{ "id": 6788587, "name": "EMBARK, LLC and DAVID B. WHEELER, Plaintiffs v. 1105 MEDIA, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Embark, LLC v. 1105 Media, Inc.", "decision_date": "2014-01-07", "docket_number": "No. COA13-263", "first_page": "538", "last_page": "551", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 N.C. App. 538" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642370 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295-96", "parenthetical": "quoting Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 734, 537 S.E.2d 854, 857-58 (2000)" }, { "page": "295-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637346 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945)" }, { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632622 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" }, { "page": "183", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.R. Civ. P. 43(e)" }, { "page": "184" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "186" }, { "page": "183", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.R. Civ. P. 43(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641933 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777", "parenthetical": "quoting Tom. Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145275", "category": "reporters:specialty_lexis", "reporter": "U.S. Dist. LEXIS", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010 WL 2367392", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b)], is limited to rulings on 'minimum contacts' questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571503 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b)], is limited to rulings on 'minimum contacts' questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "886 F.2d 673", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10532994 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "\"If the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed factual questions, the court may resolve the challenge on the basis of a separate evidentiary hearing, or may defer ruling pending receipt at trial of evidence relevant to the jurisdictional question.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/886/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "holding that although three of defendant's material witnesses were located in Washington, D.C., \"this fact is counterbalanced by the fact that plaintiff's materials and offices are located here[,]\" and \"North Carolina is a convenient forum to determine the rights of the parties\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524907 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94", "parenthetical": "finding that damaging effect of tort felt in North Carolina was a factor supporting exercise of jurisdiction" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527715 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609", "parenthetical": "finding that damaging effect of tort felt in North Carolina was a factor supporting exercise of jurisdiction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11243047 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522161 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9719", "category": "reporters:specialty_lexis", "reporter": "U.S. Dist. LEXIS", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1999 WL 417274", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 S.W.3d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 8361466 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "\"An employee telecommutes when he or she takes advantage of electronic mail, internet, facsimile machines and other technological advancements to work from home or a place other than the traditional work site.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/240/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3371", "category": "reporters:specialty_lexis", "reporter": "U.S. App. LEXIS", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "page": "*7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1999 WL 109676", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "page": "*2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 F.3d 58", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527372 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915772 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358614 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" }, { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" }, { "parenthetical": "\"After the purchase, Graphics Supply's Winston-Salem office continued to do all of the administrative work necessary to service the Winston-Salem operation, including purchasing, shipping, bookkeeping, accounting, and accounts receivable.\"" }, { "page": "834" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916410 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918770 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857-58" }, { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12134645 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" }, { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4163145 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412-13", "parenthetical": "quoting Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 734, 537 S.E.2d 854, 857-58 (2000)" }, { "page": "412-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11306135 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157001 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" }, { "page": "102" }, { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3744223 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122", "parenthetical": "quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945)" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. App. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4078455 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/212/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 S.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "716 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" }, { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. App. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4343111 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/216/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 S.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877", "parenthetical": "quoting Bell v. Mozley, 216 N.C. App. 540, 543, 716 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2011), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 574, 724 S.E.2d 529 (2012)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. App. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4357997 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "quoting Bell v. Mozley, 216 N.C. App. 540, 543, 716 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2011), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 574, 724 S.E.2d 529 (2012)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/221/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2645780 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8472795 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" }, { "page": "696" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "700" }, { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "787" }, { "page": "787" }, { "page": "786" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734507 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161615 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "quoting Tom. Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(5)", "parenthetical": "b" }, { "page": "(5)(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1244, "char_count": 34584, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1824934581128089 }, "sha256": "71e4813432df6ff9e54385a2efd049cfce745b64f389f6b0fb0c92b8f2ac6e8f", "simhash": "1:893be423d6c8ff7c", "word_count": 5571 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:32:40.304740+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "EMBARK, LLC and DAVID B. WHEELER, Plaintiffs v. 1105 MEDIA, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant 1105 Media, Inc. appeals from an order (1) denying its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to plaintiff David B. Wheeler\u2019s claims and (2) deferring ruling on its motion to dismiss as to plaintiff Embark, LLC\u2019s claims. Because the trial court\u2019s unchallenged findings of fact support its conclusion that (1) the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of our State\u2019s long arm statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4 (2011), and (2) 1105 Media had sufficient minimum contacts with the State to satisfy the requirements of due process, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order as to Wheeler\u2019s claims. We further hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deferring any ruling as to Embark\u2019s claims pending additional discovery.\nFacts\nPlaintiff Wheeler is the president, founder, and sole employee of plaintiff Embark, an event planning company organized in Illinois on 25 September 2007. Defendant 1105 Media is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Neal Vitale is the president and Chief Executive Officer of 1105 Media. David Myers is the Vice President of Event Operations at 1105 Media.\nOn 29 March 2011, Wheeler, Embark, and 1105 Media entered into a contract as a result of which Embark became a division of 1105 Media and Wheeler became an employee of 1105 Media and the head of \u201cEmbark Events, a division of 1105 Media.\u201d The contract became effective 1 April 2011 and was terminable by either party after 1 January 2012 with 12 months notice. 1105 Media terminated the contract on 31 August 2011 without providing Wheeler or Embark any reason for the termination and refused to pay Wheeler\u2019s salary or other benefits after 31 August 2011.\nWheeler and Embark filed an action for breach of contract against 1105 Media on 9 March 2012 in Mitchell County Superior Court. 1105 Media moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on 30 April 2012. On 17 October 2012, the trial court entered an order denying 1105 Media\u2019s motion to dismiss as to the claims of Wheeler, but withheld ruling on the motion to dismiss as to the claims of Embark.\nIn support of its decision, the trial court made the following findings of fact. Wheeler, the president and founder of Embark, was a resident of Mitchell County, North Carolina, and had been since August 2010. 1105 Media was at all relevant times a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California.\nPrior to entering into a contract with 1105 Media, Wheeler, on multiple occasions, told Mr. Vitale, Mr. Myers, and other 1105 Media employees that he lived in and operated Embark from North Carolina. He also provided 1105 Media with Embark business cards that listed Embark\u2019s North Carolina address.\nThe contract between Wheeler, Embark, and 1105 Media was negotiated via email and telephone communications, and Wheeler wrote many of the emails and placed most of the telephone calls from North Carolina. Although Wheeler invited Mr. Myers and Mr. Vitale to North Carolina on several occasions, no officers or agents of 1105 Media ever came to North Carolina to meet with Wheeler or for any other purpose related to the contract. The contract was signed by the parties in Washington, D.C.