{ "id": 4277810, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF T.J.F.", "name_abbreviation": "In re T.J.F.", "decision_date": "2013-11-19", "docket_number": "No. COA13-707", "first_page": "531", "last_page": "536", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 N.C. App. 531" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 9081240 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0380-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 648, "char_count": 13956, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14356937412181173 }, "sha256": "3d70bedadb2ec6b4a2642f3adb1ffa299ff4c0c73ef9c21a1fffe92046d1af1c", "simhash": "1:33d9455a1ee6c472", "word_count": 2225 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.360096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and HUNTER, JR. concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF T.J.F." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nPetitioner is the mother of T.J.F. (hereinafter referenced by the pseudonym \u201cTaylor\u201d), bom in May 2003 of a relationship between petitioner and respondent-father. Petitioner and respondent-father resided together for approximately six months after Taylor\u2019s birth and then separated. Taylor remained with petitioner. On 9 August 2012, petitioner filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent-father pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(l) (2011) on the ground of neglect. On 21 March 2013, the court filed an order concluding grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of respondent-father pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7) in that respondent-father willfully abandoned Taylor for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition. By separate disposition order, the court concluded that the best interest of Taylor required termination of the parental rights of respondent-father.\nDiscussion\nRespondent-father first contends the court erred by terminating his parental rights on a ground not alleged in the petition. A petition for termination of parental rights must allege \u201c[f]acts that are sufficient to warrant a determination that one or more of the grounds for terminating parental rights [fisted in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)[ exist.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1104(6) (2011). The facts alleged need not be \u201cexhaustive or extensive\u201d but they must be sufficient to \u201cput a party on notice as to what acts, omission or conditions are at issue.\u201d In re Hardesty, 150 N.C. App. 380, 384, 563 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2002). When the petition alleges the existence of a particular statutory ground and the court finds the existence of a ground not cited in the petition, termination of parental rights on that ground may not stand unless the petition alleges facts to place the parent on notice that parental rights could be terminated on that ground. In re B.L.H., 190 N.C. App. 142, 147-48, 660 S.E.2d 255, 257-58, off d per curiam, 362 N.C. 674, 669 S.E.2d 320 (2008).\nWe now consider whether the petition at bar alleged sufficient facts to place respondent-father on notice that his parental rights may be terminated because he abandoned his child. \u201cAbandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.\u201d In re Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986). \u201cIt has been held that if a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wilfully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.\u201d Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962).\nAbandonment of a child can support termination of parental rights under two provisions ofN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(aSee Inre Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540-41, 577 S.E.2d 421, 427 (2003). First, parental rights may be terminated pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(l) if the court concludes the parent has neglected the child by abandoning the child. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(l) (2011); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15) (defining a neglected juvenile as one \u201cwho does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile\u2019s parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned\u201d). Second, parental rights may be terminated pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7) upon a finding that the parent \u201chas willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion\u201d to terminate parental rights. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7) (2011).\nWhile the better practice would have been to specifically plead termination pursuant to section 7B-llll(a)(7), we conclude the petition here sufficiently alleged facts to place respondent-father on notice that his parental rights may be terminated on the basis that he abandoned his child. The petition alleged that respondent\u2019s \u201clack of involvement with or regard for the minor child constitutes neglect under N.C.G.S. 7B-llll(a)(l).\u201d As examples of neglect, the petition cited respondent\u2019s limited contact with the child despite consistently available opportunities for involvement; his failure to have any contact with the child within the six months preceding the petition; his failure to call or write the child within the same six-month period; and his failure to provide a reasonable amount for the cost and care of the child. The petition also alleged that as a result of the limited contact, the child has \u201cno meaningful relationship\u201d with respondent-father. These allegations suggest that respondent-father had foregone his parental responsibilities to the child and withheld his presence, care and parental affection by failing to maintain contact with the child.\nThe reliance of respondent-father upon In re G.W., 182 N.C. App. 214, 228-29, 641 S.E.2d 725, 735 (2007), in which this Court invalidated termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111(a)(7), is misplaced. The petitioner in that case conceded the petition failed to allege abandonment and the respondent-parent had been given no notice by the allegations of the petition that his rights might be terminated on that basis. Here, the petition contained sufficient facts to put respondent-father on notice that his parental rights could be revoked on the basis of abandonment. Therefore, In re C. W. is inapposite.\nRespondent-father next contends the court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights. He argues the court\u2019s determination of the child\u2019s best interest is flawed.\nUpon determining the existence of one or more grounds for termination of parental rights, the court next decides whether terminating the parent\u2019s rights is in the juvenile\u2019s best interest. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1110(a) (2011). In deciding whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the juvenile,\nthe court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:\n(1) The age of the juvenile.\n(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.\n(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.\n(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.\n(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.\n(6) Any relevant consideration.\nId. The court\u2019s decision is discretionary and reviewable only for abuse of discretion. In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). \u201cA ruling committed to a trial court\u2019s discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).