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    "judges": [
      "Judges ERVIN and McCULLOUGH concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TRAVIS MELTON SHERMAN, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nDefendant Travis Melton Sherman was charged with the murder of Kenneth Edward Ring in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17. A jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder, and judgment was entered on the verdict sentencing him to life imprisonment without parole. He appeals.\nThe facts relevant to the sole issue presented on appeal involve two of defendant\u2019s for-cause challenges to prospective jurors. First, defendant moved to excuse prospective juror Mark Antonelli for cause because Mr. Antonelli said he would form opinions during the trial. The trial judge, after questioning Mr. Antonelli, denied defendant\u2019s motion, and as a result, defendant used a peremptory challenge to excuse Mr. Antonelli.\nNext, defendant moved to excuse prospective juror Timothy Brunstetter for cause because he had orders from the United States Marine Corps to report to Quantico, Virginia, before the projected end of the trial. The trial judge denied this motion, and defendant used his sixth and final peremptory challenge to excuse Mr. Brunstetter.\nAfter defendant used all six of his peremptory challenges, he renewed his motion to remove Mr. Antonelli and Mr. Brunstetter for cause. The trial judge again denied both motions, and defendant asked for additional peremptory challenges. The court refused to give defendant additional peremptory challenges. Later, defendant renewed his request for additional peremptory challenges so he could use one to excuse a prospective juror. The judge again denied the request for additional peremptory challenges. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal defendant argues only one issue. He maintains that the trial court\u2019s failure to allow his for-cause challenges to prospective jurors Mr. Antonelli and Mr. Brunstetter was prejudicial error that requires a new trial. We disagree.\nFor a defendant to seek reversal of a judgment based on a trial court\u2019s refusal to allow his for-cause challenges, the defendant must comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(h). Compliance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(h) is mandatory and is the only way to preserve for appellate review the denial of a for-cause challenge. State v. Sanders, 317 N.C. 602, 608, 346 S.E.2d 451, 456 (1986). Section 15A-1214 requires that\n(h) In order for a defendant to seek reversal of the case on appeal on the ground that the judge refused to allow a challenge made for cause, he must have:\n(1) Exhausted the peremptory challenges available to him;\n(2) Renewed his challenge as provided in subsection (i) of this section; and\n(3) Had his renewal motion denied as to the juror in question.\n(i) A party who has exhausted his peremptory challenges may move orally or in writing to renew a challenge for cause previously denied if the party either:\n(1) Had peremptorily challenged the juror; or\n(2) States in the motion that he would have challenged that juror peremptorily had his challenges not been exhausted.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1214(h)-(i) (2011).\nA review of the transcript reveals that defendant complied with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(h). He moved to excuse Mr. Antonelli for cause, and the court denied that motion. Defendant then used a peremptory challenge to excuse Mr. Antonelli. Defendant also moved to excuse Mr. Brunstetter for cause, and the court denied that motion. As a result, defendant used his final peremptory challenge to excuse Mr. Brunstetter. After defendant used his final peremptory challenge, he renewed his motions to excuse Mr. Antonelli and Mr. Brunstetter for cause, and the court denied both motions. Therefore, defendant has complied with the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(h).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1212 lists the grounds for challenges for cause to a prospective juror. \u201cWe review a trial court\u2019s ruling on a challenge for cause for abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 301, 643 S.E.2d 909, 911 (2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1998). When we review a trial judge\u2019s ruling we consider only whether it is supported by the record, not whether we agree with the ruling. Lasiter, 361 N.C. at 302, 643 S.E.2d at 911. This is a deferential standard of review because a trial judge has the advantage of interacting with a juror. Id.\nDefendant argues that Mr. Antonelli should have been excused for cause because he responded that he would form opinions during the trial, which would substantially impair his ability to follow and apply the law. Defendant fails to state the statutory ground upon which he is relying for his for-cause challenge, but, for two reasons, it is implied that he is relying on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1212(8), which allows a for-cause challenge when, \u201c[a]s a matter of conscience, . .. [a juror] would be unable to render a verdict with respect to the charge in accordance with the law of North Carolina.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1212(8) (2011). First, defendant argues that forming opinions during trial would impair Mr. Antonelli\u2019s ability to apply the law of North Carolina. Second, defendant cites Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968), in support of his argument, which the General Assembly codified at N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1212(8). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1212 official commentary (2011). Therefore, while defendant fails to state that he is relying on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1212(8), we infer he is relying on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1212(8) based on his argument.\nA review of the transcript reveals the following relevant exchanges:\nMR. DOLAN: Let me ask you this:... Can you be sure that you would wait until all of the evidence was presented before you came and started to make any decision in this case?\n[MR. ANTONELLI]: I don\u2019t think I could guarantee that, but I think I would be able to, but I couldn\u2019t guarantee it.