{ "id": 4245554, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GLORIA TATUM-WADE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Tatum-Wade", "decision_date": "2013-08-20", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1568", "first_page": "83", "last_page": "95", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 N.C. App. 83" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639123 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 S.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641442 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0922-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559299 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "727 S.E.2d 691", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4354575 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532706, 2528068, 2529860, 2528941, 2532657 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0553-04", "/nc/335/0553-01", "/nc/335/0553-03", "/nc/335/0553-05", "/nc/335/0553-02" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521444 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "690 S.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4174430 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 L.Ed.2d 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6401314, 6402245, 6401509, 6401607, 6401417, 6401772, 6401682, 6401879, 6401980, 6402110 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0948-01", "/us/409/0948-10", "/us/409/0948-03", "/us/409/0948-04", "/us/409/0948-02", "/us/409/0948-06", "/us/409/0948-05", "/us/409/0948-07", "/us/409/0948-08", "/us/409/0948-09" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571065 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564130 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "674 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4166535 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L.Ed.2d 505", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 987", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 602016, 600769, 600610, 599844, 602404, 600329, 599178, 601002, 600829, 602256, 602064, 600950, 602010, 599549, 602335 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0987-04", "/us/484/0987-06", "/us/484/0987-11", "/us/484/0987-10", "/us/484/0987-07", "/us/484/0987-03", "/us/484/0987-13", "/us/484/0987-15", "/us/484/0987-14", "/us/484/0987-05", "/us/484/0987-12", "/us/484/0987-02", "/us/484/0987-09", "/us/484/0987-01", "/us/484/0987-08" ] }, { "cite": "821 F.2d 1247", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1699967 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/821/1247-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154240 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L.Ed.2d 688", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 1060", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 326529, 323907, 327877, 327333, 327243, 326827, 324312, 327121, 325502, 324920, 327705, 324314, 328443, 326558, 327743 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/1060-08", "/us/516/1060-10", "/us/516/1060-01", "/us/516/1060-02", "/us/516/1060-07", "/us/516/1060-11", "/us/516/1060-12", "/us/516/1060-06", "/us/516/1060-14", "/us/516/1060-09", "/us/516/1060-13", "/us/516/1060-05", "/us/516/1060-03", "/us/516/1060-15", "/us/516/1060-04" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant was not prejudiced by erroneous exclusion of character evidence in light of \"all of the other evidence\" presented at trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790122 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant was not prejudiced by erroneous exclusion of character evidence in light of \"all of the other evidence\" presented at trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L.Ed.2d 558", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 1143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11783808, 11784289, 11784417, 11784224, 11783652, 11784004, 11783912, 11784492, 11784082, 11783730, 11784149, 11784630, 11784568, 11784349, 11783870 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/1143-03", "/us/517/1143-10", "/us/517/1143-12", "/us/517/1143-09", "/us/517/1143-01", "/us/517/1143-06", "/us/517/1143-05", "/us/517/1143-13", "/us/517/1143-07", "/us/517/1143-02", "/us/517/1143-08", "/us/517/1143-15", "/us/517/1143-14", "/us/517/1143-11", "/us/517/1143-04" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790255 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 L.Ed.2d 760", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "552 U.S. 1319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3738089 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4355312 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. Evid. 403" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2526731 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704-05", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. Evid. 403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "840 N.E.