{ "id": 4278479, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN TEROD HOLLAND", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Holland", "decision_date": "2013-11-05", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1447", "first_page": "337", "last_page": "345", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 N.C. App. 337" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633605 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" }, { "page": "679" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638296 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "221" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "221" }, { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. App. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4079129 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/212/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 S.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791-92" }, { "page": "792" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 N.C. App. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4181949 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/209/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8321231 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3738718 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "259-60" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0234-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 726, "char_count": 18148, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14359717497043265 }, "sha256": "25626a18c1c179462346eb25352fad91eae5f29d65659b17789ddb53c39268ef", "simhash": "1:8babd4ae77a60d7c", "word_count": 2832 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.360096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN TEROD HOLLAND" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nKevin Terod Holland (\u201cDefendant\u201d) was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon on 1 June 2012. Defendant appeals from that conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for appropriate relief (\u201cMAR\u201d), which the trial court denied in an order entered 3 May 2013. This Court granted Defendant\u2019s motion for supplemental briefing, by both parties, regarding the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s MAR.\nI. Anneal from Conviction\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal from his conviction is that the trial court erred by failing \u201cto inquire, sua sponte, into his competency after he was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric unit before the second day of his trial.\u201d We disagree.\nA \u201ccriminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent. As a result, [a] trial court has a constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a competency hearing if there is substantial evidence before the court indicating that the accused may be mentally incompetent.\u201d State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 259, 644 S.E.2d 206, 221 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). \u201c[T]he standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\nIn arguing that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing, Defendant points to evidence showing that: he believed there was a conspiracy to rush him into court; he rejected the State\u2019s favorable offer to allow him to plead guilty to a Class I felony; he believed his attorney should file motions to dismiss \u201cheard in anticipation/prior to trial[;]\u201d and he believed his attorney conspired to get him convicted.\nThe key fact upon which Defendant relies is that he was involuntarily committed on or just before the second day of his trial. However, as Defendant acknowledges in his brief, the trial court had information indicating only that Defendant \u201cmight have been involuntarily committed.\u201d (emphasis added). The trial court had no record or information during trial that Defendant was involuntarily committed.\nDefendant was in court for the first day of trial on 29 May 2012. When court resumed for the second day of trial on 30 May 2012, counsel for both the State and Defendant were present at 9:34 a.m., but Defendant was absent. Defendant\u2019s counsel was unable to reach Defendant by telephone. According to Defendant\u2019s counsel, Defendant was supposed to \u201cshow at 8:30[a.m.] in [Defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s] office to talk\u201d but Defendant did not appear. Defendant\u2019s counsel told the trial court that Defendant indicated on 29 May 2012 that \u201che had to go back to Greensboro, and [Defendant\u2019s counsel] suggested that [Defendant] not do that[.]\u201d Defendant\u2019s counsel noted \u201can objection for the record\u201d to the trial court\u2019s decision to proceed with trial without Defendant present in court.\nThe trial court, in its order denying Defendant\u2019s MAR, made the following relevant findings describing the remainder of Defendant\u2019s trial:\nBefore proceeding further, [the trial court] gave a precautionary instruction to the jury regarding the State\u2019s burden of proof. The [trial court] also specifically instructed the jury about Defendant\u2019s absence, informing them to not form any negative inference therefrom.