{ "id": 8551720, "name": "IDA MAE QUICK, Administratrix of the Estate of Donald Gary Quick v. UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and JILL QUICK", "name_abbreviation": "Quick v. United Benefit Life Insurance", "decision_date": "1974-11-06", "docket_number": "No. 7412DC700", "first_page": "504", "last_page": "507", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "23 N.C. App. 504" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "40 N.C. L. Rev. 175", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 A.L.R. 3d 794", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 N.C. App. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550303 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/1/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.E. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625792 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S.E. 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269285 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/152/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621586 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571995 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 S.E. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607963 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0359-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 379, "char_count": 6633, "ocr_confidence": 0.589, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7817273071113374e-08, "percentile": 0.30088626788666056 }, "sha256": "a05c35c64ac4fd309de986c150330fd7ced27cbbaf0379261623df1c9fbde972", "simhash": "1:30643de7d2d34d1a", "word_count": 1114 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:39.683180+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Parker concurs.", "Judge Campbell dissents." ], "parties": [ "IDA MAE QUICK, Administratrix of the Estate of Donald Gary Quick v. UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and JILL QUICK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nIf defendant Quick is a \u201cslayer\u201d within the meaning of Chapter 31A of the General Statutes entitled \u201cActs Barring Property Rights,\u201d she is barred by that Chapter from recovery of the insurance proceeds. The term \u201cslayer\u201d means a person who \u201cshall have been convicted ... of the wilful annd unlawful killing of another .... \u201d G.S. 31A-3 (3) a.\nThe question is whether a conviction of involuntary manslaughter is a conviction of the \u201cwilful and unlawful killing of another.\u201d Presumably one cannot be \u201cconvicted\u201d of a slaying other than one that is unlawful, so only the word \u201cwilful\u201d has significance. By omitting the word \u201cwilful\u201d the Legislature would have provided that a conviction of any degree of homicide would make one a \u201cslayer\u201d for purposes of the forfeiture provisions of the act. By inserting the word the Legislature limited forfeiture to those convicted of a higher degree of homicide where the killing must be found to be wilful. \u201cInvoluntary manslaughter has been defined to be, \u2018Where death results unintentionally, so far as the defendant is concerned, from an unlawful act on his part not amounting to a felony, or from a lawful act negligently done.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hovis, 233 N.C. 359, 365, 64 S.E. 2d 564, 568. It is an unlawful killing without malice, without premeditation and deliberation, \u201cand without intention to kill or inflict serious bodily injury.\u201d State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 682, 185 S.E. 2d 129, 132. Thus to convict of involuntary manslaughter the State is not required to prove a wilful killing. Defendant Quick\u2019s conviction, therefore, does not make her a \u201cslayer\u201d with the definition. G.S. 31A-3 (3) a.\nIt is sound public policy that no person be allowed to profit by his own wrong. Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68. For example, a beneficiary who caused the death of an insured under circumstances amounting to a felony was not allowed to recover under the policy. Anderson v. Parker, 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53. \u201cBut the General Assembly is the policy-making agency of our government, and when it elects to legislate in respect to the subject matter of any common law rule, the statute supplants the common law rule and becomes the public policy of the State in respect to that particular matter.\u201d McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91 S.E. 2d 231, 234. Having concluded that Jill Quick does not forfeit the benefits of the policy as a \u201cslayer\u201d under General Statute Chapter 31A, the remaining question for us is whether that chapter positively supplants the common law as it relates to her act. G.S. 31A-15 expressly provides that\n\u201cAs to all acts specifically provided for in this chapter, the rules, remedies, and procedures herein specified shall be exclusive, and as to all acts not specifically provided for in this chapter, all rules, remedies, and procedures, if any, which now exist or hereafter may exist either by virtue of statute, or by virtue of the inherent powers of any court of competent jurisdiction, or otherwise, shall be applicable.\u201d\nThe verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter amounts to an acquittal of murder and voluntary manslaughter. In McMichael v. Proctor, supra, the widow admitted firing the shot that killed her husband but pled that in a criminal trial the jury had found her not guilty of any felonious slaying. By statute a widow then forfeited her dower if \u201cconvicted of the felonious slaying of her husband.\u201d The Court held that the language of the statute providing for forfeiture was positive, direct and unequivocal. The Court expressly declined to add another cause for forfeiture, and held that by including specific reasons for forfeiture the General Assembly had excluded all others. When it included a conviction of felonious slaying as a cause for forfeiture, the General Assembly excluded a slaying which resulted in an acquittal. But see Tew v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 1 N.C. App. 94, 160 S.E. 2d 117. So it seems to us that by specifically including a conviction for wilful and unlawful killing as a cause ^or forfeiture, the General Assembly excluded a slaying which resulted in an acquittal of a \u201cwilful and unlawful\u201d killing and, with statutory exceptions not relevant here, all killings which do not result in a conviction of \u201cwilful and unlawful\u201d killings. Other courts applying similar statutes have so held. Annot., 27 A.L.R. 3d 794, 816. But see 40 N.C. L. Rev. 175 at page 221.\nAlthough Jill Quick has been convicted of taking the life of decedent, she was acquitted of the \u201cwilful and unlawful killing\u201d of decedent. It is our view that the General Assembly has elected to legislate in the subject matter of this controversy and that the policy so established supplants the common law rule which would not have allowed her to recover.\nThe judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge Parker concurs.\nJudge Campbell dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "VAUGHN, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Campbell\ndissenting:\nI think G.S. 31A-15 is controlling and this was an unlawful killing and bars any recovery by the slayer. I therefore dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Campbell" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy S. Hair for plaintiff appellee.", "Deborah G. Mailman for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IDA MAE QUICK, Administratrix of the Estate of Donald Gary Quick v. UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and JILL QUICK\nNo. 7412DC700\n(Filed 6 November 1974)\nInsurance \u00a7 35\u2014 involuntary manslaughter of husband \u2014 right to life insurance proceeds\nA wife who was convicted of involuntary manslaughter of her husband was not convicted of the \u201cwilful and unlawful killing of another\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 31A-3(3)a and thus was not a \u201cslayer\u201d who is barred by G.S. Chapter 31 from receiving the proceeds of a policy of insurance on the life of the husband; nor was the wife barred under the common law from receiving the proceeds of the policy since G.S. Chapter 31A has supplanted the common law rule which would have required her forfeiture of the proceeds.\nJudge Campbell dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant Jill Quick from Herring, District Court Judge, 17 June 1974 Session of District Court held in Cumberland County.\nThis is an action for judgment declaring the ownership of proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of Donald Quick. The funds are being held by the Clerk of Superior Court.\nJill Quick, widow of Donald Quick, is the beneficiary named in the policy. She was indicted for the murder of Donald Quick and convicted of involuntary manslaughter as a result of the killing.\nThe judge concluded that Jill Quick was barred from taking the proceeds from the policy by reason of Chapter 31A of the General Statutes and the public policy of the State.\nLacy S. Hair for plaintiff appellee.\nDeborah G. Mailman for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0504-01", "first_page_order": 532, "last_page_order": 535 }