{ "id": 6776412, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LUCIUS ELWOOD McLEAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McLean", "decision_date": "2014-01-21", "docket_number": "No. COA13-693", "first_page": "111", "last_page": "119", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 N.C. App. 111" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632942 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288-89", "parenthetical": "\"[N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-269(a)] provides for testing of 'biological evidence' and not evidence in general. Since defendant desires to demonstrate a lack of biological evidence, the post-conviction DNA testing statute does not apply.\" (internal citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 S.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4174179 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9006275 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609", "parenthetical": "\"[N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-269(a)] provides for testing of 'biological evidence' and not evidence in general. Since defendant desires to demonstrate a lack of biological evidence, the post-conviction DNA testing statute does not apply.\" (internal citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "725 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "stating that evidence is \"material\" for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-269(a)(l) if \"there is a 'reasonable probability' that its disclosure to the defense would result in a different outcome in the jury's deliberation\" (quotation marks and citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "729 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "describing the required showing of materiality in the post-conviction context as a \"condition precedent to a trial court's statutoiy authority to grant a motion under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 15A-269\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511442 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150837 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632-33", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 N.C. App. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4181750 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/209/0116-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 896, "char_count": 21084, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1822303153581541 }, "sha256": "90b6d6b6c6f0b3d7d59dc8b09bab5c7196023bf3e4b4c1459a844ec155bf843f", "simhash": "1:2b312376db6aa0d1", "word_count": 3506 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:41.441392+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LUCIUS ELWOOD McLEAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nFollowing final judgments as to the charges against him, Lucius Elwood McLean (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals a pre-trial order entered 4 March 2010 by Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Guilford County Superior Court. The challenged order denied Defendant\u2019s pre-trial motion for DNA testing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c) (2013). Defendant contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying his motion because the absence of his DNA on shell casings found at the scene, if established, would have been relevant to the State\u2019s investigation and material to his defense. For the following reasons, we find no error and affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nI. Factual & Procedural History\nOn 20 August 2012, Defendant was convicted on two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury, one count of discharging a firearm into an occupied building, and one count of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following.\nOn 16 April 2008, Defendant agreed to rent commercial property located at 2801 Patterson Avenue in Greensboro from Stuart Elium (\u201cMr. Elium\u201d). Defendant indicated that he needed the property to open an arcade. Defendant gave Mr. Elium a down payment and entered the space. Mr. Elium testified that Defendant arrived at their meeting in a \u201cbronzish Jaguar.\u201d\nImmediately next door to Defendant\u2019s property was an established night club operated by Reginald Green (\u201cMr. Green\u201d) called \u201cClub Touch.\u201d Mr. Green also rented from Mr. Elium. Club Touch generally operated between 10 p.m. and 2 a.m. and served liquor. Derry George (\u201cMr. George\u201d) was the club\u2019s manager. Robert Willis (\u201cMr. Willis\u201d) and Mark Stephens (\u201cMr. Stephens\u201d) worked security.\nOn 17 April 2008, Mr. George arrived for work between 7 and 8 p.m. and noticed a group of men sitting outside the club next to Defendant\u2019s property. When Mr. George went inside Club Touch, he noticed that a break-in had occurred and that equipment had been stolen. Mr. George called the police, who investigated the break-in and questioned the men sitting outside Defendant\u2019s property. The men told the police that they were waiting on someone to come let them into Defendant\u2019s building.