{ "id": 6776366, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES ANTHONY McGRADY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McGrady", "decision_date": "2014-01-21", "docket_number": "No. COA13-330", "first_page": "95", "last_page": "111", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 N.C. App. 95" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "509 U.S. 579", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355769 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637520, 12637519 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0442-02", "/se2d/639/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635995 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" }, { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 L. Ed. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12697057 ], "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/569/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3741034 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8376196 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 S.E. 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[Evidence] is . . . competent to show the character of the deceased as a violent and dangerous man when the [remaining] evidence is wholly circumstantial and the character of the encounter is in doubt.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272346 ], "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[Evidence] is . . . competent to show the character of the deceased as a violent and dangerous man when the [remaining] evidence is wholly circumstantial and the character of the encounter is in doubt.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/162/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 S.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569918 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486024 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 N.C. (3 Jones) 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1855, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 798", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 602206, 11300959 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered Sixth Amendment right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0400-01", "/us/347/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 602206 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410", "parenthetical": "\"The accused does not have an unfettered Sixth Amendment right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 F.3d 494", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9325177 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/320/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905", "parenthetical": "\"When the jury is in as good a position as the expert to determine an issue, the expert's testimony is properly excludable because it is not helpful to the jury.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509910 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377", "parenthetical": "\"When the jury is in as good a position as the expert to determine an issue, the expert's testimony is properly excludable because it is not helpful to the jury.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 F.3d 780", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 105977 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "'Daubert clearly contemplates the vesting of significant discretion in the district court with regard to the decision to admit expert scientific testimony.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/137/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 F.3d 809", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7414575 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/45/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11471033 ], "weight": 20, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "519" }, { "page": "136" }, { "page": "508" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "139-40" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "143-44" }, { "page": "517" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "518" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "2012 WL 379936", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"As amended, Rule 702(a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "721 S.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 283", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 400", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "\"North Carolina is not, nor has it ever been, a Daubert jurisdiction.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 579", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355769 ], "weight": 20, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "\"We recognize that [such a role], no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.\"" }, { "page": "590" }, { "page": "480-81" }, { "page": "590" }, { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "591, 595" }, { "page": "481, 483-84" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "484", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "592" }, { "page": "482" }, { "page": "593-94" }, { "page": "482-83" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "483-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0579-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1480, "char_count": 40556, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.593218123366524e-08, "percentile": 0.40332718239557597 }, "sha256": "a2d101ca4210dabec0d206f43781949030a1de2170e81e68d61507ca9f262b53", "simhash": "1:a1eefb2475ee6e59", "word_count": 6588 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:41.441392+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES ANTHONY McGRADY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nFactual and Procedural Background\nThis case arises from the