{ "id": 6788693, "name": "NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee v. WADE H. PASCHAL, JR., Guardian Ad Litem for Harley Jessup; REGGIE JESSUP; RANDALL COLLINS JESSUP; and THURMAN JESSUP, Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Paschal", "decision_date": "2014-01-07", "docket_number": "No. COA13-615", "first_page": "558", "last_page": "568", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 N.C. App. 558" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "746", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "747", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526683 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554321 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497-98", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "146-47", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523471 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "655, 656-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11710933 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399-400", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-83", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 940, "char_count": 24440, "ocr_confidence": 0.695, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.44217257444218e-08, "percentile": 0.44406874686516473 }, "sha256": "16a9d7e53caf3c14cedf4d5b0af288eea370dc9aa723ae1748892b2ebdcb6c4a", "simhash": "1:96edd6f6820ec4ce", "word_count": 4033 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:32:40.304740+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee v. WADE H. PASCHAL, JR., Guardian Ad Litem for Harley Jessup; REGGIE JESSUP; RANDALL COLLINS JESSUP; and THURMAN JESSUP, Defendants-Appellants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nSixteen-year-old Harley Jessup (\u201cHarley\u201d) was injured on 15 April 2009 when a truck driven by her cousin, Randall Collins Jessup (\u201cRandall\u201d), ran off the road and into a ditch, causing Harley to be ejected from the truck. Harley, through her guardian ad litem Wade H. Paschal, Jr. (\u201cPaschal\u201d), and Harley\u2019s father, Reggie Jessup (\u201cReggie\u201d), filed a complaint on 28 March 2012, alleging injury from the accident and medical expenses of $81,087.44. Randall\u2019s automobile insurance carrier tendered the $30,000.00 amount of its coverage. The 28 March 2012 complaint also included an underinsured motorist claim against an automobile policy (\u201cthe policy\u201d) of Harley\u2019s paternal grandfather, Thurman Jessup (\u201cThurman\u201d), which was issued by North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019).\nPlaintiff initiated the present action by filing a complaint for declaratory judgment on 25 May 2012. Paschal, as guardian ad litem for Harley, along with Reggie, Randall, and Thurman were all named defendants. In Plaintiff\u2019s complaint, Plaintiff asked the trial court to rule that Harley was not covered by the policy. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on 4 October 2012. Harley, through Paschal, along with Reggie, Randall, and Thurman, moved on 30 October 2012 to change venue from Wake County to either Chatham County or Randolph County. The motion for change of venue was denied by order filed 30 November 2012. In an order filed 6 December 2012,\u2019 the trial court concluded that Harley was \u201cnot a resident of [Thurman\u2019s] household on April 15, 2009, and [was] therefore not entitled to coverage under the policy[.]\u201d Based upon this conclusion, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Paschal, as guardian ad litem for Harley, and Reggie and Thurman (\u201cDefendants\u201d) appeal from the 30 October 2012 and the 6 December 2012 orders. Defendant Randall Collins Jessup is not a party to this appeal.\nAt the time of the accident, Thurman owned multiple houses and several hundred acres of farmland: Thurman and Reggie had owned a house together until the house burned in 2005. Harley lived with Reggie in that house for a short period after she was bom. Thurman purchased a house at 6846 Brush Creek Road. (\u201cBrush Creek house\u201d) in 1983, and lived there until sometime in the early 2000s. Thurman also purchased a house at 6615 Joe Branson Road (\u201cBranson house\u201d) in 1997. The Branson house was approximately one mile from the Brash Creek house, and a person could walk from the Branson house to the Brush Creek house without leaving Thurman\u2019s property. Reggie and his children, including Harley, moved into the Branson house shortly after Thurman purchased it. In 2002, Thurman purchased a fifty percent interest in a house owned by his girlfriend, Donna Whitehead (\u201cMs. Whitehead\u201d), located at 398 Browns Crossroads (\u201cBrowns Crossroads house\u201d). After purchasing an interest in the Browns Crossroads house, Thurman spent most of his nights sleeping at either the Browns Crossroads house or the Brash Creek house. On rare occasions, Thurman would sleep at the Branson house.\nMost of Thurman\u2019s mail, including bank statements, was sent to the Brash Creek house, and that is the address Thurman used for most official business, such as his tax returns and voter registration. The Brash Creek house was also where Thurman kept most of his clothing.