{ "id": 6788073, "name": "DAVID M. MORGAN, Employee, Plaintiff v. MORGAN MOTOR COMPANY OF ALBEMARLE, Employer, and BRENTWOOD SERVICES, INC., Servicing Agent for the North Carolina Auto Dealers Association Self-Insurer's Fund, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Morgan v. Morgan Motor Co. of Albemarle", "decision_date": "2013-12-17", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1485", "first_page": "377", "last_page": "396", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 N.C. App. 377" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642917 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641940 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823", "parenthetical": "\"Where there are sufficient findings of fact based on competent evidence to support the Commission's conclusions of law, the award will not be disturbed because of other erroneous findings which do not affect the conclusions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638312 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637245 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "\"We may not substitute our own judgment for that of the Commission, even though the evidence might rationally justify reaching a different conclusion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637253 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "\"This Court may not weigh the evidence or make determinations regarding the credibility of the witnesses.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 464", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635369, 12635370, 12635371, 12635372 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0464-01", "/se2d/627/0464-02", "/se2d/627/0464-03", "/se2d/627/0464-04" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633569 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "408", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "\"An appellate court is not required to, and should not, assume error by the trial [tribunal] when none appears on the record before the appellate court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8173006 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463", "parenthetical": "\"An appellate court is not required to, and should not, assume error by the trial [tribunal] when none appears on the record before the appellate court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162118 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89-90", "parenthetical": "\"Where there are sufficient findings of fact based on competent evidence to support the Commission's conclusions of law, the award will not be disturbed because of other erroneous findings which do not affect the conclusions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3741607, 3737130, 3738894, 3739255, 3742617, 3740890, 3745628 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0356-04", "/nc/361/0356-06", "/nc/361/0356-03", "/nc/361/0356-05", "/nc/361/0356-07", "/nc/361/0356-02", "/nc/361/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8242544 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "\"We may not substitute our own judgment for that of the Commission, even though the evidence might rationally justify reaching a different conclusion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4740836 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "\"The Commission's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence even though evidence exists that would support a contrary finding.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987216 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705", "parenthetical": "\"The Commission's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence even though evidence exists that would support a contrary finding.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491657 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" }, { "page": "582", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560920 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8242879 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "\"This Court may not weigh the evidence or make determinations regarding the credibility of the witnesses.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n injury arises out of the employment when it is a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment and a natural result of one of its risks, so that there is some causal relation between the injury and the performance of some service of the employment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573682 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" }, { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 S.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116", "parenthetical": "quoting Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 730, 295 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11468190 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446", "parenthetical": "quoting Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 730, 295 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" }, { "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240405 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9248679 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 S.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "699 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. App. 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4177654 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/206/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569857 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787745, 3791782, 3787977, 3797401, 3793321, 3796109, 3789454, 3792409, 3787263 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0288-09", "/nc/360/0288-04", "/nc/360/0288-07", "/nc/360/0288-02", "/nc/360/0288-05", "/nc/360/0288-03", "/nc/360/0288-01", "/nc/360/0288-08", "/nc/360/0288-06" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8320194 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "713 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. App. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4079142 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/212/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 S.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "682 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169964 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149368 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" }, { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "810", "parenthetical": "stating that \"an employer would not be permitted to escape his liability or obligations under the [Workers' Compensation] Act through the use of a special contract or agreement if the elements required for coverage of the injured individual would otherwise exist\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571346 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "507-08" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694", "parenthetical": "holding that each employer is \"hable equally\" in compensating the employee for a work-related injury" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522566 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "holding that each employer is \"hable equally\" in compensating the employee for a work-related injury" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383", "parenthetical": "recognizing the concept of \"joint employment\" where the employee has a contract, whether \"express or implied\" with each