{ "id": 4278349, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SUNNY JOHN CHUKWU", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Chukwu", "decision_date": "2013-11-19", "docket_number": "No. COA13-315", "first_page": "553", "last_page": "570", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 N.C. App. 553" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638296 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633605 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" }, { "page": "678-79" }, { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642212 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "50-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/668/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633179 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 S.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627", "parenthetical": "upholding a finding of fact that defendant was malingering" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9185651 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199", "parenthetical": "upholding a finding of fact that defendant was malingering" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 S.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "upholding a finding of fact made by the Industrial Commission that plaintiff was not malingering" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168658 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664", "parenthetical": "upholding a finding of fact made by the Industrial Commission that plaintiff was not malingering" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562", "parenthetical": "trial court's finding of competency supported by testimony that defendant was malingering" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551088 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241-42", "parenthetical": "trial court's finding of competency supported by testimony that defendant was malingering" }, { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150377 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 S.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 N.C. App. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4181949 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/209/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 F. Supp. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3257242 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "finding a bona fide doubt existed regarding a defendant's competency because defendant was diagnosed as schizophrenic and underwent seven psychiatric evaluations that yielded different conclusions as to his competency to stand trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/512/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2565596 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3738718 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8321231 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558792 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572569 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 410, 259 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150426 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 410, 259 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161834 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "560" }, { "page": "560", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "559-60", "parenthetical": "discussing the temporary nature of the defendant's competency and his dependence on medication to attain competency" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9496800 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "389-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8437072 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761884 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "\"Conclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987016 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "\"Conclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153463 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1361, "char_count": 42858, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.538565743937077e-08, "percentile": 0.48759889090058917 }, "sha256": "a626a480dc32cca2656ea8592d594bf1aeb9d1b956ec7cd38232c4a20a9ec514", "simhash": "1:b1b39aaca5c68ef0", "word_count": 6824 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.360096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SUNNY JOHN CHUKWU" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER Jr. Robert N., Judge.\nSunny John Chukwu (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals from a judgment entered on 11 September 2012 in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Defendant argues that the trial court violated due process by failing sua sponte to conduct a hearing concerning whether Defendant lacked the capacity to continue to trial. Defendant also argues that competent evidence did not support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact supporting the court\u2019s conclusion of law that Defendant was competent to cooperate with his attorneys and assist in his defense. After careful review, we find no error.\nI. Facts & Procedural History\nDefendant was tried beginning on 10 September 2012 before a jury. Judge Linwood O. Foust presided in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Defendant did not put on evidence at his trial. On 11 September 2012, the jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of trafficking in heroin and one count of possession of heroin with the intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of 225 to 279 months in prison. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following facts.\nOn 2 February 2009 Defendant arrived at. Charlotte Douglas International Airport in Mecklenburg County after a three-day round trip to Costa Rica. Upon reentering the United States, Defendant presented himself to customs officials at the airport and was referred to a secondary processing area by United States Customs and Border Protection agents. Referrals to the secondary processing area are \u201cgenerally [made] from the primary inspection area by a primary inspection officer who normally doesn\u2019t have enough time to make a determination whether or not to admit somebody into the United States or whether they need to have their baggage examined.