{ "id": 4245431, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHNATHAN BLAKE PERRY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Perry", "decision_date": "2013-08-20", "docket_number": "No. COA13-30", "first_page": "304", "last_page": "325", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 N.C. App. 304" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "525 U.S. 1111", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11215905, 11215426, 11216068, 11215368, 11216203, 11215982, 11215729, 11216145, 11215604, 11215829, 11215285, 11215542, 11215222, 11215485 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/1111-10", "/us/525/1111-04", "/us/525/1111-12", "/us/525/1111-03", "/us/525/1111-14", "/us/525/1111-11", "/us/525/1111-08", "/us/525/1111-13", "/us/525/1111-07", "/us/525/1111-09", "/us/525/1111-02", "/us/525/1111-06", "/us/525/1111-01", "/us/525/1111-05" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 1106", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11656134, 11656039, 11655944, 11656007, 11656170, 11655915, 11655978, 11656205, 11656110, 11655993, 11656090, 11655901, 11656063 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/1106-11", "/us/520/1106-07", "/us/520/1106-03", "/us/520/1106-06", "/us/520/1106-12", "/us/520/1106-02", "/us/520/1106-04", "/us/520/1106-13", "/us/520/1106-10", "/us/520/1106-05", "/us/520/1106-09", "/us/520/1106-01", "/us/520/1106-08" ] }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 1169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1564321, 1563810, 1564514, 1564225, 1564429, 1563982, 1564143, 1563761, 1563860, 1564409, 1564054, 1564249, 1564283 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/1169-13", "/us/515/1169-03", "/us/515/1169-06", "/us/515/1169-12", "/us/515/1169-01", "/us/515/1169-02", "/us/515/1169-05", "/us/515/1169-08", "/us/515/1169-04", "/us/515/1169-09", "/us/515/1169-10", "/us/515/1169-07", "/us/515/1169-11" ] }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6468801, 6468547, 6469476, 6468711, 6468967, 6469353, 6469608, 6468624, 6468240, 6468465, 6469044, 6468343, 6469144, 6469246 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/1018-07", "/us/459/1018-04", "/us/459/1018-13", "/us/459/1018-06", "/us/459/1018-08", "/us/459/1018-12", "/us/459/1018-14", "/us/459/1018-05", "/us/459/1018-01", "/us/459/1018-03", "/us/459/1018-09", "/us/459/1018-02", "/us/459/1018-10", "/us/459/1018-11" ] }, { "cite": "142 L.Ed.2d 783", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 S.Ct. 883", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777320 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" }, { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832", "parenthetical": "citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 389, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980) (other citation omitted), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111, 119 S.Ct. 883, 142 L.Ed.2d 783 (1999" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659735 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609", "parenthetical": "citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 389, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980) (other citation omitted), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111, 119 S.Ct. 883, 142 L.Ed.2d 783 (1999" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 957", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1107767 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1005", "parenthetical": "opinion of Kennedy" }, { "page": "2707", "parenthetical": "opinion of Kennedy" }, { "page": "871", "parenthetical": "opinion of Kennedy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0957-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1447", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918680 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546001 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 U.S. 349", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 407817 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/217/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 U.S. 48", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12448995, 3641893 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910)" }, { "page": "2021", "parenthetical": "quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910)" }, { "page": "835", "parenthetical": "quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910)" }, { "page": "2022" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/176/0825-01", "/us/560/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719073, 4723876, 4725990, 4726221, 4723481 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0335-01", "/nc/313/0335-02", "/nc/313/0335-05", "/nc/313/0335-03", "/nc/313/0335-04" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525051 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526386 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120-21", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Riggsbee, 72 N.C. App. 167, 171, 323 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9190078 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Riggsbee, 72 N.C. App. 167, 171, 323 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4765436 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 474", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4700273 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 L.Ed.2d 312", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "475 S.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867711 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" }, { "page": "268-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 L. Ed. 2d 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 S. Ct. 2634", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558011 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-318.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220035, 220037, 219919, 219995, 219967 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0219-01", "/nc/355/0219-02", "/nc/355/0219-03", "/nc/355/0219-05", "/nc/355/0219-04" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139632 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135783 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 168, 538 S.E.2d 917, 925 (2000), and State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 493, 488 S.E.2d 576, 589 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11439501 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 168, 538 S.E.2d 917, 925 (2000), and State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 493, 488 S.E.2d 576, 589 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551245, 551312, 551313, 551120, 551352 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0584-01", "/nc/347/0584-04", "/nc/347/0584-02", "/nc/347/0584-03", "/nc/347/0584-05" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560790 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Scott, 323 N.C. 350, 353, 372 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798972 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Scott, 323 N.C. 350, 353, 372 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575150 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720397 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bates, 313 N.C. 580, 581, 330 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1985), and State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 685, 281 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1981) (other citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9129844 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bates, 313 N.C. 580, 581, 330 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1985), and State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 685, 281 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1981) (other citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.C. App. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550523 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/19/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S.E. