{ "id": 4278642, "name": "JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff v. LINDA D. BROWNING, a/k/a LINDA BROWNING and LESLIE BROWNING a/k/a LESLIE DEANNE BROWNING DAVIS, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. Browning", "decision_date": "2013-11-19", "docket_number": "No. COA13-358", "first_page": "537", "last_page": "545", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 N.C. App. 537" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635305 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "quoting Carter v. Rockingham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 687, 690, 582 S.E.2d 69, 72 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634256 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/620/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639684 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292", "parenthetical": "quoting Draughon v. Harnett Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 705, 708, 582 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.E. 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655066 ], "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/158/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9189037 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N.C. App. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301470 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666-67", "parenthetical": "quoting Carter v. Rockingham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 687, 690, 582 S.E.2d 69, 72 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/176/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520529 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521236 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684915 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526417 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" }, { "page": "872-73" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "873" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9252018 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318", "parenthetical": "noting the requirement of solicitation or inducement in unjust enrichment actions" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613542 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" }, { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569850 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12128021 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527681 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 554", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519016 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8351981 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833", "parenthetical": "\"A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason . . . [or] upon a showing that [the trial court's decision] was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527808 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815", "parenthetical": "quoting Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 722, 381 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523406 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "quoting Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 722, 381 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 783", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523989 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785-86", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0783-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9189113 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8371651 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "quoting Draughon v. Harnett Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 705, 708, 582 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914192 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521088 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1012, "char_count": 22294, "ocr_confidence": 0.73, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.969196432233225e-08, "percentile": 0.3715243630034029 }, "sha256": "aac370b685f51adc711b1e10b9437a22800979a3b734d50dac86d1d20ee6cef8", "simhash": "1:8d8ae46ad5a72cce", "word_count": 3620 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.360096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur." ], "parties": [ "JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff v. LINDA D. BROWNING, a/k/a LINDA BROWNING and LESLIE BROWNING a/k/a LESLIE DEANNE BROWNING DAVIS, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nJPMorgan Chase Bank (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019) appeals from a 26 October 2012 order granting summary judgment in favor of Linda Browning and Leslie Browning (collectively \u201cDefendants\u201d). Upon review, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment and denying Plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend.\nI. Facts & Procedural History\nPlaintiff filed a civil summons, notice of lis pendens, and its complaint on 2 December 2011 in Cherokee County Superior Court. Defendants filed an answer and counterclaims on 23 February 2012. Plaintiff replied to the counterclaims on 14 June 2012. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on 20 August 2012. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint on 1 October 2012.\nThe summary judgment motion and motion to amend the pleadings were heard simultaneously by the Honorable Sharon T. Barrett on 26 October 2012. Judge Barrett granted Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff\u2019s motion for leave to amend. The trial court served Plaintiff with this order on 19 November 2012, and notice of appeal was timely filed on 29 November 2012. The record and exhibits presented on appeal tended to show the following facts.