\nAn hour or so later, Defendant arrived on the scene and spoke to Mr. George about the incident. Mr. George testified that Defendant\u2019s men were upset about being questioned in connection to the break-in, so Mr. George wanted to let Defendant know that there were no hard feelings. Defendant was cordial to Mr. George and the two talked about Defendant\u2019s plan for opening a business next door. Defendant told Mr. George that he wanted to open a \u201c2 to 6\u201d \u2014 meaning that Defendant\u2019s establishment would be open from 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. and be a place where Club Touch\u2019s patrons could go after the club closes. After their conversation, Mr. George telephoned Mr. Green to inform him of Defendant\u2019s plans and expressed concern that Defendant\u2019s proposed business might affect Club Touch\u2019s liquor license.\nAt around 10 p.m. that same night, Defendant and his men placed balloons and a sign outside their building that read \u201cThe Party is Here\u201d and played music loudly from their establishment. Mr. George indicated that Defendant arrived that evening in a \u201cgold-colored\u201d Jaguar. Mr. George and Mr. Willis testified that as the night was coming to an end, Defendant and his men approached Club Touch and yelled, \u201cWe\u2019re hood around here\u201d and \u201cIt\u2019s hood out here. Going to be real.\u201d\nThe next morning, Mr. Green called Mr. Elium to discuss what had happened. Thereafter, Mr. Elium informed Defendant that their rental arrangement was not going to work out. Mr. Elium returned Defendant\u2019s money, reclaimed the keys to the property, and assisted Defendant in vacating the premises.\nOn 20 April 2008, at approximately 2:45 a.m., multiple cars arrived at Club Touch, circled around the back of the club, and pulled up to the entrance. Among the cars was Defendant\u2019s gold Jaguar. Mr. George, Mr. Willis, and Mr. Stephens were all standing at the front door.\nMr. George, Mr. Willis, and Mr. Stephens testified that Defendant emerged from the gold Jaguar and asked for the owner of the club. During a heated exchange, Defendant stated, \u201cIt\u2019s real\u201d and \u201cIf I can\u2019t have my club open, y\u2019all can\u2019t have y\u2019all\u2019s open.\u201d Mr. Willis testified that upon hearing these words, he laughed at Defendant. Thereafter, Defendant stated, \u201cMan, it\u2019s real out here... you think I\u2019m playing.\u201d Defendant then popped his trunk, retrieved a long black SKS rifle, and said, \u201cOh, you\u2019re not scared.\u201d Defendant then cocked the gun and stated, \u201cOh, you\u2019re really not going to run.\u201d At that point, Mr. George and Mr. Willis retreated into the Club for cover, and Mr. Stephens retreated to his pickup truck in the parking lot.\nThereafter, multiple shots were fired into the club from outside the entryway. Mr. George was shot in the hand and in the side of his body. Mr. Willis was shot in the leg. Another man from Defendant\u2019s entourage opened fire on the club with a handgun. After opening fixe on the club, Defendant and his entourage fled the scene.\nPolice arrived on the scene around 3:15 a.m. and began their investigation. Six 7.62 caliber shell casings consistent with an SKS rifle and twelve .45 caliber shell casings were recovered from the crime scene. The guns were never found. In the days that followed, Mr. George, Mr. Willis, and Mr. Stephens all identified Defendant as the shooter in a photo array with near certainty. They testified to the same in open court.\nOn 24 April 2008, police stopped Defendant\u2019s sister in the gold Jaguar and seized the vehicle. During an inventory of the vehicle, police recovered a live 7.62 caliber bullet from underneath the passenger seat. No identifiable fingerprints were found on the bullet. After processing the vehicle, the police called Defendant\u2019s sister to retrieve it. However, Defendant\u2019s sister failed to pick the vehicle up and it was released to a local auto dealer.\nOn 10 July 2008, police received information that Defendant had been spotted at a local apartment complex. Acting on this information, the police were able to locate and stop Defendant, who was driving the same gold Jaguar. Thereafter, Defendant was arrested and taken into custody.\nPrior to trial, Deputy Sheriff James Swaringen (\u201cDeputy Swaringen\u201d) was transporting Defendant from the courthouse to the jail when he overheard a conversation Defendant had with another prisoner. Deputy Swaringen testified that Defendant stated, \u201cI can\u2019t believe'they have me over here for this. I shot the guy in the calf and there wasn\u2019t even an exit wound and they\u2019ve had me sitting up here for 35 months for this? They\u2019re just trying to see if I crack being up here so long.