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624536 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657", "parenthetical": "citing Tomlins v. Cranford, 227 N.C. 323, 42 S.E. 2d 100 (1947)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567546 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105", "parenthetical": "citing Tomlins v. Cranford, 227 N.C. 323, 42 S.E. 2d 100 (1947)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715712, 4720431, 4715122, 4720187, 4718559 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0188-02", "/nc/315/0188-05", "/nc/315/0188-04", "/nc/315/0188-03", "/nc/315/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526305 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568324 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323", "parenthetical": "quoting Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point, 321 N.C. 584, 586, 364 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1988), and State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 548, 331 S.E.2d 251, 254, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 188, 337 S.E.2d 862 (1985) (internal citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867525 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593", "parenthetical": "quoting Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point, 321 N.C. 584, 586, 364 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1988), and State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 548, 331 S.E.2d 251, 254, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 188, 337 S.E.2d 862 (1985) (internal citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696125 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L. Ed. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 S. Ct. 381", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002", "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659-60" }, { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154240 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" }, { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(a) (4) (stating that, \"[i]n criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by objection ... may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error\"" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4359080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105-06", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(a) (4" }, { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S.Ct. 1111", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1802, "char_count": 55717, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.4916476050659184e-08, "percentile": 0.28154498582735904 }, "sha256": "6f6f9343fcf163ed9c826d3f93fdda2f9845f3b5b877e8966fd052b641f333d5", "simhash": "1:ab6b8023e66f0d53", "word_count": 8999 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:07:10.338246+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHNATHAN BLAKE PERRY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nDefendant Johnathan Blake Perry appeals from a judgment sentencing him to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based upon his conviction for first degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State\u2019s expert witnesses to express opinions to the effect that the injuries sustained by the alleged victim, J.W., had been intentionally inflicted on the grounds that this testimony was \u201cnot sufficiently reliable\u201d; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge against him for lack of adequate evidentiary support; that his felony murder conviction cannotbeproperlypredicatedonhis commission of felonious childabuse inflicting serious bodily injury; and that his conviction of first degree murder and resulting sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole are disproportionate and constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After careful consideration of Defendant\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s judgment should remain undisturbed.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\n1. State\u2019s Evidence\na. Events of 7 December 2010\nJoan was bom on 29 September 2009 to Sebrina Wright, who had three other children. Although Defendant was Joan\u2019s father, he was not the father of any of her siblings. Defendant and Ms. Wright had little contact during the time that Ms. Wright was pregnant with Joan or the first year of Joan\u2019s life. However, Defendant moved in with Ms. Wright and her four children in September 2010.\nJoan was a healthy baby who developed normally and did not have significant medical problems. Yolanda Manson, Ms. Wright\u2019s sister, recalled Joan as a happy, outgoing baby, who drank from a cup and could pick herself up if she fell. Joan did not take any medications, had no problems eating, and was not known to choke on food or milk.\nJoan continued to appear happy and healthy during the first week of December 2010. On Monday, 6 December 2010, Joan behaved normally, smiling at family members and eating well. At that time, Joan was starting to use a drinking cup; however, she also used a bottle, which she was able to hold on her own.\nAlthough Joan initially appeared to be comfortable with Defendant, as time went on, Ms. Wright \u201cstarted to notice [that] she would scream a lot. . . when he would have her\u201d and that \u201che was the only male that she really didn\u2019t favor.\u201d According to Ms. Wright, Defendant \u201calways thought [Joan] was real clingy to [Ms. Wright]\u201d and \u201cjust didn\u2019t like the fact that she was so clingy].]\u201d When Joan was approximately six months old, Ms. Wright returned to work. At that point, Ms. Wright\u2019s mother began watching Joan during the work day. After Defendant moved in, Ms. Wright\u2019s mother continued to watch Joan on most days. However, Defendant watched Joan once or twice on a \u201crare occasion.\u201d\nAt about 5:30 a.m. on Tuesday, 7 December 2010, Ms. Wright got up, changed Joan\u2019s diaper, and gave her a bottle of milk, which Joan drank normally. Ms. Wright did not see any bruising on Joan\u2019s legs or body at that time. Before she left for work, Ms. Wright woke Defendant, who was sleeping in the living room. Upon being awakened, Defendant moved into the bedroom where Joan was sleeping. At approximately 6:30 a.m., Ms. Wright departed with the three older children, leaving Defendant and Joan alone in the house.\nMs. Wright spoke briefly with Defendant on the phone at approximately 11:30 a.m. on 7 December 2010. When Defendant held Joan up to the phone, Ms. Wright could hear her \u201clittle baby talk\u201d and recalled that she \u201cjust sounded normal.\u201d When Ms. Wright hung up in order to enter a bank branch, Defendant asked her to call back as soon as she emerged from the bank building. After depositing a check and leaving the bank, Ms. Wright called Defendant twice without receiving any answer. At the time of her third call, Defendant answered and told Ms. Wright that Joan was not breathing and was \u201cgone.\u201d Ms. Wright told Defendant to call 911, hung up, and drove home immediately, calling 911 herself as she drove.\nAbout five minutes after speaking with Defendant, Ms. Wright arrived at her home. At that time, she saw emergency medical services personnel carrying Joan, who was not moving and whose eyes were rolled back into her head, to an ambulance for transportation to Wake Medical Center. At the time that they attempted to render assistance to Joan, emergency medical personnel noted that she was unresponsive, not moving or breathing on her own, had no discernible pulse, and felt \u201cvery limp\u201d and \u201clike a rag doll.\u201d After emergency medical services personnel moved Joan\u2019s tongue, she resumed an inadequate labored breathing. However, she did not open her eyes or respond to stimuli. In the ambulance, Joan was unresponsive, was only breathing about four times a minute, vomited a thin white fluid, and never regained consciousness. In the course of treating the child, emergency medical services personnel determined that Joan\u2019s blood sugar was normal, that her airway was not obstructed, that she was not on any sort of medication, that she did not have a fever or a history of seizures, and that she had not had any access to cleaning products or illegal drugs.\nAccording to Ms. Wright, Defendant was \u201crunning back and forth\u201d \u201carguing\u201d and \u201cfussing\u201d \u201cwith the ambulance people.\u201d As a result, Captain Tony Pack of the Wake County Emergency Medical Services called upon police to restrain Defendant. When emergency workers asked Defendant what had happened, he said that he had given Joan a bottle, departed from the room while leaving Joan on the couch, and returned about eight minutes later to find her on the floor \u201cgargling,\u201d unresponsive, and not breathing. According to investigating officers, the carpeted floor upon which Defendant claimed that Joan had fallen was 18 inches below the couch seat and 24 inches below the couch arm.