{ "id": 4278110, "name": "SONYA CHAFFINS, EMPLOYEE, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TAR HEEL CAPITAL CORPORATION, Employee, and COMPANION PROPERTY & CASUALTY CO., Carrier, Defendant-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Chaffins v. Tar Heel Capital Corp.", "decision_date": "2013-11-05", "docket_number": "No. COA13-332", "first_page": "156", "last_page": "161", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 N.C. App. 156" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "640 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637755 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/640/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8375140 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916", "parenthetical": "temporal proximity is not competent evidence of causation when addressing a complicated medical condition" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135777 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "temporal proximity is not competent evidence of causation when addressing a complicated medical condition" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 S.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 S.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630398 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "quoting Holley, 357 N.C. at 231-32, 581 S.E.2d at 752 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. App. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3806685 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47", "parenthetical": "quoting Holley, 357 N.C. at 231-32, 581 S.E.2d at 752 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/211/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169964 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630523 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "quoting Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 479, 57 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1950)" }, { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491657 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231", "parenthetical": "quoting Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 479, 57 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1950)" }, { "page": "231-32" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455", "parenthetical": "\"A determination which requires the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles is more appropriately a conclusion of law.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8899246 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582", "parenthetical": "\"A determination which requires the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles is more appropriately a conclusion of law.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346", "parenthetical": "\"Findings of fact are statements of what happened in space and time.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729581 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "\"Findings of fact are statements of what happened in space and time.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575582 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "433-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149368 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0657-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 736, "char_count": 14574, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1435805716858396 }, "sha256": "02e982f27ec1d3b938adeee6e03c003c244bc2c047a2fc3004ccf098cc52df09", "simhash": "1:b9b3ccec3c1e4072", "word_count": 2283 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.360096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER (Robert C.) and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "SONYA CHAFFINS, EMPLOYEE, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TAR HEEL CAPITAL CORPORATION, Employee, and COMPANION PROPERTY & CASUALTY CO., Carrier, Defendant-Appellants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nDefendants Tar Heel Capital Corporation, the employer, and Companion Property & Casualty Co., the insurance carrier, appeal from the opinion and award of the Industrial Commission (the \u201cCommission\u201d) in favor of employee Sonya Chaffins (\u201cplaintiff\u2019). For the following reasons, we reverse.\nI. Background\nThis workers\u2019 compensation action stems from an admittedly compensable back injury suffered by plaintiff on 1 August 2002. Since that time, plaintiff has undergone eleven different surgeries on her spine and has required continuing treatment. Plaintiff initially received indemnity and medical compensation as a consequence of her ir\\jury. However, on 24 April 2007, the parties entered into a Partial Agreement for Final Compromise Settlement and Release that resolved the indemnity portion of plaintiffs claim; the medical portion of plaintiff\u2019s claim remains open to this day. The Partial Agreement for Final Compromise Settlement and Release was approved by the Commission by order filed 7 June 2007.\nAs a result of plaintiff\u2019s back injury and subsequent surgeries, plaintiff\u2019s legs occasionally buckle, causing her to fall. Pertinent to this case, plaintiff fell on 7 October 2010 when her left leg gave out as she was getting into her car. Plaintiff testified that when she began to fall, she attempted to catch herself by grabbing the car door with her right hand. Plaintiff\u2019s attempt, however, was unsuccessful and she fell to the ground, twisting her right shoulder. Plaintiff indicated that she experienced severe pain in her right shoulder as a result of the fall.\nAfter several months without treatment, plaintiff\u2019s nurse case manager, Ms. Lisa Hollifield, referred plaintiff to Dr. Jesse L. West, IV, for treatment of plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder. At that time, Dr. West was an orthopedic surgeon at Carolina Hand and Sports Medicine, P.A., whose practice focused on the upper extremities. Dr. West first examined plaintiff on 31 January 2011. Following the examination, Dr. West formed the initial impression that plaintiff suffered severe biceps tendonitis and right shoulder impingement. For treatment, Dr. West provided plaintiff steroid injections to the areas of plaintiff\u2019s discomfort and ordered six weeks of physical therapy for iontophoresis and rotator cuff strengthening.