\u201d\nOn 20 January 2010, Defendant moved the trial court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c) for pre-trial DNA testing of the shell casings recovered from the crime scene. Specifically, Defendant\u2019s written motion indicated that he wanted \u201cto test the shell casings to see if there is any DNA material on the shell casings that may be compared to the Defendant.\u201d Defendant\u2019s written motion requested DNA testing on he following grounds:\n1. The Defendant is charged with attempted 1st Degree Murder in that it is alleged on or about April 20th in the early morning hours that the Defendant fired shots into a club in Greensboro injuring three people. Numerous shell casings were found from the weapon discharged outside the club on April 20, 2008.\n2. The Defendant intends to plead not guilty and contends that he did not discharge a firearm.\n3. The Defendant would like to test the shell casings to see if there is any DNA material on the shell casings that may be compared to the Defendant.\nAt the motion hearing, counsel for Defendant argued as follows:\nIt\u2019s my understanding that the State has these shell casings in their custody. We\u2019ve talked about a plea bargain in this case. There\u2019s not going to be a plea bargain in this case. My client says he\u2019s not guilty of this offense. In order to pursue all efforts to show that he\u2019s not guilty, I\u2019d like to have the opportunity to test these shell casings. There may or may not be DNA on the shell casings, but we won\u2019t know until we test them; until we try. So we\u2019d like to have the opportunity to test those shell casings to see if there\u2019s any DNA evidence on there and have it compared to [Defendant\u2019s]. So that\u2019s what \u2014 I think that\u2019s a reasonable request, Your Honor.\nDefendant also moved the trial court to order other discovery including fingerprint testing on the shell casings at issue. At the motion hearing, counsel for Defendant indicated that no fingerprint testing had been performed on the shell casings to date.\nBy order dated 4 March 2010, the trial court denied Defendant\u2019s motion for pre-trial DNA testing. In the same order, the trial court ordered that the shell casings at issue be subjected to fingerprint testing \u201cto determine what fingerprint evidence, if any, was present and whether or not any fingerprint evidence found on those shell casings match the Defendant\u2019s prints.\u201d No fingeiprints were found.\nThereafter, Defendant was tried and convicted on all counts and sentenced to two consecutive terms of 251 to 311 months in prison for the attempted first-degree murder convictions and to concurrent sentences for the remaining convictions. Defendant gave timely notice of appeal in open court.\nII. Jurisdiction\nDefendant\u2019s post-judgment appeal of the trial court\u2019s order denying Defendant\u2019s motion for DNA testing lies of right to this court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-27(b), 15A-1444(a) (2013). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-270.1 (2013).\nIII. Analysis\nThe only question presented to this Court by Defendant\u2019s appeal is whether the trial court erred in its application of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c). Defendant contends that pursuant to the cited statute, the trial court was required to order pre-trial DNA testing on shell casings found at the crime scene. We disagree.\n\u201cAlleged statutory errors are questions of law, and as such, are reviewed de novo.\u201d State v. Mackey, 209 N.C. App. 116, 120, 708 S.E.2d 719, 721 (2011) (internal citation omitted). \u201c \u2018Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment\u2019 for that of the lower tribunal.\u201d State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P\u2019ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c) provides:\nUpon a defendant\u2019s motion made before trial in accordance with [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 15A-952, the court shall order the Crime Laboratory or any approved vendor that meets Crime Laboratory contracting standards to perform DNA testing ... upon a showing of all of the following:\n(1) That the biological material is relevant to the investigation.\n(2) That the biological material was not previously DNA tested or that more accurate testing procedures are now available that were not available at the time of previous testing and there is a reasonable possibility that the result would have been different.\n(3) That the testing is material to the defendant\u2019s defense.\nSee also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-269(a) (2013) (outlining similar requirements for a post-conviction motion for DNA testing). Accordingly, by the plain language of this statute, the burden is on Defendant to make the required showing under subsections (1), (2), and (3) before the trial court. Absent the required showing, the trial court is not statutorily obligated to order pre-trial DNA testing. Cf. State v. Foster, _N.C. App. _, _, 729 S.E.2d 116, 120 (2012) (describing the required showing of materiality in the post-conviction context as a \u201ccondition precedent to a trial court\u2019s statutoiy authority to grant a motion under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 15A-269\u201d).