\nAt the hospital, Joan began \u201cposturing,\u201d which is \u201ca term for stiffening of the extremities,\u201d a development that indicated that the \u201c[s]welling in the brain [had] reached a point that it\u2019s actually beginning to force the brain out of... the hole at the base of the skull.\u201d According to Vernon Hilliard, Jr., of the Eastern Wake County Emergency Medical Services, these symptoms generally occur \u201calmost immediately before death due to head trauma.\u201d After receiving initial treatment at Wake Medical Center, Joan was airlifted to the University of North Carolina Medical Center at around 4:00 p.m. on 7 December 2010.\nAs they travelled between the two medical facilities, Ms. Wright asked Defendant \u201cWhat did you do?\u201d Defendant did not answer Ms. Wright\u2019s question. When investigating officers arrived at the University of North Carolina Medical Center, Defendant walked away. An hour or two later, Ms. Wright reiterated her question to Defendant, who, once again, failed to answer. However, Defendant did tell Melissa Williams of the Wake County Department of Human Services that he had put Joan on a sofa with a bottle; that, when he returned to the living room eight or ten minutes later, she was lying on the floor choking and with her eyes closed; that Ms. Wright had directed him to call 911 when she called and that he had not harmed Joan. Defendant later talked to investigating officers.\nAt the University of North Garolina Medical Center, attending physicians drilled a small hole in Joan\u2019s forehead for the purpose of installing an intracranial pressure monitor and administered medications in an attempt to reduce the pressure resulting from the swelling in her brain. Unfortunately, these medical interventions could not reverse the damage caused by Joan\u2019s injuries. As a result, Joan was pronounced dead in the early morning hours of 9 December 2010.\nb. State\u2019s Expert Testimony\nDr. Molly Berkoff, the medical director of the child protection team at the University of North Carolina Medical Center, came to the hospital on 7 December 2010. According to Dr. Berkoff, the most common injuries seen in children who have experienced abusive head injury, which is a term used to describe injuries to a child\u2019s head or brain that appear to have been intentional rather than accidental in origin, were \u201cintracranial hemorrhages\u201d and \u201csubdural hemorrhages, bleeding inside the brain, [] retinal hemorrhages or bleeding inside the eye, [and] subarachnoid edema or swelling inside the brain.\u201d Abusive head trauma is \u201cthought to be related to the child\u2019s brain being moved in a rotational way, not in one linear kind of direct manner but, instead, potentially as a result of shaking.\u201d As a result, the injuries typically associated with abusive head trauma differ from those that tend to be sustained in a simple linear fall. In Dr. Berkoff\u2019s opinion, \u201chaving a child die as a result of a simple fall would be an extremely rare occurrence\u201d affecting \u201cless than .5 per million children.\u201d\nAfter arriving at the hospital, Dr. Berkoff consulted with the intensive care physicians, examined Joan briefly, and met with Defendant and Ms. Wright, who provided a history of the circumstances surrounding Joan\u2019s injury that was consistent with the other evidence presented at trial. During a second, more thorough, physical exam, Dr. Berkoff noted the presence of bruises and scratches on Joan\u2019s body, including bruises on Joan\u2019s thighs and abdomen which, according to Dr. Berkoff, were \u201cnot [in] a typical location for a bruise in a toddler,\u201d and \u201cunusual\u201d marks and bruises on Joan\u2019s buttocks. In Dr. Berkoff\u2019s opinion, the bruising that she observed constituted \u201cfurther supporting evidence of trauma.\u201d CAT scans of Joan\u2019s head \u201cshowed a subdural hematoma in her brain as well as significant swelling of her brain, cerebral edema.\u201d According to Dr. Berkoff:\n[T]he most significant thing on these scans for [Joan] was the amount of cerebral edema that she had, and . . . [the] subdural bleeding there as well. . . . I\u2019ve come to the conclusion they weren\u2019t from accidental means, for example, a simple fall. It was in a different location as well as being more extensive than what I typically see in cases where children have simple falls.\nFinally, Dr. Berkoff observed that Joan \u201chad extensive retinal hemorrhages in both eyes,\u201d which Dr. Berkoff considered to be \u201cmore supporting evidence for her being diagnosed with abusive head trauma.\u201d\nIn Dr. Berkoff\u2019s opinion, the \u201clocation of where [Joan\u2019s] subdural was and the lack of a significant history of trauma for her made me conclude that her subdural [bleeding] was most likely a result of abusive head trauma in addition to the other findings that were identified from her clinical evaluation and her radiologic evaluation.\u201d Dr. Berkoff\u2019s opinion rested, in part, on the fact that the size and location of the bleeding in Joan\u2019s brain, in addition to the extensive swelling of Joan\u2019s brain, was not consistent with known cases involving simple falls. In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Berkoff noted that Joan had \u201cnot only had this subdural which was concerning, but she also had massive cerebral edema\u201d in which \u201cher whole brain looked swollen.\u201d Moreover, the fact that Joan \u201chad extensive retinal hemorrhages in both eyes\u201d provided \u201cmore supporting evidence for her being diagnosed with abusive head trauma.\u201d Finally, Dr. Berkoff noted that Joan\u2019s injuries \u201cseemed to have developed over a very short period of time[.]\u201d In Dr. Berkoff\u2019s opinion, Joan\u2019s injuries occurred after Ms. Wright heard her speaking normally at around 11:30 a.m., a conclusion which she reached based upon the \u201crapid onset\u201d of symptoms resulting from abusive head trauma, and might have been caused by \u201cpotentially either shaking or having a child\u2019s head strike an object or an object strike a child\u2019s head[.]\u201d As a result, after \u201c[reviewing [Joan\u2019s] lab results, the different blood tests that [Joan] had done, looking at her radiologic results, her X-rays, and the CT scans of her head that she had completed, [and] discussing the case with the other medical subspecialists and the treating team in the intensive care unit\u201d and considering the presence of \u201cextensive bilateral retinal hemorrhages in multiple layers of the retinae in her eyes,\u201d \u201csignificant cerebral edema or swelling,\u201d and \u201ca subdural hemorrhage or hematoma in her brain\u201d and the fact that there \u201cwas no evidence of any significant abnormalities that could explain\u201d these injuries, Dr. Berkoff concluded that Joan\u2019s injuries were caused by \u201cphysical abuse, child physical abuse, with abusive head trauma.\u201d\nDr. Berkoff rejected Defendant\u2019s claim that Joan had been injured in a fall for a number of reasons. Among other things, when a child is injured in a simple accidental fall, Dr. Berkoff would generally \u201cexpect to see a very small collection of blood, a really tiny amount of blood in that child\u2019s brain.\u201d Although Dr. Berkoff had observed \u201csubdural hemorrhages or hematomas in children [who] have had accidental trauma,\u201d the \u201ctypes of subdural hematomas or hemorrhages [generally found in such instances] are different in appearance from those [characteristic of] abusive head trauma\u201d in that they are \u201csmaller\u201d and \u201cusually confined to a particular location.\u201d Similarly, retinal bleeding from natural causes is limited to \u201csmall, very scattered few retinal hemorrhages in isolated layers of the retina from birth trauma\u201d and in children with certain illnesses. On the other hand, \u201cextensive retinal hemorrhages in all areas of the retina, having multiple retinal hemorrhages of the eye in all areas of the retina\u201d \u201cis something that you don\u2019t see from a simple fall in an otherwise healthy child.\u201d As a result, although Dr. Berkoff acknowledged on cross-examination that subdural hematomas, cerebral edemas, and retinal hemorrhages could result from an accidental injury, she did not believe that such an accident had occurred in this instance.