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that evidence of \"the 'trusting nature' of a person\" would constitute \"character evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "445 Mass. 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 2822483 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that evidence of \"the 'trusting nature' of a person\" would constitute \"character evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/445/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 M.J. 1", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "M.J.", "case_ids": [ 3529135 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2" }, { "page": "3" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "5-6" }, { "page": "6" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "8-9" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mj/23/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 192", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221945 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "\"Willfulness,... in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.\"" }, { "page": "630", "parenthetical": "\"Willfulness,... in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159228 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "961 F.2d 1417", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1863087 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1419", "parenthetical": "conducting de novo review of whether \"district court improperly excluded testimony from two character witnesses\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/961/1417-01" ] }, { "cite": "725 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "holding that \"questions of relevance\" are \"reviewed de novo\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. Evid. 401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568804 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. Evid. 404(a)(1)" }, { "page": "751", "parenthetical": "\"[I]n order to be admissible as a 'pertinent' trait of character, the trait must bear a special relationship to or be involved in the crime charged.\"" }, { "page": "749", "parenthetical": "holding that \"character trait of law-abidingness\" was pertinent in trafficking prosecution" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486024 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-236", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(7)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)(7)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1216, "char_count": 30661, "ocr_confidence": 0.718, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.33985359764217915 }, "sha256": "25b5fa9ef9de8361f3a49f8ad2530e19aa5992e57e91ea446a1fddaf4616048e", "simhash": "1:071010e966ff316c", "word_count": 4895 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:07:10.338246+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GLORIA TATUM-WADE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "DAVIS, Judge.\nGloria Tatum-Wade (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals her convictions for seven counts of attempting to evade or defeat the imposition or payment of North Carolina\u2019s individual income tax. After careful review, we find no prejudicial error.\nFactual Background\nThe State presented evidence at trial tending to establish the following facts: Prior to 1995, defendant filed federal and North Carolina income tax returns for 27 years. Beginning in 1995, defendant and her (now late) husband, William Wade (\u201cWade\u201d), started attending conventions put on by the organizations \u201cWe, the People\u201d and \u201cSovereign Citizens Patriot.\u201d At one of these conventions, it was represented to Wade and defendant that they could obtain an exemption from paying income tax by completing a set of documents labeled \u201cForm 1776 Codicil\u201d and filing them with the Internal Revenue Service (\u201cIRS\u201d). They purchased the packet of materials, completed the Form 1776 Codicil, and mailed a copy of it to the IRS. They also registered a copy with the Guilford County Register of Deeds.\nIn January 2003, defendant began a new job teaching at a public high school in Guilford County. As part of the hiring process, defendant completed an NC-4 Employee Withholding Allowance Certificate. Defendant wrote on the form that she was \u201cexempt\u201d from having North Carolina income tax withheld from her pay. No taxes were withheld from defendant\u2019s wages for the years 2003 through 2010.\nOn 18 June 2010, the North Carolina Department of Revenue (\u201cDOR\u201d) sent defendant a letter indicating that her taxes were delinquent. Defendant responded with a letter stating that in 1995 she had submitted the Form 1776 Codicil to the IRS and, three months later, received a letter indicating that she was \u201cfree from paying taxes to the federal government.\u201d Defendant further explained that while she had recently moved and could not find a copy of her letter from the IRS purporting to show her tax-exempt status, she did have a copy of the Form 1776 Codicil. Defendant included a copy of that document with her letter to DOR.