\nAt his deposition, Thurman testified he owned over 100 head of cattle, approximately 4,000 hogs, and about 32,000 chickens, which were housed in different areas around his farm, including the Branson house, the Brash Creek house, and surrounding land. Thurman considered his farm to be a \u201cfamily farm,\u201d and several relatives lived and work on the farm. Reggie lived in the Branson house with Harley and her brothers. Harley had lived primarily at that address since she was a very young child. Thurman paid all the bills associated with the Branson house. Those bills were sent to Thurman\u2019s Brash Creek house. Reggie did not pay anything to live in the Branson house. Thurman even paid for Reggie\u2019s phone service.\nFor many years, Thurman had taken continued responsibility for multiple family members, and some people not related to him by blood or marriage. For example, at the time of his deposition, Thurman had two children, not related to either him or Ms. Whitehead, living with him. Thurman had taken the two children in nine years earlier because the children\u2019s father was often out of the state for work. When the children\u2019s father was in town, Thurman allowed him to stay in one of Thurman\u2019s houses free of charge. Ms. Whitehead\u2019s daughter and her two children also lived with Thurman and Ms. Whitehead. Harley and her brothers also lived with Thurman at times. Reggie had ongoing trouble with the law, and spent time in jail or prison on occasion. When Harley could not stay with Reggie due to Reggie\u2019s legal problems, she stayed with Thurman, at both the Browns Crossroads house and at the Brush Creek house. Around 2005, Harley spent a year living with Thurman because of Reggie\u2019s legal troubles. Thurman was appointed as Harley\u2019s guardian for that period of time. Harley\u2019s mother was not very involved in Harley\u2019s life, and did not appear to provide Harley with material assistance or much guidance.\nThurman testified he supported Harley through \u201cevery bit\u201d of her life, providing food, clothes, housing, utilities, phone, and other expenses. Reggie drove a truck that belonged to Thurman and if something was needed for the Branson house, such as a washing machine, Thurman bought it. Thurman testified that when Harley was not living with him, he saw her two or three times a week. Harley testified she saw Thurman almost eveiy day. Thurman had keys to all his houses, and felt free to enter them at any time. If Harley needed to go to the doctor or dentist, Thurman took her. When questioned at his deposition, Thurman agreed that Reggie, Harley, and her brothers were all a part of his household.\nPlaintiff filed its complaint for declaratory judgment on 25 May 2012 and requested that the trial court \u201cdeclare whether [Plaintiff\u2019s] UIM policy issued to Defendant Thurman Jessup [was] applicable to the claim of Harley Jessup.\u201d Harley, through Paschal, and Reggie, answered Plaintiff\u2019s complaint on 3 August 2012, and counterclaimed, asking that the trial court \u201cdeclare the UIM policy issued to defendant Thurman Jessup applicable to the claims of Harley and Reggie arising from the accident on or about April 15, 2009.\u201d Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on 4 October 2012. Defendants filed a motion on 30 October 2012 to change venue from Wake County to either Chatham County or Randolph County. The trial court denied Defendants\u2019 motion to change venue by order filed 30 November 2012. In an order entered 6 December 2012, the trial court granted Plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Harley \u201cwas not a resident of the Defendant Thurman Jessup\u2019s household on April 15, 2009, and [was] therefore not entitled to coverage under the policy of UIM insurance issued by the Plaintiff to Defendant Thurman Jessup[.]\u201d Defendants appeal.\nI.\nThe issues in this appeal are whether (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendants\u2019 motion to change venue and (2) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff by ruling that Harley was not a resident of Thurman\u2019s household. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.\nII.\nDefendants acknowledge that Wake County was a proper venue for this action. However, Defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion by not changing venue to either Chatham County or Randolph County \u201cfor the convenience of witnesses and the promotion of justice.\u201d We disagree.\nThe trial court is given broad discretion when ruling on a motion to change venue for the convenience of witnesses:\n\u201c\u2018[T]he trial court may change the place of trial . . . [w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.\u201d\u2019 However, the court\u2019s refusal to do so will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. The trial court does not manifestly abuse its discretion in refusing to change the venue for trial of an action pursuant to subdivision (2) of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-83] unless it appears from the matters and things in evidence before the trial court that the ends of justice will not merely be promoted by, but in addition demand, the change of venue, or that failure to grant the change of venue will deny the movant a fair trial.\nIn resolving this issue here, we do not set forth a \u201cbright line\u201d rule or test for determination of whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to change venue. Rather, the determination of whether a trial court has abused its discretion is a case-by-case determination based on the totality of facts and circumstances in each case.