\n[Defendant\u2019s counsel] reported to the [trial court] that he had obtained some vague information about Defendant being in a hospital, in High Point, NC. It was unclear to [Defendant\u2019s counsel] who made the call to his office, but suspected it might have been from Defendant\u2019s aunt (at [Defendant\u2019s] mother\u2019s request).\n[Defendant\u2019s counsel] could not vouch for the accuracy of the message. He could not provide documentation regardingthename ofthe hospital, thereasonforthe alleged hospitalization, or how long it might last. [Defendant\u2019s counsel] could not provide any information about how to contact Defendant, or provide information from anyone who could explain Defendant\u2019s absence.\nThe State rested and Defendant offered no evidence. The evidence presented by the State was conclusive and overwhelming.\nDespite Defendant\u2019s failure to appear, [Defendant\u2019s counsel] cross-examined the witnesses, participated in the charge conference, made appropriate motions, and delivered a closing argument.\nAt no time during the trial did the [trial court] have credible information as to Defendant\u2019s whereabouts.\nAt 2:56 p.m., as part of [the trial court\u2019s] general instructions to the jury [the trial court] again charged that Defendant\u2019s absence from trial was not to affect their consideration of the evidence, or to affect their duty to apply the law as given to them by the [trial court].\nAt approximately 4:40 p.m. (during jury deliberations), [Defendant\u2019s counsel] received information (from either Defendant\u2019s aunt or mother), which indicated that Defendant might have been involuntarily committed at Wesley Long Hospital, in Greensboro, NC.\nThe information was disclosed to the [trial court] and discussed while the jury was deliberating. The [trial court] stated on the record that Defendant \u201chad potentially been involuntarily committed.\u201d\n[Defendant\u2019s counsel] informed the [trial court] that he was still unable to obtain anything official from Defendant (or [Defendant\u2019s] relatives) about the purported hospitalization and that he was uncertain about the accuracy of the information.\nWithout having anything credible upon which to rely, [Defendant\u2019s counsel] chose not to make a motion to continue.\nDuring the sentencing hearing, Defendant did not provide (nor did anyone else) any documentation about [Defendant\u2019s] hospital admission. [Defendant] did not make any statements or offer any evidence about the reason for his hospitalization, about his purported involuntary commitment, or his incapacity to proceed.\n[Defendant\u2019s counsel] maintained he had no reason to believe anything was wrong with Defendant and thought Defendant\u2019s hospitalization was part of [Defendant\u2019s] plan to avoid prosecution.\nThe record shows that, on the second day of trial, the trial court had no evidence of an involuntary commitment of Defendant. Evidence Defendant produced at the MAR hearing showed that \u201cDefendant was, in fact, involuntarily committed at Wesley Long Hospital in Greensboro, NC on the morning of May 30, 2012.\u201d However, this finding does not diminish the fact that, on the second day of trial, the trial court had no evidence of Defendant\u2019s involuntary commitment.\n\u201cEvidence of a defendant\u2019s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant\u201d in determining whether the trial court should conduct a competency hearing. State v. Staten, 172 N.C. App. 673, 678, 616 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2005). \u201cThere are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.\u201d Id. at 679, 616 S.E.2d at 655.\nIn Badgett, the defendant pointed to evidence that he \u201cwrote numerous letters to the trial court and the district attorney expressing his desire for a speedy trial resulting in a death sentence^]\u201d \u201cread a statement to the jury during the penalty phase in which he impliedly asked for a death sentence [,]\u201d and \u201chad an emotional outburst coupled with verbal attacks on the assistant district attorney who delivered the [S]tate\u2019s closing argument during the sentencing proceeding.\u201d Badgett, 361 N.C. at 259-60, 644 S.E.2d at 221. Our Supreme Court held that this evidence did not constitute substantial evidence requiring the trial court to sua sponte institute a competency hearing. Id. at 260, 644 S.E.2d at 221.\nDefendant cites State v. Whitted, 209 N.C. App. 522, 705 S.E.2d 787 (2011), in support of his argument. In Whitted, the evidence included the defendant\u2019s past history of mental illness; her rejection of a favorable plea offer; her emotional outburst after opening statements; her refusal to return to the courtroom; her loud chanting, singing, and \u201creligious imprecations[;]\u201d her refusal to \u201ccooperate with trial proceedings[;]\u201d and her further \u201csinging, crying, screaming and mumbling as the trial court pronounced sentence.