{ "id": 4244352, "name": "REBECCA S. WHITE, Plaintiff v. CURTIS COCHRAN and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "White v. Cochran", "decision_date": "2013-08-20", "docket_number": "No. COA13-155", "first_page": "183", "last_page": "195", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 N.C. App. 183" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "618 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633880 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/618/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640450 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642960 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631452, 12631453, 12631454 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0406-03", "/se2d/599/0406-01", "/se2d/599/0406-02" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631458, 12631459, 12631448, 12631450, 12631451, 12631453, 12631454, 12631455 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0408-01", "/se2d/599/0409-01", "/se2d/599/0400-01", "/se2d/599/0404-01", "/se2d/599/0405-01", "/se2d/599/0406-01", "/se2d/599/0406-02", "/se2d/599/0407-02" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631110 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/592/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8915000, 12631110 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0052-01", "/se2d/592/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641580 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641134, 12641137, 12641436, 12641437, 12641438 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0735-03", "/se2d/661/0737-01", "/se2d/662/0906-03", "/se2d/662/0907-01", "/se2d/662/0908-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640276 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0882-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the assertion in defendant's... affidavit that the All States' CD was security for El's loan is incompetent as it adds to or varies the terms of the promissory note and the CD\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550879 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the assertion in defendant's... affidavit that the All States' CD was security for El's loan is incompetent as it adds to or varies the terms of the promissory note and the CD\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 4164838 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659876, 1659877, 1659865, 1659868, 1659933 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0072-05", "/nc/348/0072-01", "/nc/348/0072-04", "/nc/348/0072-03", "/nc/348/0072-02" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11654542 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 S.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152793 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "citing Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8960498 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736", "parenthetical": "citing Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" }, { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597960 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/216/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 S.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "citing Price v. Honeycutt, 216 N.C. 270, 275, 4 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1939)" }, { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569849 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "citing Price v. Honeycutt, 216 N.C. 270, 275, 4 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1939)" }, { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357924 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 S.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798216 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491518 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188744 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265", "parenthetical": "citing Messick, 110 N.C. App. at 715, 431 S.E.2d at 494" }, { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9443380 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691", "parenthetical": "citing Messick, 110 N.C. App. at 715, 431 S.E.2d at 494" }, { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a sheriff may also waive governmental immunity by purchasing a bond\"" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9130742 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a sheriff may also waive governmental immunity by purchasing a bond\"" }, { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524171 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526342 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" }, { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "citing Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 717, 431 S.E.2d 489, 493, disc. review denied, 334 N.C. 621, 435 S.E.2d 336 (1993)" }, { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250460 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "citing Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 717, 431 S.E.2d 489, 493, disc. review denied, 334 N.C. 621, 435 S.E.2d 336 (1993)" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511442 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151090 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511113 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. 