\nUnited Services Automobile Assn. v. Simpson, 126 N.C. App. 393, 399-400, 485 S.E.2d 337, 341 (1997) (citations omitted). Defendants fail to demonstrate that the trial court\u2019s discretionary ruling denying their motion to change venue denied them a fair trial, or that the ends of justice demanded a change of venue. Defendants simply argue that \u201cit [was] more convenient for [Defendants] to litigate this action in either Randolph or Chatham County rather than Wake County.\u201d According to Defendants\u2019 motion to change venue, \u201cPlaintiff\u2019s principal office is in Wake County, North Carolina and it conducts business in said county.\u201d Chatham County borders Wake County, and the courthouses in these two counties are not separated by great distances.\nThough Randolph or Chatham County may be a more convenient forum for Defendants, Wake County appears to be a more convenient forum for Plaintiff, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s order denying Defendants\u2019 motion to change venue from Wake County. This argument is without merit.\nIII.\nDefendants argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff because Harley was covered under the policy. We agree.\nAlthough this is an action for declaratory judgment, because it was decided by summary judgment, we apply the standard of review applicable to summary judgment.\nSummary judgment is appropriate where \u201cthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact\u201d and \u201cany party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, \u201cthe court may consider the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, oral testimony and documentary materials.\u201d All such evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. On appeal, an order allowing summary judgment is reviewed de novo.\nHowerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004) (citations omitted).\nThis Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, and should affirm the trial court\u2019s action if our de novo review uncovers any basis to support the grant of summary judgment. We agree with the trial court that the dispositive issue is whether the policy issued by Plaintiff covers Harley as a \u201cfamily member\u201d as that term is defined in the policy. \u201cPart Cl\u201d of the policy: \u201cUninsured Motorists Coverage,\u201d states in relevant part:\nWe will pay compensatory damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of:\n1. Bodily injury sustained by an insured and caused by an accident; and\n2. Property damage caused by an accident.\nThe owner\u2019s or operator\u2019s liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or us\u00e9 of the uninsured motor vehicle.\n\u201cInsured\u201d as used in this Part means:\n1. You [the named insured] or any family member. [(Emphasis in original)].\nThe policy includes the following definition of \u201cfamily member:\u201d\n\u201cFamily member\u201d means a person related to [the named insured] by blood, marriage or adoption who is \u00e1 resident of [the named insured\u2019s] household. This includes a ward or foster child. [(Emphasis in original)].\nResolution of the matter before us depends on whether Harley was \u201ca resident of [Thurman\u2019s] household\u201d under the policy. The policy does not define the words \u201cresident\u201d or \u201chousehold.\u201d It is undisputed that Harley is related to Thurman Jessup by blood, and that she lived at 6615 Joe Branson Road at the time of the accident. The determination of whether Harley was also a resident of Thurman\u2019s household, however, is more complicated. The word \u201cresident\u201d is \u201cflexible, elastic, slippery and somewhat ambiguous[,]\u201d meaning anything from \u201ca place of abode for more than a temporary period of time\u201d to \u201ca permanent and established home[.]\u201d Great American Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 78 N.C. App. 653, 656, 338 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1986) (citations and quotation marks omitted). This Court has held that when a term,\nif not defined, is capable of more than one definition [it] is to be construed in favor of coverage.....\u201cWhen an insurance company, in drafting its policy of insurance, uses a \u2018slippery\u2019 word to mark out and designate those who are insured by the policy, it is not the function of the court to sprinkle sand upon the ice by strict construction of the term. All who may, by any reasonable construction of the word, be included within the coverage afforded by the policy should be given its protection. If, in the application of this principle of construction, the limits of coverage slide across the slippery area and the company falls into a coverage somewhat more extensive than it contemplated, the fault lies in its own selection of the words by which it chose to be bound.\u201d\nFonvielle v. Insurance Co., 36 N.C. App. 495, 497-98, 244 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1978) (citations omitted).