employer" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8413485 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691", "parenthetical": "recognizing the concept of \"joint employment\" where the employee has a contract, whether \"express or implied\" with each employer" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "853" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576549 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110", "parenthetical": "quoting 1C, Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation \u00a7 48.40" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8359160 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636", "parenthetical": "quoting 1C, Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation \u00a7 48.40" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401", "parenthetical": "holding that coverage exists where an employee's actions, though not expressly authorized, are \"not so extreme as to break the causal connection between his employment and his [injury]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567944 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "holding that coverage exists where an employee's actions, though not expressly authorized, are \"not so extreme as to break the causal connection between his employment and his [injury]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522486 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519-20" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 S.E. 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that an employee who has deviated from his employment is covered for injuries occurring after he returns to work" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625295 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that an employee who has deviated from his employment is covered for injuries occurring after he returns to work" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/202/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566796 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0350-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1445, "char_count": 48081, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.293521304992758e-07, "percentile": 0.6204597256442363 }, "sha256": "349bfc624cd822aac0016d23897e9c606ad3bcaaa23bbdd88469b689594e4830", "simhash": "1:298575cf0b2e1a1e", "word_count": 7753 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:32:40.304740+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge CALABRIA concurs." ], "parties": [ "DAVID M. MORGAN, Employee, Plaintiff v. MORGAN MOTOR COMPANY OF ALBEMARLE, Employer, and BRENTWOOD SERVICES, INC., Servicing Agent for the North Carolina Auto Dealers Association Self-Insurer\u2019s Fund, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "DAVIS, Judge.\nDavid M. Morgan (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019) appeals from the Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cthe Full Commission\u201d or \u201cthe Commission\u201d) denying his workers\u2019 compensation claim against Morgan Motor Company of Albemarle, Inc. (\u201cMorgan Motors\u201d). The issue before us is whether the Commission erred in concluding that Plaintiff\u2019s accident did not arise out of \u2014 or occur in the course of \u2014 his employment with Morgan Motors. After careful review, we affirm the Full Commission\u2019s opinion.\nFactual Background\nPlaintiff is a 55-year-old man who was the Secretary-Treasurer, Sales and Financial Manager, and 45.5% owner of Morgan Motors, a family-owned car dealership in Albemarle, North Carolina. Morgan Motors was initially located at 304 East Main Street in Albemarle but relocated in 1992 to a larger location on Highway 52. It continued to own the building at 304 East Main Street after its move to the Highway 52 location.\nIn 1998 or 1999, Plaintiff and his father had an architect draw up plans to remodel the old dealership building at 304 East Main Street into a restaurant. In 2003, Morgan Motors took out a $2.1 million dollar loan to pay off the mortgage on the Highway 52 building and also to renovate the building at 304 East Main Street. Approximately $1.3 million of the loan proceeds was used to renovate and remodel the old dealership building.\nBy virtue of a lease signed on 20 October 2004, Morgan Motors leased the old dealership building to Pontiac Pointe, a limited liability company formed by Plaintiff and his business partner, John Williams. Plaintiff\u2019s brother, Robert T. Morgan, signed the lease on behalf of Morgan Motors as the landlord along with Plaintiff, Mellanie M. Morgan, and Pamela C. Morgan. Plaintiff also signed the lease on behalf of the tenant, Pontiac Pointe. Paragraph 6 of the lease \u2014 entitled Maintenance, Repairs and Replacements \u2014 provided that\n[d]uring the term of this Lease, Landlord [Morgan Motors] shall be responsible for maintenance of the roof and structure of the building and for replacements of heating and air-conditioning equipment and facilities. Tenant [Pontiac Pointe] shall be responsible for all other maintenance and replacements, which do not result by fire or other casualty, and for all normal and routine maintenance, cleaning and repairs to the building, doors, windows and plumbing, air-conditioning and heating and mechanical systems. Tenant shall keep the leased premises in a neat, clean and businesslike condition.\nIn December 2004, Pontiac Pointe began operating a restaurant at the old dealership building. Plaintiff continued in his roles with Morgan Motors while also acting as the financial manager of Pontiac Pointe. Plaintiff would usually go to Pontiac Pointe each morning to pick up the restaurant\u2019s receipts and reports and then make a deposit at the bank.\nOn 15 January 2008, Plaintiff drove from Morgan Motors to the bank. He then went to Pontiac Pointe to retrieve its cash receipts and daily reports. Plaintiff testified that as he was speaking with Jay Koral, the restaurant\u2019s general manager, he heard a noise that sounded like \u201ca bearing that was going bad\u201d in the air-conditioning unit on the roof. Plaintiff explained that after they \u201chad an experience of already replacing part of that unit up there, [he] thought [he] needed to look at it and try to determine whether we needed somebody to come look at the system or not....\u201d Plaintiff accessed the roof via an internal ladder. He was found shortly thereafter lying on the ground in the back patio area of the restaurant. Plaintiff did not remember falling but did testify that there was black ice on the roof. Plaintiff suffered a C7 spinal cord injury, leaving him paralyzed from the waist down. He also broke his collarbone and several ribs and had to have his spleen removed.\nDefendants Morgan Motors and Brentwood Services, Inc., the third-party administrator for the North Carolina Auto Dealers Association Self-Insurer\u2019s Fund, denied Plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim on the basis that his injury did not arise out of \u2014 or occur in the course of \u2014 Plaintiff\u2019s employment with Morgan Motors. The matter was heard by Deputy Commissioner George T. Glenn, II on 7 March 2011 and 23 May 2011. Deputy Commissioner Glenn filed an opinion and award on 23 January 2012 finding that Plaintiff \u201csustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with Employer Defendant [Morgan Motors].\u201d He determined that Plaintiff was therefore entitled to medical expenses, attendant care expenses, and compensation in the amount of $786.00 per week until further order or until Plaintiff returned to suitable employment at his pre-injury average weekly wage.