\nOn 2 May 2011, defendant was interviewed by DOR Special Agents Charles Nische, Jr. (\u201cSpecial Agent Nische\u201d) and Nancy Yokley (\u201cSpecial Agent Yokley\u201d). During the conversation, defendant told the agents that she had not paid state income tax since 1995. She also identified herself as being a member of the organizations \u201cSovereign Citizens Patriot\u201d and \u201cWe, the People.\u201d Defendant told Special Agents Nische and Yokley that she had gone to several of those organizations\u2019 meetings and had watched some of their internet-based presentations. When the agents asked defendant about the Form 1776 Codicil, she explained that it was her \u201capplication\u201d for obtaining tax-exempt status.\nDefendant was subsequently charged with seven counts of tax evasion under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-236(a)(7) for the tax years 2004 through 2010. Defendant pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence, and the motion was denied.\nDefendant testified on her own behalf. She stated that in 1995, she and Wade attended several conventions put on by the organizations \u201cWe, the People\u201d and \u201cSovereign Citizens Patriot.\u201d At one such meeting, various speakers introduced themselves as attorneys, accountants, or former IRS employees and indicated that they could help people apply for an exemption from having to pay individual income tax. Defendant and Wade were told that the exemption was \u201clegal\u201d and that if their applications were accepted, they would no longer have to pay income tax. Defendant testified that she trusted this advice, purchased the packet including the Form 1776 Codicil, and completed the application process.\nAccording to defendant\u2019s testimony, approximately three months after she submitted the Form 1776 Codicil to the IRS, she received a letter on IRS letterhead stating that it had reviewed her application and determined that she was no longer required to pay income tax. Based on this letter, defendant stopped having income tax withheld from her pay. After being contacted by DOR, defendant hired a tax service to determine whether she had a \u201cproblem.\u201d Defendant eventually learned that the \u201cexemption\u201d was not legal and had the tax service prepare and file tax returns for her that encompassed the tax years 2006 through 2010.\nAt trial, defendant also called several character witnesses who testified that she was an honest, truthful, and law-abiding person. At the close of all the evidence, defendant renewed her motion to dismiss the charges against her. The trial court denied the motion.\nThe jury found defendant guilty on all seven counts of tax evasion. The trial court sentenced defendant to a presumptive-range term of six to eight months imprisonment for one count, consolidated the remaining six counts into one judgment, and imposed a second, consecutive term of six to eight months imprisonment. The court then suspended the sentences, placed defendant on supervised probation for 36 months, and ordered her to pay a $1,500 fine and $8,754 in restitution. Defendant appealed to this Court.\nAnalysis\nI. Character Evidence of Defendant\u2019s Trusting Nature\nDefendant\u2019s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in excluding opinion testimony by Dr. Yardley Hunter (\u201cDr. Hunter\u201d), one of defendant\u2019s friends and colleagues, regarding defendant\u2019s trusting nature. Although we agree that the trial court\u2019s exclusion of this testimony constituted error, we conclude that it was not prejudicial error.\nA. Exclusion of Opinion Testimony\nOn direct examination, Dr. Hunter testified that she had worked closely with defendant at the high school at which they both taught and that she was also defendant\u2019s friend outside of work. Dr. Hunter was permitted to testify that, in her opinion, defendant was a truthful, honest, and law-abiding citizen.\nAt the end of Dr. Hunter\u2019s testimony before the jury, following an unrecorded bench conference, defense counsel requested a voir dire examination of Dr. Hunter. During the voir dire, defense counsel asked her whether she had an \u201copinion about [defendant\u2019s] character trait for her being a trusting person of others, in general, versus a skeptical person of others[.]\u201d Dr. Hunter responded, in pertinent part, as follows: \u201c[Defendant] trusts people without challenging them. She\u2019s open to them. She believes in people. She believes in what they say. She\u2019s not gullible.\u201d After considering Dr. Hunter\u2019s voir dire testimony, the trial court excluded the evidence, citing Rules 401 and 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.\nDefendant contends that Dr. Hunter\u2019s testimony was admissible under Rule 404(a), which provides, in relevant part, as follows:\n(a) Character evidence generally. \u2014 Evidence of a person\u2019s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:\n(1) Character of accused.