\nDr. Jonathan Privette, an associate chief medical examiner for the State of North Carolina, performed an autopsy on Joan\u2019s body. During that procedure, Dr. Privette observed small blunt force injuries to Joan\u2019s forehead and lip, bruises on both of Joan\u2019s hips, and a recently inflicted blunt force injury to Joan\u2019s ribs that was not consistent with the administration of CPR. After completing an external examination, Dr. Privette examined Joan\u2019s brain tissue and identified the injury caused by the insertion of the intracranial pressure monitor. In addition, Dr. Privette found at least six other areas of subdural bruising or bleeding that were not consistent with the medical treatment that Joan had received. Dr. Privette determined that Joan had sustained \u201cblunt force [head] injuries\u201d that caused \u201cimpact or pressure significant enough to damage the tissue and cause blood to leak out into the soft tissues,\u201d with the various bruises being \u201cseparate from one another, indicating that\u201d they were caused by separate applications of impact or pressure to Joan\u2019s skull. An examination of the brain tissue in the back of Joan\u2019s head revealed the presence of additional hematomas, including at least one that was \u201cso deep\u201d that \u201cthe severity of the hemorrhage\u201d led Dr. Privette to conclude that it resulted from impact rather than mere pressure. In addition, Dr. Privette found a large quantity of blood and a degree of swelling in Joan\u2019s brain indicative of a \u201csignificant injury.\u201d According to Dr. Privette, the degree of swelling and injury that he saw in Joan\u2019s brain was equivalent to the degree of trauma that was typically associated with injuries sustained in motor vehicle collisions. In Dr. Privette\u2019s opinion, Joan\u2019s injuries were inconsistent with those that he would expect to occur during a simple fall from a height of two feet. Based upon his autopsy findings, Dr. Privette concluded that \u201cthe cause of [Joan\u2019s] injuries and subsequent death\u201d was \u201cnonaccidental head injury\u201d or a \u201cconstellation of injuries\u201d not \u201ccaused by an accident\u201d which were \u201cmost likely inflicted.\u201d Although Dr. Privette acknowledged on cross-examination that accidental injuries can also cause cranial bruising, subdural hematomas, and swelling, he stated on redirect that, \u201c[i]n [his] opinion, a fall from a love seat onto a carpeted floor didn\u2019t cause these injuries or this constellation of injuries\u201d and that Joan\u2019s injuries might have resulted from blows by a human hand.\nDr. Thomas Bouldin, a professor of pathology at the University of North Carolina medical school, reviewed Dr. Privette\u2019s autopsy report and conducted his own examination of Joan\u2019s eyes and brain. Dr. Bouldin observed recent subdural bleeding, which is typically caused by the rupture of blood vessels, and swelling of the brain, both of which are typically indicative of trauma to the brain. A microscopic examination of the tissues in both of Joan\u2019s eyes revealed the presence of multiple retinal hemorrhages that \u201cwere not superficial hemorrhages but involve [d] multiple layers of the retina.\u201d In Dr. Bouldin\u2019s opinion, \u201cthe combination of an acute subdural hematoma and the presence of retinal hemorrhages in a dead child\u201d in the absence of an alternative medical explanation for the child\u2019s death \u201calways raises very strongly the possibility of inflicted head injury.\u201d As was the case with Dr. Berkoff and Dr. Privette, Dr. Bouldin agreed that any one of the types of injuries that he observed during his examination might, considered in isolation, be accidental in origin. However, on redirect examination, Dr. Bouldin reiterated that the existence of a constellation of unexplained brain swelling, subdural hematoma, and retinal hemorrhages caused him to conclude that Joan\u2019s injuries were, most likely, intentionally inflicted.\n2. Defendant\u2019s Evidence\nDr. Donald Jason, an associate professor in the Department of Pathology at Wake Forest University School of Medicine, examined the medical and investigative reports relating to Joan\u2019s injuries. In Dr. Jason\u2019s opinion, Defendant\u2019s account of the events surrounding Joan\u2019s injuries was consistent with the possibility that Joan had fallen off the couch and landed on the back of her head, sustaining \u201ca concussion with consequent loss of [her] gag reflex,\u201d losing consciousness as the result of inhaling milk, and, for that reason, being unable to deliver oxygen to her brain for eight to ten minutes. Dr. Jason opined that the injuries to the back of Joan\u2019s head might have been caused by a short fall and that the bruises on her body were relatively minor and consistent with Joan\u2019s status as a toddler. In addition, Dr. Jason denied that retinal hemorrhages indicated that child abuse had occurred and opined that Joan\u2019s subdural hematoma was \u201ceasily explainable\u201d as resulting from the intracranial pressure monitor. Dr. Jason testified that the combination of subdural hemorrhage, subgaleal hemorrhage, and retinal hemorrhage was \u201cnot necessarily\u201d indicative of abuse because Joan\u2019s injuries \u201ccould have\u201d occurred accidentally. In his experience, child abuse often resulted in skull and rib fractures, neither of which were present in this instance. Finally, Dr. Jason told the jury that the diagnosis of \u201cshaken baby syndrome\u201d was \u201ccontroversial\u201d and sometimes inaccurate and that none of Joan\u2019s injuries were \u201csuspicious of being intentional under the circumstances.\u201d On cross-examination, Dr. Jason acknowledged that Dr. Berkoff\u2019s notes indicated the presence of cerebral edema and subdural bleeding prior to the installation of an intracranial pressure bolt and conceded that the relevant medical literature indicated that fatal injuries rarely resulted from a short fall.\nB. Procedural History\nWarrants charging Defendant with felonious child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury and first degree murder were issued on 9 December and 10 December 2010, respectively. On 4 January 2011, the Wake County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with first degree murder and felonious child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury. The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 29 May 2012 Criminal Session of Wake County Superior Court. On 4 June 2012, the jury returned verdicts finding Defendant guilty of first degree murder on the basis of the felony murder rule, with felonious child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury as the predicate felony, and felonious child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury. After arresting judgment in connection with Defendant\u2019s conviction for felonious child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury, the trial court entered a judgment sentencing Defendant to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based upon his conviction for first degree murder. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nII. Substantive Legal Analysis\nA. Admissibility of Expert Testimony\nIn his first challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgment, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the admission of \u201cunreliable and inaccurate testimony from the State\u2019s experts regarding the cause of [Joan\u2019s] injuries.\u201d More specifically, Defendant contends that the trial court should have precluded the admission of the testimony of Dr. Berkoff, Dr. Bouldin, and Dr. Privette \u201cbecause it was not sufficiently reliable\u201d given recent developments in \u201c[c]urrent medical science\u201d and that the trial court\u2019s failure to do so severely prejudiced him. We do not find this argument persuasive.\n\u201cWhen, as in this case, a defendant fails to object to the admission of the testimony at trial, we review only for plain error.