\nDefendants appealed to the Full Commission. On 27 August 2012, the Full Commission issued an opinion reversing Deputy Commissioner Glenn\u2019s opinion and award, concluding that Plaintiff\u2019s injury did not arise out of, or occur within the course and scope of, his employment with Morgan Motors. Plaintiff gave timely notice of appeal to this Court.\nAnalysis\nOur review of an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission is \u201climited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 582, 584 (2008). With regard to review of the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, this Court\u2019s \u201cduty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding[s].\u201d Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence even if there is also evidence that would support a contrary finding. Nale v. Ethan Allen, 199 N.C. App. 511, 514, 682 S.E.2d 231, 234, disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 745, 688 S.E.2d 454 (2009). The Commission\u2019s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Gregory v. W.A. Brown & Sons, 212 N.C. App. 287, 295, 713 S.E.2d 68, 74, disc. review denied, _ N.C. _, 719 S.E.2d 26 (2011).\nI. \u201cArising Out Of\u201d and \u201cIn The Course Of\u201d Elements\n\u201cUnder the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, an injury is compensable only if it is the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.\u201d Chavis v. TLC Home Health Care, 172 N.C. App. 366, 370, 616 S.E.2d 403, 408 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 288, 627 S.E.2d 464 (2006). \u201cThe phrases \u2018arising out of\u2019 and \u2018in the course of\u2019 one\u2019s employment are not synonymous but rather are two separate and distinct elements [,] both of which a claimant must prove to bring a case within the Act.\u201d Gallimore v. Marilyn\u2019s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977).\n\u201cArising out of employment relates to the origin or cause of the accident.\u201d Hedges v. Wake Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 206 N.C. App. 732, 735, 699 S.E.2d 124, 126 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, _ N.C. _, 705 S.E.2d 746 (2011). \u201cThe controlling test of whether an injury arises out of the employment is whether the injury is a natural and probable consequence of the nature of the employment.\u201d Dildy v. MBW Inv., Inc., 152 N.C. App. 65, 69, 566 S.E.2d 759, 763 (2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cIn other words, the employment must be a contributing cause or bear a reasonable relationship to the employee\u2019s injuries.\u201d Rivera v. Trapp, 135 N.C. App. 296, 301, 519 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1999). Thus, an injury is compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act if \u201cit is fairly traceable to the employment or any reasonable relationship to the employment exists.\u201d Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).\n\u201cThe words \u2018in the course of\u2019 refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which an accident occurred. The accident must occur during the period and place of employment.\u201d Chavis, 172 N.C. App. at 370, 616 S.E.2d at 408 (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cAn employee is injured in the course of his employment when the injury occurs \u2018under circumstances in which the employee is engaged in an activity which he is authorized to undertake and which is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer\u2019s business.\u2019 \u201d Shaw v. Smith & Jennings, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 442, 446, 503 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1998) (quoting Powers v. Lady\u2019s Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 730, 295 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1982)).\nIn discussing the respective roles of the Industrial Commission and a reviewing court, our Supreme Court has made clear that\n(1) the Full Commission is sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and (2) appellate courts reviewing Commission decisions are limited to reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\nDeese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). When making determinations of credibility, the Industrial Commission is not obligated to explain why it deemed certain evidence credible or not credible. Id. This is so because\n[Requiring the Commission to explain its credibility determinations and allowing the Court of Appeals to review the Commission\u2019s explanation of those credibility determinations would be inconsistent with our legal system\u2019s tradition of not requiring the fact finder to explain why he or she believes one witness over another' or believes one piece of evidence is more credible than another.\nId.\nIn its Opinion and Award, the Full Commission based its conclusion that Plaintiff\u2019s injury was not compensable on the following findings of fact:\n11. Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, Pontiac Pointe was to pay $13,000 per month in rent to the dealership. The rent amount was based on the $1.3 million loan that the dealership incurred to refurbish the 304 East Main Building. Pontiac Pointe never paid any rent money to Morgan Motors during the entire time it leased the premises.\n12. The lease between the restaurant and dealership also provided the following in Paragraph 6:\nMaintenance, Repairs, and Replacements. During the term of this lease, Landlord shall be responsible for maintenance of the roof and structure of the building and for replacements of heating and air-conditioning equipment and facilities. Tenant shall be responsible for all other maintenance and replacements, which do not result by fire or other casualty, and for all normal and routine maintenance, cleaning and repairs to the building, doors, windows and plumbing, air-conditioning and heating and mechanical systems. Tenant[] shall keep the leased premises in a neat, clean and business like condition.\n14. In addition to being part owner of the restaurant, plaintiff served as the financial manager of the restaurant, with tasks consisting of paying bills, keeping the financial books, and doing payroll. Plaintiff was in charge of supervising the operation of the restaurant, including the hiring and supervision of the General Manager, Jay Koral, hired to manage and handle the day-to-day affairs of the restaurant. Mr. Koral had contact with plaintiff on a daily basis pertaining to the restaurant\u2019s finances and operations, and plaintiff would usually eat dinner at the restaurant on Wednesday, Friday and Saturday nights.\n15. Plaintiffs brothers, including Terry [Robert T. Morgan], majority co-owner of the dealership, had no input with regard to the renovations of [the] 304 East Main building and had no financial or managerial involvement with Pontiac Pointe. Plaintiffs brothers did not perform any maintenance at the restaurant nor were they ever asked to help with any maintenance or repairs or asked to inspect anything at Pontiac Pointe.\n16. Pursuant to the lease agreement, Pontiac Pointe paid for maintenance and repairs, including maintenance and repair to the HVAC system. On occasion, employees of Pontiac Pointe would attempt to maintain or repair equipment at Pontiac Pointe \u201cin house\u201d prior to contacting outside contractors.