\nHere, Defendant failed to establish the required showing under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c)(l) and (3) in his written motion and before the trial court at the motion hearing. Defendant\u2019s written motion stated in cursory fashion that \u201cDefendant intends to plead not guilty and contends that he did not discharge a firearm\u201d and that \u201cDefendant would like to test the shell casings to see if there is any DNA material on the shell casings that may be compared to Defendant.\u201d At the motion hearing, defense counsel added: \u201c [i]n order to pursue all efforts to show that he\u2019s not guilty . . . we\u2019d like to have the opportunity to test those shell casings to see if there\u2019s any DNA evidence on there and to have it compared to [Defendant\u2019s].\u201d Thus, before the trial court, Defendant failed to sufficiently demonstrate how the absence of his DNA on the shell casings would be either relevant to the investigation or material to his defense at trial.\nBefore this Court, Defendant contends that the presence of biological material on the shell casings at issue would have been relevant to the investigation because \u201csuch biological material would tend to identify the actual perpetrator.\u201d Defendant further contends that the absence of his DNA on the shell casings, if established, would be material to his defense because such a showing would tend to identify someone else as the shooter and corroborate his alibi defense. We address each in turn.\n\u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 401. The State does not challenge Defendant\u2019s relevancy argument, and we find it sufficiently persuasive to satisfy the required showing under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c)(l). The presence of DNA evidence on a spent shell casing has some tendency to identify the person who fired the bullet.\nHowever, while we agree that the presence of DNA evidence on the shell casings at issue would be relevant to the investigation, we disagree that the absence of Defendant\u2019s DNA on the shell casings would be material to Defendant\u2019s alibi defense in this case.\nAs used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-269(a)(l), our Court has adopted the Brady definition of materiality. See State v. Hewson, _N.C. App. _,_, 725 S.E.2d 53, 56 (2012) (stating that evidence is \u201cmaterial\u201d for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-269(a)(l) if \u201cthere is a \u2018reasonable probability\u2019 that its disclosure to the defense would result in a different outcome in the jury\u2019s deliberation\u201d (quotation marks and citations omitted)). While such a standard is appropriate when evaluating motions made in the post-trial context pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-269, we find that such a standard is inappropriate when evaluating pre-trial motions made pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c). Whether a particular piece of DNA evidence would have influenced the outcome of a trial can only be determined after the trial is completed and the judge has had an opportunity to compare that DNA evidence against the cumulative evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, for purposes of applying N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c)(3), we resort to the plain meaning of \u201cmaterial\u201d and hold that biological evidence is material to a defendant\u2019s defense where such biological evidence has \u201csome logical connection\u201d to that defense and is \u201csignificant\u201d or \u201cessential\u201d to that defense. Black's Law Dictionary 998 (8th ed. 2004).\nHere, we hold that the absence of Defendant\u2019s DNA on the shell casings at issue would not be material to his alibi defense. At the outset, we note that a showing of materiality under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c) (3) carries a higher burden than a showing of relevancy under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c)(l). Thus, while the presence of DNA evidence may have relevance to an investigation, it does not follow that such evidence is necessarily material to a defendant\u2019s defense at trial.\nDefendant contends that the absence of his DNA and a positive showing of someone else\u2019s DNA on the shell casings would be material to his alibi defense because it would have \u201ctended to show that someone other than [Defendant] fired the SKS assault rifle[.]\u201d However, the absence of Defendant\u2019s DNA from the shell casings would only provide evidence of his absence from the scene if one would otherwise expect to find his DNA on the shell casings in such a situation. Even then, such evidence would only justify the inference that Defendant was absent\u2014 it would not provide \u201cessential\u201d or \u201csignificant\u201d evidence corroborating Defendant\u2019s alibi. Accordingly, we hold that the absence of Defendant\u2019s DNA on the shell casings at issue, if established, would not have a logical connection or be significant to Defendant\u2019s defense that he was in Maryland at the time of the shooting.