\u201d State v. Moore, 366 N.C. 100, 105-06, 726 S.E.2d 168, 173 (2012) (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(a) (4) (stating that, \u201c[i]n criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by objection ... may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error\u201d); State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 516, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (internal citation omitted); and State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 659-60, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)). The plain error rule:\nis always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done, or where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused, or the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial or where the error is such as to seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings or where it can be fairly said the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the juiy\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\nMoore, 366 N.C. at 106, 726 S.E.2d at 173 (quoting Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S. Ct. 381, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)). In order for an unpreserved evidentiary error to constitute plain error, the defendant must meet the burden of showing that, \u201cafter examination of the entire record, the error \u2018had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u2019 \u201d Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (quoting Odom at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378, and citing State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986)). We will now apply this standard to evaluate the validity of Defendant\u2019s argument.\nThe admission of expert testimony is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702, which provides, in pertinent part, that:\n(a) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all of the following apply:\n(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data.\n(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods.\n(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.\nAlthough Defendant has not argued that any of the State\u2019s expert witnesses were not qualified to present expert testimony or that their testimony was based on insufficient data, he does argue that certain opinions presented by the State\u2019s experts were \u201cunreliable given the current state of medical research^]\u201d Thus, Defendant\u2019s argument focuses on the proper application of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 702(a)(2) and 702(a)(3).\nAlthough their specific areas of expertise varied, all three of the State\u2019s expert witnesses testified that their review of the pertinent medical records and other available information indicated that Joan\u2019s external bruises, retinal bleeding, and intracranial bleeding and swelling were consistent with previously observed cases involving intentionally inflicted injuries and were inconsistent with previously observed cases involving accidentally inflicted injuries, such as a simple fall as suggested in Defendant\u2019s statements.\nFor example, Dr. Berkoff observed bruises and scratches on Joan\u2019s body, including unusual marks and bruises on her buttocks that were not in \u201ca typical location\u201d for bruises resulting from a toddler\u2019s fall. In addition, the extent and location of bleeding in Joan\u2019s brain, coupled with the extensive swelling of her brain, was not consistent with cases in which a child was known to have been injured as the result of a simple fall. Furthermore, Dr. Berkoff testified that the \u201cpattern of the subdural bleeding did not look like that in children that [she had] assessed\u201d after a simple fall. In Dr. Berkoff\u2019s experience, \u201chaving a child die as a result of a simple fall would be an extremely rare occurrence.\u201d As a result, in light of the unusual bruising on Joan\u2019s body; the fact that she had unexplained \u201cextensive bilateral retinal hemorrhages in multiple layers of the retinae in her eyes,\u201d \u201csignificant cerebral edema or swelling,\u201d and \u201ca subdural hemorrhage or hematoma in her brain;\u201d and the fact that Joan\u2019s injuries would be extremely unlikely to have resulted from a simple fall from a couch, Dr. Berkoff was of the opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Joan\u2019s injuries and death were caused by \u201cchild physical abuse, with abusive head trauma.\u201d\nSimilarly, Dr. Privette testified that he observed a recently inflicted blunt force injury to Joan\u2019s ribs that was not located at a place where CPR-related bruising tends to occur. Dr. Privette also determined that Joan had sustained a number of individual and separate \u201cblunt force injuries\u201d that resulted in \u201cimpact or pressure significant enough to damage the tissue and cause blood to leak out into the soft tissues.\u201d The extent of the cerebral bleeding that he observed, separate from that associated with the intracranial pressure bolt, including at least one very deep hematoma, led Dr. Privette to conclude that this cerebral bleeding stemmed from an impact in which Joan\u2019s \u201chead either struck something or something struck [her] head\u201d rather than from mere pressure. In Dr. Privette\u2019s opinion, the type and degree of Joan\u2019s injuries were not typical of those generally seen as the result of a fall from a height of less than five feet. Instead, the degree of swelling and brain injury that Joan exhibited was similar to that seen in those injured in automobile collisions. Based upon his examination and findings, Dr. Privette testified that \u201cthe cause of [Joan\u2019s] injuries and subsequent death\u201d was \u201cnonaccidental head injury\u201d or a \u201cconstellation of injuries\u201d that were \u201cmost likely inflicted\u201d rather than \u201ccaused by an accident.\u201d\nFinally, Dr. Bouldin observed that Joan had multiple retinal hemorrhages that \u201cwere not superficial hemorrhages but involve [d] multiple layers of the retina.\u201d As a result, Dr. Bouldin opined that \u201cthe combination of an acute subdural hematoma and the presence of retinal hemorrhages in a dead child\u201d given the absence of any other medical explanation for the child\u2019s death \u201calways raises very strongly the possibility of inflicted head injury.\u201d Thus, the common thread in the State\u2019s expert testimony was that it would be highly unusual for a child to suffer serious injury or death as the result of a fall of approximately two feet from a sofa onto a carpeted floor; that, at the time of her death, Joan had sustained extensive and profound damage to her brain; that the nature and degree of her injuries was comparable to the sorts of serious trauma seen in a motor vehicle accident; and that, based upon the type, location, and severity of her injuries coupled with the absence of any alternative explanation for the nature and extent of those injuries, Joan\u2019s death most likely resulted from an intentionally inflicted injury.\nAccording to Defendant, the opinions of the State\u2019s experts \u201cconcluding that [Joan\u2019s] injuries were intentionally inflicted\u201d rested \u201con previously accepted medical science that is now in doubt\u201d and that, because \u201c[c]urrent medical science has cast significant doubt\u201d on previously accepted theories regarding the possible causes of brain injuries in children, there is currently \u201cno medical certainty around these topics.\u201d Based upon that set of assertions, Defendant contends that \u201cmedical experts should be precluded\u201d from offering testimony such as that allowed by the trial court in this case.\nThe fundamental deficiency in Defendant\u2019s argument is that it rests upon information that is not contained in the record developed before the trial court. \u201c \u2018The appellate courts can judicially know only what appears of record.\u2019 \u2018This Court\u2019s review on appeal is limited to what is in the record or in the designated verbatim transcript of proceedings.\u2019 \u201d State v. Price, 344 N.C. 583, 593, 476 S.E.2d 317, 323 (1996) (quoting Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point, 321 N.C. 584, 586, 364 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1988), and State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 548, 331 S.E.2d 251, 254, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 188, 337 S.E.2d 862 (1985) (internal citation omitted)). \u201cIn making our review and reaching our determination upon the facts of a particular case, we can judicially know only what appears of record on appeal and will not speculate as to matters outside the record.\u201d State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 105, 291 S.E.2d 653, 657 (1982) (citing Tomlins v. Cranford, 227 N.C. 323, 42 S.E. 2d 100 (1947)).