death of James Allen Shore, Jr. (\u201cthe decedent\u201d), who was shot by Defendant Charles Anthony McGrady in a field near both individuals\u2019 homes. Defendant and the decedent are first cousins and were involved in a number of disputes during the decedent\u2019s life. On 6 February 2012, Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The trial began on Monday, 30 July 2012, and continued through the following Wednesday. The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following:\nAt the time of the shooting, the decedent lived on the western side of Wiles Ridge Road with his fianc\u00e9e, Tammy Wood (\u201cWood\u201d), in Hays, North Carolina. Defendant and his girlfriend, Darlene Kellum, lived on the eastern side of the road, opposite the decedent. Defendant\u2019s son, Brandon McGrady (\u201cBrandon\u201d), lived approximately 400 feet to the northwest of his father\u2019s home. Defendant\u2019s aunt and the decedent\u2019s mother, Betty Shore, lived on the western side of the road. The area encompassing these homes is approximately nine acres.\nIn the early morning hours of 20 December 2011, the decedent took his dog for a walk outside his house. Afterward, he returned home upset and told Wood that Defendant had been shining a light on him. Later that morning, around 10:00 a.m., the decedent got up, walked his dog to his mother\u2019s house, and told her the same thing. He was wearing a knife on his waist, attached by a rope, and carrying a walking stick. After talking with his mother, the decedent walked back toward his house with his dog. On the way, he came in contact with Defendant and Defendant\u2019s son, Brandon, who were riding together in a golf cart to get the mail. Defendant was seated in the driver\u2019s seat, and Brandon was seated in the passenger seat. Defendant was carrying a loaded, 9-millimeter Beretta pistol in his right pocket and an audio cassette player in his left hand. Brandon had a loaded AR-15 semi-automatic rifle between his legs.\nWhile Defendant and Brandon were checking the mail, they saw the decedent walking toward the golf cart. Shortly thereafter, Defendant and the decedent started arguing, and Defendant began recording with his cassette player. Speaking to the decedent, Defendant asked, \u201cDo you have anything to add about murdering my family last night?\u201d The decedent responded, \u201cNo, I plainly told you.\u201d Defendant repeated his question and the decedent told him to \u201cshut the fuck up.\u201d More arguing occurred, and Defendant told the decedent to \u201cstay away from us.\u201d The decedent responded, \u201cYou know I\u2019ll whoop your ass and put you on the ground if you try to stab me in the back; now get over here and get some.\u201d Defendant responded by saying, \u201cI\u2019ll put you in the grave; in the morgue, in the morgue, motherfucker.\u201d\nThe argument continued, and the decedent put his hands on the golf cart, shaking it. Defendant asked Brandon to give him the AR-15. As Brandon attempted to hand it to his father, the decedent took the AR-15 and stood back, pointing it at Defendant and his son. Brandon got out of the golf cart, but Defendant remained seated. After exchanging more insults with the decedent, D\u00e9fendant stepped out of the golf cart, pulled out his pistol, and fired approximately seven shots at the decedent in rapid succession. Afterward, Defendant said to the decedent, \u201cWhat about now, Bozo? What about now, motherfucker, huh?\u201d He then proclaimed that the decedent \u201cattacked us, by God\u201d and returned to his house with his weapons and son.\nThe decedent died shortly thereafter, at 12:35 p.m. According to the medical examiner, some of the bullets entered the decedent\u2019s arm and then reentered his torso, making it difficult to calculate an exact number of shots. Other bullets entered the decedent\u2019s back. The medical examiner testified that there were gunshot wounds in the upper part of the decedent\u2019s buttocks, going from left to right. There were also two gunshot wounds in the decedent\u2019s torso. The lower wound was fatal, resulting from a \u201cstraight-on shot\u201d into the decedent\u2019s back that went through his lung and into his heart.\nDefendant was eventually taken into custody and charged with first-degree murder. At trial, Defendant testified that the decedent was pointing the AR-15 at Brandon\u2019s head and he shot the decedent \u201cout of instinct, to protect my son.\u201d At the close of all the evidence and after the parties\u2019 arguments, the trial court instructed the jury on, inter alia, self-defense and defense of a family member. On 8 August 2012, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He gave notice of appeal that same day.\nDiscussion\nDefendant makes two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony offered by Defendant regarding the doctrine of \u201cuse of force,\u201d in violation of his right to present a defense. Second, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by preventing him from introducing evidence of the decedent\u2019s \u201cproclivity toward violence based on his reputation and his previous violent actions.\u201d We find no error.\nI. Expert Witness Testimony on Use of Force\nIt is well-established that trial courts must decide preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of experts to testify or the admissibility of expert testimony. ... In this capacity, trial courts are afforded wide latitude of discretion when making a determination \u00e1bout the admissibility of expert testimony. Given such latitude, it follows that a trial court\u2019s ruling on the qualifications of an expert or the admissibility of an expert\u2019s opinion will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\nHowerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 458, 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). \u201cAbuse of discretion results where the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).