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Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978)" }, { "page": "312" }, { "page": "312" }, { "page": "313" }, { "page": "314", "parenthetical": "stating \"that waiver of a sheriffs official immunity may be shown by the existence of his official bond as well as by his county's purchase of liability insurance\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525413 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "citing Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978)" }, { "page": "380-81" }, { "page": "381" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "716 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423-26" }, { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-76-5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 162-8", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-242", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-240", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1219, "char_count": 33311, "ocr_confidence": 0.709, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.551513960084673e-08, "percentile": 0.2855373035261901 }, "sha256": "a80e2c2a54fed17c47329688013f84d7a4180cb8fe6d6e80a93e49e367eddfb1", "simhash": "1:93295d22b8ab3e6e", "word_count": 5394 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:07:10.338246+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "REBECCA S. WHITE, Plaintiff v. CURTIS COCHRAN and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nDefendants Curtis Cochran, Sheriff of Swain County, and Western Surety Company appeal from an order denying Defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion. On appeal, Defendants argue that the trial court erred by failing to conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law on governmental immunity grounds. After careful consideration of Defendants\u2019 challenges to the trial court\u2019s judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order should be affirmed.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\nPlaintiff Rebecca White was hired to work as a detention officer with the Swain County Sheriff\u2019s Department on 5 November 2008. On 24 January 2009, Plaintiff slipped, fell, and sustained a work-related injury. As a result of her injury, Plaintiff did not work from 24 January through 25 February 2009. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits with the North Carolina Industrial Commission, ultimately receiving an award of medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits. During her period of disability, Plaintiff received a letter dated 4 February 2009 informing her that she would be eligible for insurance coverage under COBRA. Although Plaintiff asked her employer why she had received this letter, her question was never answered.\nFollowing her period of disability, Plaintiff worked on 25 February 2009,26 February 2009,2 March 2009, and 6 March 2009. On 6 March 2009, Plaintiff was informed that she should not return to work. Subsequently, Plaintiff\u2019s employment was terminated.\nOn 5 June 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the North Carolina Department of Labor in which she alleged that she had been wrongfully terminated from her employment for seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-240, et seq. On the same date, the Department of Labor sent a letter to \u201cCounty of Swain - Sheriff\u2019s Department,\u201d providing notice of Plaintiff\u2019s complaint. On 8 June and 10 June 2009, the Department of Labor sent information requests and other communications to the Swain County Sheriff\u2019s Department. On 19 June 2009, the Sheriff\u2019s Department responded to Plaintiff\u2019s complaint by providing, among other things, a position statement. On 26 June 2009, the Sheriff\u2019s Department provided a supplemental response to Plaintiff\u2019s complaint and requested that her complaint be dismissed. On 26 August 2009, the Department of Labor denied Plaintiff\u2019s claim and issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter, which was copied to Swain County and the Swain County Sheriff\u2019s Department, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-242 authorizing her to initiate civil litigation within 90 days of the date upon which the right to sue letter was issued.\nAt all relevant times, public officials and law enforcement officers employed by Swain County were covered by a number of liability insurance policies or similar instruments. From 1 July 2008 through 1 July 2009, coverage was provided pursuant to a policy issued by Argonaut Group Insurance. From 1 July 2009 through 1 July 2010, coverage was provided under the North Carolina Association of County Commissioners Risk Management Pools. Finally, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 162-8, Sheriff Cochran was covered by a bond issued by Western Surety Company from 4 December 2006 through 4 December 2010. After the initiation of the present litigation, Argonaut, NCACC, and Western Surety each denied that coverage was available under the applicable policies or bonds.