{ "id": 6788326, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD COLT ROLLINS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Rollins", "decision_date": "2013-12-17", "docket_number": "No. COA13-362", "first_page": "451", "last_page": "461", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 N.C. App. 451" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "467 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193857 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 911", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631506 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631503, 12631504, 12631506, 12631507, 12631508, 12631511, 12631512, 12631517 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0910-03", "/se2d/599/0910-01", "/se2d/599/0911-01", "/se2d/599/0914-01", "/se2d/599/0915-03", "/se2d/599/0916-02", "/se2d/599/0916-01", "/se2d/600/0852-02" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "\"Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3821987 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "\"Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/210/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8917839 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S.E.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623503 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170693 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554748 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-166", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "704 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. App. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4180720 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/208/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "729 S.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75-76" }, { "parenthetical": "'Rollins I\"" }, { "page": "76" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "77-79" }, { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193857 ], "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0039-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 847, "char_count": 23043, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.24270015130462e-08, "percentile": 0.3858692147688919 }, "sha256": "ab2238a034e9cd8f799093c0c756d5f3e1381e632880e69def361fea562f0296", "simhash": "1:9bfdd242f458af72", "word_count": 3820 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:32:40.304740+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD COLT ROLLINS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant appeals order and judgments allowing the State\u2019s motion to exclude spectators from his trial and convicting him of second degree rape, resisting public officer, breaking and/or entering, and second degree kidnapping. For the following reasons, we affirm and find no error.\nI. Background\n\u201c[Defendant was convicted of non-felonious breaking or entering, first degree kidnapping, second degree rape, and resisting a public officer.\u201d State v. Rollins, _ N.C. App. _, 729 S.E.2d 73, 75-76 (2012). The background of this case can be found in this Court\u2019s prior opinion at State v. Rollins, _ N.C. App. _, 729 S.E.2d 73 (2012) (\u2018Rollins I\u201d). In Rollins I, this Court addressed two issues on appeal, but the only one pertinent to the current appeal was the trial court\u2019s closure of the courtroom during the testimony of M.S., the complaining witness. Rollins I, _N.C. App. _, 729 S.E.2d 73. In Rollins I,\nDefendant argue [d] that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when the trial judge temporarily closed the courtroom while M.S. testified concerning the alleged rape perpetrated by defendant without engaging in the four-part test set forth in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed. 2d 31 (1984).\nId. at_, 729 S.E.2d at 76. This Court determined:\nGiven the limited closure in the present case and the fact that the trial court did not utilize the Waller four-part test, we hold that the proper remedy is to remand this case for a hearing on the propriety of the closure. The trial court must engage in the four-part Waller test and make the appropriate findings of fact regarding the necessity of closure during M.S.\u2019s testimony in an order. If the trial court determines that the trial should not have been closed during M.S.\u2019s testimony, then defendant is entitled to a new trial. If the trial court determines that the trial was properly closed during M.S.\u2019s testimony on remand, then defendant may seek review of the trial court\u2019s order by means of an appeal from the judgments that the trial court will enter on remand following the resentencing hearing as set out in the next section of this opinion.\nId. at_, 729 S.E.2d at 79.\nOn 6 September 2012, upon remand, the trial court entered an order:\n[T]he Court determines that the temporary closure of the courtroom during the testimony of the victim is necessary to provide complete, open and uninhibited testimony from the victim which is an overriding interest to the 6th Amendment rights of the Defendant, that there are no reasonable alternatives available to the Court other than to temporarily close the courtroom, that the closure was no broader than necessary to protect the overriding interest, and the above findings advance the interests of justice in this matter.