\nThe contract was an employment contract between Wheeler and 1105 Media. The trial court found that it was unclear how the contract affected Embark, but, at Mr. Vitale\u2019s suggestion, Embark operated as a division of 1105 Media headed by Wheeler. The name of the division, coined by Mr. Myers, was \u201cEmbark Events, a Division of 1105 Media, Inc.\u201d\nDuring his employment with 1105 Media, Wheeler lived and worked in Mitchell County, North Carolina, where he performed 75% of his duties for 1105 Media. All of his travel originated from North Carolina, and he did not perform any of his duties for 1105 Media at any of their other offices. He maintained an office and home phone number with a North Carolina area code, paid income and property taxes in North Carolina, and maintained apersonal North Carolina checking and savings account. He received health care in North Carolina that was covered by 1105 Media\u2019s health insurance plan.\n1105 Media paid for the rent and telephone bill for Wheeler\u2019s office in Mitchell County, and, at Wheeler\u2019s request, shipped his work computer to the North Carolina office. 1105 Media paid a monthly allowance of $450.00 for Wheeler\u2019s car, which was titled in North Carolina. 1105 Media directly deposited Wheeler\u2019s paycheck into his North Carolina checking account, paid North Carolina payroll taxes, and had an \u201cemployer account number\u201d with the North Carolina Employment Security Commission. No one at 1105 Media ever brought up any concerns about Wheeler living and working in North Carolina.\n1105 Media marketed Embark Events and Wheeler as part of the 1105 Media brand and operation. It created specific 1105 Media thank you cards for Wheeler that he sent to 1105 Media clients. The cards contained Wheeler\u2019s name, the Embark Events logo, and listed the company name as \u201cEmbark Events, a division of 1105 Media, Inc.\u201d The only address on the card was the North Carolina office address.\nBased on its findings, the trial court concluded that North Carolina had jurisdiction over Wheeler\u2019s claims against 1105 Media pursuant to North Carolina\u2019s Long Arm Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(5), and that 1105 Media had sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina such that it had purposefully availed itself of the jurisdiction of North Carolina.\nThe trial court also concluded that it was unclear whether the court had jurisdiction over 1105 Media with respect to Embark\u2019s claims. The order, therefore, denied 1105 Media\u2019s motion to dismiss as to Wheeler\u2019s claims, but withheld ruling as to Embark\u2019s claims until the parties completed discovery. 1105 Media appealed the order to this Court.\nI\n\u201cIn order to determine whether North Carolina courts have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a court must apply a two-step analysis: \u2018First, the transaction must fall within the language of the State\u2019s \u201clong-arm\u201d statute. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.\u2019 \u201d Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 193 N.C. App. 35, 39, 666 S.E.2d 774, 777 (2008) (quoting Tom. Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986)).\n\u201cThe standard of review to be applied by a trial court in deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(2) depends upon the procedural context confronting the court.\u201d Banc of Am. Secs. LLC v. Evergreen Int\u2019l Aviation, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 690, 693, 611 S.E.2d 179, 182 (2005). When, as here, both the defendant and the plaintiff submit affidavits addressing personal jurisdiction issues, \u201c \u2018the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, . . . [or] the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 694, 611 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting N.C.R. Civ. P. 43(e)). \u201cIf the trial court chooses to decide the motion based on affidavits, \u2018[t]he trial judge must determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence [presented in the affidavits] much as a juror.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Fungaroli v. Fungaroli, 51 N.C. App. 363, 367, 276 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1981)).\nThe standard of review for this Court is \u201c \u2018whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence in the record[.]\u2019 \u201d Miller v. Szilagyi, 221 N.C. App. 79, 82, 726 S.E.2d 873, 877 (2012) (quoting Bell v. Mozley, 216 N.C. App. 540, 543, 716 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2011), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 574, 724 S.E.2d 529 (2012)). Here, neither party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, and therefore, they are \u201c \u2018presumed to be supported by competent evidence and [are] binding on appeal.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Bell, 216 N.C. App. at 543, 716 S.E.2d at 871),\nA. Long Arm Statute\n1105 Media first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that jurisdiction was proper pursuant to North Carolina\u2019s Long Arm Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(5), which states, in relevant part, that jurisdiction is proper in any action which:\na. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff\u2019s benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this State or to pay for services to be performed in this State by the plaintiff; or\nb. Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant within this State, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff within this State if such performance within this State was authorized or ratified by the defendant; or\nc. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff\u2019s benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this State, or to ship from this State goods, documents of title, or other things of value;...\n1105 Media argues that the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(5) (b) were not met because that section requires that any services actually performed in North Carolina be \u201cauthorized or ratified by the defendant.\u201d According to 1105 Media, since the trial court made no findings as to whether 1105 Media authorized or ratified Wheeler\u2019s performance in North Carolina, the trial court\u2019s conclusion is not supported by its findings of fact.\nHowever, based on our review of the order, the trial court did make sufficient findings supporting the conclusion that Wheeler\u2019s performance was \u201cauthorized or ratified.\u201d The court found that 1105 Media paid for Wheeler\u2019s North Carolina office space, directly deposited Wheeler\u2019s paycheck into his North Carolina checking account, paid North Carolina payroll taxes, never brought up any concerns about Wheeler living and working in North Carolina, created specific 1105 Media thank you cards with Wheeler\u2019s North Carolina address for him to send to 1105 Media clients, paid the telephone bill for Wheeler\u2019s North Carolina office, and shipped a computer to his office. These findings are more than enough to support the conclusion that Wheeler\u2019s performance of services in North Carolina for 1105 Media was authorized and ratified by 1105 Media.\nIn any event, although 1105 Media does not address N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(a) or (c), the trial court\u2019s findings of fact also establish that the requirements for those subsections of the statute are satisfied. As provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(a), 1105 Media promised to pay Wheeler for the services Wheeler was to perform under his employment contract in North Carolina. Likewise, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(c) is met by the trial court\u2019s finding that 1105 Media shipped to Wheeler\u2019s North Carolina office a work computer and directly deposited Wheeler\u2019s salary into his North Carolina bank account. Both the computer and paychecks are \u201cthings of value.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(5)(c). See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Caccuro, 212 N.C. App. 564, 567, 712 S.E.2d 696, 700 (finding payments sent from employer to employee during employment relationship constituted \u201cthing of value\u201d for proposes of long arm statute), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 367, 719 S.E.2d 623 (2011).\nThe trial court, therefore, properly concluded that jurisdiction existed under North Carolina\u2019s Long Arm Statute.\nB. Minimum Contacts\nUnder the Due Process Clause, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only if there exists \u201csufficient \u2018minimum contacts\u2019 between the nonresident defendant and our state \u2018such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 \u201d Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 122, 638 S.E.2d 203, 210 (2006) (quoting Int\u2019l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945)). More specifically, \u201c[i]n each case, there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; the unilateral activity within the forum state of others who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant will not suffice.\u201d Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 365, 348 S.E.2d at 786. Instead, the \u201crelationship between the defendant and the forum must be \u2018such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980)).\n\u201cThere are two types of personal jurisdiction. General jurisdiction exists when the defendant\u2019s contacts with the state are not related to the cause of action but the defendant\u2019s activities in the forum are sufficiently \u2018continuous and systematic.\u2019 Specific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises from or is related to defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum.\u201d Skinner, 361 N.C. at 122, 638 S.E.2d at 210 (internal citation omitted). Here, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss as to Wheeler\u2019s claims based on specific jurisdiction.\nFor specific jurisdiction, the focus is on \u201cthe relationship among the defendant, this State, and the cause of action.\u201d Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 366, 348 S.E.2d at 786. In determining whether minimum contacts exist, our courts examine several factors: \u201c \u2018(1) the quantity of the contacts; (2) the quality and nature of the contacts; (3) the source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interests of the forum state, and (5) the convenience to the parties.\u2019 \u201d Cambridge Homes of N.C. Ltd. P\u2019ship v. Hyundai Constr., Inc., 194 N.C. App. 407, 412-13, 670 S.E.2d 290, 295-96 (2008) (quoting Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 734, 537 S.E.2d 854, 857-58 (2000)). \u201c \u2018A contract alone may establish the necessary minimum contacts where it is shown that the contract was voluntarily entered into and has a \u2018substantial connection\u2019 with this State.