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 20 October 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Sheriff Cochran asserting a claim for retaliatory termination stemming from her decision to file a workers\u2019 compensation claim in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241 and wrongful discharge, and seeking damages, including treble damages and punitive damages, as a result of the injury which she claimed to have sustained as a result of Sheriff Cochran\u2019s conduct. On 16 December 2009, Sheriff Cochran filed an answer denying the material allegations of Plaintiff\u2019s complaint and asserting that he would have terminated her employment even if she had not filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim. On 6 January 2010, Sheriff Cochran amended his answer to include a request for an award of costs and attorney\u2019s fees.\nOn 28 April 2010, Sheriff Cochran filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On 19 May 2010, Sheriff Cochran filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon Plaintiff\u2019s failure to join Sheriff Cochran\u2019s surety as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-76-5. On 28 June 2010, Judge Bradley B. Letts entered an order granting Sheriff Cochran\u2019s first motion for judgment on the pleadings and for dismissal of Plaintiff\u2019s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The essential basis for Judge Letts\u2019 decision to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s complaint was that, although the defendant named in Plaintiff\u2019s complaint was Sheriff Cochran, the right to sue letter issued to Plaintiff authorized her to bring suit against Swain County and the Swain County Sheriff\u2019s Department. Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court from Judge Letts\u2019 order.\nOn 4 October 2011, this Court filed an opinion reversing Judge Letts\u2019 order. White v. Cochran,.__ N.C. App._, 716 S.E.2d 420 (2011). In the course of making that decision, we held that Plaintiff had asserted both a common law wrongful discharge claim and a statutory retaliatory discharge claim against Sheriff Cochran, that Plaintiff\u2019s retaliatory discharge claim .had been asserted against Sheriff Cochran in his official capacity, and that a suit against Sheriff Cochran in his official capacity was tantamount to a suit against the Swain County Sheriffs Department, so that Plaintiff\u2019s claim was, contrary to the trial court\u2019s decision, brought against a party named in the right to sue letter. White,_N.C. App. at _., 716 S.E.2d at 423-26. In addition, we held that Plaintiff\u2019s common law wrongful discharge claim had been asserted against Sheriff Cochran in his official capacity, that any common law wrongful discharge complaint that Plaintiff might wish to assert against Sheriff Cochran in his official capacity was subject to Sheriff Cochran\u2019s right to assert a governmental immunity defense, and that, since the parties had not discussed, either before the trial court or in their briefs before this Court, the issue of whether Plaintiff\u2019s claim was barred by governmental immunity or by Plaintiff\u2019s failure to join Sheriff Cochran\u2019s surety was not properly before the Court at that time. Id. at_, 716 S.E.2d at 426.\nOn 8 December 2011, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave of court to amend her complaint to \u201cadd Western Surety Company as a defendant\u201d and to allege that Sheriff Cochran had waived governmental immunity by purchasing an official bond and by the fact that Swain County had purchased liability insurance which covered Sheriff Cochran. On 10 February 2012, Judge Marvin P. Pope, Jr., entered an order allowing Plaintiff\u2019s amendment motion and denying Sheriff Cochran\u2019s second motion for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On 26 March and 26 April 2012, Defendants, respectively, filed separate answers to Plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint in which they denied the material allegations of Plaintiff\u2019s complaint and asserted that Sheriff Cochran would have terminated Plaintiff even if she had not filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim, public official immunity, and governmental immunity as affirmative defenses.\nOn 20 August 2012, Defendants filed a motion seeking the entry of summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that \u201cDefendants are immune from liability because the actions brought against them are excluded from coverage under the Swain County\u2019s insurance policies.\u201d On 7 November 2012, Defendants filed an amended summary judgment motion which rested on the same contention. On 9 November 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of the affidavits that Defendants had filed in support of their summary judgment motion. On 14 November 2012, Defendants filed a second amended summary judgment motion. On 26 November 2012, the trial court entered an order denying Defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion on the grounds that \u201cthere are genuine issues of material fact to be determined in this action.