\nIT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that based upon the foregoing findings of fact, and after conducting the four-part balancing test as set out in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) that the State\u2019s Motion to close the courtroom dining the testimony of the victim is hereby ALLOWED.\nOn or about this same date, the trial court entered judgments convicting defendant for second degree rape, resisting public officer, breaking and/ or entering, and second degree kidnapping. Defendant appeals.\nII. Standard of Review\nIt is well settled in this jurisdiction that when the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts. Findings of fact by the trial court in a non-jury trial have the force and effect of a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support those findings. A trial court\u2019s conclusions of law, however, are reviewable de novo.\nMecklenburg Cnty. v. Simply Fashion Stores, Ltd., 208 N.C. App. 664, 668, 704 S.E.2d 48, 52 (2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nIII. Findings of Fact\nDefendant raises several contentions regarding the findings of fact. We address each in turn.\nA. Evidence to Support Findings of Fact\nDefendant, with admittedly no legal support, contends \u201cthat the trial judge ought to place himself back at that point in time in the trial when he heard the State\u2019s initial motion, and to consider only those facts he (the trial judge) knew at the time.\u201d Essentially, defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact can be based only upon evidence presented by the State\u2019s first eight witnesses, and not on that presented by M.S. or the State\u2019s last witness, both of whom testified after the ruling on the State\u2019s motion to exclude spectators during M.S.\u2019s testimony. Defendant\u2019s argument would require that M.S. be submitted for voir dire or direct testimony in support of the State\u2019s motion, which would defeat the very purpose of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-166, since this would entail calling the very witness the statute seeks to protect to testify in an open courtroom to provide evidence to support the closure of the courtroom. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-166 (2011). Thus, in many cases, although not all, the evidence supporting the closure is likely to come from other witnesses who have knowledge of the victim\u2019s circumstances and condition and the crime.\nWe also note that in Rollins I, this Court remanded this case for the trial court to make the appropriate findings of fact; this Court did so knowing that M.S. testified only after the trial court had already allowed the State\u2019s motion for the spectators to be removed during her testimony and that some of the findings of fact for Waller might be based upon evidence presented in her testimony which occurred after the ruling upon the motion. See Rollins I at_, 729 S.E.2d at 77-79. As such, this Court essentially required the trial court to perform a retrospective analysis considering all of the evidence due to the trial court\u2019s failure to address the Waller factors specifically during the trial.\nDefendant argues that a retrospective determination of the findings of fact based upon evidence presented both before and after the State\u2019s motion is \u201cunfair.\u201d Defendant has not presented any legal authority which would prevent a retrospective analysis, and we have found none. Although we would agree that the burden is upon the State to present sufficient evidence, either in its case in chief or by voir dire, to permit the trial court to satisfy the Waller test, we specifically do not adopt any particular requirements as to how this presentation of evidence must be made, as it is not necessary under the facts before us. Although some of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact may be based upon evidence presented after the State\u2019s motion, there was evidence to support several of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact presented prior to the State\u2019s motion. Eight witnesses had testified prior to the State\u2019s motion, and below we will address the evidence from these witnesses which would support the challenged findings of fact. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact must be based solely upon the evidence presented prior to the State\u2019s motion for closure is without merit, where there was sufficient evidence to support many of the findings of fact presented prior to the State\u2019s motion.\nB. Mislabeled Findings of Fact\nDefendant further contends that findings of fact 4, 13, 14, 16, and 18 are actually conclusions of law. \u201cFindings of fact that are essentially conclusions of law will be treated as such upon review. Wachacha v. Wachacha, 38 N.C. App. 504, 248 S.E.2d 375 (1978).\u201d State v. Rogers, 52 N.C. App. 676, 681-82, 279 S.E.2d 881, 885 (1981). However, defendant\u2019s arguments do not specifically challenge these \u201cconclusions of law\u201d beyond noting that they are mislabeled.