\nThe record developed at trial contains no information concerning the state of \u201ccurrent medical science\u201d or the degree to which \u201csignificant doubt\u201d has arisen with respect to the manner in which brain injuries in young children occur. In his brief, Defendant supports his argument with citations to a recent dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsberg expressed doubts about shaken baby syndrome and to a 2009 law review article, neither of which rest upon evidence presented to the trial court and neither of which are binding upon this Court. Although Defendant contends that \u201cthe current state of medical research\u201d in the diagnosis of head injuries in children rendered the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses \u201cunreliable,\u201d we cannot evaluate the validity of this claim in the absence of record evidence establishing what the current state of medical research into the subject of childhood head injuries actually is. While Defendant is correct in reminding us that, when a trial court is \u201cpresented with \u2018compelling new perspectives on otherwise settled theories or techniques,\u2019 \u201d Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 460, 597 S.E.2d 674, 687 (2004), it should look \u201cbeyond precedent to determine whether an expert\u2019s area of testimony is sufficiently reliable,\u201d the trial court was simply not presented with any such evidence in this case and did not, for that reason, have any opportunity to determine whether accepted medical thinking on the issues relevant to this case had changed. Moreover, Defendant\u2019s contention that aspects of the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses conflicted with certain autopsy findings and with other \u201cmedical facts\u201d and that there were contradictions and inconsistencies among the testimony offered by the State\u2019s experts ignores well-established North Carolina law to the effect that \u201c[discrepancies and contradictions in the evidence are for the jury to resolve.\u201d State v. Hendrix, 19 N.C. App. 99, 101, 197 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1973). Finally, Defendant\u2019s contention that the testimony of Dr. Privette and Dr. Bouldin was overly \u201cspeculative\u201d cannot be deemed persuasive in light of the detailed reasons that they gave in support of the conclusions that they reached. As a result, Defendant has failed to show that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the testimony of the State\u2019s expert witnesses, so he is not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.\nB. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nSecondly, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge against him for insufficiency of the evidence. More specifically, Defendant contends that \u201cthe evidence was insufficient to show that [Joan\u2019s] injuries were intentionally inflicted; that [Defendant] used his hands as deadly weapons; and that the injuries occurred at the time [Defendant] was caring for [Joan].\u201d Defendant\u2019s argument lacks merit.\n\u201cIn reviewing a motion to dismiss, this Court must determine \u2018whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and of the defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense.\u2019 Substantial evidence has been defined as. \u2018that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 Further, the evidence should be considered in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. Any contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence are for resolution by the jury and do not warrant dismissal.\u201d State v. Carrilo, 149 N.C. App. 543, 548, 562 S.E.2d 47, 50 (2002) (quoting State v. Bates, 313 N.C. 580, 581, 330 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1985), and State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 685, 281 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1981) (other citation omitted)). \u201cFurther, if the trial court determines that a reasonable inference of the defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the evidence, it must deny the defendant\u2019s motion and send the case to the jury even though the evidence may also support reasonable inferences of the defendant\u2019s innocence.\u201d State v. Wright, 127 N.C. App. 592, 597, 492 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1997) (citing State v. Scott, 323 N.C. 350, 353, 372 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1988)), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 584, 502 S.E.2d 616 (1998).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17(a) provides, in pertinent part, that any murder \u201cwhich shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first degreef.]\u201d \u201c[FJelonious child abuse committed with the use of a deadly weapon may serve as the underlying felony for felony murder purposes [in the event that the State proves] beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant actually intended to commit the underlying offense (felonious child abuse) with the use of [his] hands as a deadly weapon[.]\u201d State v. Krider, 145 N.C. App. 711, 714, 550 S.E.2d 861, 863 (2001) (citing State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 168, 538 S.E.2d 917, 925 (2000), and State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 493, 488 S.E.2d 576, 589 (1997)), appeal dismissed, 355 N.C. 219, 560 S.E.2d 150 (2002).\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-318.4(a), \u201c[a] parent or any other person providing care to or supervision of a child less than 16 years of age who intentionally inflicts any serious physical injury upon or to the child or who intentionally commits an assault upon the child which results in any serious physical injury to the child is guilty of a Class E felony[.]\u201d\nSpecific-intent crimes are \u201ccrimes which have as an essential element a specific intent that a result be reached.\u201d General-intent crimes are \u201ccrimes which only require the doing of some act.\u201d Felonious child abuse requires the State to prove \u201cthat the accused intentionally inflicted a serious physical injury upon the child or intentionally committed an assault resulting in a serious physical injury to the child.\u201d The State is not required to prove that the defendant \u201cspecifically intended that the injury be serious.\u201d Felony murder on the basis of felonious child abuse requires the State to prove that the victim was killed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of felonious child abuse with the use of a deadly weapon. See N.C. [Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 14-17. This crime does not require the State to prove any specific intent on the part of the accused.\nPierce, 346 N.C. at 494, 488 S.E.2d at 589 (quoting State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 148, 451 S.E.2d 826, 844 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 115 S. Ct. 2634, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1995); State v. Elliott, 344 N.C. 242, 278, 475 S.E.2d 202, 218-19 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1106, 117 S.Ct. 1111, 137 L.Ed.2d 312 (1997); and State v. Campbell, 316 N.C. 168, 172, 340 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1986)). As a result, \u201c[f]elony murder on the basis of felonious child abuse requires the State to prove that the killing took place while the accused was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate felonious child abuse with the use of a deadly weapon.\u201d See N.C. [Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 14-17. \u201cWhen a strong or mature person makes an attack by hands alone upon a small child, the jury may infer that the hands were used as deadly weapons.\u201d Pierce, 346 N.C. at 493, 488 S.E.2d at 589 (citing Elliott, 344 N.C. at 268-69, 475 S.E.2d at 213 and State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 527, 308 S.E.2d 317, 325 (1983)). Moreover, \u201cwhen an adult has exclusive custody of a child for a period of time during which the child suffers injuries that are neither self-inflicted nor accidental, there is sufficient evidence to create an inference that the adult intentionally inflicted those injuries.\u201d State v. Liberato, 156 N.C. App. 182, 186, 576 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (2003) (citing State v. Riggsbee, 72 N.C. App. 167, 171, 323 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1984)).