\u201d Defendants noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s order.\nII. Substantive Legal Analysis A Appealability\nAs a general proposition, no appeal lies from an order denying a summary judgment motion on the grounds that such an order is interlocutory and is not, for that reason, immediately appealable. Smith v. Phillips, 117 N.C. App. 378, 380, 451 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1994) (citing Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978)). However, \u201cwhen the motion is made on the grounds of sovereign . . . immunity, such a denial is immediately appealable, because to force a defendant to proceed with a trial from which he should be immune would vitiate the doctrine of sovereign immunity.\u201d Id. As a result, given that Defendants sought to have summary judgment entered in their favor on governmental immunity grounds, their appeal is properly before us pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 l-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(l) (allowing interlocutory appeals from orders which \u201caffect[] a substantial right\u201d).\nB. Standard of Review\n[2] According to well-established North Carolina law, summary judgment is proper when \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (see also Smith, 117 N.C. App. at 380-81, 451 S.E.2d at 312). For that reason, the moving party bears the burden of establishing \u201cthe absence of any triable issue of fact.\u201d Goynias v. Spa Health Clubs, Inc., 148 N.C. App. 554, 555, 558 S.E.2d 880, 881, aff'd, 356 N.C. 290, 569 S.E.2d 648 (2002). A trial court\u2019s decision to grant or deny a summary judgment motion is subject to de novo review on appeal. Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009). \u201cUnder a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the [trial court].\u201d In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P\u2019ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003). We will now review Defendants\u2019 challenges to the trial court\u2019s order utilizing the applicable standard of review.\nC. Waiver of Governmental Immunity\nIn their brief, Defendants argue that the trial court\u2019s order should be overturned because Plaintiff failed to forecast sufficient evidence to show that Sheriff Cochran had waived sovereign immunity through the purchase of liability insurance, that the Western Surety bond does not work a waiver of Sheriff Cochran\u2019s ability to avoid suit on the basis of governmental immunity, and, in the alternative, that Sheriff Cochran could not be held liable under the Western Surety bond in an amount in excess of the face amount of the bond. However, given that Defendants did not raise the third of these three contentions before the trial court, that issue is not properly before us and we decline to address it at this time. N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (stating that, \u201c[i]n order to pres\u00e9rve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context\u201d). As a result, we will focus our attention on the first two contentions advanced in Defendants\u2019 brief.\nThe doctrine of sovereign immunity provides \u201cthe state, its counties, and its public officials, in their official capacity[ies], [with] an unqualified and absolute immunity from law suits.\u201d Paquette v. County of Durham, 155 N.C. App. 415, 418, 573 S.E.2d 715, 717 (2002) (citing Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 717, 431 S.E.2d 489, 493, disc. review denied, 334 N.C. 621, 435 S.E.2d 336 (1993)), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 165, 580 S.E.2d 695 (2003). \u201c[I]tis generally established that a sheriff is a public official entitled to sovereign immunity and, unless the immunity is waived pursuant to a statute, is protected from suit against him in his official capacity.\u201d Myers v. Bryant, 188 N.C. App. 585, 587, 655 S.E.2d 882, 885 (quoting Smith, 117 N.C. App. at 381, 451 S.E.2d at 312) (internal quotation marks omitted), disc, review denied, 362 N.C. 360, 664 S.E.2d 309 (2008). A plaintiff seeking to overcome a governmental immunity defense must specifically allege that the official or governmental entity has waived the right to rely on such an immunity-related defense. Phillips v. Gray, 163 N.C. App. 52, 56, 592 S.E.2d 229, 232 (citing Clark v. Burke County, 117 N.C. App. 85, 88, 450 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1994)), disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 545, 599 S.E.2d 406 (2004). In accordance with this fundamental procedural principle, Plaintiff has alleged that Sheriff Cochran waived the right to assert a defense of governmental immunity based upon the fact that Swain County purchased insurance which provided Sheriff Cochran with liability coverage and the fact that Sheriff Cochran purchased a surety bond.