- \u2014 Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same[.]\nN.C. R. Evid. 404(a)(1).\nOur Supreme Court has held that \u201cRule 404(a) is a general rule of exclusion, prohibiting the introduction of character evidence to prove that a person acted in conformity with that evidence of character.\u201d State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 201, 376 S.E.2d 745, 751 (1989). However, as an exception to this general rule of exclusion, Rule 404(a)(1) \u201cpermits the accused to offer evidence of a \u2018pertinent trait of his character\u2019 as circumstantial proof of his innocence.\u201d Id. (quoting N.C. R. Evid. 404(a)(1)).\nThe Supreme Court has further explained that \u201c \u2018pertinent\u2019 in the context of Rule 404(a)(1) is tantamount to relevant.\u201d State v. Squire, 321 N.C. 541, 547, 364 S.E.2d 354, 358 (1988). Thus, the key determination concerning admissibility under Rule 404(a)(1) is whether the evidence of the trait \u201cwould \u2018make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action\u2019 more or less probable than it would be without evidence of the trait.\u201d Id. at 548, 364 S.E.2d at 358 (quoting N.C. R. Evid. 401). See also Bogle, 324 N.C. at 201, 376 S.E.2d at 751 (\u201c[I]n order to be admissible as a \u2018pertinent\u2019 trait of character, the trait must bear a special relationship to or be involved in the crime charged.\u201d) (emphasis in original).\nRelevance is a question of law, and, as such, the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(a)(1) is reviewed de novo. See State v. Houseright,_N.C. App._,_, 725 S.E.2d 445, 448 (2012) (holding that \u201cquestions of relevance\u201d are \u201creviewed de novo\u201d), see also United States v. Diaz, 961 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1992) (conducting de novo review of whether \u201cdistrict court improperly excluded testimony from two character witnesses\u201d).\nDefendant was charged with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-236(a) (7), which makes it unlawful for any person to \u201cwillfully attempt[]... in any manner to evade or defeat a tax or its payment....\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-236(a)(7) (2011) (emphasis added). In the context of tax offenses, the term \u201cwillfulness\u201d means \u201cto purposely commit an offense in violation of a known legal duty.\u201d State v. Howell, 191 N.C. App. 349, 354, 662 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2008); accord Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201, 112 L.Ed.2d 617, 630 (1991) (\u201cWillfulness,... in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.\u201d).\nDefendant contends that her character trait of being trusting of others was pertinent to whether she willfully attempted to evade paying taxes. The crux of her defense, she argues, was that she believed the representations made to her by the sellers of the Form 1776 Codicil that the purported tax exemption was legal and thus she had a good faith - albeit mistaken - belief that she was exempt from having to pay state income tax. As such, she contends that the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Hunter\u2019s testimony regarding this character trait.\nAlthough neither party cites to any North Carolina appellate decision addressing whether a defendant\u2019s trusting nature may be a trait pertinent to the crime charged, defendant does direct our attention to United States v. Elliott, 23 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1986), in which the United States Court of Military Appeals addressed this precise issue. In Elliott, the defendant, a member of the United States Air Force, was charged with stealing two government-owned televisions. Id. at 2. During the criminal investigation, the defendant maintained that the televisions had been given to him as a gift by another servicemember that defendant had recently met and who could not be located. Id. During the court-martial proceeding, defense counsel attempted to introduce evidence through character witnesses that \u201c [the defendant] is a trusting person, that he trusts other people in general.\u201d Id. at 3. The military judge excluded the evidence, and the defendant appealed his convictions. Id. at 4.\nOn appeal, the court concluded\nthat the accused\u2019s trusting nature as to other people was \u201cpertinent\u201d in th[e] case. The defense theory at trial was that another person, who may or may not himself have stolen the TVs, gave the accused both sets and that the accused had no reason to believe that they were not then his own. Contrariwise, the prosecution\u2019s theory was that [the accused] had stolen both television sets himself, had sold one, and had kept the other. With the case in this posture, it could fully be expected that the [jurors] would ask themselves, in weighing the accused\u2019s story, \u201cWhat kind of person would innocently accept two working television sets as gifts from someone he had only recently met - is that really believable?