\u201d In the secondary processing area, Defendant\u2019s luggage was inspected by Agent Thomas Weeks Jr. (\u201cAgent Weeks\u201d), a customs and border protection enforcement officer experienced and trained in identifying \u201chigh risk\u201d travelers.\nDuring the baggage inspection, Agent Weeks noticed that Defendant sweated \u201cexcessively,\u201d despite the fact that he was in an air-conditioned room in February. Agent Weeks described the room as so cold it was \u201cnot uncommon for officers even in the middle of August to be wearing heavy winter coats.\u201d Agent Weeks noticed Defendant \u201cappeared to be uncomfortable walking,\u201d and Defendant walked with his toes pointed out to the sides rather than in front of him. Agent Weeks also stated that Defendant leaned forward on the bag belt and put all of his body weight on his hands when he watched Agent Weeks examine his bags. Further, Defendant told Agent Weeks he had purchased round trip tickets for his trip to Costa Rica only three days prior to departing and was abroad for only three days.\nBased on his observations of Defendant, Agent Weeks requested and received permission from his supervisor to perform a \u201cpat down\u201d of Defendant. Agent Weeks testified that during the pat down, \u201cI felt a hard bulge in his groin area when I went up the inside of his leg\u201d and that it felt like \u201cthere was some kind of foreign object in his groin area.\u201d Agent Weeks pointed the bulge out to his supervisor who was in the room monitoring the pat down procedure.\nAgent Weeks then requested and obtained permission from his supervisor to perform a partial body search. Agent Weeks removed Defendant\u2019s pants, thereafter finding that Defendant was wearing a pair of thermal underwear over an adult diaper. After Agent Weeks asked Defendant to remove the diaper, he discovered a clear plastic bag containing 30 white pellets.\nAgent Weeks performed a narcotics field test on the pellets which showed the presence of heroin (a forensic lab test later confirmed the pellets consisted of 295.45 grams of heroin). Agent Weeks also found \u201csome cash in an envelope\u201d among Defendant\u2019s belongings. After discovering the white pellets, Agent Weeks notified airport police, who arrested Defendant and transferred him to the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department for violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(4) (2011) by transporting a controlled substance.\nAfter his arrest, the district court appointed Mr. John Ross (\u201cMr. Ross\u201d) as Defendant\u2019s counsel on 12 February 2009. On 16 February 2009, a grand jury indicted Defendant for two counts of trafficking in heroin and one count of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver. Mr. Ross made a motion questioning Defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed on 23 July 2009. Mr. Ross indicated that Defendant made statements that appeared to have no basis in fact or reality when he consulted with Defendant. Mr. Ross further noted that Defendant had refused to communicate with Mr. Ross.\nSubsequently, North Carolina Certified Forensic Screener Jennifer Kuehn (\u201cMs. Kuehn\u201d) attempted to evaluate Defendant on 3 August 2009. Ms. Kuehn opined that Defendant required further evaluation to determine if he had the capacity to proceed. Ms. Kuehn made her recommendation because Defendant failed to cooperate with her evaluation, rendering it impossible for her to form an opinion concerning Defendant\u2019s capacity to stand trial. Ms. Kuehn concluded her report by recommending that Defendant undergo further evaluation at Dorothea Dix Hospital.\nMs. Chiege Okwara (\u201cMs. Okwara\u201d) was appointed Defendant\u2019s new counsel on 13 August 2009. Ms. Okwara used Ms. Kuehn\u2019s report to support a 15 September 2009 motion requesting that Defendant be committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital to determine whether Defendant was competent to stand trial. Mecklenburg County Superior Court Judge Eric Levinson granted Ms. Okwara\u2019s motion via a 15 September 2009 order. The scope of the examination order provided that Defendant should be examined to determine whether\nby reason of mental illness or defect the defendant is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against the defendant, to comprehend his/her own situation in reference to the proceedings, and to assist in his/her defense in a rational or reasonable manner.\nDorothea Dix Senior Psychologist Dr. David Hattem (\u201cDr. Hattem\u201d) examined Defendant on 15 October 2009. During the examination and afterward, Defendant claimed he was a Nigerian diplomat who was arrested in New York for a probation violation. Defendant also stated that he was a \u201cPh.D. in school psychology with an emphasis on problem solving,\u201d and that he worked as a consultant to the \u201cFederal Ministry of Foreign Affairs\u201d in Abuja, Nigeria. Dr. Hattem opined that Defendant displayed confusion about his charges and delusional ideas about his attorneys, which impaired his ability to assist his defense in a rational or reasonable manner. Dr. Hattem rendered his opinion in a report dated 4 November 2009, concluding that Defendant lacked the mental capacity to proceed:\nIn my opinion Mr. Chukwu lacks capacity to proceed at this time. He displayed confusion about his charges that impaired his rational understanding of his position. His confusion about his charges, and delusional ideas about his attorneys, impaired his ability to assist his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.