{ "id": 6787716, "name": "KENNETH HALSTEAD, Petitioner v. JENNIFER PLYMALE, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ANITA RAE HALSTEAD, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Halstead v. Plymale", "decision_date": "2013-12-03", "docket_number": "No. COA13-375", "first_page": "253", "last_page": "259", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 N.C. App. 253" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567914 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "732" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2571858 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. App. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4175775 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/203/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 S.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615202 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559549 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572855 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a patent ambiguity occurs when doubt arises from conflicting provisions or provisions alleged to be repugnant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625764 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a patent ambiguity occurs when doubt arises from conflicting provisions or provisions alleged to be repugnant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.E. 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596902 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/190/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622716 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/250/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576597 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "\"When reading a will, the testator's intent guides the trial court's interpretation of the will.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778" }, { "page": "778" }, { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620023 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151090 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153463 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526216 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 693, "char_count": 15629, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1824643058340467 }, "sha256": "7b90e4775f7c53533ce8ec15a3e85776280cf8415b411b3d46106d5dbc4218f4", "simhash": "1:028b9476e605bc6f", "word_count": 2522 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:32:40.304740+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur." ], "parties": [ "KENNETH HALSTEAD, Petitioner v. JENNIFER PLYMALE, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ANITA RAE HALSTEAD, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nPetitioner Kenneth Halstead (\u201cPetitioner\u201d) appeals from a judgment finding that decedent Anita Rae Halstead (\u201cMs. Halstead\u201d) bequeathed and devised all of her tangible personal property, as well as her entire residuary estate, to Jennifer Plymale (\u201cMs. Plymale\u201d). Petitioner contends that Ms. Halstead\u2019s will is unambiguous and that the residuary clause fails to devise Ms. Halstead\u2019s intangible and real property. Accordingly, Petitioner contends that Ms. Halstead\u2019s intangible and real property should pass by intestacy. We disagree and affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nI. Factual & Procedural History\nPetitioner filed a complaint on 6 January 2012 seeking a declaration that the residuary clause contained in Ms. Halstead\u2019s will failed to devise her intangible and real property and that such property is therefore to pass by intestacy. The facts as alleged in the complaint are as follows.\nPetitioner is the widower of Ms. Halstead, who died testate on 17 October 2011. Ms. Halstead\u2019s will, which was attached and incorporated into the complaint by reference, indicated that Petitioner and Ms. Halstead were separated and estranged at the time of her death. Indeed, at the beginning of Ms. Halstead\u2019s will, she specifically states:\nI hereby declare that I am separated from my estranged spouse, KENNETH F. HALSTEAD, and that I have no children. I further hereby declare that I specifically wish to disinherit and disqualify my estranged spounst [sic], KENNETH F. HALSTEAD for his misconduct toward me, including but not limited to his willful abandonment of me and the marriage, and our separation, due to his cohabitation and adultery, which I have not and do not condone.\nOn 18 October 2011, Ms. Plymale, the executrix of Ms. Halstead\u2019s estate, presented Ms. Halstead\u2019s will to the Clerk of Superior Court of Union County, who admitted the will to probate. The will disposes of Ms. Halstead\u2019s property as follows:\n1. Gift of Tangible Personal Property. All of my tangible personal property that was not held by me solely for investment purposes, including, but not limited to, my automobiles, household furniture and furnishings, clothing, jewelry, collectibles and personal effects, shall be disposed of as follows:\n1. I give all such tangible personal property to my relative, JENNIFER PLYMALE, ... if she survives me.\nB. Gift of Residuary Estate. My residuary estate, being all my real and personal property, wherever located, not otherwise effectively disposed of, but excluding any property over which I may have a power of appointment, shall be disposed of as follows:\n1. I give all such tangible personal property to my relative, JENNIFER PLYMALE, if she survives me.\nBased on these provisions, Ms. Plymale indicated in the application for probate that she was the only person entitled to share in Ms. Halstead\u2019s estate. Petitioner then filed this action to obtain a declaration regarding the proper distribution of the residuary estate.\nAfter a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered a judgment on 10 October 2012 finding a patent ambiguity on the face of the will and construing the will to devise the entire residuary estate in favor of Ms. Plymale. Specifically, because the trial court concluded that \u201c[t]he bequest under \u2018A\u2019 effectively disposed of all of [Ms. Halstead\u2019s] tangible personal property so that none remained for disposition under \u2018B,\u2019 \u201d the trial court considered the repeated reference to \u201ctangible personal property\u201d in the residuary clause to be patently ambiguous. Accordingly, because the trial court concluded that it was Ms. Halstead\u2019s express intention to disinherit and disqualify Petitioner, the reference to tangible personal property in the residuary clause was disregarded and the residue was deemed to have been devised in its entirety to Ms. Plymale. Petitioner filed timely notice of appeal.