\nA. Voir Dire\nOn 30 July 2012, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Dave F. Cloutier. A voir dire hearing on that motion was held at trial. During the hearing, Cloutier testified on the \u201cscience\u201d of \u201cuse of force\u201d as applied to the facts of this- case. Specifically, he discussed the concepts of (1) \u201creaction time,\u201d (2) an individual\u2019s response to perceived lethal and nonlethal force, (3) \u201cforce variables,\u201d (4) \u201cpre-attack cues,\u201d and (5) \u201cperceptual narrowing.\u201d Cloutier described \u201creaction time\u201d as \u201cthe time it takes [to react] once the brain has perceived a threat \u2014 [the perception of such a threat is] usually visual, by the eyes, although it could be with other senses.\u201d He defined \u201cforce variables\u201d as\ncircumstances and events that would . . . influence someone\u2019s decision of a use of force that was necessary to overcome a perceived threat. That could include the actual weapons involved, the number of weapons, the number of individuals, the environment, the time of day, the lighting, any number of variables.\n\u201cPre-attack cues\u201d are \u201cthose exhibitions by an individual which an individual would actually perceive or view and make the assumption that an attack was likely.\u201d For example, \u201ca glaring look in [an individual\u2019s] face, a clinched jaw, . . . clinched fist,\u201d or bringing a weapon up as if to fire. Finally, \u201cperceptual narrowing\u201d is \u201cthe reason people have a tendency to not have a total recall of what actually may have happened [during an altercation].\u201d According to Cloutier, perceptual narrowing could result in difficulty remembering, for example, \u201cthe number of shots that may have been fired in an actual lethal encounter.\u201d\nRegarding his experience and training in the field, Cloutier testified that he had worked in \u201cuse of force\u201d since January of 1991. At the time of the trial, he was a \u201cprivate citizen\u201d who provided \u201cexpert witness services in regards to use of force ....\u201d Before that, he worked for the North Carolina Department of Justice as an instructor \u201cfor subject control and arrest techniques for law enforcement training ...\u201d and served in the military. He holds a bachelor of science degree in criminal justice from North Carolina Wesleyan College and is a graduate of the FBI National Academy. He has held certifications in (1) firearms instruction, (2) subject control and arrest techniques, (3) specialized subject control, and (4) unarmed self-defense. At the time of trial, however, he was certified only as an \u201cFBI defensive tactics instructor_\u201d Before the trial, Cloutier had been admitted as an expert approximately twenty-two times in state and federal court. Cloutier does not have a Ph.D or any medical degree.\nApplying the use of force doctrine to the facts in this case, Cloutier offered the following observations: (1) The decedent exhibited a number of pre-attack cues that might have indicated a forthcoming assault. (2) \u201c[A]ge, gender, size, environment, use of a weapon, type of weapon, number of weapons, and . . . number of subjects\u201d were \u201cuse of force variables\u201d present in this case and, along with the pre-attack cues, these factors were \u201cconsistent with exhibition by an individual that an attack was likely imminent.\u201d (3) The rounds fired at the decedent were fired in \u201csomewhere around 1.8 seconds . . . [, meaning] it\u2019s very possible and likely that during the course of firing in that 1.8 seconds that [the decedent] could have, in fact, [reacted and] turned 90 to 180 degrees, or,.in fact, could have turned 360 degrees,\u201d accounting for the injuries in his side and back. In addition, (4) Defendant was possibly affected by perceptual narrowing.\nWhen Cloutier was questioned about the scientific basis for his opinions, he testified that his knowledge came from published articles in the field of use of force and the training he received \u201cby some of those authors and studies that I have myself been involved in . ...\u201d He explained that the \u201cJustice Academy\u201d uses \u201ca number of tests ... to look at various principles of use of force . . . .\u201d According to Cloutier, this information is regularly relied on by people in the field. When asked to explain the reliability of the information described in his testimony, Cloutier explained:\nThe tests, for example, that I have been a part of performing and been involved in with the Justice Academy... measure the physiological results of an individual under stress and their reaction time; once they perceive a threat, how long it takes to react and what type of reaction they have. Those results of those studies that we have performed at the Justice Academy are consistent with the studies that have been performed and published on a national basis.\nAccording to Cloutier, these tests have \u201cremained consistent over time.\u201d When asked to describe the \u201cknown or potential rate of error,\u201d however, Cloutier admitted that he did not know.\nAt the end of the hearing, the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection and excluded Cloutier\u2019s testimony in its entirety. The court pointed out that (1) much of Cloutier\u2019s report constituted impermissible witness bolstering, (2) certain of Cloutier\u2019s opinions were based on medical knowledge that he was not qualified to discuss, (3) Cloutier\u2019s opinion on use of force variables would not be helpful to the jury because most individuals are able to recognize pre-attack cues and other use of force variables, and (4) Cloutier is not competent to testify about reaction times. In addition, the court determined that Cloutier\u2019s \u201ctestimony [was] not based on sufficient facts or data. ...