\n17. Pontiac Pointe\u2019s responsibility for the maintenance and repair of all of the equipment at 304 East Main Street is corroborated by the financial records documenting payments made by Pontiac Pointe for routine maintenance contracts, repairs and maintenance to the HVAC system, plumbing, and mechanical systems.\n18. No dealership operations occurred at the 304 East Main Street property following the move to Highway 52 in 1992. Morgan Motors hired no employees to provide any maintenance work or inspections at Pontiac Pointe or to assist in the restaurant operations. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence of record, the Full Commission finds that Pontiac Pointe and Morgan Motors were two entirely separate entities.\n19. Pontiac Pointe obtained a separate workers\u2019 compensation policy for Pontiac Pointe through Travelers. Plaintiff excluded himself from coverage under the restaurant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation policy with Travelers.\n20. Plaintiffs usual practice was to go to Pontiac Pointe first thing every morning to pick up the previous day\u2019s receipts and reports and then make a deposit. While picking up the receipts and reports, plaintiff would discuss the restaurant operations with the restaurant General Manager, Jay Koral. On January 15, 2008, plaintiff first went by Morgan Motors to get money out of the safe and then made a deposit at the Bank of Stanley. Plaintiff then performed Ms usual routme of going to Pontiac Pomte to pick up the previous night\u2019s receipts and operatmg report.\n21. On January 15, 2008, plaintiff arrived at Pontiac Pointe at approximately 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and met with the restaurant\u2019s General Manager, Jay Koral, m the third floor office to discuss the previous night\u2019s specials at the restaurant and whether the specials had sold. In addition, plaintiff was obtaining financial information about Pontiac Pomte\u2019s previous mght\u2019s operations.\n22. While speaking with Jay Koral in the restaurant\u2019s third floor office, plaintiff stated that he heard a noise on the roof. Mr. Koral testified at his deposition that he did not hear any noise.\n23. Plaintiff testified that he went up on the roof because he was concerned that a \u201cbearing\u201d might be going bad; however, plaintiff had no general mechanical trainmg or specific trainmg m the repair or mamtenance of HVAC systems, admitted that he did not know the source of the alleged noise, no noise was heard by Mr. Koral at all, although he was standing next to the plamtiff, and no subsequent repairs or maintenance were done on the HVAC system.\n27. Following plaintiff\u2019s accident, neither Morgan Motors Company nor the new dealersMp owner had to repair or replace any part of the heating or air conditiomng equipment at the restaurant, nor were there any problems with the HVAC system when the Pontiac Pomte building was eventually sold.\n28. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence of record, the Full Commission finds that plaintiff was acting solely on behalf of and for the benefit of Pontiac Pointe as the owner of Pontiac Pomte at all times relevant to this action. The Full Commission further finds that plamtiff\u2019s decision to go on the roof of 304 East Main Street was not in furtherance or related in any way to his employment with Morgan Motors. The Full Commission finds plaintiff\u2019s contention that Ms intent was to benefit Morgan Motors, not credible.\n29. Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiffs contention that he was worried about a \u201cbearing going bad\u201d or some other problem with the HVAC system is deemed credible, there was still no benefit to Morgan Motors, since the obligation for repair and maintenance of the HVAC system was the responsibility of Pontiac Pointe per the lease. Any alleged benefit which plaintiff now contends was conferred upon Morgan Motors is speculative at best and is not credible based upon the following facts: plaintiff excluded himself from the workers\u2019 compensation coverage for Pontiac Pointe through Travelers, plaintiff has an incentive for now contending that his actions were on behalf of Morgan Motors and not Pontiac Pointe, and since Pontiac Pointe paid no rent to Morgan Motors despite the $1.3 million loan liability the dealership incurred.\n31. Based on a preponderance of the evidence of record, the Full Commission finds that plaintiff\u2019s action in going up on the roof of 304 East Main Street had no reasonable relationship to his employment with Morgan Motors. Plaintiff did not know the source of the noise, the noise was not heard by Jay Koral standing next to the plaintiff, plaintiff had no intention of replacing the HVAC system, and no repairs or maintenance needed to be done to the HVAC system following the accident on January 15, 2008.\n32. Based upon the lease provisions and the pattern and practice of Pontiac Pointe, plaintiff had no legal obligation to go up on the roof on behalf of Morgan Motors on January 15, 2008.\n33. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence of record, the Full Commission finds that plaintiff was at Pontiac Pointe on the morning of January 15, 2008 for the sole purpose of conducting Pontiac Pointe financial operations and he was there solely in his role as the owner/financial manager of Pontiac Pointe. At no point during his decision to go up on the roof did plaintiff deviate from his role as the owner/financial manager of Pontiac Pointe and plaintiff\u2019s contention that he was going up on the roof on behalf of Morgan Motors is not credible.\n34. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence of record, the Full Commission finds that plaintiff\u2019s fall on January 15, 2008 did not arise out of his employment with Morgan Motors.\n35. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence of record, the Full Commission further finds that plaintiff\u2019s fall on January 15,2008 did not occur in the course of his employment with Morgan Motors.\nThus, the Commission\u2019s ultimate determination that Plaintiff\u2019s injury was not compensable rested on its findings that the accident neither arose out of, nor occurred in the course of, his employment with Morgan Motors. In analyzing the \u201carising out of\u2019 element, the Commission found that Plaintiff\u2019s accident \u201cwas not a natural or probable consequence of his employment with Morgan Motors\u201d because his act of climbing up to the roof was not \u201ccausally related to his duties with Morgan Motors, but was instead directly related to his ownership and management of Pontiac Pointe.\u201d See Mintz v. Verizon Wireless, _ N.C. App. _, _, 735 S.E.2d 217, 221 (2012) (\u201c[A]n injury arises out of the employment when it is a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment and a natural result of one of its risks, so that there is some causal relation between the injury and the performance of some service of the employment.\u201d) (citation and quotation marks omitted)).\nSpecifically, the Commission relied upon Pontiac Pointe\u2019s and Morgan Motors\u2019 respective obligations under the lease, finding that (1) Pontiac Pointe was responsible for maintenance or repairs to the HVAC system; (2) Pontiac Pointe employees would, on occasion, attempt to repair HVAC equipment themselves before contacting an outside contractor; and (3) the financial records documenting the past practices of Pontiac Pointe and Morgan Motors were consistent with the obligations of both parties as spelled out in the lease. The Commission thus concluded that Plaintiff\u2019s actions leading up to his accident did not arise out of his employment with Morgan Motors because he was not under an obligation to check the HVAC system on behalf of Morgan Motors and his actions were instead solely for the benefit of, and on behalf of, Pontiac Pointe.