\nThis action concerns title to real property located at 179 Peachtree Street in Murphy, North Carolina (\u201cPeachtree\u201d). A brief history of the chain of title shows Defendants\u2019 grandparents Evan Alonzo Browning (\u201cEvan\u201d) and Fleta Browning (\u201cFleta\u201d) previously owned Peachtree. Fleta passed away, leaving Evan as the sole owner as a surviving tenant by the entirety. Evan then conveyed Peachtree to Defendants on 26 August 1986 by a properly recorded deed, reserving a life estate for himself. Evan passed away on 27 October 1989. Defendants later conveyed a one-third interest to their father William Evan Browning (\u201cFather\u201d) by general warranty deed on 31 March 1989. Father deeded his one-third interest in Peachtree to himself and his wife Mildred Browning on 13 January 1992, creating a tenancy by the entirety. Mildred Browning predeceased her husband in 1999.\nOn 24 April 2001, Father individually executed a promissory note payable to First-Citizens Bank and Trust Company in the amount of $162,000 (\u201cFirst Note\u201d). On the same date, to secure the First Note, Defendants and Father executed a deed of trust (\u201cFirst Deed of Trust\u201d) to secure repayment of the First Note. The uniform settlement statement shows a title examination fee of $275.00 paid to Hyde, Hoover, & Lindsay, a Murphy, North Carolina law firm. As part of the closing, Attorney Charles W. McHan, Jr. notified Defendants that they needed to sign the First Deed of Trust in order for Father to complete the transaction. Defendants signed the First Deed of Trust, but not the First Note.\nOn or near 16 August 2005, Father executed a second promissory note in the amount of $236,300.00, payable to Gordon Lending Corporation, Plaintiff\u2019s predecessor in interest (\u201cSecond Note\u201d). Father simultaneously executed a deed of trust (\u201cSecond Deed of Trust\u201d), which was later recorded on 29 August 2005 in the Cherokee County Registry. Advantage Equity Services of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania completed a \u201cTitle Commitment\u201d for Father and his then-deceased wife, Mildred Browning. On the \u201cTitle Commitment,\u201d Schedule B, Item 3 required as a condition of closing that a \u201cloan termination authorization must be signed by the borrowers for each mortgage appearing on the title.\u201d In the mortgages section of this document, the First Deed of Trust is listed, along with mortgagees \u201cWilliam E. Browning, Unmarried, Linda D. Browning, Unmarried, and Leslie D. Browning Davis, Unmarried.\u201d There is also a title insurance fee of $405.50 and a title exam fee of $185.00 listed on the \u201cTitle Commitment\u201d document.\nDefendants did not execute either the Second Note or the Second Deed of Trust. The 29 August 2005 Second Deed of Trust listed the borrowers as Father and his then-deceased wife, Mildred Browning, but not Defendants. Despite the title commitment requirement, then-deceased Mildred Browning did not sign the Second Deed of Trust. The record does not show Defendants signed a \u201cloan termination authorization.\u201d\nAt closing, Gordon Lending Corporation disbursed $153,711.09 from the proceeds of the Second Note to satisfy the First Note and First Deed of Trust. The Second Deed of Trust was drafted by Gordon Lending Corporation. Additionally, the closing statement from Gordon Lending Corporation did not include any charges for checking the chain of title or for attorney\u2019s fees, although a $475 fee was paid to Advantage Equity Services. The record lacks any indication of involvement by a licensed North Carolina attorney in the second transaction.\nFather died intestate on 13 September 2006 with Defendants being his only heirs. By letter dated 15 December 2006, the administrator of Father\u2019s estate notified the then-holder of the Second Deed of Trust, Plaintiff\u2019s predecessor in interest, Washington Mutual Bank, that (i) Father never owned more than a one-third interest in Peachtree; (ii) each of Defendants owned a one-third interest; and (iii) the Second Deed of Trust constituted a lien on only a one-third tenancy in common interest in Peachtree. The administrator also notified Washington Mutual that \u201cit does not appear that a local attorney did any title examination and [does appear] that the whole transaction was handled by an out-of-state closing company, which may violate North Carolina statutes dealing with the authorized practice of law.\u201d The administrator also forwarded copies of the closing documents to the North Carolina State Bar for any appropriate action. Washington Mutual acknowledged receipt of this letter by its own letter dated 25 January 2007. Washington Mutual replied that it had \u201cinitiated an investigation of the allegations you raise and will advise you of our determination when concluded.\u201d\nOn 25 September 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company labeled Washington Mutual Bank a \u201cFailed Bank.\u201d Plaintiff, JPMorgan Chase, assumed the liabilities and purchased the assets of Washington Mutual Bank. Plaintiff is now the holder in due course of the Second Note and the beneficiary of the Second Deed of Trust.