{ "id": 4278381, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LADONN EDWARD SIMPSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Simpson", "decision_date": "2013-10-15", "docket_number": "No. COA13-253", "first_page": "119", "last_page": "127", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 N.C. App. 119" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "316 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4701428 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551528 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640085 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" }, { "page": "817" }, { "page": "816", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/654/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639310 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "no double jeopardy in separate punishments for felonious possession of cocaine and trafficking in cocaine, by possession" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2395265 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-87", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(15)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169238 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002", "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "internal citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "internal quotation mark omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154240 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" }, { "page": "518" }, { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358426 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155962 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" }, { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-108", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(7)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "728 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4346822 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154614 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4701428 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551528 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0431-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 719, "char_count": 17013, "ocr_confidence": 0.729, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33353141437975725 }, "sha256": "e0539436434a47fa00c40e83e584c2c74c8c3ff2176c446fa455160ea29a0a71", "simhash": "1:3f2b822e247eef6b", "word_count": 2631 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.360096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LADONN EDWARD SIMPSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nLadonn Edward Simpson (\u201cDefendant\u201d) was found guilty on 9 February 2012 of manufacturing methamphetamine, exceeding pseudoephedrine limits, felony conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, maintaining a vehicle that was resorted to by persons using controlled substances or that was used for keeping or selling controlled substances, possession of an immediate precursor chemical used to manufacture methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, and three counts of trafficking in methamphetamine. Defendant appeals.\nI. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Maintaining a Vehicle for Keening or Selling Methamphetamine\nDefendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling methamphetamine. We agree.\nA. Standard of Review\nWe review the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). The \u201ctrial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that .defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Bradshaw, 366 N.C. 90, 93, 728 S.E.2d 345, 347 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Id.\nThe \u201ctrial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in the State\u2019s favor.\u201d Id. at 92, 728 S.E.2d at 347. \u201cAll evidence, competent or incompetent, must be considered. Any contradictions or conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State, and evidence unfavorable to the State is not considered.\u201d Id. at 93, 728 S.E.2d at 347 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\nB. Analysis\nIt shall be unlawful for any person... [t]o knowingly keep or maintain any . . . vehicle . . . which is resorted to by persons using controlled substances in violation of this Article for the purpose of using such substances, or which is used for the keeping or selling of the same in violation of this Article].]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-108(a)(7) (2011). \u201c[T]his Article\u201d refers to Article 5, the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act.\nThe statute provides two ways to show a violation. \u201cThe first statutory alternative requires that the State prove defendant knowingly allowed others to resort to his dwelling to consume controlled substances.\u201d State v. Thompson, 188 N.C. App. 102, 105, 654 S.E.2d 814, 816 (2008). Under the first alternative, the State must prove Defendant knowingly allowed others to resort to his vehicle to use controlled substances.\n\u201cThe second statutory alternative requires that defendant knowingly used the dwelling for the keeping or selling of controlled substances.\u201d Id. at 105, 654 S.E.2d at 817. Under this alternative, the State must prove Defendant knowingly used the vehicle for the keeping or selling of controlled substances.\nJeremy Cox (\u201cMr. Cox\u201d), an acquaintance of Defendant, testified for the State. Portions of his testimony follow:\n[Defense Attorney].....[Y]ou told the detectives that you contacted [Defendant] to get more meth, shortly after you got out of jail.\n[Mr. Cox].....As I remember, I saw him and he said he had some work. He was a framer or construction man, and he said he had some concrete work, but it never came through. We ended up riding around, getting high.\n[Defense Attorney], So you get into trouble for making methamphetamine, and you get out on bond; and then, by your admission, allegedly, you get together with this man and drive around getting high on meth? (Indicating [Defendant].)\n[Mr. Cox]. That\u2019s correct.\nMr. Cox further testified as follows:\n[The State]. You said that you would ride around, getting high. Were you referring to [Defendant] being present during that time?\n[Mr. Cox], I\u2019m not sure what you\u2019re referring to.\n[The State].....Have you ever gotten high with [Defendant], on methamphetamines?\n[Mr. Cox], Yes.\n[The State], Have you ever done so in his vehicle?