\nII. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review\n\u201cCourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights . . . and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253 (2011). Accordingly, because Petitioner appeals the superior court\u2019s declaratory judgment concerning the proper disposition of Ms. Halstead\u2019s estate, Petitioner\u2019s appeal lies of right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b) (2011).\n\u201cThe interpretation of a will\u2019s language is a matter of law. When the parties place nothing before the court to prove the intention of the testator, other than the will itself, they are simply disputing the interpretation of the language which is a question of law.\u201d Cummings v. Snyder, 91 N.C. App. 565, 568, 372 S.E.2d 724, 725 (1988) (internal citations omitted). Here, both parties stipulated at the hearing that no extrinsic evidence would be considered. Accordingly, because the interpretation of Ms. Halstead\u2019s will turns solely on the language of the will, Petitioner\u2019s appeal presents a question of law. \u201cConclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review.\u201d State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). \u201cUnder a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.\u201d Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).\nIII. Analysis\nThe only question presented by Petitioner\u2019s appeal is the proper disposition of Ms. Halstead\u2019s residuary estate. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment finding that the entire residuary estate passed under the terms of the will to Ms. Plymale.\n\u201cThe intent of the testator is the polar star that must guide the coruts in the interpretation of a will.\u201d Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234 N.C. 173, 174, 66 S.E.2d 777, 778 (1951); see also Collier v. Bryant, _ N.C. App. _, _, 719 S.E.2d 70, 76 (2011) (\u201cWhen reading a will, the testator\u2019s intent guides the trial court\u2019s interpretation of the will.\u201d). \u201cThis intent is to be gathered from a consideration of the will from its four comers, and such intent should be given effect unless contrary to some rule of law or at variance with public policy.\u201d Coppedge, 234 N.C. at 174, 66 S.E.2d at 778.\nNaturally, \u201c[w]here the language employed by the testator is plain and its import is obvious, the judicial chore is light work; for, in such event, the words of the testator must be taken to mean exactly what they say.\u201d McCain v. Womble, 265 N.C. 640, 644, 144 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1965) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, \u201cwhere provisions are inconsistent, it is a general rule in the interpretation of wills, to recognize the general prevailing purpose of the testator and to subordinate the inconsistent provisions found in it.\u201d Coppedge, 234 N.C. at 176, 66 S.E.2d at 779. Indeed, \u201c[e]ven words, phrases, or clauses will be supplied in the construction of a will when the sense of the phrase or clause in question as collected from the context manifestly requires it.\u201d Entwistle v. Covington, 250 N.C. 315, 319, 108 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1959); see also Gordon v. Ehringhaus, 190 N.C. 147, 150, 129 S.E. 187, 189 (1925). (\u201c[I]n performing the office of construction, the Court may reject, supply or transpose words and phrases in order to ascertain the correct meaning and to prevent the real intention of the testator from being rendered abortive by his inapt use of language.\u201d).\nHere, we agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that a patent ambiguity appears on the face of Ms. Halstead\u2019s will. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 243 N.C. 469, 478, 91 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1956) (stating that \u201ca patent ambiguity occurs when doubt arises from conflicting provisions or provisions alleged to be repugnant\u201d). Specifically, a plain reading of Ms. Halstead\u2019s residuary clause reveals a clear inconsistency. Ms. Halstead\u2019s residuary clause reads as follows:\nB. Gift of Residuary Estate. My residuary estate, being all my real and personal property, wherever located, not otherwise effectively disposed of, but excluding any property over which I may have a power of appointment, shall be disposed of as follows:\n1. I give all such tangible personal property to my relative, JENNIFER PLYMALE, if she survives me.\nPlainly, section B indicates an intention to dispose of \u201call. . . real and personal property, wherever located, not otherwise effectively disposed of\u2019 in preceding portions of the will. Yet, when alluding back to the contents of the residuary estate in subsection B(l), the will refers only to \u201ctangible personal property.\u201d Tangible personal property would necessarily exclude all intangible personal property and all real property in Ms. Halstead\u2019s estate.\nThe inconsistency inherent in this provision is further revealed by the fact that Ms. Halstead had already disposed of her tangible personal property:\nA. Gift of Tangible Personal Property. All of my tangible personal property that was not held by me solely for investment purposes, including, but not limited to, my automobiles, household furniture and furnishings, clothing, jewelry, collectibles and personal effects, shall be disposed of as follows:\n1. I give all such tangible personal property to my relative, JENNIFER PLYMALE,... if she survives me.\nAccordingly, given that Ms. Halstead had already devised her tangible personal property to Ms. Plymale in section A, and because section B purports to devise the entire residuary estate, the repeated reference to \u201ctangible personal property\u201d in subsection B(l) creates a patent ambiguity on the face of the will. Thus, our task is to construe this inconsistent provision to effectuate Ms. Halstead\u2019s intent as revealed by the four comers of the will.\n\u201c[T]he intent of the testator must be ascertained from a consideration of the will as a whole and not merely from consideration of specific items or phrases of the will taken in isolation.