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint in Cherokee County Superior Court requesting: (i) that the Second Deed of Trust be declared a valid lien; (ii) to establish a trust in the property or to reform the Second Deed of Trust; (iii) to quiet title; or (iv) in the alternative, to find for Plaintiff that Defendants were unjustly enriched. While Plaintiff sought relief at trial on all four grounds, Plaintiff seeks review only of the trial court\u2019s treatment of its unjust enrichment claim and argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff\u2019s request for leave to amend its complaint. Plaintiff therefore has abandoned the remaining three grounds raised in the trial court. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2011) (\u201cIssues not presented in a party\u2019s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.\u201d).\nII. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review\nJurisdiction fies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b) (2011), as Plaintiff appeals from a final order of the superior court as a matter of right.\nThe first issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s unjust enrichment claim; this issue is reviewed de novo. In Re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008). The standard of review relating to the granting or denial of a summary judgment motion is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Oliver v. Roberts, 49 N.C. App. 311, 314, 271 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1980), cert. denied, 276 S.E.2d 283 (1981). \u201cIn ruling on the motion, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, who is entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the facts proffered.\u201d Averitt v. Rozier, 119 N.C. App. 216, 218, 458 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1995). Summary judgment may be properly shown by \u201c \u2018proving that an essential element of the plaintiff\u2019s case is non-existent.\u2019 \u201d Kinesis Adver., Inc. v. Hill, 187 N.C. App. 1, 10, 652 S.E.2d 284, 292 (2007) (quoting Draughon v. Harnett Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 705, 708, 582 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2003)).\nThe second issue on appeal is whether the court improperly denied a request for leave to amend Plaintiff\u2019s complaint and is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. \u201cLeave to amend should be granted when \u2018justice so requires,\u2019 or by written consent of the adverse party ... The granting or denial of a motion to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.\u201d House Healers Restorations, Inc. v. Ball, 112 N.C. App. 783, 785-86, 437 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1993) (internal citation omitted). \u201cIf the trial court articulates a clear reason for denying the motion to amend, then our review ends. Acceptable reasons for which a motion to amend may be denied are \u2018undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice and futility of the amendment.\u2019 \u201d NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Baines, 116 N.C. App. 263, 268, 447 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1994) (quoting Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 722, 381 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1989)). \u201cAbuse of discretion results where the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. \u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988); see also White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (\u201cA trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason . . . [or] upon a showing that [the trial court\u2019s decision] was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d).\nIII. Analysis\nA. Unjust Enrichment\nPlaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on its unjust enrichment claim. We disagree.\nA prima facie claim for unjust enrichment has five elements. First, one party must confer a benefit upon the other party. D. W.H. Painting Co., Inc. v. D.W. Ward Const. Co., Inc., 174 N.C. App. 327, 334, 620 S.E.2d 887, 893 (2005). Second, the benefit \u201cmust not have been conferred officiously, that is it must not be conferred, by an interference in the affairs of the other party in a manner that is not justified in the circumstances.\u201d Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570, 369 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988)) (quotation marks omitted). Third, the benefit must not be gratuitous. Id. Fourth, the benefit must be measurable. Id. Last, \u201cthe defendant must have consciously accepted the benefit.\u201d Id. For purposes of this appeal, we hold that the Plaintiff could show at trial three of these elements: (i) that the discharge of the First Deed of Trust was a benefit; (ii) that the benefit was non-gratuitous; and (iii) that the benefit was measurable. However, because the Plaintiff did not forecast evidence showing that the benefit was not officiously conferred, we affirm the trial court\u2019s granting of summary judgment.\n\u201cThe doctrine of unjust enrichment was devised by equity to exact the return of, or payment for, benefits received under circumstances where it would be unfair for the recipient to retain them without the contributor being repaid or compensated. More must be shown than that one party voluntarily benefited another or his property.\u201d Collins v. Davis, 68 N.C. App. 588, 591, 315 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1984). \u201cIn order to properly set out a claim for unjust enrichment, a- plaintiff must allege that property or benefits were conferred on a defendant under circumstances which give rise to a legal or equitable obligation on the part of the defendant to account for the benefits received.