\nOn 21 March 2011, plaintiff returned to Dr. West for a follow-up appointment. Due to plaintiff\u2019s lack of improvement and continued right shoulder pain, Dr. West changed his impression to possible right-side cervical radiculopathy and ordered either an MRI or CT myelogram to evaluate plaintiff for cervical stenosis.\nAt that point, on 28 March 2011, Ms. Hollifield was notified that defendants would not authorize any further treatment to plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder, effectively denying the compensability of plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder injury.\nNevertheless, a CT myelogram was performed and plaintiff returned to Dr. West for a third appointment on 18 April 2011. Upon review of the CT myelogram, Dr. West noted that plaintiff suffered from multilevel degenerative disc disease with central canal stenosis and changed his impression to right-side cervical radiculopathy. Because plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder injury was related to her neck, Dr. West then referred plaintiff to Dr. Stephen M. David, an orthopedic surgeon whose practice focused on the spine, for a consultation. Plaintiff, however, never saw Dr. David concerning her neck and shoulder.\nPlaintiff initiated the present action on 22 June 2011 by filing a Form 33 request for a hearing. Following defendants\u2019 Form 33R response, the matter came on for hearing on 15 December 2011 in Asheville before Deputy Commissioner Melanie Wade Goodwin. On 26 July 2012, an opinion and award by Deputy Commissioner Goodwin was filed ruling in favor of plaintiff. Defendants appealed to the full commission.\nThe full commission heard the matter on 5 December 2012. Thereafter, an opinion and award for the full commission was filed on 6 February 2012 affirming the deputy commissioner\u2019s opinion and award with minor modifications. The full commission concluded plaintiff\u2019s fall on 7 October 2010 \u201cand the consequent injury to her right shoulder and neck, were a direct and natural result of her admittedly compensable injury of 1 August 2002[]\u201d and ordered defendants to pay medical expenses related to the treatment of plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder and neck. Defendants appealed to this Court.\nII. Discussion\nOn appeal, defendants contend the Commission erred in ordering them to compensate plaintiff for medical expenses related to the treatment of plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder and neck. Specifically, defendants argue there is no competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that the injury to plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder and neck was \u201ca direct and natural result of her admittedly compensable injury of 1 August 2002.\u201d For the sake of clarity, we emphasize that the issue on appeal is not whether plaintiff\u2019s fall on 7 October 2010 was a result of her admittedly compensable injury of 1 August 2002; but whether the injury to plaintiff\u2019s neck, which was determined to be the cause of plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder pain, was a result of plaintiff\u2019s 7 October 2010 fall and, therefore, related back to plaintiff\u2019s admittedly compensable injury.\nThis Court\u2019s review of an opinion and award of the Commission \u201cis limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law. This \u2018court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u2019 \u201d Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 582, 584 (2008) (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)). \u201cThe Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.\u201d Anderson, 265 N.C. at 433-34, 144 S.E.2d at 274.\nIn the instant case, the Commission issued numerous findings of fact that summarize and recite medical records and testimony. Based on the evidence in these purported findings of fact, the Commission then issued its ultimate finding of fact and conclusion of law concerning causation. In what the Commission labeled conclusion of law number two, the Commission found, \u201c[w]hen Plaintiff attempted to prevent her 7 October 2010 fall by grabbing her car door handle with her right hand, she injured her right shoulder and neck.\u201d See State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Eddleman, 320 N.C. 344, 351, 358 S.E.2d 339, 346 (1987) (\u201cFindings of fact are statements of what happened in space and time.\u201d). The Commission then concluded \u201c[t]his [fall], and the consequent injury to her right shoulder and neck, were a direct and natural result of her admittedly compensable injury of 1 August 2002.\u201d See Guox v. Satterly, 164 N.C. App. 578, 582, 596 S.E.2d 452, 455 (2004) (\u201cA determination which requires the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles is more appropriately a conclusion of law.\u201d).\nHaving pinpointed the Commission\u2019s ultimate finding that plaintiff injured her right shoulder and neck in her 7 October 2010 fall, we now review the record for any competent evidence supporting the finding. Upon review, we find no such evidence.\n\u201cIn a workers\u2019 compensation claim, the employee \u2018has the burden of proving that his claim is compensable.\u2019 \u201d Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 231, 581 S.E.2d 750, 752 (2003) (quoting Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 479, 57 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1950)).\nA subsequent injury is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury. As long as the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, then every natural consequence flowing from that injury likewise arises out of the employment. The subsequent injury is not compensable if it is the result of an independent, intervening cause.\nNale v. Ethan Allen, 199 N.C. App. 511, 515, 682 S.E.2d 231, 235 (2009) (citation omitted). \u201cStill, \u2018the employment-related accident need not be the sole causative force to render an injury compensable\u2019 so long as competent evidence proves it to be a \u2018causal factor.\u2019 \u201d Cawthorn v. Mission Hosp., Inc., 211 N.C. App. 42, 47, 712 S.E.2d 306, 310 (2011) (quoting Holley, 357 N.C. at 231-32, 581 S.E.2d at 752 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).\nAs explained by our Supreme Court,\n[t]he quantum and quality of the evidence required to establish prima facie the causal relationship will of course vary with the complexity of the injury itself. There will be many instances in which the facts in evidence are such that any layman of average intelligence and experience would know what caused the injuries complained of. On the other hand, where the exact nature and probable genesis of a particular type of injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.