{ "id": 6788018, "name": "VANESSA B. JOYNER, Petitioner v. PERQUIMANS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; A/K/A SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PERQUIMANS COUNTY NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Joyner v. Perquimans County Board of Education", "decision_date": "2013-12-17", "docket_number": "No. COA13-446", "first_page": "358", "last_page": "368", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 N.C. App. 358" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596", "parenthetical": "quoting Abell v. Nash Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 71 N.C. App. 48, 53, 321 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1984)" }, { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639189 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8379413 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "quoting Abell v. Nash Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 71 N.C. App. 48, 53, 321 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1984)" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53839 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "506-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523740 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52-53" }, { "page": "53" }, { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4771671 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554596 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11868692 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526760 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470377 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8211420 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" }, { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 S.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.C. App. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556069 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/21/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1150325", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 926, "char_count": 24127, "ocr_confidence": 0.706, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6922169990516086e-08, "percentile": 0.2947372607437731 }, "sha256": "e30537b3589d06fc03f9159e9f52040790d5fbedf8ad9bdbaa04da5d429c7bc3", "simhash": "1:99c74121a6836742", "word_count": 3851 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:32:40.304740+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McGEE and Judge McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "VANESSA B. JOYNER, Petitioner v. PERQUIMANS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; A/K/A SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PERQUIMANS COUNTY NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "DILLON, Judge.\nThe Perquimans County Board of Education (the Board) appeals from an order of the superior court reversing the Board\u2019s decision to deny Vanessa B. Joyner (Petitioner) career status. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\nIn August 2008, Petitioner was employed by the Board to teach first grade at Perquimans Central School (PCS). After teaching first grade for two years, Petitioner spent the following two years as an Exceptional Children\u2019s (EC) teacher. Petitioner became eligible for \u201ccareer status,\u201d i.e., tenure, at the close of the 2011-2012 school year. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1150325(c)(1) (2011).\nA. The Board\u2019s Closed Session Meeting\nOn 14 May 2012, the Board met in a closed session to determine whether to grant career status to Petitioner and twelve other eligible probationary teachers, each of whom had received positive recommendations from Perquimans County Superintendent of Schools Dr. Dwayne Stallings. The minutes from the meeting are included in the record.\nAside from one question concerning one other candidate, the Board focused its discussion on Petitioner. Board member Ralph Hollowell stated that \u201che had heard from teachers, teacher assistants, parents and grandparents questionable information about [Petitioner]\u201d and that \u201cfrom the accounts he had heard, he was not sure if EC students at [PCS] were getting what they needed.\u201d Mr. Hollowell did not elaborate further with respect to his sources or the nature of the \u201cquestionable information\u201d that he had heard. He also described an incident in which he \u201csubstituted\u201d at PCS for three days, during which time he observed Petitioner meet with three students, individually, for less than ten minutes each, and thus he \u201cquestioned the quality of services the students were receiving in such a short length of time.\u201d The minutes do not reflect that Mr. Hollowell cited any basis for his belief that Petitioner\u2019s meetings were inadequate or that he has any background or training in EC education upon which to base such a belief. Further, the minutes do not reflect that Mr. Hollowell notified anyone at PCS of his concerns about Petitioner\u2019s meetings with her students at the time of his observations.\nThe Board spoke with Superintendent Stallings, current PCS Principal Melissa Fields, and former PCS Principal Linda White concerning Petitioner, as discussed further infra. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Board voted to grant career status to all the candidates, except Petitioner.\nB. The Board Hearing\nBy letter dated 15 May 2012, Superintendent Stallings notified Petitioner of the Board\u2019s decision to deny her career status. Consequently, Petitioner would no longer be employed as a teacher at PCS beyond the end of the current academic year.\nUpon receiving notice that her contract would not be renewed, Petitioner requested a formal hearing before the Board. The Board granted Petitioner\u2019s request, and a hearing on the matter was held on 29 May 2012. Mr. Hollowell was not present at the hearing.