\u201d In other words, the reasonableness of the accused\u2019s stoiy obviously was squarely in issue; and equally obviously, the accused\u2019s trusting nature of other people - that is, taking them and what they say and do at face value - was directed to this issue in dispute and legitimately tended to prove the defense version of how [the accused] had come into possession of the television sets.\nId. at 5-6.\nSimilarly, here, defendant openly admitted to not paying individual income tax when questioned by Special Agents Nische and Yokley about her delinquent tax status. Defendant maintained throughout the investigation that she believed she was not required to pay income tax because, by filing the Form 1776 Codicil with the IRS, she had \u201ctake[n] advantage of [an] exception in the law[.]\u201d In contrast, the State\u2019s theory of the case was that defendant was a \u201ctax protestor,\u201d and that \u201cher statements, her filings, every action that she\u2019s ever taken are of a tax protestor....\u201d\nGiven these opposing theories of the case, defendant\u2019s allegedly trusting nature was pertinent to the issue of willfulness under \u00a7 105-236(a)(7). See Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 830 n.13, 840 N.E.2d 939, 947 n.13 (Mass. 2006) (noting that evidence of \u201cthe \u2018trusting nature\u2019 of a person\u201d would constitute \u201ccharacter evidence\u201d). As such, we conclude that Dr. Hunter\u2019s excluded opinion testimony on this subject was admissible under Rule 404(a)(1). See Bogle, 324 N.C. at 199, 376 S.E.2d at 749 (holding that \u201ccharacter trait of law-abidingness\u201d was pertinent in trafficking prosecution). The trial court, therefore, erred by excluding this portion of Dr. Hunter\u2019s testimony on relevancy grounds.\nThe trial court also excluded Dr. Hunter\u2019s opinion testimony under Rule 403 due to its \u201ccumulative\u201d nature. Rule 403 \u201cprovides that evidence, although relevant, \u2018may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed ... by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u2019 \u201d State v. Barton, 335 N.C. 696, 704-05, 441 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1994) (quoting N.C. R. Evid. 403). A trial court\u2019s ruling under Rule 403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130, 726 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012). Under this standard, a trial court\u2019s ruling may not be overturned on appeal unless the ruling is \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason\u201d or is \u201cso arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 447, 648 S.E.2d 788, 794 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1319, 170 L.Ed.2d 760 (2008).\nHere, the trial court considered the evidence of defendant\u2019s trusting nature to be cumulative because defendant, through the testimony of Dr. Hunter and other witnesses, had already presented evidence of \u201c[defendant] loving and trusting her husband . . . and [of the fact] that she loved her family, and the family was first.\u201d The trial court\u2019s articulation of its rationale for excluding the evidence suggests that it misunderstood the purpose for which defendant sought to offer Dr. Hunter\u2019s opinion testimony regarding her character trait for trusting others. The evidence of defendant\u2019s trusting nature was not offered to show that she trusted her husband or that she valued her familial relationships but, rather, to show that defendant was trusting of individuals whom she did not know - \u201ctaking them and what they say and do at face value ....\u201d Elliott, 23 M.J. at 6.\nOur review of the trial transcript reveals that Dr. Hunter\u2019s proffered testimony would have been the only evidence regarding defendant\u2019s character trait for being trusting of others. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence as being cumulative under Rule 403.\nB. Harmless Error\nAlthough we conclude that the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Hunter\u2019s testimony, defendant must nevertheless demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the exclusion of the evidence in order to receive a new trial as aresult of the trial court\u2019s error. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2011). \u201cTo establish prejudice based on evidentiary rulings, [the] defendant bears the burden of showing that a reasonable possibility exists that, absent the error, a different result would have been reached.\u201d State v. Lynch, 340 N.C. 435, 458, 459 S.E.2d 679, 689 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143, 134 L.Ed.2d 558 (1996).\nIn attempting to demonstrate prejudice, defendant, once again, relies on Elliott. In addressing the issue of prejudice resulting from the exclusion of the evidence of the defendant\u2019s trusting nature in Elliott, the Court of Military Appeals observed that although the defendant had been allowed to testify as to his version of how he came into possession of the missing television sets, the government \u201cthroughout the trial made a consistent and sometimes strident effort to disparage the likely credibility of [the defendant\u2019s] explanation.