\u201d Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons\u2019 Farms, Inc., 140 N.C. App. 390, 417, 537 S.E.2d 248, 266 (2000). \u201cNot every enrichment of one by the voluntary act of another is unjust. \u2018Where a person has officiously conferred a benefit upon another, the other is enriched but is not considered to be unjustly enriched. The recipient of a benefit voluntarily bestowed without solicitation or inducement is not liable for their value.\u2019 \u201d Wright v. Wright, 305 N.C. 345, 350, 289 S.E.2d 347, 351 (1982) (emphasis added) (quoting Rhyne v. Sheppard, 224 N.C. 734, 737, 32 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1944)).\nFor example, in Homeq v. Watkins, 154 N.C. App. 731, 572 S.E.2d 871 (2002), this Court held the unsolicited payment of a deed of trust does not, by itself, support an unjust enrichment claim. 154 N.C. App. at 733-34, 572 S.E.2d at 873. In Homeq, the plaintiff was the \u201cfinal bidder\u201d at a foreclosure sale. Id. at 732, 572 S.E.2d at 872-73. During the ten-day upset bid period, the plaintiff in Homeq satisfied an existing deed of trust, but an upset bidder properly placed a higher bid during the ten-day period. Id. at 732-33, 572 S.E.2d at 873.\nThis Court found that there was \u201cno legal or equitable obligation\u201d for defendant to pay plaintiff for satisfying the first deed of trust. Id. at 733, 572 S.E.2d at 873. Particularly, this Court noted that the defendant \u201cdid not solicit or induce plaintiffs discharge of the first deed of trust,\u201d and that plaintiff even had an opportunity to place its own upset bid within the ten-day period. Id. (emphasis added). This Court ultimately found that \u201c[wjhere defendant did not induce plaintiffs action, he is not responsible for plaintiffs error. Though defendant is enriched, \u2018[t]he mere fact that one party was enriched, even at the expense of the other, does not bring the doctrine of unjust enrichment into play.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Williams v. Williams, 72 N.C. App. 184, 187, 323 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1984)).\nThe present case is similar to Homeq. Here, Plaintiffs predecessor in interest received a promissory note under which Father would pay $236,300. The Second Deed of Trust secured the promissory note and stated an intention to encumber the entire Peachtree property. However, Gordon Lending Corporation failed to secure the signatures of the other property owners on the Second Deed of Trust, and thus did not encumber the entire property. We note that Plaintiff\u2019s predecessor in interest, Gordon Lending Corporation, prepared the Second Deed of Trust and the closing statement\u2019s lack of a title examination fee tends to indicate that no title search was performed. Gordon Lending Corporation also utilized the services of a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania company, Advantage Equity Services. In its 11 August 2005 \u201cTitle Commitment\u201d document, this firm discovered the First Deed of Trust, listing as mortgagors Father and Defendants. Plaintiff was clearly on notice of the potential multiple ownership of Peachtree. However, Gordon Lending Corporation did not require or obtain the signatures of Defendants on the Second Deed of Trust before it disbursed the funds. Gordon Lending Corporation satisfied the First Deed of Trust in the amount of $153,711.09, doing so officiously.\nWe note this chain of events stands in contrast to Father\u2019s execution of the First Deed of Trust, where attorneys from Murphy, North Carolina ' required the signatures of Defendants on the First Deed of Trust before funds were distributed by First-Citizens Bank and Trust Company. This error or omission by the bank and the title company is self-inflicted.\nThe trial court further found that Defendants never knew of or agreed to encumber their individual one-third interests in exchange for Father\u2019s 2005 transaction. Without any knowledge of Father\u2019s action, Defendants could not induce action by Gordon Lending Corporation to fully satisfy the First Deed of Trust. See Rhyne, 224 N.C. at 737, 32 S.E.2d at 318 (noting the requirement of solicitation or inducement in unjust enrichment actions). Defendants may have gained financially by the actions of Plaintiff\u2019s predecessor, but under Wright, they were not unjustly enriched. \u201cThe recipient of a benefit voluntarily bestowed without solicitation or inducement is not liable for [its] value.\u201d Wright, 305 N.C. at 350,289 S.E.2d at 351 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Defendants are not responsible for the mistakes of Plaintiff\u2019s predecessor because they took no affirmative steps to induce action of which they were unaware.\nThis deficiency in the forecast of evidence relating to solicitation or inducement is sufficient to grant summaiy judgment for Defendants. Summary judgment is proper when \u201can essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim does not exist, cannot be proven at trial, or would be barred by an affirmative defense.\u201d Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000) (citation omitted). Because the record does not contain evidence that Defendants took any action to induce the Plaintiff\u2019s discharge of the First Deed of Trust, an essential element of an unjust enrichment claim is not met, summary judgment is appropriate, and we affirm the trial court.