\nPetitioner advocated on her own behalf at the hearing, citing the many positive evaluations that she had received while at PCS, in addition to the favorable recommendations of Superintendent Stallings and Principal Fields. Petitioner questioned the motive of Mr. Hollowell\u2019s opposition to granting her career status. She described the incident in which Mr. Hollowell had \u201csubstituted\u201d at PCS and \u201cobserved\u201d her teaching performance for several days. Petitioner explained that this incident occurred, coincidentally, shortly after she had reported Mr. Hollowell\u2019s wife, who was also a teacher at PCS, \u201cfor misadministration of the third nine weeks writing test.\u201d Petitioner then responded to a number of questions from the Board and, finally, from the Board\u2019s attorney.\nBy letter dated 1 June 2012, the Board informed Petitioner that she would not be granted career status. Attached to the letter was a copy of the Board\u2019s final decision, which included the following findings:\n1. The Board has concerns about [Petitioner\u2019s] performance; and\n2. The Board can and should find a teacher to do a better job than [Petitioner],\nPetitioner timely petitioned for judicial review of the Board\u2019s decision in Perquimans County Superior Court.\nC. Judicial Review of the Board\u2019s Decision\nThe superior court heard the matter on 5 November 2012, and, upon considering the parties\u2019 arguments and conducting a review of the whole record of the Board proceedings, the court entered an order reversing the Board\u2019s decision and ordering that Petitioner \u201cbe immediately reinstated to her teaching position as a career status teacher with all of the rights and benefits that would have accrued to her as of May 29, 2012.\u201d The superior court included detailed findings of fact in its order, including the following findings concerning Mr. Hollowell:\n5. Board member [Hollowell] spoke against the Superintendent\u2019s recommendation that the Petitioner be given career status.\n6. Hollowell said that he had \u201cheard from teachers, teaching assistants, parents and grandparents questionable information about this teacher\u201d without individually identifying any person from whom he had heard or providing any other specific details about what \u201cquestionable information\u201d he claimed to have received.\n9. Board member Hollowell, whose wife is a teacher at the same school as Petitioner, reported that he had personally \u201csubstituted\u201d at Petitioner\u2019s school, and had timed [Petitioner] walking students from their regular classrooms to her classroom on three occasions.\n10. Without any apparent information about the purpose of these interactions or the educational or scientific basis for his conclusions, Hollowell apparently concluded from these \u201cobservations\u201d that Petitioner was not providing qualify services to the students based upon the \u201cshort length of time\u201d Petitioner spent with the observed students.\n19. The [Board] hearing was held on 29 March 2012. Hollowell was not present....\nThe court then concluded as a matter of law that Mr. Hollowell\u2019s \u201cbias\u201d had \u201ctainted\u201d the Board\u2019s decision:\n4. While one might argue that the spouse of a teacher who himself \u201csubstitutes\u201d in the same school has an inherent and overriding conflict of interest which should preclude service on the school board altogether, such conflict of interest is more noticeable in matters of teacher retention.\n5. Matters of teacher retention at the same school Hollowell\u2019s spouse worked, where Hollowell \u201csubstituted\u201d, where Hollowell specifically made untrained, unscientific \u201cobservations\u201d of the teacher in question, where the teacher in question had reported to the principal an allegation of Hollowell\u2019s spouse\u2019s misadministration of a test make Hollowell\u2019s conflict of interest and bias impossible to ignore.\n6. In view of the whole record, Hollowell had a conflict of interest and was biased against Petitioner.\n7. The \u201cevidence\u201d which supports the Board\u2019s May 14 decision, essentially unsupported, undocumented hearsay presented by one biased member, was neither competent nor substantial.\n8. The competent, admissible evidence at the May 14 closed session supported the recommendations of the Superintendent and others.\n9. The Board\u2019s May 14 decision was arbitrary and capricious, made for personal reasons, and infected by the pre-meeting bias of one Board member.\n10. The Board\u2019s May 29 decision to uphold the May 14 decision was' tainted by the same bias which tainted the earlier decision.\n11. The Board\u2019s May 29 decision was based upon selective evidence, much of it incompetent or inadmissible, designed to support its initial decision rather than provide a full and fair consideration of the matter.\n12. The Board\u2019s May 29 decision was not supported by substantial admissible evidence.\n13. The Board\u2019s May 29 decision was arbitrary and capricious, made for personal reasons, and infected by the pre-hearing of one Board member even though he was absent for the May 29 hearing.\n14. The final decision of the [Board] should be reversed.\nThe superior court entered its order reversing the Board\u2019s decision on 16 November 2012. From this order, the Board appeals.\nII. Analysis\nPrior to 1972, \u201cthe contracts of public school teachers were terminable at the end of each school year. A county board of education had full authority to refuse to renew a teacher\u2019s contract for any reason it considered appropriate.