\nOn 29 January 2010, the trial court found Defendant was incapable to proceed and committed Defendant to Broughton Hospital. After further examination, Defendant\u2019s psychiatrist at Broughton concluded that Defendant was fabricating stories inconsistent with the facts. Defendant\u2019s psychiatrist also found Defendant was not delusional. The psychiatrist at Broughton noted two items in particular: Defendant did not require psychiatric medication and Defendant declined offers to help resolve his legal situation by contacting the Nigerian embassy. Defendant\u2019s final diagnosis at Broughton was \u201cmalingering psychosis,\u201d and Defendant was discharged on 11 February 2010 and returned to jail.\nDefendant was reexamined by Dr. Hattem on 7 October 2010 and 8 December 2010. Dr. Hattem received the preceding records and evaluations from Broughton Hospital as well as documents from the Mecklenburg County District Attorney\u2019s office, which were not available to him previously. These included a Nigerian Passport, a Texas ID card, a Resident Alien Card, and a Social Security card found on Defendant when arrested. When Dr. Hattem showed Defendant these documents during his examination, Dr Hattem noted Defendant\u2019s reaction as follows:\n[Defendant] inspected [the documents] carefully, then responded, \u201cthis is not me.\u201d He noted the name \u201cSunny John Chukwu\u201d was on all of the documents. He asserted that his name was \u201cSunny Chukwu\u201d and not \u201cSunny John Chukwu.\u201d He signed the name \u201cSunny Chukwu\u201d under the copy of the passport. ... He was told that a color photo of the passport showed it to be green; he responded that this passport was \u201cnot a diplomatic passport\u201d and reiterated \u201cmine is red.\u201d He pointed out the date of birth on the passport and Texas ID card was different from his professed date of birth. He asserted these identification documents belonged to someone else, and were not the documents taken from him on arrest.\nDr. Hattem opined in his 4 February 2011 report that Defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect that rendered him incapable of proceeding and that Defendant did not suffer from delusions. Dr. Hattem noted that Defendant understood he was facing \u201cdrug charges.\u201d Dr. Hattem also noted that \u201c[p]ersons who hold delusional beliefs will typically react to a credible challenge with escalating suspiciousness, escalating hostility, increasingly far fetched assertions, and disorganized thinking. Mr. Chukwu showed none of these responses. Instead, his responses were consistently rational, well organized and plausible.\u201d As a result of his observations, Dr. Hattem opined that Defendant was not delusional about his identity, that Defendant \u201cdemonstrated more than adequate factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings,\u201d that Defendant understood the charges that had been lodged against him, that Defendant could work rationally and reasonably in his defense, and ultimately that Defendant had the capacity to proceed to trial.\nOn 1 April 2011, Superior Court Judge Hugh B. Lewis of Mecklenburg County conducted a competency hearing. At this hearing, the court concluded that Defendant was \u201cfaking his disabilities to avoid facing the consequences of the court system.\u201d The court concluded that Defendant was competent to stand trial. This 1 April 2011 competency hearing was approximately seventeen months before Defendant\u2019s 9 September 2012 trial.\nOn 27 May 2011, Defendant appeared before Judge Lewis again in connection with his second attorney\u2019s motion to withdraw as counsel. At this hearing, Ms. Okwara indicated that a plea offer was on the table which included a sentence of 58 to 79 months and the dismissal of two counts of Level 3 trafficking. Ms. Okwara testified that she advised Defendant if he rejected the plea, he faced a sentence of 225 months to 279 months on each count of trafficking, plus a $500,000 fine, and could risk receiving multiple consecutive sentences. Ms. Okwara averred that she could not communicate with Defendant, and that the only response she received from Defendant was that \u201cGod is in control\u201d or that \u201cglory be to God.\u201d During this hearing, the following colloquy occurred:\nThe Court: Okay. Mr. Chukwu, do you wish to be heard in any way? Do you wish to be heard?\n[Defendant]: Sir?\nThe Court: Do you wish to make any statements or be heard?\n[Defendant]: Sir, I \u2014 I (inaudible). I still maintain that I don\u2019t need an attorney.\nThe Court: You do not need an attorney?\n[Defendant]: For probation violation.\nThe Court: And do you wish to waive your rights for an attorney and represent yourself?\n[Defendant]: Well, the lady (inaudible).\nThe Court: I\u2019m sorry?\n[Defendant]: Whatever the court decides.\nThe Court: No, sir. You have to make your own decision of your own personal waiver. Do you wish to waive the right to an attorney because it\u2019s your constitutional right? Do you wish to waive that right and represent yourself?\n[Defendant]: Yes, sir.\nThe Court: Please have the gentleman sign the waiver.\n[Defendant]: I do not agree with this statement, sir.\nThe Court: So therefore you do not wish to waive your right to an attorney and represent yourself?\n[Defendant]: Yes, sir.\nThe court then made findings of fact that (1) Defendant displayed a history of being lucid when he was at Central Regional Hospital, yet delusional when he returned to court in Mecklenburg County; (2) Defendant refused to cooperate with his attorneys; (3) both of Defendant\u2019s attorneys were experienced and able to represent Defendant; and (4) Defendant\u2019s actions were an \u201cattempt to delay and mire the Court down to avoid going forward with his case.\u201d The court found Defendant was \u201cmalingering and attempting to manipulate the system.\u201d The trial court then appointed Ms. Okwara as Defendant\u2019s standby counsel. Ms. Okwara later filed a second motion to withdraw as counsel, which the trial court granted on 27 October 2011.\nOn 20 December 2011, Mr. Christopher Sanders (\u201cMr. Sanders\u201d) was appointed to represent Defendant. On 24 August 2012, Mr. Sanders made a motion to withdraw as counsel and in support thereof he stated that the only meaningful communication he had had with Defendant were statements by Defendant that \u201cGod is in control\u201d and \u201cGlory be to God.