[,] not the product of reliable principles or methods.... [, and] simply a conclusory approach that [could not] reasonably assess for reliability.\u201d The court noted that Cloutier\u2019s testimony had not been subject to peer review, Cloutier had no knowledge of a potential rate of error regarding any of the use of force factors, and Cloutier did not recognize or apply the variables that could have affected his opinions in the case. As a result, the court concluded that Cloutier\u2019s \u201copinions . . . [were] . . . based on speculation. He[ was] just guessing and overlooking a very important part of what could very well affect his opinions in this case. \u201d It also found, \u201c [n] otwith-standing all those findings,\u201d that the probative value of Cloutier\u2019s testimony was \u201csubstantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the juiy\u201d under Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.\nB. Legal Background\nRule 702 states, in pertinent part, that\n(a) if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testily thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all of the following apply:\n(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data.\n(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods.\n(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2013). Rule 702(a) was amended to read as quoted above, effective 1 October 2011. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 400, \u00a7 1(c) (S.B. 33); 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 283, \u00a7 1.3 (H.B. 542). The earlier version of the rule did not include the criteria listed in subsections (1) \u2014 (3), but was otherwise the same. See id.\nThough our appellate courts have not addressed in detail the significance of the October 2011 amendment to Rule 702, this Court has noted that the current, amended \u201clanguage . . . implements the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,[] 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).\u201d Wise v. Alcoa, Inc., _ N.C. App. _,_n.1,_S.E.2d_,_n.1 (2013); see also State v. Hudson,_. N.C. App._, 721 S.E.2d 763 (2012) (unpublished opinion), available at 2012 WL 379936. That observation comports with the bill analysis provided to the Senate Judiciary Committee which reviewed the amendment. See Committee Counsel Bill Patterson, 2011-2012 General Assembly, House Bill 542: Tort Reform for Citizens and Business 2-3 n.3 (8 June 2011) (\u201cAs amended, Rule 702(a) will mirror Federal Rule 702(a), which was amended in 2000 to conform to the standard outlined in Daubert....\u201d); see generally Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 469. This new language represents a departure from our previous understanding of Rule 702, which eschewed the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Daubert. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 469, 597 S.E.2d at 693 (\u201cNorth Carolina is not, nor has it ever been, a Daubert jurisdiction.\u201d). Given the changes wrought by onr legislature, however, it is clear that amended Rule 702 should be applied pursuant to the federal standard as articulated in Daubert.\nIn the Daubert case, the United States Supreme Court defined a gatekeeping role for trial judges. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 485 (\u201cWe recognize that [such a role], no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.\u201d). Accordingly, an expert must first base his testimony on \u201cscientific knowledge,\u201d which \u201cimplies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science,\u201d in order for that testimony to be admissible. Id. at 590, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 480-81. The Court explained this requirement in detail as follows:\n[T]he word \u201cknowledge\u201d connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.... [I]n order to qualify as \u201cscientific knowledge,\u201d an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method, Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation \u2014 i.e., \u201cgood grounds,\u201d based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert\u2019s testimony pertain to \u201cscientific knowledge\u201d establishes a standard of eviden-tiary reliability.\nId. at 590, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 481 (emphasis added). Second, an expert\u2019s testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. Id. at 591, 595, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 481, 483-84. \u201cThe focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.\u201d Id. at 595, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 484 (emphasis added).\nIt is the trial court\u2019s responsibility to determine \u201cwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge\u201d and whether that knowledge \u201c(2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.\u201d Id. at 592, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 482. In deciding whether the proffered scientific theory or technique will assist the trier of fact, the trial court may consider, among other things, (1) \u201cwhether [a theory or technique] can be (and has been) tested,\u201d (2) \u201cwhether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication,\u201d (3) \u201cthe known or potential rate of error ... and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique\u2019s operation,\u201d and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted as rehable in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 482-83. This inquiry is \u201ca flexible one,\u201d id. at 594, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 483-84, and remains reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508, 519 (1997).