\nDeterminations of whether a particular person is a resident of the household of a named insured are individualized and fact-specific:\nCases interpreting the phrase, \u201cresidents of the same household,\u201d as used in insurance policies, are legion. These cases can be divided into two categories: those involving clauses that exclude from coverage members of the insured\u2019s household, and those that extend coverage to such persons. Applying the general rule that coverage should be provided wherever, by reasonable construction, it can be, courts have restrictively defined \u201chousehold\u201d in those cases where members of the insured\u2019s household are excluded from coverage. On the other hand, where members of an insured\u2019s household are provided coverage under the policy, \u201chousehold\u201d has been broadly interpreted, and members of a family need not actually reside under a common roof to be deemed part of the same household. As pointed out by this court in Fonvielle v. Insurance Co., . .. construction of such terms as \u201cresident\u201d and \u201chousehold\u201d in favor of coverage may lead to \u201cthe seemingly anomalous result\u201d of a very narrow definition under one set of circumstances and a very broad definition under another.\nDavis v. Maryland Casualty Co., 76 N.C. App. 102, 105, 331 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Not only are relevant facts considered in making this determination, but intent, as well:\nAs observed by our courts, the words \u201cresident,\u201d \u201cresidence\u201d and \u201cresiding\u201d have no precise, technical and fixed meaning applicable to all cases. \u201cResidence\u201d has many shades of meaning, from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. It is difficult to give an exact or even satisfactory definition of the term \u201cresident,\u201d as the term is flexible, elastic, slippery and somewhat ambiguous. Definitions of \u201cresidence\u201d include \u201ca place of abode for more than a temporary period of time\u201d and \u201ca permanent and established home\u201d and the definitions range between these two extremes. This being the case, our courts have held that such terms should be given the broadest construction and that all who may be included, by any reasonable construction of such terms, within the coverage of an insurance policy using such terms, should be given its protection.\nOur courts have also found . . . that in determining whether a person in a particular case is a resident of a particular household, the intent of that person is material to the question.\nGreat American, 78 N.C. App. at 656, 338 S.E.2d at 147 (citations omitted). A minor may be a resident of more than one household for the purposes of insurance coverage. Davis, 76 N.C. App. at 106, 331 S.E.2d at 746 (citation omitted).\nWe find the particular factual situations in Davis and Great American instructive for our analysis. In Davis, this Court held:\nApplying these general principles to the case sub judice, we believe that the minor plaintiff was as much a resident of her insured father\u2019s household as that of her mother. While the father maintained a separate residence from that of the mother,- the evidence discloses that there existed between the father and the minor plaintiff a continuing and substantially integrated family relationship. We therefore hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the minor plaintiff . . . was a resident of her insured father\u2019s household within the meaning of the insurance policy, and is entitled to coverage thereunder.\nDavis, 76 N.C. App. at 106, 331 S.E.2d at 747 (citations omitted). The following facts were considered by this Court in Great American, where the issue was whether the defendant was a resident of his parents\u2019 household for insurance purposes:\nThe forecast of evidence before the trial court showed that at the time of the collision, Sean Wale [the defendant] was an emancipated person who was enlisted in the United States Navy and stationed at Norfolk, Virginia. He enlisted in November of 1979. At the time he enlisted he gave his parents\u2019 home address in Salisbury as his home address. During his enlistment, he had no housing other than his military station. Also, during his enlistment, he visited his parents from time to time and, just prior to the April collision, he had completed a 14-day convalescent leave spent at his parents\u2019 home and was returning to his base in Norfolk. At the time of the collision, Sean gave the investigating highway patrolman a home address the same as his parents\u2019 home address in Salisbury. In June 1982, when asked by an insurance adjuster where he was, Sean answered, \u201cAt home,\u201d giving his parents\u2019 address. After he got out of the service in August of 1982, Sean stayed with his parents for several weeks while he looked for a place to live.\nWhen Sean left to join the Navy, he removed all of his personal belongings from his parents\u2019 home. When he visited his parents on leave, he slept on a living room couch and had no bed or dresser of his own. When he enlisted in the Navy, he never intended to return to his parents\u2019 home. He did not consider himself to be a resident of his parents\u2019 household at the time of the collision. Sean\u2019s parents did not consider Sean to be a resident of their household at the time of the collision.\nThe forecast.of evidence before the trial court raises a question as to Sean Wale\u2019s intent to remain a resident of his parents\u2019 household or to assume that status from time to time. Sean\u2019s habit of returning to his parents\u2019 home for furloughs and leaves and his returning there after discharge from the Navy tends to show an intent to make his parents\u2019 home his own. On the other hand, the forecast is complicated by Sean\u2019s own statement that he did not intend to return to that residence after his enlistment; this statement tends to show an opposite intent from that shown by his habits and activities. Thus, a material issue of fact has been raised which must be determined by the finder of fact.