\u201d Taylor v. Crisp, 21 N.C. App. 359, 361, 205 S.E.2d 102, 103 (1974). As this Court stated in Taylor,\nTenure in employment has long been a laudable objective of the teaching profession, and [Chapter 115C] provides teachers with much greater security than they [had prior to 1972]. It classifies all teachers into two groups: career teachers and probationary teachers.\nId.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325 provides that a \u201ccareer teacher,\u201d meaning a teacher who has obtained \u201ccareer status,\u201d may not be discharged or suspended other than for the reasons and by the procedures specifically set forth therein. Likewise, a \u201cprobationary teacher\u201d may not be discharged during a school year except for the reasons and through the procedures applicable to career teachers. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(m) (1) (2011). A school board may, however, refuse to renew the contract of a probationaiy teacher at the end of a school year \u201cfor any cause it deems sufficient: Provided, however, that the cause may not be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or for personal or political reasons.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(m)(2) (2011). Probationary teachers facing non-renewal of their teaching contracts are not entitled to present evidence or to have a hearing before the board. Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 566, 578, 649 S.E.2d 410, 418 (2007). Notwithstanding, a probationary teacher whose contract has not been renewed by the board may appeal the decision to the superior court. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(n) (2011).\nFor a probationary teacher who is about to complete the fourth consecutive year of employment, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(c)(l) provides that \u201cthe board .. . shall vote upon whether to grant the teacher career status.\u201d Id. The teacher \u201chas a right to notice and hearing prior to the board\u2019s vote[.]\u201d Id. Moreover, if the board votes not to grant a probationary teacher career status, \u201cthe teacher shall not teach beyond the current school term.\u201d Id. A decision by a county board of education not to grant a probationary teacher career status is subject to judicial review under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51. Moore, 185 N.C. App. at 572, 649 S.E.2d at 414.\nIn the present case, the superior court reversed the Board\u2019s decision to deny Petitioner career status. \u201cWhen this Court reviews appeals from superior court either affirming or reversing the decision of an administrative agency, our scope of review is twofold, and is limited to determining: (1) whether the superior court applied the appropriate standard of review and, if so, (2) whether the superior court properly applied this standard.\u201d Mayo v. N.C. State Univ., 168 N.C. App. 503, 507, 608 S.E.2d 116, 120 (2005).\nA. The Appropriate Standard of Review\nWe must first determine whether the superior court applied the appropriate standard of review. Id. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51(b) provides that a court reviewing a \u201cfinal decision\u201d of the Board\nmay affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings. It may also reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:\n(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-31 in view of the entire record as submitted; or\n(6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51(b)(5)-(6) (2011). Alleged errors relating to subsections (5) and (6) of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51(b) are reviewed under the \u201cwhole record test.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51(c) (2011). The present appeal concerns (1) whether the record evidence supports the Board\u2019s decision; and (2) whether the Board\u2019s decision was arbitrary or capricious. We hold, therefore, that the superior court was correct in applying the \u201cwhole record test\u201d in undertaking its review of the Board\u2019s decision.\nB. Proper Application of the \u201cWhole Record Test\u201d\nHaving determined that the superior court applied the correct standard of review, we must next determine whether the superior court applied this standard properly. Mayo, 168 N.C. App. at 507, 608 S.E.2d at 120.\nWe have \u201cdistinguished [the whole record test] from the \u2018any competent evidence\u2019 test and a de novo review[.]\u201d Bennett v, Hertford County Board of Education, 69 N.C. App. 615, 618, 317 S.E.2d 912, 915 (1984). \u201cIn applying the whole record test, the reviewing court must examine all the competent evidence of record, including evidence that detracts from the Board\u2019s conclusions, to determine whether the Board\u2019s decision has a rational basis in the evidence.\u201d Beauchesne v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 125 N.C. App. 457, 465, 481 S.E.2d 685, 691 (1997). \u201c \u2018The whole record test\u2019 does not allow the reviewing court to replace the Board\u2019s judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo.\" Baxter v. Poe, 42 N.C. App. 404, 411, 257 S.E.2d 71, 76 (1979) (citation omitted).\nPetitioner bore the burden of showing that the Board erred in its decision to deny her tenure. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-44(b) (2011) (providing that \u201c[i]n all actions brought in any court against a local board of education, the order or action of the board shall be presumed to be correct and the burden of proof shall be on the complaining party to show to the contrary\u201d). It was thus Petitioner\u2019s burden to show that the Board\u2019s decision was arbitrary, in that it was not supported by substantial evidence, Godfrey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 317 N.C. 51, 60, 344 S.E.2d 272, 278 (1986), or because the reasons for the Board\u2019s decision were \u201cwithout any rational basis in the record, such that a decision made thereon amount[ed] to an abuse of discretion^]\u201d Abell v. Nash Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 71 N.C. App. 48, 52-53, 321 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1984).