{ "id": 4277844, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN GLENN BRYAN, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bryan", "decision_date": "2013-11-05", "docket_number": "No. COA13-520", "first_page": "324", "last_page": "330", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 N.C. App. 324" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639638 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637241 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "holding that a statute's intent may be gleaned from its title and legislative history, and that \"[p]arts of the same statute dealing with the same subject matter must be considered and interpreted as a whole.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520562 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527386 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511376 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8156942 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12132533 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 S.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458", "parenthetical": "\"Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1445 ... the State has a right of appeal to this Court if the superior court grants a defendant's motion to suppress.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that where the State appeals from a final judgment of a superior court, \"if the State's right to appeal arises in the district court, the appeal is to the superior court; if it arises in the superior court, the appeal is to the appellate division.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573179 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that where the State appeals from a final judgment of a superior court, \"if the State's right to appeal arises in the district court, the appeal is to the superior court; if it arises in the superior court, the appeal is to the appellate division.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551603 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "\"N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(a)(l) gives the State a statutory right of appeal to superior court from a district court's order dismissing criminal charges against a defendant, and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167655 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "\"N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(a)(l) gives the State a statutory right of appeal to superior court from a district court's order dismissing criminal charges against a defendant, and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "\"[A]fter the superior court considers an appeal by the State . . . the superior court must then enter an order remanding the matter to the district court with instructions to finally grant or deny the defendant's pretrial motion . . . because the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(f" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167493 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8239503 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "holding that a statute's intent may be gleaned from its title and legislative history, and that \"[p]arts of the same statute dealing with the same subject matter must be considered and interpreted as a whole.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152888 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2646236 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 570, "char_count": 15112, "ocr_confidence": 0.71, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.922832180285532e-08, "percentile": 0.5361277819672112 }, "sha256": "d56dfc81682404281be9565b9f90a47673042c7ad30c1d1906f4b56896736ae9", "simhash": "1:9847a166062b0462", "word_count": 2522 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.360096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN GLENN BRYAN, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nWhere the State fails to file a certificate as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) (2011) for appeal from a final judgment of the district court, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss.\nOn 26 June 2010, defendant was stopped and arrested for misdemeanor driving with license revoked and driving while impaired (\u201cDWI\u201d). The vehicle he was driving was impounded. Over the course of the next fourteen months, defendant\u2019s case was set for trial, then continued, on eight occasions. Defendant filed two demands for a speedy trial on 6 July 2010 and 11 August 2011.\nOn 31 August 2011, the district court issued a written preliminary indication of intention to dismiss the DWI charges for a speedy trial violation. The State appealed to superior court on 2 September 2011, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1432(a)(l). On 12 October 2011, the superior court remanded the matter to district court for additional findings. Thereafter, defendant filed two requests for a hearing date on 17 October 2011 and 30 January 2012 and made two demands for a speedy trial on 3 November 2011 and 5 December 2011.\nOn 15 February 2012, the district court entered additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that a speedy trial violation had occurred and indicating its intent to dismiss the DWI charge pending against defendant. On 16 February 2012, the State appealed to superior court, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(a) (1). On 20 February 2012 defendant made a request for a hearing date and a demand for a speedy trial. A second demand for a speedy trial was made on 26 March 2012. The superior court heard the State\u2019s appeal on 2-3 April 2012. On 13 June 2012, the superior court entered a written order affirming the district court\u2019s preliminary indication and remanded the case to district court for a final dismissal of the charges.\nOn 20 July 2012, the district court entered a final order dismissing the charges against defendant. The State appealed the dismissal to superior court, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(a)(l). After a hearing on 6 September 2012, the superior court issued a written order on 24 September 2012 upholding the district court\u2019s dismissal of the charges based on a speedy trial violation. On 24 September 2012, the State filed a notice of appeal to this Court, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(1).\nDefendant filed a motion to dismiss the State\u2019s appeal contemporaneously with his brief to this Court on 8 July 2013. On 16 July 2013, the State filed a response to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and a petition for writ of certiorari.