\nC. Analysis\nDefendant argues that the trial court erroneously excluded Cloutier\u2019s testimony under Rule 702 and, in doing so, abused its discretion. Specifically, Defendant asserts that \u201cuse of force is a science,\u201d based on scientific principles and utilized by other experts. He states that concepts like \u201creaction time\u201d are based on \u201creliable\u201d studies, which were cited by Cloutier, and points out that Cloutier unearthed a number of \u201cuse of force variables that came into play in this situation.... Most importantly], Cloutier explained that [the decedent] could have turned 90 to 180 degrees in 1.8 seconds,\u201d the amount of time it took Defendant to Are the shots. Defendant argues that this fact, in particular, could have assisted the jury in determining that Defendant used \u201cdefensive force\u201d in the confrontation with the decedent. Defendant also argues that expert testimony \u201cshould be liberally admitted\u201d and that the trial court \u201cunfairly interjected] itself into the litigation\u201d and disregarded the liberal admission precept. In conjunction with the above argument, Defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude Cloutier\u2019s testimony violated his constitutional right to present a defense. We disagree.\n(1) Rule 702\nIn Joiner, the United States Supreme .Court reviewed a trial court\u2019s application of the Daubert test. 522 U.S. at 136, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 508. The respondent-employee worked as an electrician for the petitioner-employer. Id. at 139, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 514. By expert testimony, the employee linked the development of his cancer to his exposure to certain chemicals used by his employer. Id. at 139-40, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 514. In providing that testimony, the experts relied on a number of specific scientific studies. Id. at 143-44, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 517. Nonetheless, the trial court excluded the proffered testimony on grounds that it did not rise above \u201csubjective belief or unsupported speculation.\u201d Id. at 140, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 515. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the trial court, citing a general \u201cpreference\u201d for the admission of expert testimony. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed that decision on writ of certiorari and affirmed the trial court\u2019s original decision to exclude the expert testimony. Id. at 141, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 515.\nIn his argument to the Supreme Court, the employee asserted that the trial court\u2019s disagreement with the experts\u2019 conclusions was error because the experts had relied on the specific principles and methodology used in the cited studies, pursuant to the requirements laid down in Daubert. Id. at 146, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 518. The Supreme Court overruled that argument and stated that, while the focus of a trial court\u2019s analysis must be on principles and methodology,\nconclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.... [N]o thing... requires a [trial court] to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.\nId. at 146, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 519 (emphasis added). Citing the highly deferential standard afforded to a trial court\u2019s decision to exclude or admit expert testimony, the Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the employee\u2019s expert testimony and in determining that the analytical gap between the data and the opinion in that case was too great. Id.\nIn this case, just as in Joiner, the trial court determined that there was too great an analytical gap between the authorities cited by Cloutier and his offered opinion. Specifically, the court concluded that Cloutier\u2019s testimony was not based on sufficient facts or data or the product of reliable principles and methods. The trial court also noted that (1) the testimony served as \u201csimply a conclusory approach that cannot reasonably assess for reliability\u201d and (2) Cloutier had failed to provide any known rate of error or show that any of the referenced studies were the subject of peer review. For those reasons, the trial court determined that Cloutier\u2019s testimony was merely \u201cbased on speculation\u201d and commented that \u201c[Cloutier] is just guessing and overlooking [variables that] could... affect his opinions in this case.\u201d\nDefendant contests the trial court\u2019s conclusions and asserts that it abused its discretion in coming to those conclusions, but does not show how the court\u2019s decision was arbitrarily or manifestly unreasonable. Rather, he argues for the reasonableness of a different conclusion based on the same evidence. This demonstrates a misunderstanding of the abuse of discretion standard.\nThe federal courts have traditionally granted \u201ca great deal of discretion\u201d to the trial court when determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Daubert. See, e.g., U.S. v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809 (4th Cir. 1995); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 137 F.3d 780 (4th Cir. 1998) (\u2018Daubert clearly contemplates the vesting of significant discretion in the district court with regard to the decision to admit expert scientific testimony.