{ "id": 8548929, "name": "CAROL FLETCHER v. GALE CORVIN FLETCHER, MABEL FLETCHER LAWSON and husband, WILLIAM C. LAWSON", "name_abbreviation": "Fletcher v. Fletcher", "decision_date": "1974-10-02", "docket_number": "No. 7415SC671", "first_page": "207", "last_page": "211", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "23 N.C. App. 207" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "67 S.E. 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271326 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/152/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E. 2d 714", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570275 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559699 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560891 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550081 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574599 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0731-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 412, "char_count": 8022, "ocr_confidence": 0.604, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6538955773692357e-07, "percentile": 0.69321184362486 }, "sha256": "5db4bf47f81bc47fd8a789751517fb1f39d025f47d13c1be2978f6a68033de50", "simhash": "1:33f7cc600857927a", "word_count": 1311 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:39.683180+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Campbell and Parker concur." ], "parties": [ "CAROL FLETCHER v. GALE CORVIN FLETCHER, MABEL FLETCHER LAWSON and husband, WILLIAM C. LAWSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nIn a non jury trial the resolution of conflicting evidence is a matter for the Court, and when the evidence is sufficient to support \u00a1the findings and when error of law does not appear upon the face of the record proper, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. Wall v. Timberlake, 272 N.C. 731, 158 S.E. 2d 780. The judge\u2019s factual findings, if supported by competent evidence, are as conclusive on appeal as the verdict of a jury. McMichael v. Borough Motors, Inc., 14 N.C. App. 441, 188 S.E. 2d 721. This is the rule notwithstanding that, as here, there is evidence which would sustain contrary findings.\nThe Court made findings that respondent had inflicted violence on petitioner, that respondent threatened to kill her if she did not sign the separation agreement, and that she signed the agreement because she was afraid not to sign. These and other findings were supported by the petitioner\u2019s evidence. The Court was at liberty to disbelieve all of respondent\u2019s evidence to the contrary.\nG.S. 52-6 establishes statutory requirements for the execution of separation agreements between husband and wife. Among other things, the certifying officer must conduct an examination and determine that the agreement was voluntarily executed, and certify that the agreement is not unreasonable or injurious to the wife. See Tripp v. Tripp, 266 N.C. 378, 379, 146 S.E. 2d 507, 508. \u201cThe certificate of the officer shall be conclusive to the facts therein stated but may be impeached for fraud as other judgments may be.\u201d G.S. 52-6. See Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 128 S.E. 2d 235. The certificate is conclusive except for fraud. Tripp, supra, at 379, 146 S.E. 2d, at 508. Duress and undue influence are both a species of fraud. Joyner v. Joyner, 264 N.C. 27, 140 S.E. 2d 714. Duress may take the form of unlawfully inducing one to make a contract or to perform some other act against his own free will. It may be manifested by threats or by the exhibition of force which apparently cannot be resisted. See Smithwick v. Whitley, 152 N.C. 369, 67 S.E. 913.\nThe Court\u2019s findings of fact, based upon evidence offered by petitioner, supports the Court\u2019s conclusions of law, including the conclusions that respondent practiced coercion, undue influence and duress upon petitioner so as to render petitioner\u2019s execution of the agreement involuntary. Such coercion amounts to fraud and renders the agreement void and not binding on petitioner.\nThe judgment from which respondent appealed is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Campbell and Parker concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "VAUGHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "W. R. Dalton, Jr., for plaintiff appellee.", "Frederick J. Sternberg for defendant appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAROL FLETCHER v. GALE CORVIN FLETCHER, MABEL FLETCHER LAWSON and husband, WILLIAM C. LAWSON\nNo. 7415SC671\n(Filed 2 October 1974)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 57\u2014 nonjury trial \u2014 review of trial court\u2019s findings\nIn a nonjury trial the resolution of conflicting evidence is a matter for the court, and when the evidence is sufficient to support the findings and when error of law does not appear upon the face of the record proper, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal.\n2. Husband and Wife \u00a7 10\u2014 separation agreement signed under duress \u2014 ownership of property\nIn a proceeding for a partition sale of real property, evidence was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s findings that the husband had inflicted violence on the wife, that the husband threatened to kill her if she did not sign a separation agreement by which the husband claimed sole ownership of the real property in question, and that the wife signed the agreement because she was afraid not to sign.\n3. Husband and Wife \u00a7 10\u2014 separation agreement \u2014 examination vof wife \u2014 certificate attacked for fraud\nG.S. 52-6 requires that a certifying officer conduct an examination and determine that a separation agreement was voluntarily executed and certify that the agreement is not unreasonable or injurious to the wife; the certificate of the officer is conclusive of the facts therein stated, but it may be impeached for fraud.\nAppeal by defendants from Clark, Judge, 4 February 1974 Session of Superior Court held in Alamance County.\nThis is a special proceeding for a partition sale of real property.\nPetitioner, Carol Fletcher, alleged that she was formerly married to Gale Corvin Fletcher, respondent; that she and respondent had become owners of an estate by the entireties in certain real property; that respondent had conveyed his interest in said property by deed of trust to secure a purported debt; that she never signed said deed of trust and therefore did not convey her interest in the land; that thereafter she and respondent were divorced; and, that an actual partition cannot be made without injuries to the interested parties.\nRespondent answered and, among other things, claimed sole ownership of the real property in question by reason of the provisions of a separation agreement dated 16 March 1971.\nPetitioner\u2019s reply attacked the validity of the separation agreement, claiming the agreement was not executed in compliance with the formal requirements of law and that the agreement was signed by petitioner under coercion and undue influence exercised upon her by respondent.\nFollowing petition, answer and reply, the Clerk transferred the cause to the civil issue docket of the Superior Court where the case was tried by the Court without a jury.\nThe issue at trial was whether the separation agreement excluded plaintiff from any interest in the real estate.\nThe record indicates that respondent offered evidence first, as follows. He and petitioner entered into a separation agreement on 16 March 1971, whereby petitioner conveyed to respondent her interest in the real property in question. Although respondent testified that petitioner signed a quitclaim deed to the property, he admitted that there had been no delivery of the deed. At the time of and prior to its execution, respondent and petitioner had negotiated with respect to the agreement. Respondent engaged the services of an attorney and petitioner elected not to employ an attorney to represent her interest.\nRespondent never mistreated petitioner. He never made a threat- on her life and did not threaten to kill petitioner if she did not \u00a1sign the agreement. Respondent admitted one act of violence on petitioner when petitioner returned home after staying out all night. Respondent slammed a door on her arm, but both parties were at fault. Respondent never interferred with petitioner at the privy examination conducted in the magistrate\u2019s office and the examination was conducted as required by statute;\nIn summary, the thrust of respondent\u2019s evidence was that petitioner freely and voluntarily executed the agreement and that the same was not unreasonable or injurious to her.\nPetitioner testified in summary as follows. Respondent had inflicted violence on her person and once used a wrench to cut her hand when she was attempting to enter a storm door. Petitioner talked with the respondent\u2019s attorney about the separation agreement but only in respondent\u2019s presence. Petitioner saw the deed of separation for the first time on 16 March 1971.\nWhen petitioner signed the separation agreement in the magistrate\u2019s office, the door was not shut and respondent and his attorney were observing her during the examination. Prior to the time of the signing of the separation agreement by petitioner, respondent had threatened to kill her and make her death look like an accident if she did not sign. She believed respondent and signed the agreement for fear she would be harmed if she refused to do so.\nThe Court made findings of fact in favor of petitioner which were generally in accord with petitioner\u2019s testimony and concluded that the signing of the separation agreement by petitioner was not voluntary and of her own free will but was the result of coercion and duress practiced upon her by respondent. The Court adjudged that the separation agreement was void and petitioner was a tenant in common in the property.\nW. R. Dalton, Jr., for plaintiff appellee.\nFrederick J. Sternberg for defendant appellants." }, "file_name": "0207-01", "first_page_order": 235, "last_page_order": 239 }