\u201d Mr. Sanders represented that Defendant \u201crefuse[d] or [chose] not to communicate\u201d with him concerning the case. The court denied the motion to withdraw, so Mr. Sanders represented Defendant at trial.\nBoth the State and Defendant\u2019s counsel remarked that the trial itself was brief. Defendant did not testily nor did Defendant present evidence. The State called three witnesses: Agent Weeks, airport police officer Robert Spencer, and Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department crime lab analyst Arm Charlesworth. After hearing all of the evidence, the jury returned unanimous verdicts finding Defendant guilty of two counts of trafficking in heroin by transportation and possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of 225 to 279 months in prison. Defendant was given credit for 1,317 days spent in confinement prior to the entry of judgment.\nII. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review\nAs Defendant appeals from the final judgment of a superior court, an appeal lies of right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b) (2011).\nDefendant raises two issues on appeal. The first issue is whether the court improperly failed to institute, sua sponte, a second competency hearing during the trial when Defendant exhibited irrational conduct. This issue is a question of law, and is reviewed de novo. \u201cConclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review.\u201d State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011); see also Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 517, 597 S.E.2d 717, 721 (2004) (\u201cConclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal.\u201d).\nDefendant\u2019s second issue on appeal is whether the findings of fact supporting the trial court\u2019s order to allow Defendant\u2019s case to proceed to trial were supported by competent evidence. If the trial court\u2019s findings of fact regarding a defendant\u2019s competency are supported by competent evidence, they are deemed conclusive on appeal. State v. Heptinstall, 309 N.C. 231, 234, 306 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1983). \u201cCompetent evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the finding.\u201d Eley v. Mid/East Acceptance Corp. of N.C., Inc., 171 N.C. App. 368, 369, 614 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nDefendant argues that competent evidence does not support the trial court\u2019s findings that: (i) Defendant displayed a history of being lucid while at Central Regional Hospital and delusional when he returned to Mecklenburg County; (ii) Defendant refused to cooperate with his attorneys; (iii) both of Defendant\u2019s attorneys were competent and had the ability to represent him; and (iv) Defendant\u2019s actions constituted malingering, an attempt to delay and mire down the court, and an attempt to manipulate the system.\nIII. Analysis\nA. Sua Sponte Competency Hearing\nDefendant first argues that the trial court violated his due process rights when it allowed his case to proceed to trial without sua sponte instituting a second competency hearing. We disagree.\n\u201c[A] trial court has a constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a competency hearing if there is substantial evidence before the court indicating that the accused may be mentally incompetent.\u201d State v. McRae, 139 N.C. App. 387, 390, 533 S.E.2d 557, 559 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201c \u2018The conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process.\u2019 \u201d State v. Coley, 193 N.C. App. 458, 461, 668 S.E.2d 46, 49 (2008), aff'd, 363 N.C. 622, 683 S.E.2d 208 (2009) (quoting State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 410, 259 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1979)). In addition to constitutional guarantees, North Carolina\u2019s General Statutes also provide that only competent defendants may stand trial:\nNo person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1001(a) (2011) (emphasis added). The State, a defendant, a defense counsel, or the trial court may move for a competency determination. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(a) (2011). If raised by any party, the trial court has a statutory duty to hold a hearing to resolve questions of competency. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b).\nTrial courts have a \u201c \u2018constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a competency hearing if there is substantial evidence before the court indicating that the accused may be mentally incompetent.\u2019 \u201d Coley, 193 N.C. App. at 464, 668 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting State v. Young, 291 N.C. 562, 568, 231 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1977)). On review, this Court \u201cmust carefully evaluate the facts in each case in determining whether to reverse a trial judge for failure to conduct sua sponte a competency hearing where the discretion of the trial judge, as to the conduct of the hearing and as to the ultimate ruling on the issue, is manifest.\u201d State v. Staten, 172 N.C. App. 673, 682, 616 S.E.2d 650, 657 (2005). Further:\nEvidence of a defendant\u2019s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant to a bona fide doubt inquiry. There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.\nId. at 678-79, 616 S.E.2d at 655 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). While the trial court\u2019s finding of competency receives deference, other \u201cfindings and expressions of concern about the temporal nature of [a] defendant\u2019s competency\u201d may raise a bona fide doubt as to a defendant\u2019s competency. McRae, 139 N.C. App. at 391, 533 S.E.2d at 560. We thus review the record to determine (i) whether there is a bona fide doubt as to Defendant\u2019s competency and (ii) whether Defendant\u2019s competency was temporal in nature.