\nAs Plaintiff\u2019s argument suggests, a sheriff may waive governmental immunity in at least two different ways. Smith, 117 N.C. App. at 383, 451 S.E.2d at 313. According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-76-5, a sheriff waives governmental immunity by purchasing a bond as is required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 162-8. See also Sellers v. Rodriguez, 149 N.C. App. 619, 624, 561 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2002) (stating that \u201ca sheriff may also waive governmental immunity by purchasing a bond\u201d). However, the purchase of a bond precludes a sheriff from relying upon \u201cthe protective embrace of governmental immunity... only where the surety is joined as a party to the action,\u201d Summey v. Barker, 142 N.C. App. 688, 691, 544 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2001) (citing Messick, 110 N.C. App. at 715, 431 S.E.2d at 494), and only to the extent of the amount of the bond. Hill v. Medford, 158 N.C. App. 618, 623, 582 S.E.2d 325, 328-29 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-76-5 and Summey, 142 N.C. App. at 691, 544 S.E.2d at 265), rev\u2019d per curiam on the basis of the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, 357 N.C. 650, 588 S.E.2d 467 (2003).\nSecondly, a sheriff waives governmental immunity when a county purchases liability insurance which provides coverage to the sheriff. Paquette, 155 N.C. App. at 418, 573 S.E.2d at 717 (stating that \u201c[a] county may waive its sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-435(a)\u201d); see also Smith, 117 N.C. App. at 384, 451 S.E.2d at 314 (stating \u201cthat waiver of a sheriffs official immunity may be shown by the existence of his official bond as well as by his county\u2019s purchase of liability insurance\u201d). As the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-435(a) suggests, a waiver of immunity generally extends \u201conly to the extent of the insurance obtained.\u201d Evans v. Housing Auth. of Raleigh, 359 N.C. 50, 57, 602 S.E.2d 668, 673 (2004). As a result, \u201cimmunity is waived only to the extent that [the insured] is indemnified by insurance for negligence or tort.\u201d Over cash v. Statesville Bd. of Educ., 83 N.C. App. 21, 23-25; 348 S.E.2d 524, 526-27 (1986). Thus, both the purchase of a bond and the purchase of liability insurance only operate as a waiver of governmental immunity to the extent of the coverage provided by those insuring instruments.\n1. Purchase of a Surety Bond\nAs the record clearly reflects, given that Sheriff Cochran, in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 162-8, purchased a bond from Western Surety on 4 December 2006 and given that Western Surety has been joined as a party to this action, Sheriff Cochran has waived governmental immunity \u201cto the extent of the amount of the bond.\u201d In seeking to persuade us that the purchase of the Western Surety bond did not operate to waive Sheriff Cochran\u2019s right to assert a defense of governmental immunity in this case, Defendants argue that claims of the nature asserted by Plaintiff are not covered by Sheriff Cochran\u2019s bond. We disagree.\nAs is required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 162-8, the bond purchased by Sheriff Cochran ensures that he\nshall in all things faithfully perform the duties of his office and shall honestly account for all moneys and effects that may come into his hands in his official capacity during the said term, then this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect.\nAlthough Defendants argue that the provisions of the Western Surety bond do not cover claims such as those advanced by Plaintiff, they never explain why Plaintiff\u2019s allegations fail to implicate the extent to which Sheriff Cochran failed to \u201cfaithfully perform the duties of his office.\u201d In addition, Defendants\u2019 assertion conflicts with relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, which hold that \u201c[t]he last clause of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-76-5] has been held to enlarge the conditions of the official bond to extend to all official duties of the office.\u201d State ex rel. Williams v. Adams, 288 N.C. 501, 504, 219 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1975) (citing Price v. Honeycutt, 216 N.C. 270, 275, 4 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1939)); see also Sellers, 149 N.C. App. at 624, 561 S.E.2d at 339 (stating that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-76-5 only gives a plaintiff \u201cthe right of action\u201d and \u201cdoes not relieve [him] of the burden of proving that defendants either intentionally engaged in neglect, misconduct or misbehavior while performing their custodial duties, or that they acted negligently in performing those duties despite a duty to do otherwise\u201d). As a result, a sheriffs official bond has been found applicable to claims \u201cfor wrongful death caused by the negligence of the defendant officers in not providing medical attention for the plaintiff\u2019s intestate,\u201d Williams, 288 N.C. at 505, 219 S.E.2d at 200, and to claims for false arrest involving the use of excessive force, Price, 216 N.C. at 276, 4 S.E.2d at 615. In view of the fact that Plaintiff has alleged that Sheriff Cochran wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for her decision to file a workers\u2019 compensation claim and the fact that acting in that matter would constitute a failure to properly perform his official duties, we have no choice but to conclude that Plaintiff\u2019s claim, if supported by adequate proof, comes within the scope of Sheriff Cochran\u2019s official duties.