\nUpon careful examination of the whole record, we are unable to discern a rational basis in the evidence for the Board\u2019s decision. Both Superintendent Stallings and Principal Fields recommended that Petitioner be granted career status; and Petitioner\u2019s summative evaluations consistently designated her performance as at least equal to that of her peers. Indeed, Petitioner\u2019s evaluations are replete with statements extolling her performance, describing her, for instance, as an \u201cengaging\u201d teacher and one who has made \u201ccommendable\u201d progress at PCS.\nAny signs or indicia of Petitioner\u2019s negative performance at PCS are far more difficult to glean from the record before us. At its closed session meeting, the Board questioned both Principal Fields and Linda White, a former principal at PCS, concerning Petitioner\u2019s placement on a \u201cplan of action.\u201d Ms. White clarified that Petitioner did not have an \u201caction plan\u201d - which a struggling teacher might be placed on in order to improve certain areas of performance - but rather a more informal \u201cplan of action\u201d to address \u201careas of communication to parents and insubordination.\u201d Regardless, Principal Fields informed the Board that the informal plan of action had been discontinued. We note Ms. Field\u2019s statements that Petitioner had not always followed her directions, that she had not always turned in her lesson plan on time, and that she needed to work on her pedagogical skills; but we also note Principal Field\u2019s statement that Petitioner\u2019s lessons plans had improved and that Principal Fields did, in fact, recommend Petitioner for career status, a point which Principal Fields reiterated to the Board at the closed session meeting.\nFrom what we are able to discern from the minutes taken at the Board\u2019s closed session meeting, it appears that, aside from Mr. Hollowell\u2019s vague and unsubstantiated concerns, the only reason articulated for denying Petitioner career status was that a Board member was \u201cunsure if [Petitioner] had contributed to the growth of the EC students at [her school].\u201d However, there is no evidence in the record from the meeting upon which the Board member could base this reason except for the opinion stated by Mr. Hollowell based on his unsubstantiated concerns. Another Board member stated that the Board should not grant tenure if \u201cit was thought that the system could do better.\u201d There is no indication, however, that the Board members applied this \u201ccould do better\u201d standard to any of the other twelve candidates for career status.\nWith respect to the 29 May 2012 hearing, the Board did not seek to elicit testimony from any individual other than Petitioner, who introduced evidence of her positive impact as a teacher at PCS. Mr. Hollowell\u2019s absence from the hearing rendered his vague allegations unexplained and precluded Petitioner from questioning Mr. Hollowell directly to counter his \u201cconcerns\u201d with her side of the story.\nThe Board insists that its decision to deny Petitioner tenure was \u201camply supported by evidence in the record.\u201d Because Mr. Hollowell lacks a basis in knowledge and educational training, his remarks do not constitute substantial evidence supporting the Board\u2019s decision. Further, we do not believe the other evidence in record which might support the Board\u2019s decision - e.g., testimony that Petitioner had not always turned her lessons in on time - in light of the overwhelming evidence favorable to Petitioner, constitutes substantial evidence to support the Board\u2019s decision. See ACT-UP, Inc. v. Comm\u2019n for Health Servs., 345 N.C. 699, 707-08, 483 S.E.2d 388, 393 (1997). As such, we do not believe that the superior court erred by concluding that, in view of the whole record, the Board\u2019s decision lacks a rational basis in the evidence. See id.\nThe Board also points to the findings included in its written decision, which, according to the Board, \u201cexplains the basis for\u201d its decision. Though we have held, as the Board points out, that \u201ca school board need not \u2018make exhaustive inquiries or formal findings of fact,\u201d Davis v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 178 N.C. App. 646, 655, 632 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2006) (quoting Abell v. Nash Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 71 N.C. App. 48, 53, 321 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1984)), the underlying notion is that such findings are not necessary because \u201cthe personnel file, board minutes or recommendation memoranda, should disclose the basis for the board\u2019s action.\u201d Davis, 178 N.C. App. at 656, 632 S.E.2d at 596 (2006) (quoting Abell, 71 N.C. App. at 53, 321 S.E.2d at 506-07) (emphasis added). However, given that the record fails to disclose a rational basis for the Board\u2019s decision in the present case, the scant nature of the Board\u2019s two findings - that the Board had \u201cconcerns\u201d about Petitioner\u2019s performance and that the Board could find a teacher \u201cto do abetter job\u201d than Petitioner - serve only to bolster the superior court\u2019s conclusion that the Board\u2019s decision was arbitrary and capricious. To accept the Board\u2019s \u201cfindings\u201d as explaining a valid basis for its decision - or, put another way, as indicative of the standard for attaining tenure status, without being accompanied by an articulation of a specific concern supported by substantial evidence in the record - would be to grant the Board unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily toward a particular candidate, as there will always be some candidate, somewhere, who could \u201cdo a better job.