\nIn its disposition order, the court noted the lack of contact by respondent-father with the child for more than two years. The court also found that the child has a close and loving relationship with her mother and maternal grandparents; that the maternal grandparents desire to adopt the child in order to provide her with otherwise unavailable benefits; that petitioner desires for her parents to adopt the child; and that, despite the child\u2019s desire to continue a relationship with her father, respondent-father \u201chas not been forthcoming\u201d in allowing the relationship to continue. The court concluded that it was in the child\u2019s best interest for termination to occur based upon her age, relationship with the maternal grandparents, and the lack of a relationship with respondent-father. As these findings reflect a reasoned decision, we find no abuse of discretion.\nRespondent-father lastly takes issue with the court\u2019s terminating his rights based in part upon the child\u2019s obtaining \u201cnecessary benefits\u201d through adoption by her grandparents. The report of the guardian ad litem shows that if the child is adopted by her maternal grandparents, she qualifies for benefits as a child of a retired military person. The guardian ad litem wrote in her report that \u201cthe purpose of this termination and adoption basically is to manipulate the system so that [Taylor] can receive federal benefits.\u201d\nRespondent-father argues that terminating parental rights so the child can obtain a financial advantage is against public policy and violates N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(2), which prohibits termination of a parent\u2019s rights for the sole reason that the parent is unable to care for the child because of the parent\u2019s poverty. He also argues it contravenes the first listed purpose of the Juvenile Code of providing \u201cprocedures for the hearing of juvenile cases that assure fairness and equity[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-100(1) (2011). Respondent-father submits that, since petitioner is herself abdicating parental responsibility for her child, \u201cas a matter of equity she should not have the right to petition to terminate [respondent-father\u2019s] parental rights.\u201d\nOur General Assembly has decreed that the Juvenile Code:\nshall be interpreted and construed so as to implement the following purposes and policies:\n(1) To provide procedures for the hearing of juvenile cases that assure fairness and equity and that protect the constitutional rights of juveniles and parents;\n(2) To develop a disposition in each juvenile case that reflects consideration of the facts, the needs and limitations of the juvenile, and the strengths and weaknesses of the family.\n(3) To provide for services for the protection of juveniles by means that respect both the right to family autonomy and the juveniles\u2019 needs for safety, continuity, and permanence; and\n(4) To provide standards for the removal, when necessary, of juveniles from their homes and for the return of juveniles to their homes consistent with preventing the unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents.\n(5) To provide standards, consistent with the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, P.L. 105-89, for ensuring that the best interests of the juvenile are of paramount consideration by the court and that when it is not in the juvenile\u2019s best interest to be returned home, the juvenile will be placed in a safe, permanent home within a reasonable amount of time.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-100 (2011). A \u201ccommon thread running throughout the Juvenile Code, [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-100 el seq.], is that the court\u2019s primary concern must be the child\u2019s best interest.\u201d In re Pittman, 149 N.C. App. 756, 761, 561 S.E.2d 560, 564, disc, review denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 608 (2002), cert. denied, Harris-Pittman v. Nash County Dept. of Social Services, 538 U.S. 982, 155 L. Ed. 2d 673 (2003). \u201c[T]he child\u2019s interest in being protected from abuse and neglect is paramount.\u201d Id.\nThe respondent-father\u2019s argument might have some merit if the only basis cited by the court for terminating his rights is so the child could obtain financial benefits. However, the court cited other bases in its determination that termination of parental rights was in Taylor\u2019s best interest. In making a determination of the disposition in the child\u2019s best interest, a court may assign more weight to one or more factors over the others. In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 448, 615 S.E.2d 704, 709 (2005), aff\u2019d per curiam, 360 N.C. 475, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006). Here, consistent with the purpose of protecting the child from abuse or neglect, the bulk of the court\u2019s findings of fact in the adjudication and disposition orders is devoted to the failure of respondent-father to satisfy his parental obligations to his child by withholding his presence, affection, and support. Only one mention is made concerning the possibility of the child\u2019s obtaining financial benefits by being adopted by her maternal grandparents.\nWe affirm the adjudication and disposition orders.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges CALABRIA and HUNTER, JR. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lane & Lane, PLLC, by Freddie Lane, Jr. and Meleisa C. Rush-Lane, for mother, petitioner-appellee.", "Assistant Appellate Defender J. Lee Gilliam for father, respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF T.J.F.\nNo. COA13-707\nFiled 19 November 2013\n1. Termination of Parental Rights \u2014 specific ground \u2014 not alleged in petition \u2014 sufficient facts \u2014 respondent on notice\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights on a ground not alleged in the petition. While the better practice would have been to specifically plead termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7), the petition sufficiently alleged facts to place respondent on notice that his parental rights may be terminated on the basis that he had abandoned his child.\n2. Termination of Parental Rights \u2014 best interest of child \u2014 reasoned decision\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it was in the best interest of the child that respondent\u2019s parental rights be terminated. The court\u2019s findings of fact reflected a reasoned decision.\n3. Termination of Parental Rights \u2014 consideration of child\u2019s adoption \u2014 necessary benefits\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by terminating respondent\u2019s rights based in part upon the child\u2019s obtaining necessary benefits through adoption by her grandparents. The bulk of the court\u2019s findings of fact in the adjudication and disposition orders were devoted to the failure of respondent to satisfy his parental obligations to his child by withholding his presence, affection, and support. Only one mention was made concerning the possibility of the child\u2019s obtaining financial benefits by being adopted by her maternal grandparents.\nAppeal by respondent-father from orders entered 21 March 2013 by Judge A. Elizabeth Keever in Cumberland County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 October 2013.\nLane & Lane, PLLC, by Freddie Lane, Jr. and Meleisa C. Rush-Lane, for mother, petitioner-appellee.\nAssistant Appellate Defender J. Lee Gilliam for father, respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0531-01", "first_page_order": 541, "last_page_order": 546 }