\nThe appropriate test for evaluating defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial is \u201cwhether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\u201d State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 259, 644 S.E.2d 206, 221 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A defendant need not \u201cbe at the highest stage of mental alertness to be competent to be tried.\u201d State v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684, 689, 374 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1989). \u201cSo long as a defendant can confer with his or her attorney so that the attorney may inteipose any available defenses for him or her, the defendant is able to assist his or her defense in a rational manner.\u201d Id.\nColey provides an example of this Court applying the test under similar facts. In Coley, the defendant argued that regardless of his competence at a prior hearing, his testimony at trial demonstrated that he did not possess the capacity to proceed to trial. 193 N.C. App. at 464, 668 S.E.2d at 51. At trial, the defendant \u201cappeared to ramble in response to questions imposed by counsel.\u201d Id. However, such behavior was \u201cnot a new occurrence, and had been present during defendant\u2019s examinations prior to the preliminary hearing.\u201d Id. This Court, finding no error, held \u201c[t]he fact, by itself, that defendant continued this behavior at trial, did not amount to substantial evidence that defendant was mentally incompetent at trial.\u201d Id.\nHere the record demonstrates Defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial and an unwillingness to cooperate with his attorneys and attending psychiatrists. Defendant\u2019s first attorney, Mr. Ross, requested a forensic examination in July 2009, primarily due to Defendant\u2019s refusal to communicate with Mr. Ross. Defendant thereafter refused to cooperate with the forensic examiner. Dr. Hattem evaluated Defendant in October 2009, finding Defendant incompetent to proceed due to confusion about his charges and delusions regarding his attorneys. Defendant was then committed to Broughton Hospital for two weeks, where he was treated solely for medical conditions before being released after his psychiatrist found Defendant was malingering by fashioning stories to avoid legal consequences. Defendant stated that he understood the nature of the \u201cdrug charges\u201d against him while at Broughton and when examined by Dr. Hattem.\nDefendant indicated distrust for his attorney, Ms. Okwara, at his October 2010 evaluation, stating that she was pursuing a \u201chidden agenda.\u201d Defendant also claimed that he was charged with a \u201cprobation violation\u201d and made statements that he was a Nigerian diplomat. Despite Defendant\u2019s statements, Dr. Hattem concluded that Defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect that could cause him to be incapable of proceeding and that Defendant did not suffer from delusions. Dr. Hattem concluded that Defendant was capable of working rationally and reasonably with his counsel, but was inventing stories to avoid prosecution. In his 4 February 2011 report, Dr. Hattem stated that \u201c[a]lthough he continues to express distrust of his attorney, he no longer asserted that he does not need an attorney, and he clearly demonstrated an understanding of the importance of adequate representation.\u201d Dr. Hattem also found that Defendant \u201cdemonstrated that he is capable of working rationally and reasonably in his own defense.\u201d In light of this evidence, we agree with the trial court\u2019s finding that Defendant \u201cpossessed the capacity to (1) comprehend his position, (2) understand the nature of the proceedings against him, (3) conduct his defense in a rational manner, and (4) cooperate with his counsel.\u201d Id. at 464, 668 S.E.2d at 50-51. Thus, the record and testimony presented do not indicate a need for a sua sponte second competency hearing.\nThe record also shows no cause for concern regarding the \u201ctemporal nature\u201d of Defendant\u2019s mental condition. In McRae, this Court found the temporal nature of a competency finding to be relevant, as there were \u201cnumerous psychiatric evaluations\u201d of the defendant\u2019s competency \u201cthat were conducted before trial with various findings and expressions of concern about the temporal nature of defendant\u2019s competency\u201d which raised a bona fide doubt as to the defendant\u2019s competency. 139 N.C. App. at 391, 533 S.E.2d at 560 (emphasis added) (discussing six different findings by psychiatrists finding defendant competent at times and incompetent at others); see also Meeks v. Smith, 512 F. Supp. 335, 338 (W.D.N.C. 1981) (finding a bona fide doubt existed regarding a defendant\u2019s competency because defendant was diagnosed as schizophrenic and underwent seven psychiatric evaluations that yielded different conclusions as to his competency to stand trial).\nHere, based on his initial observations of Defendant\u2019s confusion about the charges against him and his distrust of his attorneys, Dr. Hattem concluded that Defendant was not capable of proceeding. However, Dr. Hattem adjusted his diagnosis after gathering additional evidence, concluding Defendant was competent to proceed and did not suffer from delusions as originally thought. Dr. Hattem also stated that during his initial evaluation of Defendant in November 2009, Defendant did not exhibit any symptoms of mental illness, that Defendant had no symptoms prior to arrest, and that the origin of the recent onset of symptoms was unclear.\nHere there were minimal competency concerns and no findings by any of the examining psychiatrists that Defendant\u2019s competency was temporaiy. Gf. McRae, 139 N.C. App. at 389-91, 533 S.E.2d at 559-60 (discussing the temporary nature of the defendant\u2019s competency and his dependence on medication to attain competency). Defendant displayed consistent behavior in asserting that he was a Nigerian diplomat, that he was being charged for a \u201cprobation violation,\u201d and that he did not wish to have counsel. The singular item of concern regarding competency was the initial evaluation by Dr. Hattem, which he later changed. In McRae, on the other hand, the court\u2019s findings of fact showed the existence of a variety of opinions concerning the defendant\u2019s competency and its temporal relation to medication taken by the defendant. See id. Thus, Defendant\u2019s competency was not temporal.