{ "id": 4278064, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDGARD JOEL MARTINEZ", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Martinez", "decision_date": "2013-11-05", "docket_number": "No. COA13-492", "first_page": "361", "last_page": "366", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 N.C. App. 361" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639062 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" }, { "page": "258" }, { "page": "257-58" }, { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639310 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8208672 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4346822 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "92" }, { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154614 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-221.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573163 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168230 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 3", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5-6" }, { "page": "5-6" }, { "page": "5" }, { "page": "5", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867543 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194-95" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0190-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 566, "char_count": 11429, "ocr_confidence": 0.724, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.143577868825557 }, "sha256": "80c8c1aa2a7645ddb0a61d7f07a8a67e0ee05cfb5a81956241c33449b1e8cbbb", "simhash": "1:890bd523d7caaeb6", "word_count": 1875 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.360096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and DILLON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDGARD JOEL MARTINEZ" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nEdgard Joel Martinez (\u201cDefendant\u201d) was indicted on 11 September 2012 for altering court documents, using the seal or notarial records of a notary without authority, and obstructing justice. At trial, Defendant testified that he and Marcia Martinez (\u201cMs. Martinez\u201d) married in February 2010 and separated in March 2010. Defendant filed an action for divorce on 23 May 2011.\nMs. Martinez testified that she did not sign her name to a document titled \u201cAcceptance of Service, Answer and Waiver of Notice\u201d filed in the Office of the Clerk of Superior Court in Onslow County on 20 June 2011. Stanley McCormick (\u201cMr. McCormick\u201d), a notary public, testified that the signature which reads \u201cStanley D. McCormick\u201d was not his signature and that he did not sign the document titled \u201cAcceptance of Service, Answer and Waiver of Notice.\u201d Defendant was convicted of altering court documents and obstructing justice on 15 November 2012. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of altering court documents. Defendant does not challenge his conviction for obstructing justice on appeal.\nI. Preservation\nPreliminarily, we address the question of whether Defendant preserved this issue for review. \u201cIn order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Defendant preserves only those arguments that he presented to the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Sharpe, 344 N.C. 190, 194-95, 473 S.E.2d 3, 5-6 (1996).\nThe defendant in Sharpe argued at trial that evidence \u201cshould be admitted under the state of mind and dying declarations exceptions to the rule against hearsay.\u201d Id. at 195, 473 S.E.2d at 5-6. The defendant argued on appeal that the evidence was admissible as statements against penal interest. Id. at 194, 473 S.E.2d at 5. Our Supreme Court held that \u201cwhere a theory argued on appeal was not raised before the trial court, the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get abetter mount[.]\u201d Sharpe, 344 N.C. at 194,473 S.E.2d at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nIn the present case, at the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the State failed to present evidence that Defendant was the perpetrator.\n[Defense counsel]. Judge, obviously, there has been evidence that shows, perhaps, a forgery was committed. There\u2019s been testimony it was not the signature of Mr. McCormick; however, Judge, there has been absolutely no evidence that points toward this defendant. There has been no evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the [S]tate, that shows he\u2019s the one that altered these court documents....\nI would ask the court that, based on the elements of this particular crime or these particular crimes, because the [S]tate is only proceeding, Your Honor, with the altering the court documents and obstructing justice, that there\u2019s not enough evidence for this to go to the jury for them to make any type of decision based on my client is the one that did this. Yes, there has been some evidence of a forgery. Who? Not one person has gotten on that stand and said, based on this, that, or the other, he did it. I would ask the court to dismiss this case].]\nDefendant renewed his motion to dismiss at the conclusion of all evidence, as follows:\n[Defense counsel]. Judge, I want to renew my motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence and ask that the court enter directed verdict. Judge, it would be under the grounds I stated previously in my argument.\nDefendant acknowledges \u201cthat his argument in this Court presents a different theory for dismissal than that argued in the trial court.\u201d Defendant requests that this Court invoke N.C.R. App. P. 2 to review the sufficiency of the evidence.\nTo prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the public interest, either court of the appellate division may, except as otherwise expressly provided by these rules, suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a case pending before it upon application of a party or upon its own initiative].]\nN.C.R. App. P. 2.\nThis Court invoked N.C.R. App. P. 2 to review the merits of an argument in State v. Gayton-Barbosa, 197 N.C. App. 129, 676 S.E.2d 586 (2009). In that case, the defendant failed to renew his motion to dismiss the charge of felonious larceny. Id. at 133, 676 S.E.2d at 589. The defendant limited his argument in support of his motion at the close of the State\u2019s evidence to the lack of \u201cevidence that the firearm in question was not returned to the owner].]\u201d Id. The defendant argued on appeal that there existed a variance between the indictment and the evidence. Id.