\n[Mr. Cox], Yes.\nDefendant contends that, even if Mr. Cox used methamphetamine in the vehicle, \u201cthe State did not establish that anyone else resorted to [the] truck to use methamphetamine.\u201d Evidence shows that only Mr. Cox and Defendant used methamphetamine in the vehicle. However, the statute \u201crequires that the State prove defendant knowingly allowed others to resort to\u201d his vehicle to consume controlled substances. Thompson, 188 N.C. App. at 105, 654 S.E.2d at 816 (emphasis added). Defendant cannot allow himself to \u201cresort to\u201d his vehicle. Our Supreme Court has noted that it does \u201cnot believe the General Assembly intended \u2018resorted to,\u2019 as used in this statute [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-108(a)(7)], to include persons who live in the dwelling.\u201d State v. Rich, 87 N.C. App. 380, 384, 361 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1987). Similarly, we do not believe the General Assembly intended \u201cresorted to,\u201d as used in N.C.G.S. \u00a790-108(a)(7), to include persons who own the vehicle at issue.\nThe State presented no evidence, as to the second alternative, that Defendant used the vehicle for the keeping or selling of controlled substances. As to the first alternative, the evidence shows only that Defendant and Mr. Cox used controlled substances in Defendant\u2019s vehicle. This evidence is insufficient to show that Defendant allowed others to resort to his vehicle to use controlled substances. The trial court therefore erred in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of maintaining a vehicle that was resorted to by persons using controlled substances or that was used for keeping or selling controlled substances.\nII. Jury Instructions\nDefendant next argues the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on the intent element of the manufacturing methamphetamine and the trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture charges. We disagree.\nA. Standard of Review\nBecause Defendant did not object to the jury instructions at trial, we review for plain error. State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012).\n[T]he plain error rule... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a \u201cfundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,\u201d or \u201cwhere [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,\u201d or the error has \u201c \u2018resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial\u2019 \u201d or where the error is such as to \u201cseriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings\u201d or where it can be fairly said \u201cthe instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d\nState v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted)).\nTo show plain error, \u201ca defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice \u2014 that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).\nB. Analysis\nThe trial court must \u201cinstruct the jury on the law arising on the evidence. This includes instruction on the elements of the crime.\u201d State v. Watterson, 198 N.C. App. 500, 503, 679 S.E.2d 897, 899 (2009).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-87 defines \u201cmanufacture\u201d as:\nthe production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance by any means, whether directly or indirectly, artificially or naturally, or by extraction from substances of a natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis; and \u2018manufacture\u2019 further includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container except that this term does not include the preparation or compounding of a controlled substance by an individual for his own use[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-87(15) (2011).\nOur Supreme Court held that \u201cthe offense of manufacturing a controlled substance does not require an intent to distribute unless the activity constituting manufacture is preparation or compounding.\u201d State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 568, 313 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1984). When the activity is \u201cpreparation\u201d or \u201ccompounding,\u201d Brown indicates that the offense of manufacturing requires an intent to distribute.\nThe trial court instructed the jury on the charge of trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture as follows:\n[Defendant has been charged with trafficking in methamphetamine, or any liquid mixture containing methamphetamine, which is the unlawful manufacturing of 200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams....\nFor you to find [Defendant guilty of this offense, the state must prove two things, beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that [Defendant, acting either by himself or acting together with another person, manufactured methamphetamine or any liquid mixture containing methamphetamine.\nThe manufacture of methamphetamine is the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion or processing of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, either by extraction from substances of natural origin or by chemical synthesis, (emphasis added).\nThe trial court instructed the jury on the manufacture of methamphetamine as follows:\n[Defendant has been charged with manufacture of methamphetamine, a controlled substance. For you to find [Defendant guilty of this offense, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Defendant manufactured methamphetamine by producing, preparing, propagating, compounding, converting or processing methamphetamine, a controlled substance, either by extraction from substances of natural origin or by chemical synthesis, (emphasis added).\nDefendant contends that the trial court \u201cnever explained that the State bore the burden of proving that [Defendant] acted with an intent to distribute if the jury determined that [Defendant] manufactured methamphetamine by preparation or compounding.\u201d\nDespite the inclusion of \u201cpreparing,\u201d \u201ccompounding,\u201d and \u201cpreparation\u201d in its instructions, the trial court did not instruct on intent to distribute. Even assuming arguendo that this omission was error, the omission does not rise to the level of plain error. The evidence indicates that Defendant sold methamphetamine and possessed more than 200 grams of a liquid containing methamphetamine and items consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine.\nMr. Cox testified that Defendant asked, on 26 January 2011, for help making methamphetamine. Mr. Cox explained to the jury how to make methamphetamine, using ammonium nitrate, lye, drain cleaner, propane, pseudoephedrine, and batteries. Mr. Cox testified he smelled propane when Defendant picked Mr. Cox up in Defendant\u2019s vehicle. They went to several stores to purchase ingredients, including Sudafed, Coleman fuel, filters, and batteries. When officers stopped Mr. Cox and Defendant, Mr. Cox and Defendant had all the ingredients for methamphetamine.\nOfficers found \u201ca white powder in a plastic bag\u201d in Mr. Cox\u2019s pocket. Mr. Cox indicated he purchased the methamphetamine from Defendant. A State Bureau of Investigation agent searched the vehicle the next day. The agent found a syringe, spoon, bag with white powder residue, bucket, propane tank, drain opener, funnel, filtration mask, plastic baggies, a shopping bag containing \u201cempty boxes and boxes of pseudoephedrine[,]\u201d receipts for pseudoephedrine dated 26 January 2011, loose pseudoephedrine pills, and a glass jar containing \u201ckind of a clear liquid[.]\u201d The jar held 210 grams of liquid containing methamphetamine. Also in the vehicle was a notebook with Defendant\u2019s name written inside the cover. The notebook contained a picture of a \u201ccooking synthesis\u201d for methamphetamine.\nThe evidence of manufacturing methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture was overwhelming. In light of this overwhelming evidence, Defendant failed to demonstrate the requisite \u201cprejudice \u2014 that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (internal quotation mark omitted). The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct on the intent to distribute.\nIII. Sentencing\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court deprived Defendant \u201cof his right against double jeopardy\u201d by sentencing him for three trafficking in methamphetamine charges, manufacturing methamphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine based on the same illegal substance.\nThe State argues, without citation to authority, that Defendant failed to preserve his right to appeal the conviction for trafficking by transport because Defendant failed to list it in his proposed issues on appeal. \u201cThe proposed issues on appeal listed in the record on appeal shall not limit the scope of the issues that an appellant may argue in its brief.\u201d N.C.R. App. P 28(b)(2). This argument is without merit.\nDefendant acknowledges the holdings regarding double jeopardy of our Supreme Court in State v. Pipkins, 337 N.C. 431, 446 S.E.2d 360 (1994), and State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 340 S.E.2d 450 (1986). \u201c[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has held that, where a legislature clearly expresses its intent to proscribe and punish exactly the same conduct under two separate statutes, a trial court in a single trial may impose cumulative punishments under the statutes.\u201d Pipkins, 337 N.C. at 433-34, 446 S.E.2d at 362 (alteration in original).\n\u201cAn examination of the subject, language and history of the statutes indicates that the legislature intended that these offenses be punished separately, even where the offenses are based on the same conduct.\u201d Id. at 434, 446 S.E.2d at 362 (no double jeopardy in separate punishments for felonious possession of cocaine and trafficking in cocaine, by possession).\n\u201c [Possessing, manufacturing, and transporting heroin are separate and distinct offenses.\u201d Perry, 316 N.C. at 103, 340 S.E.2d at 461. A defendant may be punished separately \u201cfor trafficking in heroin by possessing 28 grams or more of heroin, trafficking in heroin by manufacturing 28 grams or more of heroin, and trafficking in heroin by transporting 28 grams or more of heroin even when the contraband material in each separate offense is the same heroin.\u201d Id. at 104, 340 S.E.2d at 461. Like heroin, methamphetamine is a controlled substance. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(b) (2011).\nBeing bound by the decisions in Pipkins and Perry, we hold the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendant separately for trafficking in methamphetamine, manufacturing methamphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine.\nReversed in part; no error in part.\nJudges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas M. Woodward, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. Andrews, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LADONN EDWARD SIMPSON\nNo. COA13-253\nFiled 15 October 2013\n1. Drugs \u2014 maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling methamphetamine \u2014 insufficient evidence\nThe trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling methamphetamine. The evidence was insufficient to show that defendant allowed others to resort to his vehicle to use controlled substances.\n2. Drugs \u2014 manufacturing methamphetamine \u2014 trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture charges \u2014 jury instructions \u2014 element of intent \u2014 no plain error\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a drugs case by failing to instruct the jury on the intent element of manufacturing methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture charges. Even assuming arguendo that the trial court\u2019s omission of an instruction on intent to distribute was erroneous, the omission did not rise to the level of plain error as defendant failed to show prejudice.\n3. Constitutional Law \u2014 double jeopardy \u2014 separate charges based on same substance \u2014 stare decisis\nBound by the decisions in State v. Pipkins, 337 N.C. 431, and State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not deprive defendant of his right against double jeopardy by sentencing him for three trafficking in methamphetamine charges, manufacturing methamphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine based on the same illegal substance.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgments entered 9 February 2012 by Judge Jack W. Jenkins in Superior Court, Onslow County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 August 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas M. Woodward, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. Andrews, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0119-01", "first_page_order": 129, "last_page_order": 137 }