\nBecause (i) the evidence presented does not raise a bona fide doubt about Defendant\u2019s competency during the trial and (ii) Defendant\u2019s competency was not temporal in nature, we hold that the trial court did not err when it did not commence a second competency hearing sua sponte.\nB. Findings of Fact\nDefendant challenges four of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, arguing that they are not supported by competent evidence. After careful review, we find no error.\ni. Lucid Intervals\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by finding Defendant displayed a histoiy of being lucid when at Central Regional Hospital, yet delusional when he returned to Mecklenburg County. We disagree.\nA defendant can appear completely lucid and competent at some intervals, yet not at others. See State v. Whitted, 209 N.C. App. 522, 528-29, 705 S.E.2d 787, 791-92 (2011). Prior to the 27 May 2011 hearing before Judge Hugh Lewis, Defendant was committed to Broughton Hospital on 29 January 2010. At Broughton, Defendant did not exhibit signs of mental illness and was not prescribed medications for mental illness. The State\u2019s psychiatrist concluded that Defendant was manufacturing a story which was not consistent with the facts and was \u201cnot actually delusional.\u201d The psychiatrist also reported that Defendant \u201cunderstood he was later charged with \u2018stolen passport, armed robbery, and recently drug charges.\u2019 \u201d Likewise, when Dr. Hattem examined Defendant at Central Regional Hospital on 7 October 2010, there were no signs of mental illness or delusions.\nAt the 1 April 2011 hearing, Judge Lewis asked whether Defendant understood the charges against him and Defendant replied that he did not understand the charges and believed he was \u201carrested for probation violation.\u201d Defendant also continued to insist that he was a \u201cdiplomatic consultant\u201d employed by the Nigerian government, similar to statements Defendant had previously made to the forensic examiner. Judge Lewis, after engaging in discussion about Defendant\u2019s diplomatic activities, provided an explanation of the competency requirement in layman\u2019s terms for Defendant:\nThe Court: Okay. Well, competency to stand trial means that you understand what\u2019s going on, okay? And you\u2019re able to help your attorney with your defense, all right? I determine that you are not able to understand what\u2019s going on here, and you cannot help your attorney, then I deem that you are incompetent to stand trial. That means that you do not have the capacity to stand before me either before me and enter a plea or go to trial for a jury to find whether or not you\u2019re innocent or guilty. And if I find that you\u2019re incompetent, what I will do is send you back to the hospital where you will stay there under the treatment of physicians and with medication until you become competent so that you understand what\u2019s going on. Does that explain it to you?\n[Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.\nThe Court: Okay. And do you understand that?\n[Defendant]: I don\u2019t fully understand, Your Honor. Because I recall on January 29th, 2010 I was sent down to Broughton Hospital in Morganton.\nThe Court: Um-hum.\n[Defendant]: And I was there for 13 days precisely.\nTHE COURT: Um-hum.\nThe Court: And I was there for treatment. And they were not giving me any treatment except the words I\u2019m receiving right at the Mecklenburg County jail. Except there was in windows and (inaudible) that trying to get me to sign a plea to what I do not know. That continued on till they decided do like this - they have to send me to a special counsel. I said, I don\u2019t need any counsel. I\u2019ve told you that before. I told them I don\u2019t need a counsel. My medications \u2014 I listed all my medications to them, and they were giving me the same medication that I was receiving right at Mecklenburg County Jail. They decided on their own to send me back on the 11th of February, 2010.\nThe Court: But you were clear enough to know that you didn\u2019t wish to enter a plea; is that correct? You were clear enough to understand you didn\u2019t want to enter a plea; is that correct?\n[Defendant]: What-what \u2014\nThe Court: You just told me that the attorneys were tiying to trick you into signing a paper that would indicate that you were pleading, and you knew that you did not want to do that; is that correct?\n[Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.\nThe court then found Defendant was competent to proceed based on the conversations with Defendant and the reports of Defendant\u2019s psychiatrists. Ms. Okwara then requested and received a continuance of Defendant\u2019s trial date so she could advise Defendant of his options for a plea arrangement. Defendant responded to Ms. Okwara by stating \u201cGlory be to God.\u201d At Defendant\u2019s 27 May 2011 trial date, Defendant continued to insist that he did not want an attorney for his \u201cprobation violation.\u201d After the court asked Defendant to sign a waiver of his right to counsel, Defendant stated he did not agree with the waiver. The court then made its finding that Defendant was lucid while at Central Hospital, yet delusional when he returned to Mecklenburg County to stand trial.\nThe preceding evidence provides ample support for Judge Lewis\u2019s decision. Defendant was found competent via two separate examinations by psychiatrists. Defendant stated that he understood the charges against him, then denied that he understood. Defendant requested a waiver of counsel, then refused to sign a form verifying his waiver. Defendant testified that a plea was offered, but he chose not to accept it. Given the reports of Defendant\u2019s rational behavior while in the custody of Central Hospital and the divergent behavior displayed at trial, we conclude competent evidence supported the trial court\u2019s finding of fact.