\u201d Whitted, 209 N.C. App. at 527-28, 705 S.E.2d at 791-92. In Whitted, this Court held that, in light of the defendant\u2019s \u201chistory of mental illness, including paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder,\u201d the defendant\u2019s \u201cremarks that her appointed counsel was working for the State and that the trial court wanted her to plead guilty, coupled with her irrational behavior in the courtroom, constituted substantial evidence\u201d that required the trial court to conduct a competency hearing. Id. at 528, 705 S.E.2d at 792.\nIn the present case, the trial court had no information at the time of trial that Defendant had any history of mental illness. Defendant\u2019s behavior in the courtroom was not disruptive or irrational. Rather, Defendant\u2019s conduct and interactions with the trial court during the first day of trial on 29 May 2012 indicate that he was able to communicate clearly and \u201cwith a reasonable degree of rational understanding[.]\u201d Badgett, 361 N.C. at 259, 644 S.E.2d at 221. Relevant portions of the trial court\u2019s interactions with Defendant before trial follow:\nTHE COURT:____I have called Mr. Waters over and made inquiry in chambers as to whether he was representing you, and at that time he advised me that he is not representing you as to these charges, that he has had discussions with you, but has not been retained and cannot participate absent being paid. Are you aware of this?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I indicated to Mr. Lambeth that I was seeking to retain Mr. Waters.\nTHE COURT: All right, sir. But that has not been accomplished at this point?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir. We were in discussions, Mr. Waters and I.\nTHE COURT: Well, you do understand that the jury is here. They\u2019re not in the courtroom, but they\u2019re down in the jury room, and it\u2019s time for trial.\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: All right. Do you see Mr. Waters being retained in the next few moments and being ready?\nTHE DEFENDANT: As far as being ready for trial today, I don\u2019t, but being retained in the next few moments, yes, sir.\nThe trial court heard from the State regarding the attorneys that had withdrawn from representation of Defendant, and the trial court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to continue.\nAlthough Defendant apparently disagreed with counsel, attempted to retain a different attorney, and failed to appear for the second day of trial, Defendant\u2019s actions do not constitute substantial evidence that Defendant was incompetent to stand trial. The transcript indicates Defendant had a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. Allegations that Defendant may have been involuntarily committed in Guilford County, coupled with the fact that Defendant told his attorney that he planned to return to Greensboro, does not suggest incompetency. Rather, the evidence suggests that Defendant chose not to attend the second day of trial. This suggestion is bolstered by the representations of Defendant\u2019s counsel to the trial court. In its order denying Defendant\u2019s MAR, the trial court found as fact that \u201c[Defendant\u2019s counsel] maintained he had no reason to believe anything was wrong with Defendant and thought Defendant\u2019s hospitalization was part of [Defendant\u2019s] plan to avoid prosecution.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s distrust of counsel, decision to proceed to trial, mistaken understanding of criminal procedure, and refusal to attend his trial do not constitute substantial evidence requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing into Defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial. The trial court did not err in failing to, sua sponte, hold a hearing on Defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial.\nII. Appeal from Denial of MAR\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal from the denial of his MAR is that the trial court erred because \u201cthe crucial finding of fact that [Defendant] had been diagnosed as \u2018malingering\u2019 and \u2018feigning illness\u2019 was not supported by any evidence, and the crucial conclusions of law rested on that finding.\u201d We disagree.\n\u201cWhen a trial court\u2019s findings on a motion for appropriate relief are reviewed, these findings are binding if they are supported by competent evidence and may be disturbed only upon a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. However, the trial court\u2019s conclusions [of law] are fully reviewable on appeal.\u201d State v. Taylor, 212 N.C. App. 238, 243, 713 S.E.2d 82, 86 (2011).\nDefendant does not specify which finding he challenges on appeal. Rather, Defendant states that the \u201ctrial court made a finding of fact that Dr. Readling diagnosed [Defendant] as a malingerer. In the same finding, the trial court also found that the hospital records stated that [Defendant] was feigning his mental illness.