\nA careful examination of the record evidence considered in the light most favorable to the State tends to show that Joan was a normal, healthy baby who had no medical problems in the days leading up to her death. By the age of fourteen months, Joan could walk, drink from a cup and hold a bottle, and had no tendency to choke when consuming food or drink. After Defendant moved in with Ms. Wright, Joan \u201cstarted to . . . scream a lot\u201d when Defendant held her, while Defendant \u201cjust didn\u2019t like the fact\u201d that Joan tended to cling to her mother. The record further reflects that, on the morning of 7 December 2010, Joan had no visible bruises, ate normally and appeared healthy. After Ms. Wright left the house on the morning of 7 December 2010, Defendant was the only adult in the house with Joan. Although Joan sounded normal when Ms. Wright heard her over the phone at around 11:30 a.m., Defendant told Ms. Wright that Joan was not breathing and was \u201cgone\u201d about 30 minutes later. At the time that emergency medical services personnel arrived, Joan was unconscious, unresponsive, and barely breathing. By the time that an ambulance carrying Joan reached the hospital, Joan had started to \u201cseize and posture,\u201d indicating that she had a grave, potentially fatal, condition. Although Joan was treated at Wake Medical Center and University of North Carolina Medical Center, she never regained consciousness and was pronounced dead early on 9 December 2010. An external examination of Joan\u2019s body revealed the presence of bruises and scratches, including unusual bruises on her buttocks that were not \u201ctypical\u201d of the bruises that usually resulted from a toddler\u2019s fall and a recently inflicted blunt force injury to her ribs that did not appear to have resulted from the administration of CPR. An internal examination showed that Joan had suffered extensive bilateral retinal hemorrhages in multiple layers of the retinae in her eyes, significant cerebral edema or swelling, and extensive bleeding or subdural hemorrhage in her brain, indicating that Joan\u2019s head had been subjected to a number of individual and separate blunt force injuries that were sufficiently significant to damage Joan\u2019s brain and to cause a leakage of blood. Joan\u2019s injuries, which could have been caused by human hands, did not result from medical treatment or a mere fall from a couch onto a carpeted floor. According to the State\u2019s evidence, it would be an extraordinarily rare occurrence for a child to die from a two to three foot fall, and the size, location, and degree of Joan\u2019s subdural hematoma and edema and the fact that Joan exhibited the presence of extensive retinal hemorrhages were inconsistent with the minor injuries that are typically sustained in a fall and are more consistent with the sort of injuries that are typically sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The record evidence which we have summarized in this paragraph is more than sufficient to support a jury determination that Defendant had exclusive custody of Joan at the time that she suffered fatal injuries, that her injuries were neither self-inflicted nor accidental, and that Defendant\u2019s account of what had happened to Joan conflicted with the relevant medical evidence. For that reason, the record contained sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that Defendant had intentionally assaulted Joan while using his hands as deadly weapons and that Joan sustained fatal injuries as a result of this assault. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant\u2019s dismissal motion.\nIn seeking to persuade us to reach a different result, Defendant argues that the State did not adduce evidence that Joan\u2019s injuries were intentionally inflicted, rather than accidental. However, Dr. Berkoff specifically testified that, in her opinion, Joan\u2019s death resulted from abusive head trauma. In addition, both Dr. Privette and Dr. Bouldin testified that Joan\u2019s death likely resulted from an intentional rather than an accidental injury. Thus, the record contains ample evidence tending to show that Joan\u2019s injuries were intentionally, rather than accidentally, inflicted.\nSecondly, Defendant directs our attention to evidence that differentiates this case from other similar cases in which we have held that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, and to evidence that in Defendant\u2019s view tended to show Defendant\u2019s innocence. For example, Defendant points to the fact that the record did not reveal the existence of a long-term history of abuse, that Defendant gave a consistent account of what happened on the morning of Joan\u2019s death, and that Dr. Jason testified that the injuries which Joan sustained could have been of accidental origin. However, as we have previously discussed, the fact that the record contains evidence that tends to contradict the evidence presented by the State does not justify the dismissal of a criminal charge for insufficiency of the evidence.\nSimilarly, Defendant argues that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that he used his hands as a deadly weapon. In support of this argument, Defendant places principal reliance on a comparison of the facts in this case with the facts present in other cases in which a defendant\u2019s hands have been found to be a deadly weapon, noting that, in each of these cases, either the defendant admitted to having used his hands to injure a child or there was additional evidence bearing on the \u201chands as a deadly weapon\u201d issue. In light of the testimony given by the State\u2019s expert witnesses that Joan suffered severe injuries that were traumatic in origin, that Joan\u2019s death resulted from these injuries, that the injuries which Joan had sustained could have been caused by human hands, and that, until the morning of 7 December 2010, Joan was a normal, healthy, and uninjured child, we hold that the record contained sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a determination that Defendant used his hands as a deadly weapon.\nMoreover, Defendant argues that the State failed to establish that Joan\u2019s injuries occurred when she was in Defendant\u2019s exclusive custody. However, Dr. Berkoff testified that Joan\u2019s injuries occurred after Ms. Wright heard Joan speaking normally at around 11:30 a.m. on 7 December 2009 given the \u201crapid onset\u201d of symptoms resulting from abusive head trauma. The undisputed evidence reflects that Joan was in the exclusive custody of Defendant during the time between his 11:30 a.m. phone call with Ms. Wright and the time at which Joan\u2019s injuries were reported to Ms. Wright and emergency medical services personnel. Although Defendant argues that certain \u201cmedical literature\u201d suggests that a child may have a \u201clucid interval\u201d of up to 72 hours after an injury, no such evidence was offered at trial. Even if such evidence had been presented for the jury\u2019s consideration, such evidence would go to the weight rather than the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence. Finally, Defendant\u2019s citation to State v. Reber, 71 N.C. App. 256, 321 S.E.2d 484 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 335, 327 S.E.2d 897 (1985), is unavailing in that, in Reber, unlike this case, none of the expert witnesses testified that the child\u2019s injuries had occurred during the time when she was alone with the defendant. Thus, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to allow an inference that Joan\u2019s injuries were sustained while she was in Defendant\u2019s exclusive custody. As a result, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant\u2019s dismissal motion.\nC. Felonv-Murder Charge Predicated on Felonious Child Abuse\nThirdly, Defendant argues that, \u201cunder the merger doctrine, felony child abuse is not a viable underlying felony\u201d sufficient to support a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder rule. Although Defendant \u201cacknowledges that this issue has been decided adversely [to his position] by the Court of Appeals,\u201d he has \u201craise[d] the claim for potential further review.\u201d However, we lack the authority to provide Defendant with the further review that he seeks. According to well-established law, \u201c[w]here a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.\u201d In re Appeal of Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). As a result, Defendant is not entitled to relief based on this challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nD. Cruel and Unusual Punishment\nFinally, Defendant argues that his conviction and resulting sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole are \u201cdisproportionate\u201d and constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant\u2019s argument lacks merit.\nThe Eighth Amendment states: \u201cExcessive bail shall not be. required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.