\nii. Cooperation with Attorneys\nDefendant next argues that competent evidence did not support the trial court\u2019s finding of fact that Defendant refused to cooperate with his two attorneys. We disagree.\nDefendant\u2019s first attorney was Mr. Ross. Mr. Ross was allowed to withdraw from the case because he was not able to communicate effectively with Defendant. At the 27 May 2011 hearing, Ms. Okwara made a motion to withdraw, noting that Defendant\u2019s most meaningful communications with her were his statements that \u201cGod is in control\u201d or \u201cGlory be to God.\u201d Ms. Okwara testified that she made several attempts to discuss possible pleas Defendant could enter to receive a reduced sentence. After sending several letters and reaching out to Defendant to advise him of how he could receive a reduced sentence,\nDefendant\u2019s response continued to be that \u201cGod is in control\u201d or \u201cGlory be to God.\u201d Ms. Okwara stated:\nI can\u2019t continue to represent a client I cannot communicate with. He\u2019s looking at a substantial amount of time, and I just -1 cannot proceed further on this case.\nWe\u2019ve never had any meaningful discussions, and my conscience will not allow me to continue to represent him. I\u2019ve been in this case now almost 20 months - 21 months, and we\u2019re no further along than we were when I got the case in August, 2009.\nDr. Hattem\u2019s 4 February 2011 report also indicates that Defendant had a history of refusing to cooperate with his attorneys and medical staff. Defendant noted at several points that he did not need or want counsel. Defendant also stated in these examinations that Ms. Okwara had a \u201chidden agenda\u201d and that he distrusted his attorneys. In light of this testimony and conduct we hold competent evidence existed showing Defendant refused to cooperate with his attorneys.\niii. Attorney Competency\nDefendant argues that there was not competent evidence supporting the trial court\u2019s finding that Defendant\u2019s attorneys were competent to represent him. We disagree.\n\u201cCompetent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.\u201d N.C. Admin. Code tit. 27, r. 1.01 (August 2013). The record contains no evidence to suggest Defendant\u2019s attorneys were incompetent, and instead contains evidence showing competent representation by Defendant\u2019s attorneys when Defendant allowed them to interact with him. For example, during the 27 May 2011 hearing, the trial court considered evidence that Defendant\u2019s attorney at the time, Ms. Okwara, had obtained a plea offer from the State and advised her client to accept the offer. Ms. Okwara had obtained a plea offer that she testified would have reduced Defendant\u2019s sentence to \u201c58 months to 79 months\u201d and resulted in the dismissal of two charges of Level 3 trafficking. Defendant was notified by Ms. Okwara that \u201che faces a sentence of 225 months to 279 months on each count of trafficking, plus a $500,000 fine and could also receive a consecutive sentence on the plea.\u201d Ms. Okwara\u2019s communication with her client concerning strategies to reduce the length of his sentence provide an example of competent advice that would meet the standard required of counsel.\nLastly, Judge Lewis, in making his finding stated \u201c[t]his Court has had the opportunity to observe in the practice of law over the last 15 years as a jurist and deems both of them to be competent and have the ability to represent the defendant.\u201d Judge Lewis\u2019s statements regarding his experience represent a volunteered statement that preceded his ultimate finding of fact: that Defendant received competent legal advice during the proceedings. Even without the statement by Judge Lewis, the finding of fact would still be supported by the record and would stand by itself. We therefore find Defendant\u2019s argument that the record should contain evidence concerning Judge Lewis\u2019s experience to be without merit. Accordingly, we find competent evidence exists to support the trial court\u2019s finding of fact that Defendant\u2019s counsel was competent.\niv. Delay and Malingering\nDefendant last argues that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact that Defendant\u2019s actions were \u201csimply an act of attempt to delay and mire the Court down to avoid going forward with his case\u201d and that he was \u201cmalingering and attempting to manipulate the system\u201d were actually conclusions of law. We disagree.\nIn distinguishing between findings of fact and conclusions of law, generally, \u201cany determination requiring the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles is more properly classified as a conclusion of law.\u201d State v. Sparks, 362 N.C. 181, 185, 657 S.E.2d 655, 658 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\nA trial court\u2019s findings that a defendant is attempting to delay a case and mire down the court, and that a defendant is malingering and manipulating the system are properly considered findings of fact. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 347 N.C. 235, 241-42, 490 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1997) (trial court\u2019s finding of competency supported by testimony that defendant was malingering); Cannizzaro v. Food Lion, 198 N.C. App. 660, 664, 680 S.E.2d 265, 268 (2009) (upholding a finding of fact made by the Industrial Commission that plaintiff was not malingering); State v. Mahatha, 157 N.C. App. 183, 199, 578 S.E.2d 617, 627 (2003) (upholding a finding of fact that defendant was malingering). The trial court was correct in characterizing these statements as findings of fact, making the appropriate inquiry whether there was competent evidence before the trial court to support these findings of fact. Heptinstall, 309 N.C. at 234, 306 S.E.2d at 111.\nTucker is instructive in determining whether competent evidence existed to support Judge Lewis\u2019s findings. In Tucker, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by finding him capable of proceeding to trial. 