\n2. Purchase of Liability Insurance\nSimilarly, Defendants argue that the decision by Swain County to purchase liability insurance did not operate to waive Sheriff Cochran\u2019s right to assert a governmental immunity defense on the grounds that the policies on which Plaintiff relies did not provide him with coverage against Plaintiff\u2019s claims. More specifically, Defendants argue that, since the Argonaut policy had terminated and the extended reporting period provided for in that policy had ended before Plaintiff asserted her claim and since the NCACC policy had not come into effect as of the date upon which Plaintiff\u2019s claim arose, Sheriff Cochran did not have coverage against Plaintiff\u2019s claim under either policy Secondly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff\u2019s claim is specifically excluded from coverage under an exclusion obviating any necessity for the carrier to provide coverage relating to a proceeding before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or some similar state proceeding. We do not find either argument persuasive.\na. Interpretation of Insurance Policies\nA determination of the extent to which either the Argonaut policy or the NCACC policy provides coverage to Sheriff Cochran relating to Plaintiff\u2019s claims requires us to interpret the effective date and notice provisions contained in each policy. The interpretation of a contract of insurance is a question of law. Old Line Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bollinger, 161 N.C. App. 734, 736, 589 S.E.2d 411, 412 (2003) (citing Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970)). The traditional rules of contract construction are only useful in the event that relevant policy language is ambiguous. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buzz Off Insect Shield, L.L.C., 364 N.C. 1, 10, 692 S.E.2d 605, 612 (2010). \u201cTo be ambiguous, the language of an insurance policy provision must, \u2018in the opinion of the court, [be] fairly and reasonably susceptible to either of the constructions for which the parties contend.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522) (alteration in original). As a result of the fact that the relevant language in both policies is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to rules of construction in order to resolve the issue before us in this case. Houpe v. City of Statesville, 128 N.C. App. 334, 342, 497 S.E.2d 82, 88 (stating that, \u201c[w]hen language is clear and unambiguous,... a policy provision will be accorded its plain meaning) (citing Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522)), disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 72, 505 S.E.2d 871 (1998). As a result, we will now look at the relevant policy language in order to determine whether either the Argonaut policy or the NCACC policy provides Sheriff Cochran with coverage against Plaintiff\u2019s claims.\nb. Timeliness of Notice\nIn their brief, Defendants argue that the Argonaut policy is a \u201cclaims based\u201d policy and that Plaintiff failed to provide notice of her claim within the policy period and related extended reporting period. More specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not assert her claim until she filed her complaint in this case on 8 October 2009, a date which came slightly over one month after the end of the extended reporting period specified in the policy. We do not find this argument persuasive.\nAccording to the Argonaut policy, a claim arising from a \u201cwrongful act\u201d has been asserted in a timely manner \u201cif a claim for \u2018damages\u2019 is first made in writing against any insured during the policy period or any Extended Reporting Period,\u201d with \u201c[a] claim by a person or organization seeking \u2018damages\u2019 . . . deemed to have been made when written notice of such claim is received by any insured or by [Argonaut], whichever comes first.\u201d As a result, the only prerequisites set out in the relevant policy language for the provision of proper notice are that it be in writing and that it provide notice of the claim which the claimant seeks to assert against the insured. Nothing in the relevant policy language indicates that the required notice must take the form of the initiation of a civil action as contended for by Defendants, so we conclude that, as long as Plaintiff informed Sheriff Cochran in writing of the nature of her claim in a timely manner, Plaintiff will have adequately complied with the notice provision of the Argonaut policy.