{
  "id": 8547876,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HOYLE CLAXTON MEDLIN",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Medlin",
  "decision_date": "1974-09-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 7420SC681",
  "first_page": "84",
  "last_page": "86",
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      "cite": "23 N.C. App. 84"
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 526",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "276 N.C. 690",
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      "reporter": "N.C.",
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "281 N.C. 275",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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    {
      "cite": "189 S.E. 2d 481",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "281 N.C. 592",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:39.683180+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Britt and Hedrick concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HOYLE CLAXTON MEDLIN"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BALEY, Judge.\nThe defendant assigns as error the failure of the court to grant his motion for a mistrial and a continuance. He asserts that the reference to the prior offense of defendant as set out in the warrant which charged him with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second offense, was prejudicial.\nUpon arraignment the charge in the warrant of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second offense, was read to defendant in the presence of prospective jurors. This reference to a prior offense as an essential element of that charge was entirely proper. The defendant did not object or move for mistrial at this time. The District Attorney then elected to try defendant only for a first offense. This election was obviously for the benefit of the defendant. Then, in the selection of the petit jury, reference was made to the warrant and the prior offense and upon this occasion defendant made a motion for mistrial and a continuance of the case.\nAt the time of jury selection it is clear that the prospective members of the jury were already aware of the prior offense of the defendant as set out in the warrant. The additional comment of the District Attorney while not approved did not add any information to that already made public in the arraignment. Whether there was sufficient prejudice to defendant to justify ordering a mistrial and continuance was a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. He was in the best position to make this determination. In the absence of abuse of such discretion \u2014which does not here appear \u2014 the action of the trial court in denying the motion for a mistrial and continuance will not be disturbed. State v. Daye, 281 N.C. 592, 189 S.E. 2d 481; State v. Cox, 281 N.C. 275, 188 S.E. 2d 356; State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 174 S.E. 2d 526.\nDefendant was tried for a first offense of driving intoxicated. The evidence submitted and the charge of the court related solely to the elements of a first offense. The State\u2019s evidence was strong and convincing. Defendant has shown no error sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.\nNo error.\nJudges Britt and Hedrick concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BALEY, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General James H. Carson, Jr., by Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray and Assistant Attorney General William W. Melvin, for the State.",
      "Gerald R. Chandler for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HOYLE CLAXTON MEDLIN\nNo. 7420SC681\n(Filed 18 September 1974)\nAutomobiles \u00a7 125; Criminal Law \u00a7 34\u2014 drunken driving \u2014 charge of second offense \u2014 trial for first offense \u2014 references to prior offense \u2014 continuance \u2014\u25a0 mistrial\nWhere defendant was charged in the warrant with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second offense, the reference to a prior offense when the warrant was read at the arraignment in the presence of prospective jurors prior to the solictor\u2019s announcement that defendant would be tried only for a first offense was proper, and defendant was not prejudiced when, in the selection of the petit jury, the solicitor referred to the warrant and prior offense since the prospective jurors were already aware of the prior offense as set out in the warrant; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the denial of defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial and a continuance based on the references to the prior offense.\nAppeal by defendant from Chess, Special Judge, 11 February 1974 Session of Superior Court held in Stanly County.\nHeard in the Court of Appeals 3 September 1974.\nDefendant was convicted in District Court on a warrant charging a second offense of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a violation of G.S. 20-138. He appealed to Superior Court for a trial de novo.\nUpon arraignment in the Superior Court, the District Attorney informed the court that the defendant was charged with a second violation of G.S. 20-138 but announced that the State would not ask for a verdict of guilty of driving under the influence, second offense. The defendant was placed on trial for a first offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. During the selection of the jury, reference was made by the District Attorney to the prior charge against the defendant, and the warrant was read to prospective jurors. Defendant moved for a mistrial and a continuance. This motion was denied.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant was driving his truck on the public highway weaving to' the left of the center line; that he was staggering and unsteady on his feet when he got out of his vehicle; that there was a strong odor of alcohol on his breath; his talk was very slurred; and that, in the opinion of the arresting officer, he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.\nDefendant offered no evidence.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty. From judgment imposed thereon, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General James H. Carson, Jr., by Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray and Assistant Attorney General William W. Melvin, for the State.\nGerald R. Chandler for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0084-01",
  "first_page_order": 112,
  "last_page_order": 114
}