\nB. Leave to Amend Pleadings\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court\u2019s denial of its motion to amend the Complaint was a manifest abuse of discretion. We disagree and affirm the trial court.\nMotions to amend are governed by North Carolina Civil Procedure Rule 15(a), which provides that \u201ca party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.\u201d N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A ruling on a motion for leave to amend is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and the denial of such a motion is not reviewable except for a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Martin v. Hare, 78 N.C. App. 358, 360-61, 337 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1985).\nA trial court abuses its discretion only where no reason for the ruling is apparent from the record. Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 233-34, 271 S.E.2d 393, 398-99 (1980). \u201cA motion to amend may be denied for \u2018(a) undue delay, (b) bad faith, (c) undue prejudice, (d) futility of amendment, and (e) repeated failure to cure defects by previous amendments.\u2019 \u201d Strickland v. Lawrence, 176 N.C. App. 656, 666-67, 627 S.E.2d 301, 308 (2006) (quoting Carter v. Rockingham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 687, 690, 582 S.E.2d 69, 72 (2003)).\nHere, the record indicates that the trial court denied Plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend based on undue delay and the futility of an amendment. If either ground exists, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Nothing in the record suggests that the \u201cnew evidence\u201d supplied in the information supporting the motion to amend would show solicitation or inducement by Defendants, a material issue of fact to be resolved by the jury. Put differently, there is no forecast of evidence that Defendants participated in any way in procuring the second transaction. In the absence of such evidence, which is necessary to supply the missing proof needed to withstand the summary judgment motion, any further amendment would be futile.\nPlaintiff correctly notes that new evidence may give rise to new equitable remedies. Commercial Farmers Bank v. Scotland Neck Bank, 158 N.C. 238, 244, 73 S.E. 157, 160 (1911). However, as noted above, Defendants\u2019 affidavit admitting their prior signatures on the First Deed of Trust was not new evidence. While Defendants provided affidavits that were perhaps \u201cnew documents\u201d stating that they had signed the First Deed of Trust, several pre-existing documents made this fact self-evident. First, the First Deed of Trust contained both Defendants\u2019 notarized signatures and could be accessed at the Register of Deeds office. Second, Defendants\u2019 answer, filed and served on 23 February 2012, noted both Defendants\u2019 signatures on the First Deed of Trust. While Defendants reaffirmed that they signed the First Deed of Trust via affidavit on 15 August 2012, this does not constitute \u201cnew evidence\u201d that would give rise to additional claims for equitable subrogation or equitable assignment, nor does it show an abuse of discretion by the court. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion based on futility.\nFor the reasons stated above, the decision of the trial court is\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges ERVIN and DAVIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roberson Haworth & Reese, by Alan B. Powell, Christopher C. Finan, and Matthew A.L. Anderson, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Cowan & Cowan, P.A., byRonaldM. Cowan, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff v. LINDA D. BROWNING, a/k/a LINDA BROWNING and LESLIE BROWNING a/k/a LESLIE DEANNE BROWNING DAVIS, Defendants\nNo. COA13-358\nFiled 19 November 2013\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to argue\nWhile plaintiff sought relief at trial on four grounds, plaintiff sought review only of the trial court\u2019s treatment of its unjust enrichment claim and argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying its request for leave to amend its complaint. Plaintiff therefore abandoned the remaining three grounds raised in the trial court under N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\n2. Unjust Enrichment \u2014 benefit voluntarily bestowed \u2014 no action to induce\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff\u2019s unjust enrichment claim. The recipient of a benefit voluntarily bestowed without solicitation or inducement is not liable for the value. The record did not contain evidence that defendants took any action to induce plaintiff\u2019s discharge of the First Deed of Trust.\n3. Pleadings \u2014 denial of motion to amend complaint \u2014 no new evidence\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in an unjust enrichment case by denying plaintiff\u2019s request for leave to amend its complaint. Nothing in the record suggested that the \u201cnew evidence\u201d supplied in the information supporting the motion to amend would show solicitation or inducement by defendants, a material issue of fact to be resolved by the jury.\nAppeal by plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank from order entered 26 October 2012 by Judge Sharon Tracey Barrett in Cherokee County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 September 2013.\nRoberson Haworth & Reese, by Alan B. Powell, Christopher C. Finan, and Matthew A.L. Anderson, for plaintiff-appellant.\nCowan & Cowan, P.A., byRonaldM. Cowan, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0537-01", "first_page_order": 547, "last_page_order": 555 }