Det. Huntley:\nQ. Okay. And what did you know his date of birth to be?\n[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor; hearsay, no foundation.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ll sustain -\nQ. Okay, what if - you said you obtained a warrant for the defendant\u2019s arrest. What if anything happened next?\nA. The warrant went into the police system and it wasn\u2019t until later that Mr. Barrett was arrested for the offense.\nQ. Okay. How did you get the defendant\u2019s information?\nA. Mr. Barrett was already in the police system.\nQ. Okay.\nA. From prior arrests.\nQ. Okay. And what was the date of birth -\n[Defense counsel]: I\u2019d ask that be stricken, Your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nQ. What - based upon the information that you gathered from the defendant, what was the date of birth that you discovered in his information?\nA. January 1st of 1970.\nQ. How old was Mr. Barrett on August 21st, 2009?\nA. Thirty-nine.\nQ. How old was [Lucy]?\nA. Fifteen.\nQ. That\u2019s twenty-four years older; is that correct?\nA. Yes, ma\u2019am.\nEven presuming that the admission of Det. Huntley\u2019s testimony indicating that the Monroe Police Department had a record of defendant\u2019s date of birth \u201c[f]rom prior arrests\u201d could be considered 404(b) evidence, it was clearly admissible to show a fact other than defendant\u2019s character. See e.g., State v. Weaver, 318 N.C. 400, 348 S.E.2d 791 (1986). Further, we also, find unpersuasive defendant\u2019s argument that there is a reasonable possibility the jury\u2019s guilty verdict on the charge of taking indecent liberties with Lucy would have been affected had the testimony been struck from the jury\u2019s consideration. There was no indication given of the nature of defendant\u2019s acts which resulted in arrest and no indication defendant had been convicted. Moreover, the detail shared by Lucy in her testimony describing the assault by defendant, along with the testimony given by Segura, Det. Hower, and Det. Huntley, was sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. Therefore, we do not find a reasonable possibility that, had the challenged testimony by Det. Huntley not been admitted, the jury would have reached a different result. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument is overruled.\nIII\nNext, defendant argues the trial court made a clerical error that creates a conflict between the trial court\u2019s oral ruling and its written judgment. Defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s ruling announced in open court allowed him to reside with his minor children while the written judgment specifies that defendant \u201cnot reside in a household with... any minor child.\u201d We disagree.\nFollowing the announcement of the jury verdict finding defendant guilty of taking indecent liberties with a child, the trial court sentenced defendant to an active term of seventeen to twenty-one months. The trial court then suspended defendant\u2019s sentence and placed him on supervised probation for a period of thirty months. We note that the crime of taking indecent liberties with a minor, as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.1, is a sexually violent offense pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5) (2011) and thus a \u201creportable conviction\u201d pursuant to section 14-208.6(4).\nPursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-1343, \u201cConditions of probation,\u201d\na defendant who has been convicted of an offense which is a reportable conviction as defined in G.S. 14-208.6(4), or which involves the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor, must:\n(4) Not reside in a household with any minor child if the offense is one in which there is evidence of sexual abuse of a minor.\n(5) Not reside in a household with any minor child if the offense is one in which there is evidence of physical or mental abuse of a minor, unless the court expressly finds that it is unlikely that the defendant\u2019s harmful or abusive conduct will recur and that it would be in the minor child\u2019s best interest to allow the probationer to reside in the same household with a minor child.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2) (2011) (entitled \u201cSpecial Conditions of Probation for Sex Offenders and Persons Convicted of Offenses Involving Physical, Mental, or Sexual Abuse of a Minor\u201d).\nIn announcing the provisions of defendant\u2019s probation, the trial court questioned defendant about his children:\nTHE COURT: He is to abide by all the rules and regulations of the sex offender control program - how old are your children?\nMR. BARRETT: Twenty-one, eighteen, seventeen, thirteen, seven, and six.\nTHE COURT: Does the State contend he should have no contact with the children under the age of eighteen unless -\nTHE COURT: It appears that he is Static 99 - form has been conformed and that he\u2019s found to be a low risk for reoffending. Anything further as to that?\nMS. SULLIVAN: No, Your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Yes, sir.\nMR. STERMER: Yes, because of that, Your Honor, we would ask that he be allowed to have contact - under the statute, as I understand, he can\u2019t have contact with any minor under eighteen years of age. We\u2019d ask that the Court make the only exception for his children.