{
  "id": 8550345,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURLEY SPICER",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Spicer",
  "decision_date": "1974-10-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 7429SC715",
  "first_page": "364",
  "last_page": "365",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "23 N.C. App. 364"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "199 S.E. 2d 462",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1973,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "465"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "284 N.C. 81",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8559946
      ],
      "year": 1973,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "84"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/284/0081-01"
      ]
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    "simhash": "1:3127e00d9a7f1f14",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:39.683180+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Parker and Vaughn concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURLEY SPICER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nThe defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling defendant\u2019s motion for nonsuit. \u201cOn such motion the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment thereon and every reasonable inference therefrom. . . . Only the evidence favorable to the State is considered, and defendant\u2019s evidence relating to matters of defense or defendant\u2019s evidence in conflict with that of the State is not considered.\u201d State v. Everette, 284 N.C. 81, 84, 199 S.E. 2d 462, 465 (1973).\nTaking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and disregarding that evidence of the defendant which is in conflict, it is established that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury. The case was submitted to the jury free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Parker and Vaughn concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General James H. Carson, Jr., by Assistant Attorney General Charles R. Hassell, Jr., for the State.",
      "George R. Morrow for the defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURLEY SPICER\nNo. 7429SC715\n(Filed 16 October 1974)\nAssault and Battery \u00a7 14\u2014 felonious assault \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient for the jury in a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injuries not resulting in death where it tended to show that defendant stated he was going to kill his estranged wife and the victim, that defendant pulled a gun and shot the victim twice and that defendant fired another shot at the victim while he was running to a witness\u2019s car for help.\nAppeal by defendant from Martin, Judge, May 1974 Session of Rutherford Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 September 1974.\nDefendant was charged in a bill of indictment with felonious assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injuries, not resulting in death. He pleaded not guilty.\nThe evidence for the State tended to show that the victim of the assault had been dating the defendant\u2019s wife after the defendant and she were separated and living apart; that the defendant, his wife, their children, and the victim were riding in the victim\u2019s car to the defendant\u2019s house; that the defendant got out of the car and went into the house to get some money for his wife and children; that upon returning the defendant announced \u201c . . . I have something for both of you. . . . I\u2019m going to kill both of you.\u201d; that the defendant pulled a gun and shot the victim twice whereupon the victim began running to a witness\u2019s car for help; and that the defendant fired another shot at him while he was running away.\nUpon denial of a motion to dismiss, the defendant testified that he was threatened by the victim; that the victim reached in his pocket, presumably for a gun; that he shot him in this belief; that his hand then came out of his pocket and no gun was present; that the victim began running away; and that he did not shoot at him again. Defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal as of nonsuit was renewed and was denied.\nThe judge then charged the jury on the various degrees of assault, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury; and from a sentence imposing imprisonment from five to seven years in prison, the defendant appealed.\nAttorney General James H. Carson, Jr., by Assistant Attorney General Charles R. Hassell, Jr., for the State.\nGeorge R. Morrow for the defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0364-01",
  "first_page_order": 392,
  "last_page_order": 393
}