{ "id": 8553140, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LINWOOD CRANDALL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Crandall", "decision_date": "1974-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 743SC780", "first_page": "625", "last_page": "630", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "23 N.C. App. 625" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572031 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573776 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 1004", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6436170, 6436273, 6435889, 6436023, 6435963 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/1004-04", "/us/409/1004-05", "/us/409/1004-01", "/us/409/1004-03", "/us/409/1004-02" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570781 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E. 2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575036 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560782 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 1011", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11797248, 11797284, 11796933, 11796814, 11797039, 11796880, 11796982, 11797335, 11797177, 11797114 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/1011-08", "/us/414/1011-09", "/us/414/1011-03", "/us/414/1011-01", "/us/414/1011-05", "/us/414/1011-02", "/us/414/1011-04", "/us/414/1011-10", "/us/414/1011-07", "/us/414/1011-06" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E. 2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559319 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E. 2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559288 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563969 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 A.L.R. 2d 883", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 U.S. 369", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163723 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/356/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565770 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 427", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11718713 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0427-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 627, "char_count": 12588, "ocr_confidence": 0.606, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7530836739902597 }, "sha256": "5eb1aefadc3191b05a68cdeff09986221a4286ad88f87c42c118f3ef8626d25c", "simhash": "1:df0b262acd57ec56", "word_count": 2056 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:39.683180+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Morris and Hedrick concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LINWOOD CRANDALL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BALEY, Judge.\nDefendant has presented numerous assignments of error to the admission or exclusion of evidence and the conduct of the trial. All of these assignments have been carefully considered, and we find no prejudicial error.\nThe major thrust of this appeal was directed to the defense of entrapment. Defendant sought, by cross-examination concerning prior activities of the State\u2019s witnesses while posing as members of the drug community, to demonstrate that defendant had no intent to commit the offense and was induced to do so by the conduct of law enforcement officers. The cross-examination did not bear upon the specific offense with which defendant was charged, but upon the investigative methods used by undercover agents in the detection of crime. This was neither material nor relevant to the defense in this case.\n\u201cThe conduct with which the defense of entrapment is concerned is the manufacturing of crime by law enforcement officials and their agents. Such conduct, of course, is far different from the permissible strategems involved in the detection and prevention of crime.\u201d Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434 (1963), quoted in State v. Fletcher and State v. St. Arnold, 279 N.C. 85, 94, 181 S.E. 2d 405, 411. The State has a right to engage in undercover work. \u201cCriminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.\u201d Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). Entrapment involves more than affording the opportunity to commit crime; it requires inducement without which defendant would have had no criminal intent to commit the offense. See Annot., 33 A.L.R. 2d 883 (1954) ; 2 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, \u00a7 7, pp. 487-88. The State\u2019s witnesses here testified that Adcock merely agreed to purchase narcotics which defendant offered to procure. Defendant claims that he obtained the narcotics at the urgent request of the State\u2019s.witness. Upon conflicting testimony the case was submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions from the trial court concerning entrapment, instructions which are not challenged by defendant. The jury accepted the State\u2019s version of the facts.\nDefendant assigns as error the denial of his motion for preliminary hearing after indictment had been obtained. The rule as to the right of a defendant to a preliminary hearing is well stated in State v. Foster, 282 N.C. 189, 196, 192 S.E. 2d 320, 325:\n\u201cNeither the North Carolina nor the United States Constitution requires a preliminary hearing. A preliminary \u2022 hearing is not a necessary step in the prosecution of a person accused of crime, and an accused person is not entitled to a preliminary hearing as a matter of substantive right.