\nIn Gayton-Barbosa, this Court invoked N.C.R. App. P. 2 for three reasons: (1) Supreme Court precedent [State v. Brown, 263 N.C. 786, 140 S.E.2d 413 (1965)] indicated that \u201cfatal variances of the type present here are sufficiently serious to justify the exercise of our authority under N.C.R. App. P. 2[;]\u201d (2) \u201ca variance-based challenge is, essentially, a contention that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction[,]\u201d and this Court and our Supreme Court \u201chave regularly invoked N.C.R. App. P. 2 in order to address challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction[;]\u201d and (3) \u201cit is difficult to contemplate a more \u2018manifest injustice\u2019 to a convicted defendant than that which would result from sustaining a conviction that lacked adequate evidentiary support[.]\u201d Gayton-Barbosa, 197 N.C. App. at 134-35, 676 S.E.2d at 590.\nThe challenge in the present case concerns the sufficiency of the evidence. After careful consideration, we invoke our authority under N.C.R. App. P. 2 to review Defendant\u2019s argument. Defendant contends that the \u201cfiling of a forged document does not violate N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-221.2.\u201d\nII. Standard of Review\nWe review the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). The \u201ctrial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Bradshaw, 366 N.C. 90, 93, 728 S.E.2d 345, 347 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Id.\nThe \u201ctrial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in the State\u2019s favor.\u201d Bradshaw, 366 N.C. at 92, 728 S.E.2d at 347. \u201cAll evidence, competent or incompetent, must be considered. Any contradictions or conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State, and evidence unfavorable to the State is not considered.\u201d Bradshaw, 366 N.C. at 93, 728 S.E.2d at 347 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\nIII. Analysis\n\u201cAny person who without lawful authority intentionally enters a judgment upon or materially alters or changes any criminal or civil process, criminal or civil pleading, or other official case record is guilty of a Class H felony.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-221.2 (2011).\nIn State v. Burke, 185 N.C. App. 115, 648 S.E.2d 256 (2007), this Court held that evidence that the defendant swapped the second page of an order with another page was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss the charge of altering court documents. In the order, the defendant was required to pay child support and provide health insurance for the children. Id. at 116, 648 S.E.2d at 257.\nThe defendant\u2019s employer sent DSS a letter stating that the defendant was \u201cnot required to have health insurance on his children\u201d and attached a copy of an order. Id. DSS \u201cknew that an order from a show cause hearing would not have an effect on [the] defendant\u2019s obligations regarding his children\u2019s medical insurance\u201d and confirmed this knowledge by checking the original order in the clerk of court\u2019s office. Id. at 117, 648 S.E.2d at 258. The copy \u201cincluded handwritten portions relieving [the] defendant of his obligation to provide medical insurance to his children through his employer.\u201d Id. at 117, 648 S.E.2d at 257-58. The original order \u201cdid not contain the hand-written language[.]\u201d Id. at 117, 648 S.E.2d at 258.\nHowever, an employee of DSS was later \u201csummoned to the clerk\u2019s office, where she learned that the order in the file had been changed to match the one sent to her by\u201d the defendant\u2019s employer. Id. A handwriting analyst testified that the handwriting on the altered portion of the order was consistent with the defendant\u2019s handwriting samples, in the opinion of the analyst.\nIn the present case, the State presented testimony from two witnesses, Ms. Martinez and Mr. McCormick. Ms. Martinez testified that, on the document titled \u201cAcceptance of Service, Answer and Waiver of Notice,\u201d the signature which reads \u201cMarcia Martinez\u201d was a \u201chorrible signature\u201d and was not her own signature. Ms. Martinez further testified that she and Defendant were having \u201cdisagreements about the dissolution of the marriage[.]\u201d Mr. McCormick, the notary public, testified that the signature which reads \u201cStanley D. McCormick\u201d was not his signature and that he did not sign the document titled \u201cAcceptance of Service, Answer and Waiver of Notice.\u201d\nThe State urges a plain reading of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-221.2. A plain reading of the statute, with the precedent in Burke, supra, compels us to conclude that the evidence does not show that Defendant materially altered or changed any process, pleading, or other official case record. Rather, the evidence suggests that Defendant forged the signatures of Ms. Martinez and Mr. McCormick on the document before it was filed in the clerk of court\u2019s office.\nThe trial court erred in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of altering court documents. We need not reach Defendant\u2019s argument concerning juiy instructions because of our holding on the first issue.\nVacated.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and DILLON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Mabel Y. Bullock, for the State.", "W. Michael Spivey for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDGARD JOEL MARTINEZ\nNo. COA13-492\nFiled 5 November 2013\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 certiorari granted \u2014 different theory on appeal\nThe Court of Appeals granted defendant\u2019s petition for certiorari, invoking its authority under N.C.R. App. P. 2, to review the merits of defendant\u2019s appeal where defendant acknowledged that his argument in Court of Appeals presented a different theory for dismissal than that argued in the trial court.\n2. Crimes, Other \u2014 altering court documents \u2014 insufficient evidence\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of altering court documents. While the evidence suggested that defendant forged signatures on a document before it was filed in the clerk of court\u2019s office, the evidence did not show that defendant materially altered or changed any process, pleading, or other official case record.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 15 November 2012 by Judge Tanya T. Wallace in Superior Court, Onslow County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 October 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Mabel Y. Bullock, for the State.\nW. Michael Spivey for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0361-01", "first_page_order": 371, "last_page_order": 376 }