\u201d Elliott, 23 M.J. at 8.\nAgainst these attacks, the court noted that the defendant\nhad no more with which to defend himself than his own credibility, manifested by his demeanor on the stand, and testimony that he was an honest person. It cannot be doubted that the believability of [the accused] \u2019s story explaining his possession of the stolen property would have been enhanced if the [trial] judge had not erroneously excluded all this evidence that he is a trusting person who takes others and their actions at face value without questioning motives when other people might do so[.]\nId. at 8-9. Consequently, the court concluded that \u201c[t]he existence of prejudice [was] clear.\u201d Id. at 9.\nAnalogizing to Elliott, defendant contends that \u201cthe State went to some lengths to disparage [her] testimony,\u201d attack her credibility, and undermine the \u201cbelievability of her account . . . .\u201d Unlike in Elliott, however, the jury in the present case was not limited to assessing the believability of defendant\u2019s story based solely on her own testimony. To the contrary, the jury heard from several witnesses - besides defendant herself - whose testimony bore directly on her state of mind - that \u2022 is, whether she genuinely believed that she was exempt from paying income tax.\nFirst, Norma Matto (\u201cMatto\u201d), a mortgage loan originator, testified on defendant\u2019s behalf. Matto testified that she had met with defendant about obtaining a loan to purchase a new home. During the qualification process, Matto told defendant that she would need copies of defendant\u2019s tax returns to determine her eligibility. In response, defendant told Matto that she believed, based on a letter she had received from the IRS, that she was exempt from having to file income tax returns and, for this reason, she did not have any returns to give Matto. Matto further testified that (1) defendant was \u201copen and confident in [her] belief\u201d that \u201cshe was exempt from paying taxes\u201d; and (2) nothing about defendant\u2019s demeanor suggested that she was \u201cbeing evasive in any way[.]\u201d\nSimilarly, Ruthmarie Mitchell (\u201cMitchell\u201d), an assistant principal at the school at which defendant taught, also testified as a character witness for defendant. After testifying that, in her opinion, defendant was an honest, truthful, and law-abiding person, Mitchell was asked on cross-examination whether there was anything that would change her opinion about defendant\u2019s character. In response, the following exchange occurred:\nA. Not of Ms. Wade\u2019s character. No.\nQ. If I told you that she\u2019s evaded taxes for more than 15 years, that wouldn\u2019t change your mind?\nA. Considering she thought she was exempt, no.\nQ. The fact that she\u2019s never filed a return in 15 years, would not change your mind that she\u2019s a law-abiding citizen?\nA. It would not change my mind, because Ms. Wade was exempt. In her mind, she was exempt.\n(Emphasis added.)\nFinally, on cross-examination, Dr. Hunter was asked by the prosecutor whether - as a former member of the military and current public school teacher whose salary was paid from tax revenue- - she was \u201cbother[ed]\u201d by defendant\u2019s failure to pay individual income tax. Dr. Hunter responded as follows: \u201cIf she consciously violated a right of responsibility, then it would bother me. However, I don\u2019t believe she consciously violated her right of responsibility.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe believe that this testimony by Matto, Mitchell, and Dr. Hunter arguably had greater probative force regarding defendant\u2019s state of mind - and, therefore, the issue of willfulness - than the excluded testimony would have had. The gist of these witnesses\u2019 testimony was that defendant openly, honestly, and in good faith believed, based on what she had been told by others, that she was exempt from paying taxes. As defendant asserts in her brief, \u201cthe central issue in this case\u201d was whether \u201cshe w[as] . . . taken in by the scheme she described and honestly believed she was not violating the law.\u201d This state of mind evidence bore directly on this issue and was sufficient to enable the jury to consider her defense that she had not willfully violated the law.\nMoreover, we note that while Dr. Hunter did testify that, in her opinion, defendant was a \u201ctrusting person,\u201d she qualified that opinion by emphasizing that defendant was \u201cnot gullible.\u201d Thus, had the trial court allowed the jury to hear Dr. Hunter\u2019s opinion testimony regarding defendant\u2019s trusting nature, it also would have heard evidence that defendant was not \u201cgullible.