\nAs the record clearly reflects, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging retaliatory discharge stemming from her decision to file a workers\u2019 compensation claim with the Department of Labor, which provided the Human Resources Manager of the Swain County Sheriff\u2019s Department with notice of Plaintiff\u2019s complaint by means of a letter dated 5 June 2009. In addition, facsimile transmissions requesting information were sent to Swain County\u2019s Human Resources Manager and to the Sheriff\u2019s Department by a Department of Labor investigator on 8 June and 9 June 2009. As is reflected in letters to the Department of Labor investigator from the attorney for Swain County dated 18 June and 25 June 2009, Sheriff Cochran and other county officials were clearly aware of both the existence and nature of Plaintiff\u2019s claim by the end of June 2009. As a result of the fact that the Argonaut policy ended on 1 July 2009 and the fact that the Extended Reporting Period set out in the Argonaut Policy ended on 1 September 2009, Sheriff Cochran clearly received notice of Plaintiff\u2019s claim in a form consistent with that required by the applicable policy language before the Argonaut policy expired, and considerably in advance of the end of the Extended Reporting Period. Thus, Defendants\u2019 argument that the Argonaut policy does not afford coverage for Plaintiff\u2019s claim against Sheriff Cochran is without merit.\nc. Applicability of EEOC Exclusion\nFinally, Defendants argue that Sheriff Cochran is not precluded from asserting a defense of governmental immunity on the basis of a policy provision excluding \u201c[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] hearings or similar proceedings conducted by state agencies or commissioners\u201d from the scope of the coverage afforded by the Argonaut policy. Defendants have not, however, offered any support for their contention that Plaintiff\u2019s retaliatory discharge claim is either an EEOC claim or a similar state proceeding and, instead, simply refer to Plaintiff\u2019s claim as an EEOC claim on a number of occasions in their brief. Aside from the fact that Defendants\u2019 failure to provide any argumentation in support of their position would permit us to deem this aspect of their challenge to the trial court\u2019s order to have been abandoned, Sugar Creek Charter Sch., Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 195 N.C. App. 348, 358, 673 S.E.2d 667, 674 (stating that \u201c[w]e note that Defendants include no authority in their brief in support of several of the following arguments, which constitutes a violation of [N.C.R. App. P. Rule 28(b)(6)] and subjects these arguments to dismissal\u201d) (citing Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 200, 657 S.E.2d 361, 367 (2008)), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 663, 687 S.E.2d 296 (2009), we need not rest our decision on this ground given our conclusion that the claims asserted in Plaintiffs complaint do not constitute an EEOC or similar state proceeding for purposes of the relevant policy language. The EEOC is responsible for \u201cenforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person\u2019s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.\u201d http://www.eeoc.a~ov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited 8 August 2013). On the other hand, the Department of Labor is responsible for enforcing the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act, which is \u201cintended to prevent employer retaliation from having a chilling effect upon an employee\u2019s exercise of his or her statutoiy rights under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act,\u201d Whiting v. Wolf son Casing Corp., 173 N.C. App. 218, 222, 618 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2005), or other specific statutory provisions. Simply put, the EEOC serves to protect individuals from discrimination based on certain characteristics or affiliations while the Department of Labor serves to protect individuals from retaliation stemming from their decision to exercise specific statutory rights. In view of the fact that the purposes sought to be served by proceedings before the Department of Labor differ substantially from the purposes sought to be served by proceedings before the EEOC, we have no difficulty in concluding that Plaintiff\u2019s claim is simply not an \u201cEEOC proceeding or similar proceeding conducted by state agencies or commissioners\u201d excluded from coverage under the Argonaut policy. As a result, neither of Defendants\u2019 contentions to the effect that the relevant policies did not provide Sheriff Cochran with coverage relating to Plaintiff\u2019s claim have merit, thereby establishing that Defendants were not entitled to the entry of judgment as a matter of law in their favor on the basis of governmental immunity considerations.\nIIL Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, none of Defendants\u2019 challenges to the trial court\u2019s order have merit. As a result, the trial court\u2019s order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STROUD concur.\n. In support of this argument, Defendants point to affidavits suggesting that Western Surety appropriately denied coverage on the basis of the relevant bond language. However, as plaintiff correctly argued before the trial court and asserts before us, the statements in these affidavits are not competent evidence as to the scope of the coverage of the Western Surety bond. Old S. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of North Carolina, 36 N.C. App. 18, 32, 244 S.E.2d 264, 272 (1978) (stating that \u201cthe assertion in defendant\u2019s... affidavit that the All States\u2019 CD was security for El\u2019s loan is incompetent as it adds to or varies the terms of the promissory note and the CD\u201d).\n. We do not, of course, wish to be understood as expressing an opinion as to whether Plaintiffs allegations have any merit, since we are, as we have noted above, required to base our decision in this case on the information contained in the record taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. A trier of fact, after the completion of the requisite procedural steps, may well conclude that Plaintiff\u2019s claims lack merit as a factual matter.\n. Although Defendants describe the Argonaut policy as a \u201cclaims based\u201d policy, we believe that they are actually describing it as a \u201cclaims-made\u201d policy. A \u201cclaims-made\u201d policy is \u201c[a]n agreement to indemnify against all claims made during a specified period, regardless of when the incidents that gave rise to the claims occurred.\" Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 877 (9th ed. 2009). The Argonaut policy provides that the \u201cwrongful act\u201d must occur during the policy period and that the claim must be asserted during the policy period or the extended reporting period. As a result, the Argonaut policy has features characteristic of a \u201cclaims made\u201d policy without technically being one.\n. The NCACC policy is an \u201coccurrence\u201d policy, given that it covers \u201cany loss from an event that occurs within the policy period, regardless of when the claim is made.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 878 (9th ed. 2009). As a result of the fact that the events underlying Plaintiff\u2019s claim against Sheriff Cochran occurred prior to the effective date of the NCACC policy, it clearly does not provide any basis for a determination that Sheriff Cochran waived his right to assert a defense of governmental immunity.\n. A \u201cwrongful act\u201d is defined in the Argonaut policy as \u201cany act, error or omission by an insured\u201d or \u201cflowing from or originating out of a \u2018law enforcement activity.\u2019\u201d\n. \u201cDamages\u201d are defined in the Argonaut policy as \u201cmoney damages.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Moore Law Office, PLLC, by George W. Moore, for Plaintiff", "Melrose, Seago & Lay, PA, by Mark R. Melrose, Joshua Nielsen, and Kimberly C. Lay, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "REBECCA S. WHITE, Plaintiff v. CURTIS COCHRAN and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, Defendants\nNo. COA13-155\nFiled 20 August 2013\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 interlocutory orders and appeals \u2014 denial of summary judgment \u2014 sovereign immunity\nThe denial of summary judgment was immediately appealable where the motion was made on the grounds of sovereign immunity.\n2. Appeal and Error \u2014 standard of review \u2014 summary judgment\nA trial court\u2019s decision to grant or deny a summary judgment motion is subject to de novo review on appeal.\n3. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 issue not raised at trial\nAn issue regarding the amount of a sheriff\u2019s liability under a surety bond was not addressed on appeal where it was not raised at trial.\n4. Immunity \u2014 governmental\u2014sheriff\u2019s surety bond \u2014 claim with scope of bond\nDefendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on governmental immunity in an action by a detention officer for wrongful discharge after a workers\u2019 compensation claim. Defendants raised governmental immunity through the sheriff\u2019s purchase of a surety bond, which waived liability only to the extent of coverage. Plaintiff\u2019s claim came within the scope of the sheriff\u2019s official duties, if supported by adequate proof, and is covered by the sheriff\u2019s bond.\n5. Immunity \u2014 governmental\u2014purchase of insurance\nDefendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on governmental immunity in an action by a detention officer for wrongful discharge after a workers\u2019 compensation claim. Defendants raised governmental immunity through the county\u2019s purchase of insurance, which waived liability only to the extent of coverage. Although plaintiff argued that plaintiff\u2019s claim fell between policies, the sheriff received notice of the claim in a form consistent with the policy before the policy period expired, and considerably before the end of the extended reporting period. Defendants also pointed to a clause in the policy excluding Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) hearings, but offered no support for the contention that plaintiff\u2019s retaliatory discharge claim was either an EEOC claim or a similar state proceeding.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 26 November 2012 by Judge James U. Downs in Swain County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2013.\nThe Moore Law Office, PLLC, by George W. Moore, for Plaintiff\nMelrose, Seago & Lay, PA, by Mark R. Melrose, Joshua Nielsen, and Kimberly C. Lay, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0183-01", "first_page_order": 193, "last_page_order": 205 }