\nC. Challenged Findings of Fact\nDefendant contends that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact 7, 9, 10,11, 12, and 15 were unsupported by the evidence. We disagree. Finding of fact 7 states, \u201cThe particular circumstances of this case involved common church attendance and involvement of the victim and defendant, and includes additional issues of moral guilt imposed on the victim because of prior consensual sexual acts with Defendant^]\u201d The State\u2019s first witness, Mr. Thomas Sitter, was a fellow church member of M.S. and defendant and testified that M.S. and defendant socialized at church activities and that the church was opposed to sexual relations outside of marriage. M.S. also testified that she met defendant at church camp, saw him at church, and eventually entered into a consensual sexual relationship with defendant wherein she \u201cfelt uncomfortable with [her] convictions\u201d because \u201cit just [went] against what [she] fe [It] as far as right and wrong outside of marriage.\u201d\nDefendant also challenges finding of fact 9, which stated, \u201cThe victim intended to continue to be an active member of her Seventh Day Adventist Church[.]\u201d The evidence supports this finding also. Mr. Sitler testified that he had known M.S. as a church member for eight years at the time of the incident, indicating she had an extensive history with the church. M.S. also testified that she \u201cgrew up in this church\u201d and had been a member for approximately 15 years. M.S.\u2019s testimony indicated that her church was a large part of her past and nothing indicated that this would change.\nFinding of fact 10 stated, \u201cThere existed a particular fragile mental and emotional state of the victim due to the circumstances of the crime[.]\u201d Although we agree with defendant that evidence of the victim\u2019s condition at the time of the rape is not necessarily sufficient to support a finding as to her \u201cmental and emotional\u201d state at a trial which may occur years later, we do find it to be some relevant evidence which the trial court may properly consider. In this case, a deputy who arrived at the scene to assist M.S. testified M.S. \u201cwas shaking uncontrollably, crying, she was hysterically screaming and she was nude.\u201d The deputy had difficulty getting the pertinent facts from M.S. because\n[s]he could not calm down enough for me to be able to get that information out of her. It was extremely chaotic. Whenever she would attempt to calm down and I was trying to get her clothed and she would attempt to calm down, she would come out of the closet, she would see the bedroom and then she would again become uncontrollably shaking and crying and it was hard to console her.\nLater, when M.S.\u2019s repeated bouts of \u201csobbing\u201d remitted enough that she was able to provide more information to the deputy, she told her that prior to the incident which led to his arrest, defendant had been stalking her, was going to kill her, had tried to force himself on her, and she had once found him in the crawl space of her home. M.S.\u2019s condition at the time of the rape and defendant\u2019s pattern of behavior leading up to it could certainly affect her \u201cmental and emotional state\u201d long after the event.\nFurthermore, this type of finding of fact is one that the trial court is particularly well-qualified to make, and one that we are not well-qualified to question. The trial judge had the opportunity to observe M.S., defendant, and the other witnesses during the trial, including M.S.\u2019s demeanor during the State\u2019s evidence up to the point of the State\u2019s motion. Observations of this sort are something that cannot be captured in a written transcript but are crucial in this particular determination. Given the other findings of fact made by the trial court regarding the graphic nature of defendant\u2019s crime, M.S.\u2019s accompanying moral guilt, and the circumstances of their mutual church attendance, there was evidence upon which to base this ultimate finding of fact that M.S. was in a fragile mental and emotional state. See generally Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 472, 67 S.E.2d 639, 645 (1951) (\u201cUltimate facts are those found in that vaguely defined area lying between evidential facts on the one side and conclusions of law on ttie other. In consequence, the fine of demarcation between ultimate facts and legal conclusions is not easily drawn. An ultimate fact is the final resulting effect which is reached by processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts. Whether a statement is an ultimate fact or a conclusion of law depends upon whether it is reached by natural reasoning or by an application of fixed rules of law.\u201d (citations omitted)).\nFinding of fact 11 was that, \u201cThere were less [sic] tha[n] 6 spectators removed from the courtroom and only church members were excused, with the exception of the counselor for the victim[.]