\u201d Adcock v. Perry, 305 N.C. 625, 629, 290 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1982). \u201c[T]he use of particular words, clauses or sentences must yield to the purpose and intent of the testator as found in the whole will.\u201d Kale v. Forrest, 278 N.C. 1, 6, 178 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1971). Accordingly, \u201c[i]n interpreting the different provisions of a will, the courts are not confined to the literal meaning of a single phrase.\u201d Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 611, 617, 36 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1945). Courts may even supply a gift by implication \u201c[i]f a reading of the whole will produces a conviction that the testator must necessarily have intended an interest to be given which is not bequeathed by express or formal words.\u201d First Charter Bank v. Am. Children\u2019s Home, 203 N.C. App. 574, 587, 692 S.E.2d 457, 467 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original).\nMoreover, there is a general presumption that a testator did not intend to die intestate as to any part of his property, unless there is such an intent plainly and unequivocally expressed in the will. McKinney v. Mosteller, 321 N.C. 730, 732-33, 365 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1988). Furthermore, \u201cthe presumption against intestacy is strengthened by the presence of a residuary clause in a will.\u201d Id. at 732, 365 S.E.2d at 614; see also Gordon, 190 N.C. at 150, 129 S.E. at 189 (\u201cIn dealing with the residuary clause of a will which is ambiguous, it is required, by the general rale of construction, that a liberal, rather than a restricted, interpretation be placed upon its terms; for a partial intestacy may thereby be prevented, which, it is reasonable to suppose, the testator did not contemplate.\u201d).\nHere, an application of the foregoing principles leads us to the conclusion that Ms. Halstead specifically intended to disinherit Petitioner and to devise her entire residuary estate in section B to Ms. Plymale.\nFirst, Ms. Halstead states at the beginning of her will that \u201cI specifically wish to disinherit and disqualify my estranged spounst [sic], KENNETH F. HALSTEAD for his misconduct toward me.\u201d Thus, the remainder of the will\u2019s provisions must be read in light of the fact that Ms. Halstead did not want Petitioner to share in her estate. Second, before the residuary clause appears in the will, Ms. Halstead effectively disposed of all her tangible personal property in section A of the will in favor of Ms. Plymale. Accordingly, her intent in subsection B(l) could not have been to re-gift the same property to the same person. Third, the introductory language of the residuary clause, section B, purports to dispose of all of Ms. Halstead\u2019s remaining real and personal property. Given this intent, the reference to \u201call such tangible personal property\u201d in subsection B(l) is more aptly translated \u201call such property.\u201d See Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N. A., 301 N.C. 456, 464, 272 S.E.2d 90, 96 (1980) (\u201cWhen the language following an introductory phrase which purports to dispose of all of testator\u2019s property can be interpreted to result in complete disposition or partial intestacy, the introductory statement, pointing to a complete disposition, ought to be considered, and that sense adopted which will result in a disposition of the whole estate.\u201d (quotation marks and citation omitted)).\nIn summary, Ms. Halstead\u2019s intent as garnered from the four comers of the will was to specifically disinherit Petitioner, to avoid intestacy, and to pass her entire estate to Ms. Plymale. Furthermore, the reference to \u201ctangible personal property\u201d in subsection B(l) of the residuary clause was not intended to limit the contents of the residuary estate to tangible personal property. Accordingly, the proper interpretation of subsection B(l) is that Ms. Halstead intended to pass all of her residue, including all remaining real and personal property, to Ms. Plymale.\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court finding that all of Ms. Halstead\u2019s tangible personal property, together with her entire residuary estate, were bequeathed and devised in their entirety to Ms. Plymale.\nAffirmed.\nJudges ERVIN and DAVIS concur.\n. Notwithstanding this language, Ms. Plymale described her relationship with Ms. Halstead as a \u201cclose friend\u201d in the application for probate.\n. Petitioner\u2019s brief does not challenge the trial court\u2019s finding that all of Ms. Halstead\u2019s tangible personal property passed to Ms. Plymale under the section of the will entitled \u201cA. Gift of Tangible Personal Property.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Office of Shawna Collins, by Shawna D. Collins, for petitioner-appellant.", "Helms Robison & Lee, P.A., by James Allen Lee and Emily B. Harp, for respondent-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KENNETH HALSTEAD, Petitioner v. JENNIFER PLYMALE, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ANITA RAE HALSTEAD, Respondent\nNo. COA13-375\nFiled 3 December 2013\n1. Jurisdiction \u2014 declaratory judgment \u2014 disposition of estate\u2014 standard of review\nAn appeal from the superior court\u2019s declaratory judgment concerning the proper disposition of an estate was an appeal of right to the Court of Appeals pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(b). Moreover, review was de novo because the interpretation of the will turned solely on the language of the will and thus presented a question of law.\n2. Wills \u2014 residuary estate \u2014 patent ambiguity \u2014 intent of testator\nWhere there was a patent ambiguity on the face of a will, the trial court correctly found that the entire residuary estate of testator (Ms. Halstead) passed under the terms of her will to her relative (Ms. Plymale) and not to petitioner, her estranged husband.\nAppeal by petitioner from judgment entered 10 October 2012 by Judge W. David Lee in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 2013.\nLaw Office of Shawna Collins, by Shawna D. Collins, for petitioner-appellant.\nHelms Robison & Lee, P.A., by James Allen Lee and Emily B. Harp, for respondent-appellee." }, "file_name": "0253-01", "first_page_order": 263, "last_page_order": 269 }