\nSimilarly, the Commission concluded that Plaintiff\u2019s injury did not occur in the course of his employment with Morgan Motors because Plaintiff\nwas at the restaurant at a time he would normally be at the restaurant performing his duties as the owner/financial manager of the restaurant. Plaintiff\u2019s duties with Morgan Motors did not take him to the restaurant for anything on the day of the accident [and] Plaintiff was not engaged in any activity that he was authorized to undertake for Morgan Motors pursuant to the lease at the time of the accident.\nSee Powers, 306 N.C. at 730, 295 S.E.2d at 475 (\u201cA claimant is injured in the course of employment when the injury occurs during the period of employment at a place where an employee\u2019s duties are calculated to take him, and under circumstances in which the employee is engaged in an activity which he is authorized to undertake and which is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer\u2019s business.\u201d).\nThe Commission based its conclusion that Plaintiff\u2019s accident did not occur in the course of his employment with Morgan Motors on its findings that (1) on the morning of the accident, Plaintiff was at the old dealership building for the purpose of conducting his business as the financial manager of Pontiac Pointe (and not pursuant to any duties he had as an employee of Morgan Motors); (2) he was at the building during the time of day that he typically conducted his business as owner and financial manager of Pontiac Pointe; and (3) his action of climbing up to the roof was not authorized by or undertaken to benefit Morgan Motors.\nWhile Plaintiff testified that he climbed up on the roof out of a concern that a bearing.in the air conditioning unit was \u201cgoing bad\u201d (thereby potentially implicating Morgan Motors\u2019 obligation under the lease to replace heating and air conditioning equipment), the Commission specifically found that his testimony on this issue lacked credibility. The Commission also found that he had no general mechanical training or knowledge; \u201cthat he did not know the source of the alleged noise;\u201d and that Koral did not hear any noise at all. The Commission further determined that Plaintiff\u2019s \u201ccontention that his intent was to benefit Morgan Motors [was] not credible\u201d and that any alleged benefit that Plaintiff \u201cnow contends was conferred upon Morgan Motors is speculative at best____\u201d These credibility determinations by the Commission are not reviewable on appeal. See Seay v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 N.C. App. 432, 434, 637 S.E.2d 299, 301 (2006) (\u201cThis Court may not weigh the evidence or make determinations regarding the credibility of the witnesses.\u201d).\nPlaintiff concedes that the Commission found his testimony that \u201chis intent was to benefit Morgan Motors [was] not credible.\u201d However, he argues that its findings relating to his decision to climb up to the roof were erroneous because, in making them, the Commission failed to take into account the fact that Plaintiff was the designated \u201cpoint person\u201d authorized to address any issues regarding the conditions of the old dealership building on Morgan Motors\u2019 behalf. Plaintiff thus asserts that the Full Commission\u2019s finding that he \u201cwas acting solely on behalf of and for the benefit of Pontiac Pointe as the owner of Pontiac Pointe at all times relevant to this action\u201d is erroneous. In making this contention, he argues that his actions leading up to the accident could have benefitted Pontiac Pointe yet still constituted a compensable injury by accident because those same actions also conferred a benefit upon Morgan Motors. In support of this \u201cdual benefit\u201d argument, Plaintiff cites Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976). In Watkins, our Supreme Court affirmed the Commission\u2019s .determination that an on-duty firefighter\u2019s accident while assisting a co-worker in the maintenance of a personal automobile was compensable. Id. at 285, 225 S.E.2d at 583. The Court reasoned that\n[a]cts of an employee for the benefit of third persons generally preclude the recovery of compensation for accidental iryuries sustained during the performance of such acts, usually on the ground they are not incidental to any service which the employee is obligated to render under his contract of employment, and the injuries therefore cannot be said to arise out of and in the course of the employment.... However, where competent proof exists that the employee understood, or had reasonable grounds to believe that the act resulting in injury was incidental to his employment, or such as would prove beneficial to his employer\u2019s interests or was encouraged by the employer in the performance of the act or similar acts for the purpose of creating a feeling of good will, or authorized so to do by common practice or custom, compensation may be recovered, since then a causal connection between the employment and the accident may be established.\nId. at 283, 225 S.E.2d at 582 (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nThe Court then determined that the plaintiff\u2019s act of assisting in the maintenance of a co-worker\u2019s personal vehicle was a reasonable activity and a risk of his employment as a firefighter because (1) his superiors at the fire department had authorized the practice of making minor repairs to personal vehicles while on duty; and (2) those repairs were \u201cto an appreciable extent a benefit to the fire department\u201d because firefighters used their personal vehicles to respond to emergencies when they were called in from off duty. Id. at 284, 225 S.E.2d at 582.\nWe believe the present case is readily distinguishable from Watkins. Unlike in Watkins, Plaintiff here failed to show that his actions leading up to the accident were authorized by Morgan Motors. Moreover, competent evidence supported the Commission\u2019s finding that any benefit accruing to Morgan Motors from Plaintiff\u2019s actions was \u201ctenuous, immeasurable, speculative, and remote.\u201d\nIn asserting that he was authorized by Morgan Motors to inspect the HVAC system and that the Commission erred by failing to make findings regarding his role as the \u201cpoint person\u201d for Morgan Motors in this regard, Plaintiff relies heavily on a brief portion of his brother\u2019s testimony. When asked on direct examination if he [Robert T. Morgan] had ever completed any maintenance or repairs at the old dealership building after Pontiac Pointe began leasing the property, his brother replied: \u201cI really didn\u2019t have hardly anything to do with Pontiac Point[e], David did most of that because he was down there approximately every day.\u201d Plaintiff contends that this testimony affirmatively established that he \u201cwas authorized [by Morgan Motors] to undertake the activity he was undertaking when his accident occurred and that his co-majority owner in fact relied upon him to do so.\u201d We believe, however, that the brief testimony of Plaintiff\u2019s brother on this point fell well short of compelling a finding by the Full Commission that Plaintiff was authorized by Morgan Motors to take these actions or that he was acting for the benefit of Morgan Motors at the time of the accident.