\u201d\nSee also State v. Thornton, 283 N.C. 513, 196 S.E. 2d 701; State v. Harrington, 283 N.C. 527, 196 S.E. 2d 742, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973). Defendant made no request for discovery and has shown no prejudice from the denial of his motion for a preliminary hearing.\nDefendant contends that the court erred in interrupting the continuity of the trial by extending the noon recess until he could conduct another previously scheduled but unrelated hearing. Defendant claims that such a break in the trial is as much a denial of the fundamental right to a speedy trial as an unwarranted delay in the commencement of a trial. We do not agree. In discharging his duty to control the conduct of the trial to prevent injustice to any party, the-trial court has broad discretionary powers. Certainly the interruption of a trial for the purpose of expediting other court matters would be well within the discretion of the judge, and, absent a positive showing that defendant was prejudiced in a material way, such an interruption would not deprive defendant of his right to a speedy trial. There is no indication that defendant suffered any prejudice from the delay in resuming the trial after the noon recess.\nDefendant complains that the court allowed the State to use leading questions on direct examination. Permitting leading questions on direct examination is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and not reviewable on appeal, absent a showing of abuse of discretion which does not here appear. State v. Clanton, 278 N.C. 502, 180 S.E. 2d 5; State v. Painter, 265 N.C. 277, 144 S.E. 2d 6.\nDefendant challenges the admission of exhibits and testimony identifying the white powder as MDA. Agent Adcock testified that he retained possession of the powder throughout the forty-five minute interval between the time he acquired it from defendant and the time he handed it over to the S.B.I. It w\u00e1s retained by the S.B.I. until presented in court. The evidence was properly admitted. Defendant further contends that the trial court violated G.S. 1-180 by finding in the presence of the jury that a witness was an expert in forensic chemistry. This is simply a ruling upon the qualifications of the witness to testify as to his opinion and is not error. State v. Frazier, 280 N.C. 181, 185 S.E. 2d 652, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 409 U.S. 1004 (1972).\nDefendant assigns error in the State\u2019s cross-examination of a defense witness on details of prior convictions and of defendant himself on a previous prison term. Prior convictions are a proper subject for cross-examination. State v. Miller, 281 N.C. 70, 187 S.E. 2d 729; State v. Gainey, 280 N.C. 366, 185 S.E. 2d 874; 1 Stansbury, N. C. Evidence (Brandis rev.), \u00a7 112. Furthermore, defendant had already testified on direct examination that he had been in prison. He cannot have been prejudiced by the reference on cross-examination.\nDefendant makes several assignments of error in the court\u2019s rulings during testimony of a defense witness. The questions concerned the witness\u2019s addiction to heroin, a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of distribution of heroin, and prior dealings with Miss Wells. In excluding the testimony the court was merely protecting the witness\u2019s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. His rulings on whether the responses would be incriminating will not be disturbed on appeal. See generally 1 Stansbury, supra, \u00a7 57.\nG.S. 90-95 (a) (1) under which defendant was prosecuted makes it unlawful for any person \u201c(1) To manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled substance.\u201d The indictment charged that defendant \u201cdid sell and deliver.\u201d Defendant was also charged under G.S. 90-95 (a) with the possession of a controlled substance. The instruction of the court related to both offenses: possession and sell or deliver. The jury returned a verdict in both offenses \u201cguilty as charged.\u201d Defendant received concurrent \u25a0 sentences of 4 to 5 years on each of the two charges. Both sentences were within statutory limits. We do not perceive how defendant could have been prejudiced since either of the offenses for which he was convicted would support the sentence imposed. .'There was ample evidence to find that he was guilty of both sale and delivery, but he was only sentenced as if it were a single offense.\nDefendant has been accorded a vigorous defense in a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Morris and Hedrick concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BALEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General James H. Carson, Jr., by Assistant Attorney General Rafford E. Jones, for the State.", "James, Hite, Cavendish & Blount, by Marvin Blount, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LINWOOD CRANDALL\nNo. 743SC780\n(Filed 20 November 1974)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 7 \u2014 entrapment \u2014 investigative methods of undercover agents\nIn a prosecution for possession and sale and delivery of MDA, defendant\u2019s cross-examination of State\u2019s witnesses about investigative methods used by undercover agents in the detection of crime, but which did not bear upon the specific offenses with which defendant was charged,'was neither material nor relevant to the defense of entrapment.