\u201d Thus, while we acknowledge that the Board is to be accorded broad discretion in deciding whether career status is appropriate for a given candidate, we cannot ignore the limitations placed on this discretion by our General Statutes, which, as relevant for purposes of the present case, expressly provide that arbitrary decisions or decisions not supported by substantial admissible evidence, in view of the entire record, will not be upheld. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51(b)(5)-(6).\nHI. Conclusion\nThe superior court properly applied the appropriate standard of review in determining that the Board\u2019s decision lacked a rational basis in the evidence. Further, the superior court acted within its authority pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51 when it \u201cmodified\u201d the Board\u2019s decision by directing that Petitioner be reinstated with career status. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court\u2019s 16 November 2012 order.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudge McGEE and Judge McCULLOUGH concur.\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325 (c)(1) provides that \u201c[i]f a majority of the board votes against granting career status, the teacher shall not teach beyond the current school term.\u201d\n. The Board argues that the superior court lacks jurisdiction to review its decision to deny career status. The Board contends that \u201cG.S. \u00a7 115C-325(n) [which provides for judicial review of a school board\u2019s decision not to renew the contract of a probationary teacher pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 115C-325(m)(2)], does not explicitly provide for a right to appeal from a board of education\u2019s decision not to grant career status pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 115(c)(1).\u201d In other words, the Board points out that \u201cthe judicial review in this matter has proceeded under the assumption that a denial of career status is the same, for purposes of the right to appeal, as a contract nonrenewal under subsection (m)(2).\u201d However, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(n) does not expressly prohibit a probationary teacher from seeking judicial review of a board\u2019s decision to deny career status, and we do not believe that our Legislature intended to limit a probationary teacher\u2019s ability to seek judicial review in this context. We thus conclude that a probationary teacher who has been denied career status has the right to seek judicial review of the board\u2019s decision in accordance with the standards set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51.\n. Petitioner received performance reviews ranging from \u201cproficient,\u201d indicating standard performance in the evaluated area, to \u201caccomplished\u201d and \u201cdistinguished,\u201d indicating above standard performance, in evaluations completed by more than a dozen educational professionals, including three principals at PCS.", "type": "majority", "author": "DILLON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Leon Law Firm, P.C., by Mary-Ann Leon, for Petitioner", "Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Deborah R. Stagner, and Homthal, Riley, Ellis & Maland, L.L.P., by John D. Leidy, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VANESSA B. JOYNER, Petitioner v. PERQUIMANS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; A/K/A SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PERQUIMANS COUNTY NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent\nNo. COA13-446\nFiled 17 December 2013\n1. Schools and Education \u2014 teacher\u2014denial of career status\u2014 right to seek judicial review\nA probationary teacher who has been denied career status had the right to seek judicial review of the board of education\u2019s decision in accordance with the standards set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-51.\n2. Schools and Education \u2014 teacher\u2014denial of tenure \u2014 judicial review \u2014 whole record test\nThe superior court was correct in applying the \u201cwhole record test\u201d in reviewing a board of education decision to deny a teacher career status (tenure). The appeal concerned whether the record evidence supported the board\u2019s decision and whether the board\u2019s decision was arbitrary or capricious.\n3. Schools and Education \u2014 teacher\u2014denial of tenure \u2014 arbitrary\nThe superior court properly reversed a board of education\u2019s decision to deny tenure to a teacher where there was not a rational basis in the record for the board\u2019s decision. The teacher\u2019s evaluations were replete with statements extolling her performance, while any signs or indicia of negative performance were far more difficult to glean from the record, aside from vague and unsubstantiated concerns from a board member with a possible conflict of interest who was not present at the hearing that followed the denial of tenure.\nAppeal by Respondent from order entered 16 November 2012 by Judge William R. Pittman in Perquimans County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 September 2013.\nThe Leon Law Firm, P.C., by Mary-Ann Leon, for Petitioner\nTharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Deborah R. Stagner, and Homthal, Riley, Ellis & Maland, L.L.P., by John D. Leidy, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0358-01", "first_page_order": 368, "last_page_order": 378 }