\u201d). As the State points out in its brief, Cloutier provided little data to support the reliability of his proposed methodology. Though Cloutier testified that (1) use of force has been \u201ctested,\u201d (2) publications exist in the field, and (3) the theory is \u201crelied upon regularly,\u201d he provided no substantive reasons \u2014 no specific scientific knowledge, methods, or procedures \u2014 to support those assertions. Indeed, unlike the experts in Joiner, Cloutier was not even able to cite a single specific study, merely referring to the existence of studies and their authors generally. In addition, when the court asked about the relevant \u201crate of error,\u201d Cloutier admitted that he knew nothing about that factor or how it related to his opinions.\nA review of the trial transcript indicates that, in excluding Cloutier\u2019s testimony, the trial court properly applied the standard laid down by the Supreme Court in Daubert. The court determined that Cloutier\u2019s testimony was firmly within the realm of common knowledge and would not be helpful to the jury. The Court pointed out that Cloutier completely lacked medical credentials and provided little evidence regarding the principles or methodology used to come to his conclusions. Therefore, even if we were to assume that the doctrine of \u201cuse of force\u201d constitutes scientific knowledge, we see no reason to conclude that the trial court was manifestly unreasonable in determining that Cloutier\u2019s knowledge of that doctrine \u2022\u2014 including the way an individual reacts in a confrontation or the fact that an individual might turn away when a gun is fired \u2014 was not helpful to the jury. See generally Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 377, 410 S.E.2d 897, 905 (1991) (\u201cWhen the jury is in as good a position as the expert to determine an issue, the expert\u2019s testimony is properly excludable because it is not helpful to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted). In our view, the court\u2019s decision was well-reasoned, especially given the Daubert requirements invoked by amended Rule 702. Therefore, Defendant\u2019s first argument is overruled, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude Cloutier\u2019s testimony under Rule 702.\n(2) Right to Present a Defense\nDefendant also contends that the exclusion of Cloutier\u2019s testimony under Rule 702 violated his constitutional right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. We disagree.\nThe right to present a defense is not absolute. U.S. v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2003). Criminal defendants do not have a right to present evidence that the trial court, in its discretion, deems inadmissible under the rules of evidence. See id. (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988) (\u201cThe accused does not have an unfettered Sixth Amendment right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\u201d) (brackets omitted)). Indeed, only rarely has the Supreme Court \u201cheld that the right to present a complete defense [is] violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of evidence.\u201d Nevada v. Jackson, _U.S. _, _, 186 L. Ed. 2d 62, 66 (2013). Because we have determined that the trial court excluded Cloutier\u2019s testimony within the bounds of our rules of evidence, we hold that Defendant\u2019s constitutional right to present a defense was not violated. Defendant\u2019s second argument is therefore overruled.\nII. Character Evidence\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Dr. Jerry Brittain, who addressed the decedent\u2019s alleged proclivity toward violence. We disagree.\nA. Voir Dire\nAt trial, Defendant called Dr. Brittain to the stand as a lay witness. The State objected, and the trial court conducted a voir dire examination.\nOn voir dire, Dr. Brittain discussed meetings he held with the decedent in June and July of 2011, approximately one year before the decedent\u2019s death. Referencing his notes from those meetings, Dr. Brittain testified that the decedent was angry and frustrated with many \u201careas\u201d of his life. By his second meeting with the decedent, Dr. Brittain had begun \u201cto surmise\u201d that the decedent was dealing with \u201caggression,\u201d \u201cthoughts of violence,\u201d and \u201cconflict that he had with the people that were around him.\u201d In that meeting, Dr. Brittain and the decedent discussed \u201cthe violence,\u201d and Dr. Brittain stressed the need for the decedent to avoid being either the victim or the perpetrator in a confrontation. Dr. Brittain also referred to the decedent as \u201ca very angry man,\u201d but noted that he was taking his medication, \u201cha[d] not perpetrated violence,\u201d and, in the decedent\u2019s words, was \u201ctrying to not become angry and harm someone.\u201d When asked about the source of the decedent\u2019s anger, Dr. Brittain testified that it \u201cpermeated all of his life,\u201d but noted that the source was not specifically related to Defendant, who was not discussed during the meetings.\nAt the conclusion of voir dire, the trial court excluded Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony in its entirety on relevance grounds and under Rules 403 and 404(a)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.\nB. Legal Background and Analysis\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony, \u201c[s]imply put, [because] a violent man' is more likely to be the aggressor than a peaceable man.\u201d Defendant also argues that this error prevented him from offering important evidence in his defense and, thus, \u201cdenied him his constitutional right to present a defense.\u201d We are unpersuaded.\n(1) Rule 404(a)(2)\nRule 404 provides, in pertinent part, that:\n(a) . . . Evidence of a person\u2019s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:\n(2) . . . Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404.\nCharacter evidence is evidence of \u201c [t]he peculiar qualities impressed by nature or by habit on the person, which distinguish him from others.