\nIn a workers\u2019 compensation action, the plaintiff \u201chas the burden to prove each element of compensability.\u201d Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 234, 581 S.E.2d 750, 754 (2003). Plaintiff simply failed to offer evidence requiring the Commission to find that (1) his job duties with Morgan Motors included inspecting the HVAC system for potential malfunctions; (2) he was authorized by Morgan Motors to undertake these actions; (3) his accident was a result of a risk inherent in his employment with Morgan Motors; or (4) he was acting on behalf, or for the benefit, of Morgan Motors at the time of the accident. Given that it was Plaintiff\u2019s burden to produce such evidence and he failed to meet this burden, we cannot say that the Commission erred in its determination that Plaintiff\u2019s accident neither arose out of nor occurred in the course of his employment with Morgan Motors.\nIn reaching a contrary conclusion, the dissent goes beyond the scope of appellate review applicable in workers\u2019 compensation cases. Our Supreme Court has made clear that when reviewing an opinion and award from the Industrial Commission, an appellate court \u201cdoes not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight.\u201d Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Our review is purely \u201climited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Richardson, 362 N.C. at 660, 669 S.E.2d at 584.\nThus, while the dissent discusses the doctrine of joint employment \u2014 which provides that two employers may be jointly liable for workers\u2019 compensation benefits to the same employee if he is simultaneously performing services for both at the time of his injury by accident \u2014 such an analysis is inapplicable here based on the findings of fact of the Industrial Commission. Where \u2014 as here \u2014 there is competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and those factual findings support its conclusions of law, our review is at an end. See Johnson v. S. Tire Sales & Serv., 358 N.C. 701, 705, 599 S.E.2d 508, 512 (2004) (\u201cThe Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence even though evidence exists that would support a contrary finding.\u201d) (citation and quotation marks omitted)).\nWe \u201care not at liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set aside the findings of the Commission, simply because other inferences could have been drawn and different conclusions might have been reached.\u201d Hill v. Hanes Corp., 319 N.C. 167, 172, 353 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1987) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The dissent relies on the notions that Morgan Motors had an interest in \u201ckeeping tabs\u201d on the HVAC unit and a \u201cneed to make regular determinations regarding the condition of its investment\u201d to support its conclusion that Plaintiff\u2019s actions provided an \u201cappreciable benefit\u201d to Morgan Motors, but these findings simply were not made by the Commission.\nIn short, the dissent reaches a result based on findings the Industrial Commission could have conceivably made but did not actually make. Such an analysis is inconsistent with our standard of review in workers\u2019 compensation cases. Because the result the Commission reached is supported by findings of fact that are supported by competent evidence of record, our analysis must end there.\nThe dissent does not deny the existence of competent evidence in the record to support all of the findings of fact made by the Commission. Nor does it explain why these findings do not support the Commission\u2019s legal conclusions. Instead, the dissent \u2014 in essence \u2014 is claiming that the facts of this case could have supported a different conclusion. The dissent asserts that the Commission\u2019s findings axe not \u201cdeterminative\u201d or \u201cdispositive\u201d on the issue of Morgan Motors\u2019 liability. However, the correct standard is merely whether the Commission\u2019s factual findings support its conclusions \u2014 not whether other conclusions could have possibly been drawn. See Rose v. City of Rocky Mount, 180 N.C. App. 392, 400, 637 S.E.2d 251, 257 (2006) (\u201cWe may not substitute our own judgment for that of the Commission, even though the evidence might rationally justify reaching a different conclusion.\u201d) (citation and quotation marks omitted)), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 356, 644 S.E.2d 232 (2007).\nII. Findings of Fact 23 and 27\nIn addition to those findings of the Commission addressed in his primary argument on appeal, Plaintiff also contends that findings 23 and 27 are not supported by competent evidence and, therefore, do not support the Commission\u2019s ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff\u2019s injury was not compensable. In making this argument, he focuses on the specific portions of those findings referencing the absence of subsequent repairs or maintenance to the HVAC system following the accident.\nDuring the hearing before the deputy commissioner, Robert T. Morgan testified that he was not aware of any replacements of HVAC equipment after Plaintiffs injury. When asked if \u201c[a]s part of the foreclosure process, was Morgan Motors asked to replace any equipment on top of the roof?,\u201d he replied: \u201cNot that I know of.\u201d We conclude that this testimony constituted competent evidence upon which the Commission could base its findings that no subsequent replacements or repairs to the HVAC system occurred in the aftermath of Plaintiffs injury or when the building was ultimately sold.\nFurthermore, even assuming arguendo that these findings were unsupported by any competent evidence of record or that the existence (or nonexistence) of post-accident repairs or maintenance lacked relevance to the question of whether Plaintiff\u2019s injury was compensable, we believe the remaining findings by the Commission \u2014 as discussed in detail above \u2014 adequately support its ultimate conclusion. See Meares v. Dana Corp., 193 N.C. App. 86, 89-90, 666 S.E.2d 819, 823 (2008) (\u201cWhere there are sufficient findings of fact based on competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law, the award will not be disturbed because of other erroneous findings which do not affect the conclusions.\u201d) (citation, quotation marks, and alterations omitted)), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 129, 673 S.E.2d 359 (2009).\nIII. Interpretation of the Lease\nPlaintiff also asserts that the Commission erred by failing to make an explicit finding as to whether Paragraph 6 of the lease between Morgan Motors and Pontiac Pointe was ambiguous. Our review of the Commission\u2019s findings lead us to conclude that it determined the lease provision was unambiguous \u2014 that is, Pontiac Pointe was to pay for maintenance and repairs of the HVAC system while Morgan Motors was to pay for the replacement of HVAC system equipment. \u201cWhen the parties use clear and unambiguous terms, the contract should be given its plain meaning, and the court can determine the parties\u2019 intent as a matter of law.\u201d 42 East, LLC v. D.R. Horton, Inc., _ N.C. App. _, _, 722 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In our view, the plain language of Paragraph 6 of the lease makes clear the respective obligations of the parties regarding the HVAC system. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission did not err in its findings regarding the parties\u2019 duties based on the lease. Nor did it err in failing to make a finding expressly determining Paragraph 6 to be unambiguous.\nIV. Morgan Motors\u2019 Offers of Proof\nFinally, Plaintiff asserts that the Full Commission erred by failing to make express findings regarding various offers of proof made by Morgan Motors during the hearing before the deputy commissioner. As there is no evidence that these offers of proof formed the basis for the Full Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award, we will not assume that the Commission relied upon this evidence in reaching its conclusions. See McKyer v. McKyer, 182 N.C. App. 456, 463, 642 S.E.2d 527, 532 (2007) (\u201cAn appellate court is not required to, and should not, assume error by the trial [tribunal] when none appears on the record before the appellate court.\u201d) (citation and quotation marks omitted)). This argument is accordingly overruled.\nConclusion\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the Opinion and Award of the Full Commission.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudge CALABRIA concurs.\n. Plaintiff also argues that the Commission erred by failing to take into account Morgan Motors\u2019 admission that it paid a 2005 bill for a new compressor in the HVAC system. As the payment was for the replacement of the compressor, however, this evidence simply corroborates the fact that the parties acted in accordance with their understanding of the unambiguous obligation of Morgan Motors under Paragraph 6 of the lease to replace HVAC equipment.", "type": "majority", "author": "DAVIS, Judge." }, { "text": "DILLON, Judge,\ndissenting.\nWhile I believe the Commission\u2019s findings support a conclusion that Pontiac Pointe may be liable for Plaintiffs injuries, I also believe that these same findings compel a conclusion that Morgan Motors is also liable. I do not believe that the Commission made any findings which compel its conclusion that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving that the accident \u201carose out of his employment with Morgan Motors [or that it] occurred during the course and scope of his employment with Morgan Motors.\u201d Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\nWhile it has been said that a person cannot serve two masters, this is not the rule when determining liability for workers\u2019 compensation coverage under North Carolina law. Rather, our courts have recognized that there may be situations where an employee sustains an injury while in the service of two different employers. Specifically, our Court has stated as follows:\nJoint employment . . . occurs when \u2018a single employee, under contract with two employers, and under the simultaneous control of both, simultaneously performs services for both employers, and when the service for each employer is the same as, or is closely related to, that for the other. In such a case, both employers are liable for workman\u2019s compensation.\nAnderson v. Texas Gulf, Inc., 83 N.C. App. 634, 636, 351 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1986) (quoting 1C, Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation \u00a7 48.40). Our Supreme Court has held that where two employers are hable for an employee\u2019s injuries, the employee \u201cha[s] the right to proceed\u201d against either employee or against both. Leggette v. McCotter, 265 N.C. 617, 623, 144 S.E.2d 849, 853 (1965); see also Hughart v. Dasco Transportation, Inc., 167 N.C. App. 685, 691, 606 S.E.2d 379, 383 (2005) (recognizing the concept of \u201cjoint employment\u201d where the employee has a contract, whether \u201cexpress or implied\u201d with each employer); Henderson v. Manpower, 70 N.C. App. 408, 415, 319 S.E.2d 690, 694 (1984) (holding that each employer is \u201chable equally\u201d in compensating the employee for a work-related injury).\nOur Supreme Court has stated that the \u201ccompensability of a claim basically turns upon whether or not the employee was acting for the benefit of his employer \u2018to any appreciable extent\u2019 when the accident occurred.\u201d Hoffman v. Truck Lines, Inc., 306 N.C. 502, 506, 293 S.E.2d 807, 809 (1982) (citation omitted). In this case, I believe that the Plaintiffs action to determine the source of a noise on the roof where the HVAC system was located - a system which his employer Morgan Motors owned - benefited Morgan Motors to some \u201cappreciable extent\u201d; and, accordingly, I believe that Morgan Motors is hable for Plaintiffs injuries sustained when he fell off the roof. Specifically, the Commission found that Morgan Motors owned the building where the accident occurred; that Morgan Motors borrowed $1.3 million to renovate the building; that Morgan Motors leased the renovated building to Pontiac Pointe for $13,000.00 per month; that Pontiac Pointe never actually paid any of the rent due under the lease; that under the lease, Morgan Motors was responsible for \u201creplacements of [HVAC] equipment\u201d and Pontiac Pointe was responsible for \u201call normal and routine maintenance [to the HVAC system] \u201d; that Plaintiff was an employee of both Morgan Motors and Pontiac Pointe; that Plaintiff was the only owner of Morgan Motors who was involved with the renovations of the building; and that Morgan Motors had no other employees whose responsibility was to oversee the condition of the building. Further, the Full Commission found that, on the day of the accident, Plaintiff heard a noise on the roof but he \u201cdid not know the source of the noise\u201d; that Plaintiff climbed on the roof with a wrench; and that Plaintiff slipped from the roof and sustained injuries.\nThe Full Commission made a number of findings which, Defendants argue, support the conclusion that Morgan Motors was not liable for Plaintiff\u2019s injuries when he decided to climb on the roof. However, I do not believe that any of these findings compel a conclusion that Morgan Motors is not liable in this case. For instance, the Full Commission found that \u201c[P]laintiff\u2019s contention that his intent was to benefit Morgan Motors [is] not credible.\u201d I do not believe, though, that Plaintiff\u2019s \u201cintent\u201d is dispositive on the issue of Morgan Motors\u2019 liability. In other words, I believe that under North Carolina law, Morgan Motors can still be found liable as Plaintiff\u2019s employer for Plaintiff\u2019s injuries even though Plaintiff had no specific intent to benefit Morgan Motors when he climbed on the roof to investigate the noise. Our Supreme Court has held that coverage may be found even where an employee\u2019s intent is to benefit a third party as long as \u201cthe acts benefit the employer to an appreciable extent\u201d. Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 321 N.C. 350, 355, 364 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1988) (citation omitted). Accordingly, even though the Commission failed to find that Plaintiff intended to benefit Morgan Motors, Morgan Motors may still be held hable since Plaintiffs actions, in attempting to determine the source of the noise on the roof where the HVAC was located, would have some \u201cappreciable\u201d benefit to Morgan Motors as the owner of the building.