\u201d We assume Defendant intended to challenge the finding which appears on page 8 of the trial court\u2019s order, as follows:\nUpon learning of Defendant\u2019s legal issues (and that law enforcement would be taking Defendant back to Wilmington), Dr. Read[l]ing changed his discharge diagnosis by adding \u201cMalingering\u201d to his original diagnosis. Cone Health Behavioral Health Hospital\u2019s coding record for Defendant\u2019s final diagnosis also included (among others) \u201cperson feigning illness.\u201d\nDefendant contends that \u201c[fjrom this unsupported finding, the trial court concluded the following about [Defendant\u2019s] competence to stand trial:\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s failure to attend the second day of trial, his untruthfulness to the hospital admissions staff, his refusal to release admission information to court officials, his involuntary commitment diagnosis based on incomplete information, and the discharge diagnosis of \u201cmalingering\u201d and \u201cperson feigning illness,\u201d was not substantial evidence indicating Defendant may have been mentally incompetent.\nDefendant faked and feigned his illness.\nDefendant has failed to carry his burden with credible evidence as to his incompetence to stand trial.\nDefendant was not entitled to a hearing on the issue of his competency whereby the [trial] court was required to conduct a thorough inquiry before it allowed Defendant\u2019s trial to proceed.\nEven assuming arguendo, without deciding, that the challenged finding of fact was unsupported, Defendant fails to show that the trial court erred in its ultimate conclusion to deny Defendant\u2019s MAR. With the exception of the conclusion that \u201cDefendant faked and feigned his illness [,]\u201d the above conclusions are supported by other unchallenged findings of fact, quoted in Section I of this opinion, and additional unchallenged findings, which are quoted below:\nDefendant was required to answer a number of questions and submit to an assessment before admission. When asked by admissions staff whether he had \u201cany legal issues,\u201d \u201cany criminal charges pending,\u201d or \u201cany court dates,\u201d Defendant answered \u201cNo\u201d to each. When the staff provided Defendant with a standard form entitled \u201cConsent to Release Information,\" he refused to check the box that would give the staff permission to release information to \u201cLaw Enforcement, Probation, (or his) Attorney.\u201d\nDefendant was transferred to Cone Health Behavioral Health Hospital for admission and treatment. Defendant did not inform the staff at Cone that he was supposed to be in Wilmington in court for his armed robbery trial, or that he had \u201cany legal issues.\u201d\nThe record demonstrates that there was not substantial evidence requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing into Defendant\u2019s competency. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant\u2019s MAR.\nIII. Conclusion\nDefendant has not shown error in either his conviction or the trial court\u2019s denial of his MAR. We note that, although Defendant refers to the right to be present at trial in his brief challenging the denial of his MAR, Defendant does not argue that the trial court deprived him of this right under the Confrontation Clause of either the Constitution of North Carolina or the United States Constitution. We therefore express no opinion as to that issue.\nNo error in part, affirmed in part.\nJudges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Anne Goeo Kirby, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Jon H. Hunt and Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN TEROD HOLLAND\nNo. COA12-1447\nFiled 5 November 2013\n1. Constitutional Law \u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 hearing not required\nThe trial court did not err in a robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon case by failing to inquire, sua sponte, into defendant\u2019s competency after he was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric unit before the second day of his trial. The trial court had no record or information during trial that defendant was involuntarily committed. Further, defendant\u2019s distrust of counsel, decision to proceed to trial, mistaken understanding of criminal procedure, and refusal to attend his trial did not constitute substantial evidence requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing.\n2. Appeal and Error \u2014 motion for appropriate relief \u2014 no substantial evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon case by denying defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief (MAR). Even assuming arguendo that the challenged finding of fact was unsupported, defendant failed to show that the trial court erred in its ultimate conclusion to deny the MAR. There was not substantial evidence requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing into defendant\u2019s competency.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 1 June 2012 by Judge D. Jack Hooks in Superior Court, New Hanover County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 August 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Anne Goeo Kirby, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Jon H. Hunt and Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0337-01", "first_page_order": 347, "last_page_order": 355 }