\u201d Bottoms v. Kent, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 154, 160 (1855). A person\u2019s character \u201ccan only be known indirectly ... by inference from acts. A witness called to prove them, can only give the opinion which he has formed by his observations of the conduct of the person under particular circumstances . . . .\u201d Id. As distinct from reputation, \u201ccharacter is what a man is\" and \u201creputation is what others say he is.\u201d Kenneth S. Broun, 1 Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence 253 (6th ed. 2004) (emphasis in original).\n\u201cRule 404(a) is a general rule of exclusion, prohibiting the introduction of character evidence to prove that a person acted in conformity with that evidence of character.\u201d State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 201, 376 S.E.2d 745, 751 (1989). Such evidence may be admitted, however, when testimony regarding a, pertinent character trait of the victim (here, the decedent) is offered by the defendant in a criminal case. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(2). In cases where self-defense is at issue, evidence of a victim\u2019s violent or dangerous character may be admitted under Rule 404(a)(2) when \u201c(1) such character was known to the accused, or (2) the [other] evidence of the crime is all circumstantial or the nature of the transaction is in doubt.\u201d State v. Winfrey, 298 N.C. 260, 262, 258 S.E.2d 346, 347 (1979) (emphasis added); see also State v. Blackwell, 162 N.C. 672, 78 S.E. 316 (1913) (\u201c[Evidence] is . . . competent to show the character of the deceased as a violent and dangerous man when the [remaining] evidence is wholly circumstantial and the character of the encounter is in doubt.\u201d) (emphasis added). This is because the evidence of the victim\u2019s violent character \u201ctends to shed some light upon who was the aggressor since a violent man is more likely to be the aggressor than is a peaceable man.\u201d Winfrey, 298 N.C. at 262, 258 S.E.2d at 348 (emphasis added).\nIn this case, the court excluded Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony under Rule 404(a)(2) because the witness \u201cdidn\u2019t testify as to any trait or character. He was simply testifying as to a fact. . . . He . . . was merely reciting what the facts were when the victim presented himself [during the meetings].\u201d Defendant argues, however, that Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony should have been admitted pursuant to State v. Everett, 178 N.C. App. 44, 630 S.E.2d 703 (2006), affirmed, 361 N.C. 217, 639 S.E.2d 442 (2007). In that case, the defendant, arguing that she killed the victim in self-defense, presented evidence that the victim had committed a separate violent act. Id. at 52, 630 S.E.2d at 708. The trial court excluded that testimony as irrelevant. Id. at 50, 630 S.E.2d at 707. We reversed the trial court\u2019s decision under Winfrey and Rule 404(a)(2) and held that the evidence of the violent act was relevant and admissible, in part, because it was known by the defendant. Id. Defendant argues under Everett that, \u201c[w]ithout the testimony from Dr. Brittain, the jury was unable to understand how [the decedent] was the aggressor. This evidence established, through specific examples, that [the decedent] was a violent man and likely was the aggressor. The exclusion of this evidence by the trial court was error.\u201d We disagree.\nDr. Brittain\u2019s testimony \u2014 as the trial court noted in excluding it under Rule 404(a) \u2014 does not constitute evidence of the decedent\u2019s character for violence. When asked about his meetings with the decedent, Dr. Brittain testified to the fact that the decedent was an angry person who had thoughts of violence. He did not, however, testify to his opinion that the decedent was, inherently, a man of violent character or even a violent person as distinguished from others. In fact, contrary to Defendant\u2019s argument on appeal, Dr. Brittain affirmed on cross-examination that \u201cthere was no evidence that [the decedent] was actually committing any acts of violence [.]\u201d Rather, \u201c[h]e was just generally frustrated at the system.\u201d Because Rule 404(a)(2) only allows testimony regarding a pertinent character trait, the trial court did not err in excluding Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony as inadmissible on that basis.\nTo the extent that Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony could be construed as character evidence, however, we note that this case is distinct from Everett. In Everett, the evidence of the victim\u2019s violent act fulfilled one of the Winfrey requirements \u2014 it was known by the defendant \u2014 and, therefore, increased the likelihood that the defendant acted out of self-defense. Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony met neither requirement. First, it failed to show that Defendant was aware of any anger issues or the alleged violent nature of the decedent. Indeed, Dr. Brittain clearly stated that the source of the decedent\u2019s anger was not Defendant and that Defendant was not even discussed. Second, there is ample direct evidence regarding the altercation between the decedent and Defendant. The altercation was recorded on Defendant\u2019s tape recorder and was the subject of eyewitness testimony. Such evidence is not circumstantial and, therefore, does not allow the trial court to admit the evidence under Rule 404(a) (2). Accordingly, Defendant\u2019s argument is overruled.\n(2) Rules 401, 402, and 403\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony as to Defendant\u2019s, character for violence because \u201c[the decedent\u2019s alleged] violent character is relevant as it relates to whether [he] was the aggressor\u201d and is not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 because \u201c[i]ts only prejudice to the State was its relevance to the defense.\u201d This argument is without merit.