\u2019 \u201d Banc of Am. Secs., 169 N.C. App. at 696, 611 S.E.2d at 184 (quoting Williamson Produce, Inc. v. Satcher, 122 N.C. App. 589, 594, 471 S.E.2d 96, 99 (1996)).\nIn Better Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Davis, 120 N.C. App. 498, 499, 462 S.E.2d 832, 833 (1995), this Court held that there was personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants for breach of a contract to purchase a North Carolina business. The plaintiff in Better Business was a \u201cFlorida corporation with an office and place of business in Forsyth County, North Carolina.\u201d Id. It sold an operating division of its company, which had sales offices in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and Roanoke, Virginia, to a Virginia corporation owned by the defendants. Id. After the merger, the North Carolina sales office \u201ccontinued to do all of the administrative work necessary to service the Winston-Salem operation,\u201d and generated half of the company\u2019s sales. Id. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 834.\nIn its due process analysis, this Court noted that the \u201cactive negotiations to purchase a North Carolina business, some of which were conducted in North Carolina, demonstrate a purposeful attempt by defendants to avail themselves of the privilege of conducting business in this State.\u201d Id. at 500, 462 S.E.2d at 834. The Court found it insignificant that one of the individual defendants had never stepped foot in North Carolina or personally conducted or managed any of the North Carolina activities, concluding instead that \u201cjurisdiction here is based on the benefits received by defendants from the underlying contract which has a substantial connection with North Carolina.\u201d Id. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 834.\nWe believe that the facts here parallel those in Better Business. The trial court\u2019s findings show that 1105 Media voluntarily entered into a contract whereby it created a division of its company that had an office and head of operations in North Carolina. 1105 Media negotiated the contract knowing that Wheeler was a resident of North Carolina and that Embark was operated out of North Carolina. 1105 Media\u2019s proposal to make Embark a division of 1105 Media and hire Wheeler to head the division \u201cdemonstrate [s] a purposeful attempt by [1105 Media] to avail [itself] of the privilege of conducting business in this State.\u201d Id. at 500, 462 S.E.2d at 834.\nAdditionally, 1105 Media\u2019s performance during the course of the contract further demonstrates that the contract at issue in this case is materially indistinguishable from the one in Better Business that this Court concluded had a substantial connection with North Carolina. 1105 Media treated the North Carolina operation as part of itself: it paid for the North Carolina office rent and telephone and created 1105 Media thank you cards for Wheeler to send to 1105 Media clients that identified \u201cEmbark Events, a Division of 1105 Media, Inc.\u201d as having a North Carolina address. As in Better Business, \u201cjurisdiction here is based on the benefits received by defendants from the underlying contract which has a substantial connection with North Carolina.\u201d Id. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 834.\nDefendant attempts to distinguish Better Business on the bases that (1) Embark was incorporated in Illinois and not North Carolina; (2) no events were produced, performed, or contemplated in North Carolina; and (3) no significant revenue was generated from any operations of Embark Events. None of these purported distinctions is material.\nBetter Business focused not on the purchased business\u2019 state of incorporation, but rather on the location of its offices and where it did business. Id. at 500-01, 462 S.E.2d at 834. In this case, after entering into the contract with Wheeler and Embark, 1105 Media established a division office in North Carolina and 75% of Wheeler\u2019s services for 1105 Media were performed in North Carolina. Compare id. (\u201cAfter the purchase, Graphics Supply\u2019s Winston-Salem office continued to do all of the administrative work necessary to service the Winston-Salem operation, including purchasing, shipping, bookkeeping, accounting, and accounts receivable.\u201d). Where the events Wheeler arranged for Embark actually took place - as opposed to where Wheeler\u2019s services were rendered - is no more material than where the Better Business clients were located or where their products where shipped.\nFinally, although the Court noted in Better Business that the defendants did financially benefit from the Winston-Salem office, id. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 834, the Court did not hold that a generation of revenues was necessary. The focus was on \u201cthe benefits received by defendants from the underlying contract.\u201d Id. Here, those benefits were Wheeler\u2019s services, 75% of which were rendered in North Carolina. Accordingly, under Better Business, the trial court properly concluded that 1105 Media had sufficient minimum contacts with respect to Wheeler\u2019s claims. See also Brickman v. Codella, 83 N.C. App. 377, 384, 350 S.E.2d 164, 168 (1986) (finding personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant where defendant\u2019s contacts with State \u201cwere \u2018purposefully directed\u2019 toward [plaintiff] in order to obtain his financial assistance with a new business venture whereby [defendant] sought personal commercial benefit\u201d (emphasis added)).