\u201d Such testimony could have had the effect of diminishing, rather than enhancing, her defense.\nFor these reasons, we conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that a reasonable possibility exists that, absent the trial court\u2019s error, a different result would have been reached at trial. See State v. Powell, 340 N.C. 674, 692, 459 S.E.2d 219, 228 (1995) (holding that defendant was not prejudiced by erroneous exclusion of character evidence in light of \u201call of the other evidence\u201d presented at trial), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1060, 133 L.Ed.2d 688 (1996).\nII. \u201cTax Protestor\u201d Evidence\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting \u201cinflammatory anti-tax cult evidence\u201d through the testimony of several of the State\u2019s witnesses. The first witness, Jeff Thigpen (\u201cThigpen\u201d), the Guilford County Register of Deeds, testified that defendant filed copies of the Form 1776 Codicil with his office and that it resembled other filings by members of \u201ctax protestor\u201d groups known as \u201csovereign citizen\u201d groups. Thigpen then stated, without objection from defendant, that he had heard that such groups in the Southwest had been involved in (1) the death of several law enforcement officers; (2) bringing lawsuits against judges; and (3) obtaining liens against the property of law enforcement officers.\nStephanie Gray, the DOR supervisor who manages the unit responsible for investigating tax protestor groups, testified - once again, without any objection from defendant - that she was familiar with sovereign citizen groups and that she understood such groups to be \u201cvery anti-tax and that they can be aggressive, even dangerous, in nature.\u201d\nThe last witness, Special Agent Yokley, testified that when she first interviewed defendant, defendant indicated that she was a member of the \u201cAmerican Patriot\u201d and \u201cWe, The People\u201d organizations and that she had participated in some of the groups\u2019 activities. Without objection, Special Agent Yokley then stated that these groups were involved in the tax protest movement and that they are \u201canti-government in general.\u201d\nDefendant asserts that this evidence was not relevant to any issue at trial and that it served no purpose other than to portray her as a dangerous, anti-government \u201ctax protestor.\u201d Because - as defendant acknowledges - she failed to object to the admission of the above-referenced testimony at trial, we review its admission only for plain error. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4). As our Supreme Court has recently emphasized, under plain error review, the defendant bears the burden of establishing prejudice resulting from a \u201cfundamental error\u201d - one that, based on an \u201cexamination of the entire record,\u201d had a \u201cprobable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nDefendant contends that this evidence of the \u201cviolent\u201d and \u201canti-government\u201d nature of tax protestor organizations was not relevant to any element of the charges against her and that the \u201crepeated association\u201d of her with these groups amounted to inflammatory and prejudicial character evidence. Even assuming arguendo that the challenged evidence should not have been admitted, we do not believe that any such error reached the level of plain error. On redirect examination, Thigpen clarified that he had no reason to believe that defendant was actually involved in or associated with any of the violent or anti-government conduct of the tax protestor groups referenced earlier in his testimony. Moreover, on recross examination, Thigpen answered in the negative when asked: \u201cDo you have any knowledge whether that group you\u2019re talking about, the [Sjouthwest thing, is this same group [with which defendant is associated]?\u201d\nWe conclude that the clarifying testimony as to the absence of evidence that defendant had participated in, or been affiliated with, the violent, anti-government activities of certain tax protestor groups mitigated any prejudicial impact of the challenged testimony. See United States v. Grosshans, 821 F.2d 1247, 1253 (6th Cir.) (holding that admission of allegedly prejudicial tax protestor evidence in tax evasion prosecution did not constitute plain error under equivalent federal rule), cert. denied,, 484 U.S. 987, 98 L.Ed.2d 505 (1987). Thus, even assuming arguendo that this evidence was erroneously admitted, defendant has failed to show plain error.\nIII. Jury Instructions\nFinally, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the element of willfulness under \u00a7 105-236(a)(7). Specifically, she asserts that \u201c[t]he trial court erred by denying [her] requested jury instruction defining \u2018good faith\u2019 and instructing the jury... that certain beliefs were not objectively reasonable and had no support in the law.