\nRule 401 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence states that \u201c \u2018[Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401. Rule 402 provides that \u201c[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of North Carolina, by Act of Congress, by Act of the General Assembly or by these rules. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.!\u2019 N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 (emphasis added). Rule 403 provides that \u201c[although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403. \u201cWe review a trial court\u2019s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 166, 160, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2008).\nBecause we have already determined that the trial court properly excluded Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony as not admissible under Rule 404(a)(2), we need not address these alternative bases for exclusion. Nonetheless, we note that Defendant\u2019s argument does not provide any reason to believe that Judge Albright acted arbitrarily or was manifestly unreasonable in determining that \u201cany probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.\u201d Defendant\u2019s argument is overruled.\n(3) Constitutional Right to Present a Defense\nAs a part of his preceding arguments, Defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s exclusion of Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony requires a new trial because it violated his constitutional right to present witnesses in his own defense under Article VI of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. We disagree.\nAs we noted in section 1(C)(2), the right to present a defense is not absolute and does not apply when a trial court properly deems evidence inadmissible under the rules of evidence. Because we have determined that Dr. Brittain\u2019s testimony was properly excluded by the trial court under Rule 404(a)(2), this argument is overruled.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.\n. The shots were fired in 1.82 seconds.\n. He elaborated: \u201c[B]y the time the individual perceives a threat, recognize[s] it as a threat, and makes the decision to begin to use some technique, tactic, or method to either flee or fight[, i]t usually takes the average person about three-quarters of a second to begin to react to some stimulus that they perceive as a threat. So we utilize that reaction time in analyzing these various cases.\u201d\n. Cloutier later stated: \u201cI have not done[ a] statistical analysis on any of these studies or read a statistical analysis.\u201d\n. The \u201cscientific method\u201d is \u201c[a]n analytical technique by which a hypothesis is formulated and then systematically tested through observation and experimentation.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1463-64 (9th ed. 2009).\n. Such \u201cpreference\u201d is not unlike the liberal admission precept invoked by Defendant in this case.\n. Ipse dixit is Latin for \u201che himself said it\u201d and defined as \u201c[s]omething asserted but not proved].]\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 905 (9th ed. 2009).\n. We also note that Defendant does not address the trial court\u2019s determination that the testimony is inadmissible under Rule 403.\n. Cloutier stated that he had read and even participated in some of the studies leading to these publications. Nevertheless, he was completely unable to provide details regarding their content.\n. We do not offer an opinion as to whether it does. We note, however, that Cloutier offered scant evidence to support that fact in this particular case. Merely referencing scientific studies and explaining the meaning of apparent scholarly terms like \u201cperceptual narrowing\u201d - without providing a more substantial basis on which to ground one\u2019s opinion \u2014 does not fit with the Daubert Court\u2019s intent that expert testimony be based on scientific knowledge.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Solicitor General Gary R. Govert, for the State.", "Rudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES ANTHONY McGRADY\nNo. COA13-330\nFiled 21 January 2014\n1. Evidence \u2014 expert testimony \u2014 \u201cuse of force\u201d \u2014 scientific knowledge \u2014 Rule 702\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion and violate defendant\u2019s right to present a defense in a first-degree murder trial by excluding expert testimony offered by defendant regarding the doctrine of \u201cuse of force.\u201d Even assuming that the doctrine of \u201cuse of force\u201d constituted scientific knowledge, the court\u2019s decision was well-reasoned, especially given the requirements set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, invoked by amended Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.\n2. Evidence \u2014 witness testimony \u2014 decedent\u2019s character \u2014 proclivity for violence\nThe trial court did not err and violate defendant\u2019s right to present a defense in a first-degree murder trial by excluding under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404 the testimony of a defense witness who addressed the decedent\u2019s alleged proclivity toward violence. The witness\u2019s testimony did not constitute evidence of the decedent\u2019s character for violence. Furthermore, the testimony failed to show that defendant was aware of any anger issues or the alleged violent nature of the decedent and there was ample direct evidence regarding the altercation between the decedent and defendant.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 8 August 2012 by Judge R. Stuart Albright in Wilkes County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Solicitor General Gary R. Govert, for the State.\nRudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0095-01", "first_page_order": 105, "last_page_order": 121 }