\nMoreover, where the cause of action is a breach of contract, the substantial performance of the contract by the plaintiff in the forum state with the defendant\u2019s knowledge, permission, or endorsement is a factor weighing in favor of a finding of specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Here, 1105 Media employed Wheeler as the head of a division of its company and marketed Wheeler and Embark as part of the 1105 Media brand and operation. With 1105 Media\u2019s knowledge and, therefore, its permission, Wheeler performed.75% of his duties under the contract from North Carolina. See Chapman v. Janko, U.S.A., Inc., 120 N.C. App. 371, 373, 462 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1995) (finding jurisdiction over nonresident, non-domesticated corporation in action for breach of contract for consultation services by resident plaintiff where plaintiff performed substantial services for corporation in North Carolina and corporation fisted plaintiff as a \u201c \u2018U.S.A. sales rep\u2019 \u201d on its own letterhead, even though employer had no employees residing in North Carolina, only contacted plaintiff through telephone, letter, or outside North Carolina, and contacts involved negotiations only); Dataflow Cos. v. Hutto, 114 N.C. App. 209, 213, 441 S.E.2d 580, 582-83 (1994) (finding personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants for breach of contract where supplies were shipped to defendants from plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina office, plaintiff spent considerable time engineering and designing computer system in North Carolina, and defendants sent payments to North Carolina office).\nHowever, 1105 Media vigorously argues that Wheeler was simply a telecommuting employee and that this Court should adopt the reasoning of other courts that have held that when a telecommuting employee brings suit against his out-of-state employer in an action related to the employment relationship, the employer\u2019s withholding of state payroll taxes and payment of unemployment insurance to the forum state, alone, is not enough to establish purposeful availment or minimum contacts with that state. In support of this argument, defendant cites Slepian v. Guerin, 172 F.3d 58, 1999 WL 109676, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3371 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 1999) (unpublished).\nIn Slepian, the Court, in considering a telecommuting employee\u2019s lawsuit, held it did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant employer because the defendant\u2019s actions toward the forum state amounted to nothing more than an \u201caccommodation of [the plaintiff\u2019s] choice of residence.\u201d 1999 WL 109676, at *2, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3371, at *7. Here, however, the circumstances do not involve a mere telecommuting employee and, therefore, we need not consider whether North Carolina should adopt the Slepian reasoning.\nIn this case, the trial court found that Wheeler did not simply work from home, but rather worked out of his \u201c1105 Media office\u201d in Mitchell County, North Carolina - an office paid for by 1105 Media and constituting a traditional work site of 1105 Media. See Wait v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 240 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Term. 2007) (\u201cAn employee telecommutes when he or she takes advantage of electronic mail, internet, facsimile machines and other technological advancements to work from home or a place other than the traditional work site.\u201d).\nMore importantly, the trial court\u2019s findings establish that 1105 Media\u2019s actions were not merely an accommodation to Wheeler\u2019s choice of residence, but rather a result of 1105 Media\u2019s own initiative to create an operating division and office in North Carolina in an ongoing and mutually beneficial business relationship. See Sheets v. Integrated Info. Util. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. 98-1328-KI, 1999 WL 417274, at *1, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9719, at *2-*3 (D. Or. June 17, 1999) (declining to follow lower court\u2019s recommendation in Slepian and finding jurisdiction over out-of-state corporation in action for breach of employment contract of telecommuter where employer initiated contact with employee, and employee\u2019s residence in forum state was, at least in part, for convenience of employer due to employer\u2019s financial concerns and inability to pay for employee\u2019s relocation).\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by failing to make a finding as to which party initiated contact. While this is a relevant factor to the minimum contacts analysis, our Supreme Court has noted that \u201c[n]o single factor controls, but they all must be weighed in light of fundamental fairness and the circumstances of the case.\u201d B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Tire King of Greensboro, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 129, 132, 341 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1986). Additionally, \u201cRule 52(a)(1) [of the Rules of Civil Procedure] does not require the trial court to recite all of the evidentiary facts; it is required only to find the ultimate facts, i.e., those specific material facts which are determinative of the questions involved in the action and from which an appellate court can determine whether the findings are supported by the evidence and, in turn, support the conclusions of law reached by the trial court.\u201d Mann Contractors, Inc. v. Flair with Goldsmith Consultants-II, Inc., 135 N.C. App. 772, 774, 522 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1999).