\u201d While the transcript does not reflect how many people were excluded, the trial court did discuss with counsel whether \u201csupport people\u201d for either M.S. or defendant would be permitted to remain, ultimately ruling that he would not permit anyone to remain for either side. Defendant has not directed us to any evidence that contradicts this finding of fact by the trial court. The trial court\u2019s own observations can serve as the basis of a finding of fact as to facts which are readily ascertainable by the trial court\u2019s observations of its own courtroom. See generally State v. McRae, 163 N.C. App. 359, 367, 594 S.E.2d 71, 77 (\u201c[T]he trial judge did not err in making his finding of fact no. 8 referring to his observations as judge where the reference to his observations were only used to corroborate the undisputed facts in the record.\u201d), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 358 N.C. 548, 599 S.E.2d 911 (2004). In addition, as discussed in more detail below as to finding of fact 12, the trial court would have had knowledge of the identities of those present based upon the identification of witnesses and others in the courtroom during jury selection.\nFinding of fact 12 stated, \u201cThe parties excluded by the Court had no actual knowledge of the specific acts committed by the Defendant that led to the particular charges before the Court[.]\u201d Defendant is correct that the record does not identify each person present or what knowledge each might have had, but it is apparent from the record that the trial court was aware of the general positions of those present. Although the actual voir dire of the jury was not recorded, the trial court\u2019s introduction of the case to the potential jurors and identification of potential witnesses, counsel, and members of the district attorney\u2019s office who may be present during the trial was in the record. Furthermore, the trial judge was on the bench watching the entire courtroom during jury selection, opening statements, and the first eight witnesses, so the trial court would have substantial knowledge regarding those present in the courtroom at the time the State\u2019s motion was made.\nLastly, finding of fact 15 stated, \u201cNo one from the media was present nor sought admission into the proceedings to advance an interest in being present for the testimony[.]\u201d Again, as noted above, at this point in the trial, the trial court would have been well aware of who was present in the courtroom. Certainly no media representative requested on the record to remain in the courtroom. This finding of fact was also based upon the trial Judge\u2019s observations of his own courtroom. Accordingly, we conclude that all of the challenged findings of fact were supported by competent evidence before the trial court.\nD. Waller Test\nFinally, defendant \u201ccontends that there is insufficient evidence before the trial court to support element number (1) of the Waller test[.]\u201d As defendant is actually challenging a conclusion of law, that the elements of Waller have not been met, we will address this contention below.\nIV. Trial Court\u2019s Determination\nDefendant next presents a broad argument that generally challenges the trial court\u2019s ultimate determination to exclude spectators from the courtroom. Essentially defendant requests that we reweigh the evidence before the trial court. North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 15-166 provides,\nIn the trial of cases for rape or sex offense or attempt to commit rape or attempt to commit a sex offense, the trial judge may, during the taking of the testimony of the prosecutrix, exclude from the courtroom all persons except the officers of the court, the defendant and those engaged in the trial of the case.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-166. In Rollins I, this Court stated,\nwhile N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-166 permits the trial court to close the courtroom during a rape victim\u2019s testimony, the trial court must balance the interests of the prosecutor with the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a public trial. The Supreme Court in Waller set forth the following four-part test that the trial court must engage in while balancing these competing interests: (1) the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, (2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and (4) it must make findings adequate to support the closure.\nThis Court has recognized the applicability of the Waller test when allowing a courtroom closure pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-166.\nRollins I, _ N.C. App. at _, 729 S.E.2d at 77 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The trial court found either uncontested or upon competent evidence:\n1) The testimony of the victim involved matters of personal, delicate sexual nature;\n2) The testimony of the victim involved forceful intercourse without the consent of the witness;\n3) The testimony of the victim was of a graphic sexual nature making it uncomfortable for the witness to discuss openly;\n4) The interests of justice require candid, honest and complete testimony from witnesses uninhibited by outside influences such as spectators in the courtroom;\n5) The victim is an active member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church and has been for many years;\n6) The defendant and witness met at a \u201ccamp meeting\u201d and began to know each other through a singles group at her church, the Seventh Day Adventist Church, after the defendant was released from prison and brought into the church by the church\u2019s ministry;\n7) The