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 7\u2014 entrapment \u2014 necessity for inducement\nEntrapment involves more than affording the opportunity to commit a crime; it requires inducement without which defendant would have had no criminal intent to commit the offense.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 7 \u2014 entrapment \u2014 jury question\nProsecution for possession and sale or delivery of MDA was properly submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions concerning entrapment where the State\u2019s witnesses testified that an undercover agent merely agreed to purchase narcotics which defendant offered to procure and defendant claimed that he obtained the narcotics at the urgent request of a second undercover agent.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 21 \u2014 motion for preliminary hearing\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion for a preliminary hearing after an indictment had been obtained.\n5. Constitutional Law \u00a7 SO \u2014 speedy trial \u2014 extension of recess for another hearing'\nDefendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial when the trial judge extended the noon recess until he could conduct another previously scheduled but unrelated hearing.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 87 \u2014 leading questions\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to ask leading questions on direct examination.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 42 \u2014 chain of custody of MDA\nExhibits and testimony identifying a white powder as MDA were properly admitted where an undercover agent testified he retained possession of the powder from the time he acquired it from defendant until he handed it over to the S.B.I., and it was retained by the S.B.I. until presented in court.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 51, 99 \u2014 finding witness was expert \u2014 expression of opinion\nThe trial court did not express an opinion on the evidence by finding in the presence of the jury that a witness was an expert in forensic chemistry.\n9. Criminal Law \u00a7 89\u2014 cross-examination \u2014 prior convictions \u2014 prior prison term\nState\u2019s cross-examination of a defense witness on details of prior convictions and of defendant on a previous prison term was not improper since a witness may be cross-examined as to prior convictions and defendant had already testified on direct examination that he had been in prison.\n10.Constitutional Law \u00a7 33 \u2014 privilege against self-incrimination \u2014 court\u2019s rulings\nTrial court\u2019s rulings upon questions asked a defense witness concerning the witness\u2019s addiction to heroin, a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of distribution of heroin and prior dealings with an undercover agent were for the protection of the witness\u2019s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and will not be disturbed on appeal.\nOn certiorari to review Order of Peel, Judge, 18 March 1974 Session of Superior Court held in Pitt County.\nHeard in Court of Appeals 21 October 1974.\nDefendant was charged in separate bills of indictment with possession and with sale and delivery of the controlled substance 3, 4-methylenedioxamphetamine or MDA on 11 January 1974 in the parking lot of College View Apartments in Greenville. He pleaded not guilty to both charges and was tried before a jury.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show in substance that special agent James Roland Adcock of the State Bureau of Investigation and Katina Wells, also employed by the S.B.I., were engaged in undercover work in connection with a drug investigation in Greenville. Shortly before midnight on 10 January 1974 Adcock and Miss Wells were seated in her automobile in a parking lot on Fifth Street when approached by defendant, Linwood Crandall. Defendant spoke to Miss Wells and got into the rear seat of the car. He told them he knew where they could get some MDA. He then went with them in the car directing them to the parking lot of College View Apartments. While en route defendant stated that the price would be $35.00 per gram. Ad-cock gave defendant $80.00, and defendant went into an apartment and returned with two plastic bags containing a white powder later identified as MDA which he gave to Adcock together, with $10.00 in change.\nDefendant presented evidence which would tend to show that earlier in the evening of 10 January 1974 Katina Wells had asked him repeatedly to get some \u201cstuff\u2019 for her and that as a result of these requests he took her and Adcock to where he knew he could obtain some MDA. He testified he took the money from Adcock and purchased the MDA from a James Cain and delivered it to Adcock after asking Miss Wells \u201cwhether he was cool.\u201d\nThe jury found defendant guilty as charged. From a judgment imposing concurrent sentences of 4 to 5 years imprisonment, defendant appealed. The appeal was not docketed in apt time, and this Court granted certiorari. .\nAttorney General James H. Carson, Jr., by Assistant Attorney General Rafford E. Jones, for the State.\nJames, Hite, Cavendish & Blount, by Marvin Blount, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0625-01", "first_page_order": 653, "last_page_order": 658 }