\u201d \u201cThe concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment. Embodied in the Constitution\u2019s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the \u2018precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.\u2019 \u201d Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825, 835 (2010) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910)). In determining whether a particular sentence is categorically disproportionate, the United States Supreme Court has \u201cused categorical rules to define Eighth Amendment standards\u201d which consider both the nature of an offense and the offender characteristics, and has concluded, among other things, that capital punishment is impermissible for offenses other than homicide, for offenders who committed a homicide before the age of eighteen, or for persons with very low intellectual functioning. Id.\nDefendant does not argue that imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the offense of first degree murder is categorically impermissible, or that he is a member of a category or class of offender for whom such a sentence would violate the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held \u201cthat neither imposition of a life sentence nor imposition of consecutive life sentences for first-degree murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.\u201d State v. Bronson, 333 N.C. 67, 81, 423 S.E.2d 772, 780 (1992). In addition, \u201cNorth Carolina courts have consistently held that when a punishment does not exceed the limits fixed by the statute, the punishment cannot be classified as cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense.\u201d State v. Evans, 162 N.C. App. 540, 544, 591 S.E.2d 564, 567 (2004) (citation omitted). According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1447(a), a murder committed during the commission of certain categories of felonies constitutes first degree murder, which is a Class A offense. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(c) provides that, upon conviction of a Class A offense, a defendant shall be sentenced to \u201clife imprisonment without parole or death[.]\u201d Thus, the sentence imposed upon Defendant was authorized by statute. Once again, as we have already noted, this Court is bound by its previous decisions. As a result, given that the sentence imposed upon Defendant was authorized by the relevant statutory provisions, it cannot be \u201cclassified as cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense.\u201d Evans, 162 N.C. App at 544, 591 S.E.2d at 567. Thus, Defendant is not entitled to relief on the basis of a categorical challenge to his sentence.\nIn addition, Defendant urges this court to find that, even if his sentence is constitutional under the principle enunciated in the preceding paragraph, it is not \u201cproportionate to the crime committed.\u201d In support of this contention, Defendant directs our attention to the proportionality review conducted in capital cases and urges us to conduct a similar review in this case. We conclude that Defendant has failed to establish a right to relief based on the argument that his sentence, while generally permissible for the crime of first degree murder, is disproportionate when applied to his individual circumstances.\n\u201cThe controlling opinion in Harmelin explained its approach for determining whether a sentence for a term of years is grossly disproportionate for a particular defendant\u2019s crime\u201d and directed that a \u201ccourt must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.\u201d Graham, 560 U.S. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 836 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836, 871 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy)). \u201cOnly in exceedingly rare noncapital cases will sentences imposed be so grossly disproportionate as to be considered cruel or unusual.\u201d State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 609, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832 (1998) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 389, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980) (other citation omitted), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111, 119 S.Ct. 883, 142 L.Ed.2d 783 (1999). We see no basis, given the facts surrounding the crime for which Defendant has been convicted, for concluding that this is one of the \u201cexceedingly rare noncapital cases\u201d in which the sentence imposed is \u201cgrossly disproportionate\u201d to the crime for which Defendant stands convicted.\nIn urging us to reach a different result, Defendant argues, among other things, that the record evidence fails to conclusively establish his guilt. For example, Defendant contends that the evidence against him was circumstantial, repeats his argument that the expert testimony presented by the State was \u201ccontrary to medical facts and current research,\u201d and reiterates that his expert witness testified that Joan\u2019s injuries could have been the result of an accident. In addition, Defendant directs our attention to other felonious child abuse cases that, in his opinion, were more egregious than this case. However, the evidence presented in this case by the State, which the jury clearly believed, tended to show that Defendant intentionally inflicted a number of severe and traumatic injuries to the head and body of a previously healthy fourteen month old child, causing massive swelling and bleeding in and around the brain, extensive retinal hemorrhaging, and death. As a result, we see no basis for concluding that Defendant\u2019s sentence was so disproportionate as to constitute prohibited cruel and unusual punishment.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that none of Defendant\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s judgment have merit. As a result, the trial court\u2019s judgment should, and hereby does, remain undisturbed.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STROUD concur.\n. J.W. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion as Joan, a pseudonym used to protect the child\u2019s privacy and for ease of reading.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Nicholaos G. Vlahos, for the State.", "Kathryn L. VandenBerg for Defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHNATHAN BLAKE PERRY\nNo. COA13-30\nFiled 20 August 2013\n1. Evidence \u2014 expert testimony \u2014 cause of injuries \u2014 current state of medical research\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a first-degree murder case by allowing the admission of testimony from the State\u2019s experts regarding the cause of the minor child\u2019s injuries. Although defendant contended that \u201cthe current state of medical research\u201d in the diagnosis of head injuries in children rendered the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses unreliable, the validity of this claim could not be evaluated based on the absence of record evidence.\n2. Homicide \u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 intentional assault of child \u2014 hands used as deadly weapons\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder. The record contained sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that defendant had intentionally assaulted the minor child while using his hands as deadly weapons and that the child sustained fatal injuries as a result of this assault.\n3. Homicide \u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 felony murder rule \u2014 underlying felony \u2014 felony child abuse\nAlthough defendant argued that felony child abuse was not a viable underlying felony sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree murder under the felony murder rule, defendant acknowledged that this issue has already been decided adversely to his position by the Court of Appeals.\n4. Sentencing \u2014 life imprisonment without parole \u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 not cruel and unusual punishment\nThe trial court did not violate defendant\u2019s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by sentencing him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the crime of first-degree murder. The imposed sentence was authorized by the relevant statutory provisions, and thus, could not be classified as cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 5 June 2012 by Judge Michael J. O\u2019Foghludha in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Nicholaos G. Vlahos, for the State.\nKathryn L. VandenBerg for Defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0304-01", "first_page_order": 314, "last_page_order": 335 }