\u201d\nWe need not address these contentions, however, because even if we assume - without deciding - that the trial court\u2019s instructions were erroneous, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish prejudice on appeal. \u201c[A]n error in jury instructions is prejudicial and requires a new trial only if \u2018there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.\u2019 \u201d State v. Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. 109, 116, 674 S.E.2d 707, 712 (2009) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a)). It is the defendant\u2019s burden to establish the existence of such prejudice on appeal. State v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 609, 268 S.E.2d 800, 809 (1980).\nDefendant\u2019s entire argument with respect to prejudice on this issue consists of her bare assertion that \u201c[a] new trial is required\u201d because \u201c[t]here is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict\u201d had the trial court not committed the alleged instructional errors. Such a conclusory, unsubstantiated claim is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice warranting a new trial. See State v. Bailey, 280 N.C. 264, 269, 185 S.E.2d 683, 687 (\u201cIt suffices to say that [a] defendant\u2019s bare assertion of prejudice is not self-sustaining.\u201d), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948, 34 L.Ed.2d 218 (1972); State v. Barron, 202 N.C. App. 686, 695, 690 S.E.2d 22, 29 (holding that defendant \u201cfailed to carry his burden of proof to show he was prejudiced\u201d by assumed instructional error where defendant \u201cnever addressefd] the effect of the error on the jury\u2019s verdict\u201d) (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc, review denied, 364 N.C. 327, 700 S.E.2d 926 (2010). Thus, without any particularized argument showing how she was prejudiced by the challenged instructions, defendant has failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to a new trial.\nConclusion\nFor the reasons stated above, we find no prejudicial error.\nNO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur.\n. Where, as here, the controlling North Carolina Rule of Evidence is similar or identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence, our courts have looked to federal decisions for guidance. Crawford v. Fayez, 112 N.C. App. 328, 333, 435 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1993), disc, review denied, 335 N.C. 553, 441 S.E.2d 113 (1994); N.C. R. Evid. 102 cmt.\n. In her reply brief to this Court, defendant asserts that the trial court\u2019s instructional errors are \u201creversible per se\" because the instructions were not supported by the evidence presented at trial. Defendant is correct that \u201c[a] trial judge should never give'instructions to a jury which are not based upon a state of facts presented by some reasonable view of the evidence.\u201d State v. Sweat, 366 N.C. 79, 89, 727 S.E.2d 691, 698 (2012). It is well established, however, that only \u201c \u2018[w]hen such instructions are prejudicial to the accused\u2019 \u201d is she \u201c \u2018entitled to anew trial.\u2019 \"Id,, (quoting State v. Lampkins, 283 N.C. 520, 523, 196 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1973)) (emphasis added).", "type": "majority", "author": "DAVIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Ryan F. Haigh, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by John F. Carella, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GLORIA TATUM-WADE, Defendant\nNo. COA12-1568\nFiled 20 August 2013\n1. Evidence \u2014 opinion testimony \u2014 character evidence \u2014 trusting nature \u2014 tax evasion \u2014 pertinent trait \u2014 no prejudice\nThe trial court erred in a tax evasion case by excluding opinion testimony of defendant\u2019s friend and colleague regarding defendant\u2019s trusting nature where defendant\u2019s allegedly trusting nature was pertinent to the issue of willfulness under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-236(a)(7). However, defendant failed to demonstrate that a reasonable possibility existed that, absent the trial court\u2019s error, a different result would have been reached at trial.\n2. Evidence \u2014 testimony\u2014inflammatory anti-tax cult \u2014 no plain error\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a tax evasion case by admitting inflammatory anti-tax cult evidence through the testimony of several of the State\u2019s witnesses. Even assuming arguendo that the challenged evidence should not have been admitted, the error did not reach the level of plain error.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 24 February 2012 by Judge Michael J. O\u2019Foghludha in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in. the Court of Appeals 6 May 2013.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Ryan F. Haigh, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nStaples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by John F. Carella, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0083-01", "first_page_order": 93, "last_page_order": 105 }