347 N.C. at 241, 490 S.E.2d at 562. The defendant was examined by three physicians multiple times. Id. Eventually the defendant\u2019s attending physician at Dorothea Dix Hospital diagnosed him with antisocial personality disorder and suspected that he was malingering. Id. A staff psychologist at Dorothea Dix also found the defendant to not appear psychotic, but to be malingering to avoid prosecution. Id. During his final evaluation, a third physician found the defendant not competent to stand trial, but stated that it was \u201cpossible that he was malingering.\u201d Id. Defendant\u2019s examining physician testified, based on an eight-day examination at Dorothea Dix Hospital, review of jail records, review of a hearing record, and other psychological testing results that the defendant was competent and malingering. Id. at 243, 490 S.E.2d at 562. Thus, there was conflicting evidence over whether the defendant in Tucker was malingering. This Court found the preceding facts provided competent evidence to support a finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial. Id.\nAs in Tucker, conflicting opinions exist here concerning whether Defendant was malingering. Notably, on 11 February 2010, Defendant received a diagnosis of \u201cmalingering psychosis\u201d and was discharged from Broughton Hospital. However, Dr. Hattem, in his 4 February 2011 report, opined that Defendant did not suffer from \u201cmalingering psychosis\u201d because \u201cmanufacturing a story\u201d about his identity to evade prosecution \u201cis not malingering because it is not an attempt to portray symptoms of mental illness.\u201d\n\u201cWhen the trial court, without a jury, determines a defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed to trial, it is the court\u2019s duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence; the court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is competent evidence to support them, even if there is also evidence to the contrary.\u201d Heptinstall, 309 N.C. at 234, 306 S.E.2d at 111. As in Tucker, the trial court here found Defendant was malingering and thus competent to stand trial based on the available evidence, despite evidentiary conflicts. We agree that competent evidence supports a finding of fact that Defendant was \u201cmalingering and attempting to manipulate the system\u201d and find no error.\nIV. Conclusion\nBased on the foregoing discussion, we find the trial court did not err in determining Defendant competent to proceed, nor in making its underlying findings of fact used to arrive at that result.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges ERVIN and DAVIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER Jr. Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper; by Assistant Attorney General Matthew Tuichin, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Charlesena Elliot Walker for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SUNNY JOHN CHUKWU\nNo. COA13-315\nFiled 19 November 2013\n1. Constitutional Law \u2014 due process \u2014 second competency hearing \u2014 failure to conduct sua sponte\nThe trial court did not violate defendant\u2019s due process rights in a heroin prosecution when it allowed his case to go to trial without sua sponte instituting a second competency hearing. The evidence presented did not raise a bona fide doubt about defendant\u2019s competency dining trial and his competency was not temporal in nature.\n2. Criminal Law \u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 divergent behavior\nThe trial court did not err in a heroin prosecution by finding that defendant displayed a history of being lucid when at Central Regional Hospital yet delusional when he returned to Mecklenburg County. Given the reports of defendant\u2019s rational behavior while in the custody of Central Hospital and the divergent behavior displayed at trial, competent evidence supported the trial court\u2019s finding.\n3. Criminal Law \u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 cooperation with attorneys \u2014 findings\nThe trial court did not err in a heroin prosecution by finding that defendant refused to cooperate with his attorneys where those attorneys withdrew or moved to withdraw due to their inability to communicate with defendant, a psychologist\u2019s report indicated that defendant had a history of refusing to cooperate with his attorneys, and defendant noted at several points that he did not need or want an attorney.\n4. Constitutional Law \u2014 competent representation \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThere was competent evidence in a heroin prosecution to support the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s attorneys were competent to represent him. The record contained no evidence suggesting that defendant\u2019s attorneys were incompetent and contained evidence of competent representation when defendant allowed his attorneys to represent him. Although defendant argued that the record should have contained evidence supporting a volunteered statement by the judge about the attorney\u2019s competence, the finding of competent representation would be supported by the record even \u25a0without the volunteered statement.\n5. Criminal Law \u2014 judge\u2019s statements \u2014 findings rather than conclusions \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe trial court in a heroin prosecution correctly characterized its statements that defendant was malingering and attempting to delay and manipulate the system as findings rather than conclusions. Those findings were supported by competent evidence, although there was evidence to the contrary.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 11 September 2012 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 September 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper; by Assistant Attorney General Matthew Tuichin, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Charlesena Elliot Walker for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0553-01", "first_page_order": 563, "last_page_order": 580 }