\nIn this case, the fact that Wheeler sent out the first email was not a determinative factor in the minimum contacts analysis. The trial court made sufficient findings of 1105 Media\u2019s contacts with the State to support its exercise of jurisdiction. The court was not then required to make findings of fact on issues that would not alter the conclusion. The trial court could reasonably determine that the question of whom initiated the contact was not material in light of the facts of this case, where the parties engaged in a balanced negotiation, the ultimate structure of their business relationship was proposed by 1105 Media, and 1105 Media entered into a contract with the North Carolina plaintiffs knowingly, voluntarily, and for their own economic benefit. We, therefore, hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that 1105 Media had purposeful minimum contacts with North Carolina.\nOnce a court finds that a defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum State, it must consider those contacts in light of (1) the interests of North Carolina and (2) the convenience of the forum to the parties. We note, however, that \u201conce the first prong of purposeful minimum contacts is satisfied, the defendant will bear a heavy burden in escaping the exercise of jurisdiction based on other factors.\u201d Banc of Am. Secs., 169 N.C. App. at 701, 611 S.E.2d at 187.\nWith respect to North Carolina\u2019s interest, \u201c [i]t is generally conceded that a state has a \u2018manifest interest\u2019 in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.\u201d Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 367,348 S.E.2d at 787. Here, Wheeler, a resident of North Carolina, has been injured by 1105 Media\u2019s alleged breach of contract, the damaging effect of which is felt in this State. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Barnett, 76 N.C. App. 605, 609, 334 S.E.2d 91, 94 (1985) (finding that damaging effect of tort felt in North Carolina was a factor supporting exercise of jurisdiction).\nAs for the convenience of the parties, litigating in North Carolina would not be convenient for 1105 Media, but, by the same token, litigation in another state would not be convenient for Wheeler. The record does \u201cnot indicate that any one State would be more convenient to all of the parties and witnesses than another.\u201d Banc of Am. Secs., 169 N.C. App. at 700, 611 S.E.2d at 186. See Climatological Consulting Corp. v. Trattner, 105 N.C. App. 669, 675, 414 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1992) (holding that although three of defendant\u2019s material witnesses were located in Washington, D.C., \u201cthis fact is counterbalanced by the fact that plaintiff\u2019s materials and offices are located here[,]\u201d and \u201cNorth Carolina is a convenient forum to determine the rights of the parties\u201d).\nFinally, with respect to the fairness of this State\u2019s exercising jurisdiction, \u201c[ijt is well settled that a defendant need not physically enter North Carolina in order for personal jurisdiction to arise.\u201d Better Bus., 120 N.C. App. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 834. Moreover, 1105 Media has not \u201cpointed to any disparity between plaintiff[s] and itself which might render the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it unfair.\u201d Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 368, 348 S.E.2d at 787.\nWe, therefore, hold that the contacts in this case rose to the level satisfying the constitutional minimum under the Due Process Clause necessary in order to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 1105 Media. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying 1105 Media\u2019s motion to dismiss Wheeler\u2019s claims.\nII\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in limiting its ruling to Wheeler\u2019s claims and withholding ruling on 1105 Media\u2019s motion to dismiss with respect to Embark\u2019s claims. Defendant points out that the jurisdictional analysis does not consider a plaintiff\u2019s contacts with North Carolina, but rather \u201cthe relationship among the defendant, this State, and the cause of action.\u201d Id. at 366, 348 S.E.2d at 786. It argues that, as a result, the analysis as to Wheeler should apply equally to 1105 Media.\nWhile under this reasoning, our holding in this opinion would result in the conclusion that 1105 Media\u2019s motion to dismiss should have been denied as to both plaintiffs, we do not agree with 1105 Media\u2019s analysis. The trial court did not defer ruling as to jurisdiction over Embark\u2019s claims because of any confusion over Embark\u2019s contacts with North Carolina, but rather because it was unclear about the nature of Embark\u2019s cause of action. For specific jurisdiction, the sole basis for personal jurisdiction in this case, the focus is on \u201cthe relationship among the defendant, this State, and the cause of action.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Defendant has not cited any authority suggesting that it was error for the trial court to defer ruling when it had insufficient information regarding the nature of Embark\u2019s cause of action. See also Cambridge Homes of N.C., 194 N.C. App. at 412-13, 670 S.E.2d at 295-96 (holding that trial court, in determining minimum contacts, should consider, among other factors, \u201c \u2018the source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cooper, 140 N.C. App. at 734, 537 S.E.2d at 858)).