\nFurther, I do not believe that the Full Commission\u2019s finding - that Plaintiff was at the building on the day of the accident \u201cfor the sole purpose of conducting [work for Pontiac Pointe and that] his decision to go up on the roof [did not] deviate from his role as the owner/financial manager of Pontiac Pointe\u201d - is dispositive on the issue of Morgan Motors\u2019 liability. Rather, I believe this finding only supports a determination that Pontiac Pointe may also be liable to Plaintiff for his injuries. I agree with the Commission that Plaintiff was acting for the sole benefit of Pontiac Pointe - and thereby deviated from his employment with Morgan Motors - when he traveled to the building to meet with the restaurant manager about the financial performance of the restaurant. However, I believe this deviation from his employment with Morgan Motors ceased when he made the decision to climb on the roof to determine the source of the noise, notwithstanding that this decision might not have been a deviation from his employment with Pontiac Pointe, because this decision conferred an \u201cappreciable\u201d benefit on both his employers: Both had an interest in the maintenance of the building and the HVAC system. See Jackson v. Dairymen\u2019s Creamery, 202 N.C. 196, 162 S.E. 359 (1932) (holding that an employee who has deviated from his employment is covered for injuries occurring after he returns to work).\nAlso, I do not believe the Full Commission\u2019s determination that Morgan Motors had no \u201clegal obligation\u201d under its lease to send an employee onto the roof to determine the nature of the noise is determinative of Morgan Motors\u2019 liability for Plaintiff\u2019s accident. In other words, even if Morgan Motors had no such \u201clegal obligation\u201d under its lease agreement, Morgan Motors still had a significant interest as the building\u2019s owner to make sure that its new HVAC system was being properly maintained by its tenant. See Hoffman, 306 N.C. at 507-08, 293 S.E.2d at 810 (stating that \u201can employer would not be permitted to escape his liability or obligations under the [Workers\u2019 Compensation] Act through the use of a special contract or agreement if the elements required for coverage of the injured individual would otherwise exist\u201d). Even if the potential replacement of the HVAC system was merely \u201cspeculative and remote,\u201d as found by the Commission, Morgan Motors still had a significant interest, as the owner of the HVAC system and building, in \u201ckeeping tabs\u201d on the condition of its $1.3 million investment, notwithstanding any obligation of its tenant to maintain this investment in good repair. Morgan Motors\u2019 need to make regular determinations regarding the condition of its investment is bolstered by the Full Commission\u2019s finding that Morgan Motors\u2019 tenant was not meeting its financial obligation to pay rent.\nFinally, I do not believe that the Full Commission\u2019s determination that Plaintiff\u2019s activity was not \u201cauthorized\u201d by Morgan Motors is relevant as to Morgan Motors\u2019 liability based on the evidence in this case. There is nothing in the evidence nor did the Commission make any finding to suggest that Plaintiff was expressly prohibited by anyone at Morgan Motors from climbing onto the roof of the building to make an inspection. Rather, the findings by the Full Commission suggest that Plaintiff was the only employee of Morgan Motors who had any involvement with the building. This Court has held as follows:\n[I]f an employee does something which he is not specifically ordered to do by a then present superior and the thing he does furthers the business of the employer although it is not part of the employee\u2019s job, an injury sustained by accident while he is so performing is in the course of employment. This has been characterized as \u201cbeing about his work.\u201d\nParker v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 517, 519-20, 337 S.E.2d 589, 591 (1985); see also Hensley v. Caswell Action Committee, 296 N.C. 527, 531, 259 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1978) (holding that coverage exists where an employee\u2019s actions, though not expressly authorized, are \u201cnot so extreme as to break the causal connection between his employment and his [injury]\u201d).\nIn conclusion, I believe that the actions of Plaintiff as found by the Commission - that Plaintiff climbed onto the roof of the building to determine the source of a noise coming from the HVAC system owned by and paid for by Morgan Motors - served to benefit Morgan Motors to some \u201cappreciable extent,\u201d and that, therefore, these findings do not support a conclusion that Morgan Motors is not liable for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff, notwithstanding that Pontiac Pointe may also be liable for those injuries.\n. Though not included in the findings by the Full Commission, the Deputy Commissioner found - and the evidence is uncontradicted - that over $100,000.00 of the loan proceeds funded spent a new HVAC system for the building.", "type": "dissent", "author": "DILLON, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Poisson, Poisson & Bower, PLLC, by E. Stewart Poisson and.Fred D. Poisson, Jr, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Bruce A. Hamilton and Carla M. Cobb, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAVID M. MORGAN, Employee, Plaintiff v. MORGAN MOTOR COMPANY OF ALBEMARLE, Employer, and BRENTWOOD SERVICES, INC., Servicing Agent for the North Carolina Auto Dealers Association Self-Insurer\u2019s Fund, Defendants\nNo. COA12-1485\nFiled 17 December 2013\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 injury by accident \u2014 arising out of employment \u2014 occurred in the course of employment \u2014 sufficient findings \u2014 supported by the evidence\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by denying plaintiff\u2019s claim for benefits. The Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s accident did not arise out of, or occur in the course of, his employment with defendant employer was supported by findings of fact that were supported by competent evidence of record.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 injury by accident \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 supported by the evidence\nThe Industrial Commission\u2019s challenged finding of fact in a workers\u2019 compensation case were supported by competent evidence and supported the Commission\u2019s ultimate conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s injury was not compensable.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 duties based on lease \u2014 unambiguous\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case in its findings regarding the parties\u2019 duties based on a lease or fail to make a finding expressly determining Paragraph 6 of the lease to be unambiguous.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 offers of proof\u2014 not basis of award\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by failing to make express findings regarding various offers of proof during the hearing before the deputy commissioner. There was no evidence that these offers of proof formed the basis for the Full Commission\u2019s opinion and award.\nJudge DILLON dissenting.\nAppeal by plaintiff from opinion and award entered 27 August 2012 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2013.\nPoisson, Poisson & Bower, PLLC, by E. Stewart Poisson and.Fred D. Poisson, Jr, for plaintiff-appellant.\nTeague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Bruce A. Hamilton and Carla M. Cobb, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0377-01", "first_page_order": 387, "last_page_order": 406 }