\nMR. DOLAN: What do you mean you don\u2019t think you [can] guarantee it?\n[MR. ANTONELLI]: Well, because you form opinions as it goes on and it changes.\nMR. DOLAN: And are you saying that you think you would form opinions as the case went on?\n[MR. ANTONELLI]: Probably.\nMR. DOLAN: . . . Are you saying you don\u2019t think that you can wait, that you\u2019re probably going to form opinions along the way?\n[MR. ANTONELLI]: Most likely.\nMR. DOLAN: I would move for cause, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Yes.\nMr. Antonelli, let me follow-up with just a question for you. You\u2019ve already heard me instruct several times to that one of the rules you have to follow is to [sic] not form or express any opinions about the outcome of this case, and there are a number of important steps that a case must go through. There is the evidence, there is the arguments of counsel, there is my instructions on the law, and then there\u2019s deliberation. What we require of jurors is the ability to keep an open mind and not form or express opinions until they get into the jury deliberation room, engage in deliberation with their fellow jurors, consider all of the things I\u2019ve just described. Do you believe that you could fulfill that duty as a juror?\n[MR. ANTONELLI]: Yes, but I believe I would still form an opinion but can still be open-minded.\nTHE COURT: In the event that you were instructed on the law or persuaded by an argument or persuaded by evidence later in the trial that your opinion was perhaps in error, would you be able to set aside any opinion that you had formed and listen to either of the evidence or the instructions or the argument or the deliberation in views of your fellow jurors? Would you be able to set aside any opinion that you had formed and render a verdict according to the instructions, the law, and the argument and the evidence?\n[MR. ANTONELLI]: I believe so. I can\u2019t guarantee that, but I believe so.\nTHE COURT: And when you say you can\u2019t guarantee that, what do you mean by that?\n[MR. ANTONELLI]: I\u2019ve never been through this so I don\u2019t know how my opinion is going to form...\nTHE COURT: Are you willing to follow my instructions to keep an open mind throughout this case?\n[MR. ANTONELLI]: Yes.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m going to deny the motion for cause at this time.\nMR. DOLAN: I just want to be clear, Mr. Antonelli, and I\u2019m not trying to pick on you. Is it your position that you will form an opinion as the case progresses?\n[MR. ANTONELLI]: I would probably say most likely, yeah, I would form an opinion as it was going on, but I can\u2019t guarantee that I definitely will.\nThe above-quoted portion of voir dire demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when disallowing the for-cause challenge. The trial judge was in the best position to observe Mr. Antonelli and to weigh and decide the credibility of his responses. The judge\u2019s denial of the for-cause challenge to Mr. Antonelli is logically supported by his response that he was willing to follow the judge\u2019s instructions. Therefore, the trial court did not err when disallowing defendant\u2019s for-cause challenge to Mr. Antonelli.\nNext, defendant argues, without citing any statutory authority or case law, that the trial court erred when it denied his for-cause challenge to Mr. Brunstetter because he was a Marine with orders to report to Quantico, Virginia, before the projected end of the trial. We assume that defendant is relying on the catch-all provision of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1212 for his challenge, which allows a for-cause challenge when a juror \u201c[f]or any other cause is unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1212(9).\nOur Supreme Court considered whether a prospective juror could render a fair verdict because he was concerned about the estimated time of the trial in State v. Reed, 355 N.C. 150, 160, 558 S.E.2d 167, 174 (2002), appeal after remand, 162 N.C. App. 360, 590 S.E.2d 477 (2004). The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the for-cause challenge. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that trial judges routinely decide whether to excuse a prospective juror because of concerns about the length of a trial. Id. Also, in Reed, despite the estimated length of the trial, the prospective juror stated that he could be fair to both sides. Id. .\nIn this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the for-cause challenge. Mr. Brunstetter twice asserted that despite his orders to report to Quantico, Virginia, he could focus on the trial if he was selected to be a juror. Also, the trial court was able to observe Mr. Brunstetter when he made these statements. Therefore, based on Mr. Brunstetter\u2019s testimony, the trial court properly denied the challenge because Mr. Brunstetter could render a fair verdict despite his concerns about the length of the trial.\nNo Error.\nJudges ERVIN and McCULLOUGH concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Jonathan P. Babb, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.",
      "Glover & Petersen, PA., by James R. Glover and Ann B. Petersen, for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TRAVIS MELTON SHERMAN, Defendant\nNo. COA13-811\nFiled 7 January 2014\nJury \u2014 challenges for cause \u2014 denied\u2014no error\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by failing to allow defendant\u2019s for-cause challenges to two prospective jurors. The court\u2019s denial of the for-cause challenge to Mr. Antonelli was logically supported by his response that he was willing to follow the judge\u2019s instructions. Further, based on Mr. Brunstetter\u2019s testimony, the trial court properly denied the challenge because Mr. Brunstetter could render a fair verdict despite his concerns about the length of the trial.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 16 August 2012 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 December 2013.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Jonathan P. Babb, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nGlover & Petersen, PA., by James R. Glover and Ann B. Petersen, for defendant-appellant."
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