\nTHE COURT: You have any argument with that?\nMS. SULLIVAN: No, Your Honor, I\u2019ll leave it to your discretion.\nTHE COURT: Okay. And I will modify -- note that he is the father - you have eight children in all?\nJEFFERY JAMES BARRETT: Six.\nTHE COURT: Six children?\nJEFFERY JAMES BARRETT: Yes, ma\u2019am.\nTHE COURT: Four that are under the age of eighteen; is that correct?\nTHE COURT: Four children under the age of eighteen with whom he resides; is that correct? Do you live with them?\nMR. STERMER: Two of them.\nJEFFERY JAMES BARRETT: Two of them.\nTHE COURT: That the Court will modify the special conditions for sex offenders to allow him to have contact with his four natural children.\nIn the judgment entered, the trial court found that defendant was convicted of a reportable conviction as defined by G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(4) and pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2) (Conditions for probation) must \u201c[n]ot reside in a household with any minor child.\u201d [R. 39]. But, in its judgment under the heading \u201cSpecial Conditions of Probation - G.S. 15A-1343(b1), 143B-704(c),\u201d the trial court \u201callow[ed] contact with [defendant\u2019s] natural childrenf.]\u201d\nTo the extent that defendant contends the trial court ordered that he be allowed to reside with his minor children, we find no support for this in the record and therefore, overrule the argument.\nIn response to defendant\u2019s argument, the State contends that the trial court made a clerical error in selecting physical or mental abuse, as opposed to sexual abuse, on the judgment form Mandatory Special Conditions for Sex Offenders and Persons Convicted of Offenses Involving Physical, Mental, or Sexual Abuse of a Minor. We note that on the first page of the judgment form suspending defendant\u2019s felony sentence and imposing probation, the trial court checked box number 8, finding that defendant\u2019s offense involved both the physical or mental abuse and the sexual abuse of a minor. On the judgment form mandating special conditions for sex offenders, the trial court selected only the box indicating defendant\u2019s offense involved the physical or mental abuse of a minor, and failed to also select the box indicating the offense involved the sexual abuse of a minor. Therefore, we remand this matter for correction of a clerical error, failing to check the box on the Mandatory Special Conditions for Sex Offenders and Persons Convicted of Offenses Involving Physical, Mental, or Sexual Abuse of a Minor form indicating that defendant\u2019s offense involved the sexual abuse of a minor, in accordance with the trial court\u2019s findings on page one of the judgment. State v. Lark, 198 N.C. App. 82, 95, 678 S.E.2d 693, 702 (2009) (\u201cA clerical error is \u2018[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake ... in writing or copying something on the record, and not from judicial reasoning or determination.\u201d (citation omitted)).\nNo error at trial; remanded for correction of clerical error.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge DAVIS concur.\n. A pseudonym has been used to protect the identity of the victim.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Olga Vysotskaya, for the State.", "Andrew L. Farris for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEFFERY JAMES BARRETT\nNo. COA12-1530\nFiled 6 August 2013\n1. Evidence \u2014 prior statements \u2014 corroboration\u2014minor inconsistencies\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in an indecent liberties with a child case by admitting prior statements made by the victim for corroboration. The prior statements generally tracked her trial testimony, all of the challenges were to minor inconsistencies, and slight variances went to the weight of the evidence.\n2. Evidence \u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 defendant\u2019s date of birth from prior unrelated arrest\nThe trial court did not commit prejudicial error in an indecent liberties with a child case by admitting into evidence law enforcement\u2019s record of defendant\u2019s date of birth as a result of prior unrelated arrests. There was no reasonable possibility that had the challenged testimony by a detective not been admitted, the jury would have reached a different result\n3. Probation and Parole \u2014 special conditions of probation form\u2014 clerical error \u2014 reportable conviction involving sexual abuse of minor\nThere was no indication the trial court committed a clerical error in its written judgment precluding defendant from residing with his minor children in an indecent liberties with a child case. However, the case was remanded for correction of a clerical error on the special conditions of probation form where the trial court failed to mark the box indicating that a reportable conviction involved the sexual abuse of a minor.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 22 August 2012 by Judge Anna M. Wagoner in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 April 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Olga Vysotskaya, for the State.\nAndrew L. Farris for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0655-01", "first_page_order": 665, "last_page_order": 679 }