\nIn federal court, deferral of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pending discovery is within the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989) (\u201cIf the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed factual questions, the court may resolve the challenge on the basis of a separate evidentiary hearing, or may defer ruling pending receipt at trial of evidence relevant to the jurisdictional question.\u201d). This standard of review is consistent with this Court\u2019s holding that a trial court may choose either to hear a motion to dismiss for lack of minimum contacts based on affidavits or \u201c \u2018the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.\u2019 \u201d Banc of Am. Secs., 169 N.C. App. at 694, 611 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting N.C.R. Civ. P. 43(e)).\nBecause the trial court was unable to determine based on the affidavits and pleadings the precise nature of Embark\u2019s cause of action, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that the motion to dismiss as to Embark should be heard based on deposition testimony that more fully fleshes out that cause of action. Consequently, we also affirm the trial court\u2019s order to the extent that it defers ruling on the motion to dismiss as to Embark\u2019s claims.\nAffirmed.\nJudges ROBERT C. HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. Although the order denying 1105 Media\u2019s motion to dismiss is interlocutory, this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277 (2011) because 1105 Media argued that it lacked minimum contacts with North Carolina. See Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 581, 291 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1982) (\u201c[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b)], is limited to rulings on \u2018minimum contacts\u2019 questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).\u201d)\n. Defendant argues that the trial court made no findings as to 1105 Media\u2019s knowledge that Wheeler resided in and operated Embark from North Carolina. We disagree. The trial court\u2019s finding of fact that Wheeler told 1105 Media\u2019s officers that he lived in North Carolina and operated Embark from this State is a sufficient finding regarding 1105 Media\u2019s knowledge of those facts.\n. 1105 Media also cites Waldron v. Atradius Collections, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-551, 2010 WL 2367392, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145275 (D. Md. June 9, 2010), another unpublished opinion. The district court, however, declined to decide the question of personal jurisdiction and instead simply transferred venue from Maryland to Illinois. 2010 WL 2367392, at *3,2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145275, at*9-*10.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Adams, Hendon, Carson, Crow and Saenger, PA., by Robert C. Carpenter, for plaintiffs-appellees.", "Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Davis, P.A., by Heather Whitaker Goldstein, Larry McDevitt and David M. Wilkerson, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EMBARK, LLC and DAVID B. WHEELER, Plaintiffs v. 1105 MEDIA, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA13-263\nFiled 7 January 2014\n1. Jurisdiction \u2014 long arm \u2014 merger of North Carolina and California companies \u2014 employment contract\nThe trial court properly concluded that jurisdiction existed under North Carolina\u2019s long arm statute in a breach of contract case involving a plaintiff who worked from North Carolina and his employer in California. The trial court made sufficient findings supporting the conclusion that plaintiffs performance was \u201cauthorized or ratified\u201d by defendant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(b); moreover, the findings also established the requirements for N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(a) and (c) (the promise of payment for services within the state and the promise to deliver things of value within the state).\n2. Jurisdiction \u2014 minimum contacts \u2014 employment contract\u2014 California company and North Carolina employee\nContacts between a California defendant and North Carolina satisfied the constitutional minimum necessary to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant under the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs business in North Carolina was merged with defendant with an employment contract for plaintiff; plaintiff continued to work from North Carolina with defendant\u2019s knowledge and approval; and defendant was not just accommodating defendant\u2019s choice of residence, but was establishing a division in North Carolina.\n3. Jurisdiction \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 nature of claim not clear\u2014 ruling deferred\nIn an employment dispute between plaintiff and defendant after plaintiff\u2019s company (Embark) merged with defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deferring a motion to dismiss Embaxk\u2019s claims where the trial court was not able to determine the precise nature of Embark\u2019s cause of action.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 17 October 2012 by Judge C. Philip Ginn in Mitchell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 August 2013.\nAdams, Hendon, Carson, Crow and Saenger, PA., by Robert C. Carpenter, for plaintiffs-appellees.\nVan Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Davis, P.A., by Heather Whitaker Goldstein, Larry McDevitt and David M. Wilkerson, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0538-01", "first_page_order": 548, "last_page_order": 561 }