\nClick v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). \u201cAlthough medical certainty is not required, an expert\u2019s \u2018speculation\u2019 is insufficient to establish causation.\u201d Holley, 357 N.C. at 234, 581 S.E.2d at 754. \u201c \u2018The evidence must be such as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture and remote possibility, that is, there must be sufficient competent evidence tending to show a proximate causal relation. \u2019 \u201d Id., 357 N. C. at 232, 581 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting Gilmore v. Hoke Cty. Bd. ofEduc., 222 N.C. 358, 365, 23 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1942)). \u201cStating an accident \u2018could or might\u2019 have caused an injury, or \u2018possibly\u2019 caused it is not generally enough alone to prove medical causation; however, supplementing that opinion with statements that something \u2018more than likely\u2019 caused an injury or that the witness is satisfied to a \u2018reasonable degree of medical certainty\u2019 has been considered sufficient.\u201d Carr v. Dep\u2019t. of HHS (Caswell Ctr.), _ N.C. App. _, _, 720 S.E.2d 869, 873 (2012).\nAs noted above, upon review of the CT myelogram in this case, Dr. West noted that plaintiff suffered from multilevel degenerative disc disease with central canal stenosis and changed his impression to right-side cervical radiculopathy. Given the complex nature of plaintiff\u2019s injury, testimony from plaintiff that the pain in her shoulder and neck did not occur until after her 7 October 2010 fall was insufficient to support the finding of a causal relationship. See Young v. Hickory Business Furniture, 353 N.C. 227, 232, 538 S.E.2d 912, 916 (2000) (temporal proximity is not competent evidence of causation when addressing a complicated medical condition). Instead, evidence of medical causation was necessary.\nAs recited in the Commission\u2019s purported finding of fact number twelve, the only medical evidence supporting the finding that plaintiff injured her right shoulder and neck in the 7 October 2010 fall is a notation made in plaintiff\u2019s medical record by Dr. West during plaintiff\u2019s 18 April 2011 visit. That notation states, \u201c[h]er new onset shoulder pain that occurred from her fall in October 2010 appears to be in fact related to her neck[.]\u201d The Commission then found that \u201cDr. West testified that it was at least as likely as not that [p]laintiff\u2019s complaints of pain were consistent with the injury mechanism [p]laintiff described to him.\u201d\nAlthough the notation in the medical record appears to support the Commission\u2019s finding, we hold the notation is not competent evidence of causation given that the notation was not Dr. West\u2019s opinion. As Dr. West explained the medical record at his deposition, he discounted the notation by testifying that \u201c[t]hat was the history related [sic] to me at the initial visit.\u201d Furthermore, Dr. West\u2019s statement that \u201c[i]t\u2019s at least as likely as not[]\u201d that plaintiff\u2019s complaints of pain were consistent with the injury mechanism plaintiff described is insufficient to establish a causal relationship. Dr. West\u2019s statement merely amounts to speculation.\nThe speculative nature of Dr. West\u2019s opinion is further evident from his responses that \u201c[ijt\u2019s possible\u201d or \u201c50/50\u201d that plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder and neck injury was consistent with the injury mechanism plaintiff described. Dr. West testified that it was also possible that plaintiff\u2019s degenerative disc disease in and of itself, just occurring naturally over time, could have caused plaintiff\u2019s neck condition. Moreover, Dr. West could not state within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that plaintiff\u2019s degenerative disc disease in her cervical spine was exacerbated or made symptomatic by her 7 October 2010 fall.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons discussed above, we find no competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding of a causal relationship between plaintiff\u2019s 7 October 2010 fall and her right shoulder and neck injury. As a result, we reverse the decretal portions of the Commission\u2019s opinion and award ordering defendants to compensate plaintiff for the treatment of her right shoulder and neck.\nReversed.\nJudges HUNTER (Robert C.) and GEER concur.\n. Although evidence in the record supports these purported findings of fact, we note that \u201cfindings of fact must be more than a mere summarization or recitation of the evidence ....\u201d Lane v. American Nat\u2019l Can Co., 181 N.C. App. 527, 531, 640 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2007).", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Williams & Mills, PLLC, by Reed G. Williams, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Rudisill, White & Kaplan, PLLC, by Stephen Kushner, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SONYA CHAFFINS, EMPLOYEE, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TAR HEEL CAPITAL CORPORATION, Employee, and COMPANION PROPERTY & CASUALTY CO., Carrier, Defendant-Appellants\nNo. COA13-332\nFiled 5 November 2013\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 medical expenses \u2014 injury\u2014no causal relationship\nThe Industrial Commission erred in a workers\u2019 compensation case by ordering defendants to compensate plaintiff for medical expenses related to the treatment of plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder and neck. No competent evidence supported the trial court\u2019s finding of a causal relationship between plaintiff\u2019s 7 October 2010 fall and her right shoulder and neck injury.\nAppeal by defendants Tar Heel Capital Corporation and Companion Property & Casualty Co. from the opinion and award of the Industrial Commission filed 6 February 2013. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 August 2013.\nWilliams & Mills, PLLC, by Reed G. Williams, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRudisill, White & Kaplan, PLLC, by Stephen Kushner, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0156-01", "first_page_order": 166, "last_page_order": 171 }