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to dismiss challenges the jurisdiction of this Court to hear the State\u2019s appeal based on the State\u2019s failure to fulfill the statutory requirements for a proper appeal. In addressing defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the State argues that its appeal from the final judgment of the district court was properly filed pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l) rather than N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e). We disagree.\nOur Court holds that \u201cthe State cannot appeal proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right.\u201d Stale v. Dobson, 51 N.C. App. 445, 446, 276 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1981). Whereastatute must be interpreted, \u201c[t]he intent of the Legislature controls the interpretation of a statute.\u201d State v. Davis, 364 N.C. 297, 302, 698 S.E.2d 65, 68 (2010) (citation omitted).\nNorth Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-1432, \u201cAppeals by State from district court judge,\u201d sets forth the procedures the State must follow when it wishes to appeal from a district court to a superior court. Section 15A-1432(e) states that\n[i]f the superior court finds that the order of the district court was correct, it must enter an order affirming the judgment of the district court. The State may appeal the order of the superior court to the appellate division upon certificate by the district attorney to the judge who affirmed the judgment that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) (2011) (emphasis added). General Statutes, section 15A-1445(a)(l), \u201cAppeal by the State,\u201d provides that \u201cthe State may appeal from the superior court to the appellate division... [w]hen there has been a decision or judgment dismissing criminal charges as to one or more counts.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l) (2011).\nThe State contends that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l), rather than N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e), controls its appeal because the State is appealing from a judgment of the superior court affirming the district court\u2019s dismissal. We note that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e), \u201cAppeals by State from district court judge,\u201d is placed within Article 90, \u201cAppeals from Magistrates and District Court Judges.\u201d In comparison, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l), \u201cAppeal by the State,\u201d is found within Article 91, \u201cAppeal to Appellate Division.\u201d Such a categorical division of these two statutes helps to enforce their separate roles regarding appeals by the State from a final decision of a district court judge as opposed to a superior court judge. See Printing Servs. of Greensboro v. Am. Capital Grp., 180 N.C. App. 70, 76, 637 S.E.2d 230, 233 (2006) (holding that a statute\u2019s intent may be gleaned from its title and legislative history, and that \u201c[p]arts of the same statute dealing with the same subject matter must be considered and interpreted as a whole.\u201d) (citation omitted). Moreover, the legislative history of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) indicates that this statute was enacted to cover all appeals taken from final judgments issued by a district court. See State v. Palmer, 197 N.C. App. 201, 203, 676 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2009) (\u201c[A]fter the superior court considers an appeal by the State . . . the superior court must then enter an order remanding the matter to the district court with instructions to finally grant or deny the defendant\u2019s pretrial motion . . . because the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(f) [and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432] indicate[] that the General Assembly intended [that] the district court should enter the final judgment on [such] a . . . pretrial motion.\u201d) (citation and internal quotations omitted). As such, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) was intended to address appeals taken from a final order of a district court by the State. See State v. Fowler, 197 N.C. App. 1, 7, 676 S.E.2d 523, 532 (2009) (\u201cN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(a)(l) gives the State a statutory right of appeal to superior court from a district court\u2019s order dismissing criminal charges against a defendant, and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) gives the State a statutory right of appeal to this Court from a superior court\u2019s order affirming a district court\u2019s dismissal.') (emphasis added).\nIn contrast, the legislative history of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l) indicates that this statute is applicable to final orders issued by a superior court acting in its original jurisdiction. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-240 (\u201coriginal general jurisdiction of all justiciable matters of a civil nature ... is vested in the ... superior court division), 7A-271 (\u201c[g]eneral jurisdiction for the trial of criminal actions is vested in the superior court\u201d). This statutory application is supported by our case law, as the State receives an automatic appeal as of right only from decisions by a superior court acting in its normal capacity. See State v. Greenwood, 12 N.C. App. 584, 586, 184 S.E.2d 386, 387-88 (1971), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 280 N.C. 651, 187 S.E.2d 8 (1972) (holding that where the State appeals from a final judgment of a superior court, \u201cif the State\u2019s right to appeal arises in the district court, the appeal is to the superior court; if it arises in the superior court, the appeal is to the appellate division.\u201d); see also State v. Osterhoudt, _ N.C. App. _, _, 731 S.E.2d 454, 458 (2012) (\u201cPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1445 ... the State has a right of appeal to this Court if the superior court grants a defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\u201d).\nHere, defendant made before the district court a pretrial motion to dismiss the DWI charge for violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district court issued an order indicating its preliminary approval of defendant\u2019s motion. The State appealed this order to the superior court; the superior court remanded to the district court for additional findings of fact. Once the superior court received those further findings of fact, it affirmed the district court\u2019s preliminary order and remanded the case back to the district court with orders to affirm the dismissal of defendant\u2019s case. Upon the district court issuing its final judgment, pursuant to the superior court\u2019s orders, the State again appealed to the superior court. As this appeal to superior court was from a final order of the district court, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432 is the controlling statute. As the superior court affirmed the order of the district court, the State could then appeal only by following the procedures stated in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e):\n[i]f the superior court finds that the order of the district court was correct, it must enter an order affirming the judgment of the district court. The State may appeal the order of the superior court to the appellate division upon certificate by the district attorney to the judge who affirmed the judgment that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay.\nThe State also argues that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) is not applicable to its appeal because N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e)\u2019s certificate requirement indicates that this statutory provision only applies to interlocutory orders. We disagree.\n\u201cAn order is interlocutory if it does not determine the issues in an action, but instead merely directs some further proceeding preliminary to the final decree.\u201d State v. Nichols, 140 N.C. App. 597, 598, 537 S.E.2d 825, 826 (2000) (citation omitted). \u201cAs a general rule an appeal will not lie until there is a final determination of the whole case.\u201d State v. Newman, 186 N.C. App. 382, 384, 651 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2007) (citation omitted).\nAs already discussed, in the instant case the final order dismissing all charges against defendant was issued by the district court on 20 July 2012. Although the State appealed this final order to superior court, the superior court was limited, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e), to entering an order affirming the judgment of the district court. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e). As such, the State\u2019s right of appeal was clearly from a final order by the district court. The State\u2019s contention that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e)\u2019s certificate requirement makes this statute applicable only to interlocutory orders is meritless. We further note that the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) confirms that the State\u2019s certificate requirement concerns final, rather than interlocutory orders, as\n[i]f the superior court finds that the order of the district court was correct, it must enter an order affirming the judgment of the district court. The State may appeal the order of the superior court to the appellate division upon certificate by the district attorney to the judge who affirmed the judgment that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay.\nId. As such, the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) leaves no doubt as to its requirement that the State must provide a certificate when appealing from a final order of a district court. \u201cWhere the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction^] and the courts must give [the statute] its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u201d Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 575, 573 S.E.2d 118, 121 (2002) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the State\u2019s argument that the requirement of a certificate applies only to interlocutory orders is overruled.\nTherefore, the statutory requirements for appeal in the instant case are found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e). As the burden to demonstrate the right to appeal by following the statutory mandate is on the State, where the State fails to fulfill the statutory requirements, no appeal can be taken, and our Court is without jurisdiction over the appeal. State v. McDonald, 55 N.C. App. 393, 394, 285 S.E.2d 282, 283 (1982). Accordingly, \u201cthe appeal by the State is not authorized by statute, and this court has no jurisdiction over the appeal.\u201d Id.\nThe State further contends that even if a certificate was required, it has cured that defect by filing a belated certificate with its brief on appeal. We are not convinced, as we have held that where the State sought to cure a failure to timely file a certificate by petitioning to file the certificate at a later date, the appeal must be dismissed because \u201c[t]o give the State the right to file the certificate after the case has already been docketed in the appellate court would be to reduce the requirement of the certificate to a nullity.\u201d State v. Blandin, 60 N.C. App. 271, 272, 298 S.E.2d 759, 759-60 (1983).\nHere, the State seeks to file a belated certificate by petitioning for a writ of certiorari. As we see no reason to nullify the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) by allowing the petition for writ of certiorari, we therefore deny the State\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari and dismiss the appeal.\nDismissed.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C., and STEELMAN concur.\n. The superior court\u2019s written order was made pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e).", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L. Hyde, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Kathleen M. Joyce, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN GLENN BRYAN, Defendant\nNo. COA13-520\nFiled 5 November 2013\nAppeal and Error \u2014 appellate jurisdiction \u2014 appeal from district court dismissal\nAn appeal by the State was not authorized by statute, and the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the appeal, where defendant made a pretrial motion to dismiss a driving while impaired charge in district court; after a remand for further findings, the superior court affirmed the district court\u2019s preliminary order and remanded it to the district court for dismissal; and the State again appealed to the superior court. Since this appeal to superior court was from a final order of the district court, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432 was the controlling statute and the State could then appeal only by following the procedures stated in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) and including a certificate that the appeal was not for purposes of delay. While the State sought to file a belated certificate by petitioning for a writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals saw no reason to nullify the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) by allowing the petition.\nAppeal by the State from the order entered 24 September 2012 by Judge John O. Craig in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L. Hyde, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Kathleen M. Joyce, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0324-01", "first_page_order": 334, "last_page_order": 340 }