\nFurthermore, we note like its counterpart in the post-conviction setting, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c) outlines a procedure for the DNA testing of \u201cbiological material,\u201d not evidence in general. Cf. State v. Brown, 170 N.C. App. 601, 609, 613 S.E.2d 284, 288-89 (2005) (\u201c[N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-269(a)] provides for testing of \u2018biological evidence\u2019 and not evidence in general. Since defendant desires to demonstrate a lack of biological evidence, the post-conviction DNA testing statute does not apply.\u201d (internal citation omitted)), superseded, by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Norman, 202 N.C. App. 329, 332-33, 688 S.E.2d 512, 515 (2010). Here, the purpose of Defendant\u2019s request for DNA testing is to demonstrate the absence of his DNA on the shell casings at issue. By its plain language, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c) contemplates DNA testing for ascertained biological material\u2014 it is not intended to establish the absence of DNA evidence. It is unknown in this case if there is any biological material that may be tested on the shell casings. Indeed, at the motion hearing, defense counsel stated \u201c[t]here may or may not be DNA on the shell casings, but we won\u2019t know until we test them; until we try.\u201d Thus, to the extent that Defendant\u2019s motion sought to establish a lack of DNA evidence on the shell casings, we hold that such a motion is not proper under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c).\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court denying Defendant\u2019s motion under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c) for pretrial DNA testing.\nAffirmed.\nJudges ROBERT C. HUNTER and CALABRIA concur.\n. Defendant stipulated to a prior felony conviction at trial.\n. It is unclear from the record how or when Defendant reacquired the same gold Jaguar after it was released by the police to a local auto dealer.\n. The State conceded at the hearing that the shell casings had not been previously tested for DNA, thereby satisfying the showing required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-267(c)(2).\n. At trial Defendant testified that he was in Maryland attending his cousin\u2019s grandmother\u2019s funeral at the time of the shooting. Defendant could provide no additional witnesses or evidence corroborating his alibi.\n. Although Defendant waited until after he was convicted to appeal in the instant case, our General Assembly has provided a right to appeal pre-trial orders denying motions for DNA testing on an interlocutory basis. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-270.1 (2013) (\u201cThe defendant may appeal an order denying the defendant\u2019s motion for DNA testing under this Article, including by an interlocutory appeal.\u201d). In such situations, it would be difficult if not impossible for this Court to determine whether disclosure of a DNA test result would have a reasonable probability of changing a jury\u2019s verdict.\n. Defendant\u2019s contention assumes the presence of biological material on the shell casings \u2014 a premise that has not been established in this case.\n. Such an expectation is undermined by the fact that shooting a gun does not require one to load or handle bullets.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Ward Zimmerman, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Andrew DeSimone, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LUCIUS ELWOOD McLEAN\nNo. COA13-693\nFiled 21 January 2014\nPretrial Proceedings \u2014 defense motion for DNA testing \u2014 absence of DNA \u2014 not significant to defendant\u2019s defense\nThe trial court did not err in an attempted first-degree murder case by denying defendant\u2019s motion for DNA testing pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-267(c). The absence of defendant\u2019s DNA on the shell casings at issue, if established, would not have had a logical connection or have been significant to defendant\u2019s defense that he was in Maryland at the time of the shooting. Furthermore, to the extent that defendant\u2019s motion sought to establish a lack of DNA evidence on the shell casings, such a motion was not proper under N.C.G.S.. \u00a7 15A-267(c).\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 21 August 2012 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 November 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Ward Zimmerman, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Andrew DeSimone, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0111-01", "first_page_order": 121, "last_page_order": 129 }