\nGreat American, 78 N.C. App. at 655, 656-57, 338 S.E.2d at 146-47 (citations omitted).\nIn the present case, evidence before the trial court, considered in the light most favorable to Defendants, tends to show that Thurman was the most constant caregiver in Harley\u2019s life. Thurman owned the Branson house where Harley was living at the time of the accident. Thurman did not charge any rent for Reggie, Harley, or her brothers to live there. Thurman had a key to the Branson house, and freely entered it whenever he desired. Thurman paid the utility bills for the Branson house, and bought appliances for the house as needed. The Branson house and the Brush Creek house were connected to each other by contiguous land owned by Thurman. Thurman considered these two houses to be part of his farm, which he considered to be a family farm. To this extent, Harley and Thurman could both be considered residents of Thurman\u2019s \u201cfamily farm.\u201d Thurman spent much of his time at the Brush Creek house, and had most of his mail, including important documents, delivered to that address.\nThough Thurman apparently did not spend many nights at the\u2019 Branson house, he did see Harley most every day of the week, and he was a regular participant in Harley\u2019s life. Thurman was often the one who took Harley to the dentist or doctor. Thurman paid for the vast majority of Harley\u2019s expenses, including necessaries such as food and clothing, as well as lifestyle items, such as Harley\u2019s prom dress. In addition, when Harley did not have a parent with whom to live because her father was either in prison or otherwise prohibited from living with Harley, and her mother either could not or would not provide housing and support, Harley lived with Thurman. On these occasions, Thurman handled every responsibility, including helping Harley with her schoolwork and taking her to school. For a period of time when Reggie was incarcerated, Thurman was appointed legal guardian of Harley. A few years before the accident, Harley lived with Thurman for a year due to Reggie\u2019s legal troubles.\nFinally, in the present case, unlike in Great American, both Harley and Thurman considered Harley to be a part of Thurman\u2019s household. When we consider all the relevant facts, we hold, in light of the very particular circumstances in this case, that Harley was a resident of Thurman\u2019s household as defined under the policy at the time of the accident. We reverse the 6 December 2012 order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and remand for entry of an order declaring that, at the time of the accident, Harley was a \u201cfamily member,\u201d and thus an \u201cinsured,\u201d pursuant to the UIM policy issued by Plaintiff to Thurman.\nAffirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.\nJudges BRYANT and STROUD concur.\n. Plaintiff and Defendants argue about whether Thurman could be considered a resident of 6615 Joe Branson Road. Determination of the place or places where Thurman resided, however, is only relevant to the extent, if any, that it can assist in determining what constituted Thurman\u2019s \u201chousehold.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Haywood, Denny & Miller, L.L.P., by Robert E. Levin, for Plaintiff-Appellee.", "Moody, Williams, Roper & Lee, LLP, by C. Todd Roper, for Defendants-Appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee v. WADE H. PASCHAL, JR., Guardian Ad Litem for Harley Jessup; REGGIE JESSUP; RANDALL COLLINS JESSUP; and THURMAN JESSUP, Defendants-Appellants\nNo. COA13-615\nFiled 7 January 2014\n1. Venue \u2014 motion to change \u2014 convenience of witnesses\u2014 denied \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThere was no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s order denying defendants\u2019 motion to change venue from Wake County in an action to determine insurance coverage after a car accident. Defendants did not demonstrate that the trial court\u2019s discretionary ruling denied them a fair trial, or that the ends of justice demanded a change of venue. Although Randolph or Chatham County may have been a more convenient forum for defendants, Wake County appeared to be a more convenient forum for plaintiff.\n2. Insurance \u2014 underinsured motorist \u2014 resident of household\nThe trial court erred by granting summary judgment for plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action to determine whether Harley, injured in an automobile accident, was covered by the underin-sured motorist policy of her grandfather, Thurman. In light of the very particular circumstances in this case, Harley was a resident of Thurman\u2019s household as defined under the policy at the time of the accident.\nAppeal by Defendants from orders entered 30 November 2012 and 6 December 2012 by Judge G. Wayne Abernathy in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 October 2013.\nHaywood, Denny & Miller, L.L.P., by Robert E. Levin, for Plaintiff-Appellee.\nMoody, Williams, Roper & Lee, LLP, by C. Todd Roper, for Defendants-Appellants." }, "file_name": "0558-01", "first_page_order": 568, "last_page_order": 578 }