particular circumstances of this case involved common church attendance and involvement of the victim and defendant, and includes additional issues of moral guilt imposed on the victim because of prior consensual sexual acts with Defendant;\n8) The nature of the relationship between the defendant and witness and her efforts to end the relationship was the subject of the victim\u2019s testimony;\n9) The victim intended to continue to be an active member of her Seventh Day Adventist Church;\n10) There existed a particular fragile mental and emotional state of the victim due to the circumstances of the crime;\n11) There were less tha[n] 6 spectators removed from the courtroom and only church members were excused, with the exception of the counselor for the victim;\n12) The parties excluded by the Court had no actual knowledge of the specific acts committed by the Defendant that led to the particular charges before the Court;\n13) A chilling effect on the completeness and opened of the victim\u2019s testimony is likely to occur if she feels overly embarrassed, emotional or intimidated by the presence of fellow church members during her testimony;\n14) That in closing the courtroom, the victim will be less inhibited in testifying completely and the \u201cchilling effect\u201d will be reduced;\n15) No one from the media was present nor sought admission into the proceedings to advance an interest in being present for the testimony;\n16) The overriding interest in providing an environment for truthful testimony of the victim would be prejudiced by allowing spectators during her testimony;\n17) That, the courtroom would be closed temporarily, only during the testimony of the victim, and there are many other witnesses whose testimony is open to the public;\n18) That no reasonable alternatives to closing the courtroom during the victim\u2019s testimony exist.\n(Emphasis added.) We conclude that these uncontested findings of fact, see Peters v. Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 13, 707 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2011) (\u201cUnchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal.\u201d), along with the contested findings of fact which we have already determined were supported by competent evidence, are sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s application of the Waller test as required by this Court in Rollins I. Rollins I, _ N.C. App. at _, 729 S.E.2d at 79.\nAlthough it is possible that other findings of fact could have been made or that other conclusions could have been drawn weighing the factors more in defendant\u2019s favor does not mean that the trial court erred. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its determination that the limited removal of spectators should be permitted in this case. As such, this argument is overruled.\nV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm and find no error.\nAFFIRMED and NO ERROR.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge GEER concur.\n. As noted above, voir dire of the prosecuting witness may, in a particular case, defeat the purpose of North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 15-166, and this determination must be made on a case-by-case basis by the trial judge.\n. We again note that the courtroom was closed only for the testimony of M.S. and was open for the testimony of the other 12 witnesses and all other proceedings during the trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth J. Weese, for the State.", "Paul F. Herzog, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD COLT ROLLINS, Defendant\nNo. COA13-362\nFiled 17 December 2013\n1. Criminal Law \u2014 closure of courtroom during trial \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 not based solely on evidence presented prior to motion\nThe trial court\u2019s challenged findings of fact upon remand of a rape case during which the trial court temporarily closed the courtroom to spectators while the prosecuting witness testified were supported by competent evidence. Defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact must have been based solely upon the evidence presented prior to the State\u2019s motion for closure was without merit.\n2. Criminal Law \u2014 closure of courtroom during trial \u2014 sufficient evidence \u2014 Waller test\nDefendant\u2019s argument in a rape case that the trial court erred by temporarily closing the courtroom to spectators while the prosecuting witness testified was without merit. The uncontested findings of fact along with the challenged findings of fact which the Court of Appeals concluded were supported by competent evidence were sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s application of the test set forth in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, and its determination that the limited removal of spectators was permissible in this case.\nAppeal by defendant from order and judgments entered on or about 6 September 2012 by Judge C. Philip Ginn in Superior Court, Henderson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2013.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth J. Weese, for the State.\nPaul F. Herzog, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0451-01", "first_page_order": 461, "last_page_order": 471 }