{ "id": 6776457, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AUDRA LINDSEY SMATHERS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Smathers", "decision_date": "2014-01-21", "docket_number": "No. COA13-496", "first_page": "120", "last_page": "132", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 N.C. App. 120" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640657 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642367 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268-69", "parenthetical": "holding that reasonable suspicion was not required to justify an interaction that did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-166.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(33b)" }, { "page": "(4b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "417 U.S. 583", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1519506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, 335 (1974)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 N.C. App. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552711 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, 335 (1974)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/39/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 F.2d 807", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "470 F. Supp. 704", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4074729 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708", "parenthetical": "\"The investigative stop authority announced in Terry v. Ohio has led to cases where the officer says, 'He looked suspicious.' The Fourth Amendment stands against initiating a new line of cases in which the officer says, 'I thought he was lost.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/470/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 S.W.3d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 11496214 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/7/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 N.W.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11220154 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/617/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "875 P.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10351969, 10351919 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/875/0557-02", "/p2d/875/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "844 P.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10360776 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/844/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.W.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8668058 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/155/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.W.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8668406 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/142/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "737 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359", "parenthetical": "holding that where an officer's subjective mistake of law was itself objectively reasonable, there may still be reasonable suspicion to justify a warrantless traffic stop" }, { "page": "356", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4357764 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283", "parenthetical": "holding that where an officer's subjective mistake of law was itself objectively reasonable, there may still be reasonable suspicion to justify a warrantless traffic stop" }, { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 L. Ed. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "555 U.S. 914", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149866 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 F.2d 452", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1453237 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/600/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "759 N.W.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 3766486 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" }, { "page": "609" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/315/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "936 P.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he [government] must show that the officer, both subjectively and objectively, is actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid or assistance. The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 2313884, 2313925 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530", "parenthetical": "\"No seizure, however limited, is a valid exercise of the community caretak-ing function if credible evidence indicates that the stop is a pretext for investigating criminal activity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va-app/20/0284-01", "/va-app/20/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4163236 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544-45", "parenthetical": "holding that reasonable suspicion was not required to justify an interaction that did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "857 N.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519564 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108-9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613-14", "parenthetical": "\"In creating exceptions to the general [warrant requirement], this Court must consider the balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798758 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "\"In creating exceptions to the general [warrant requirement], this Court must consider the balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377", "parenthetical": "adopting a new rale of law based on well-reasoned decisions in other jurisdictions that was consistent with, although not directly supported by, precedent from the North Carolina Supreme Court" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549334 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "adopting a new rale of law based on well-reasoned decisions in other jurisdictions that was consistent with, although not directly supported by, precedent from the North Carolina Supreme Court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.W.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 7082736 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/775/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 3845146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120-23" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/227/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 A.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 316331 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/260/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "764 N.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 S.W.3d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 7091924 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187, n. 8" }, { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/403/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11341150 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443, 447-478" }, { "page": "715-18" }, { "page": "441" }, { "page": "714-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/413/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526395 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177992 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368-69" }, { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "\"In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called 'community caretaking functions,' automobiles are frequently taken into police custody.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568424 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219", "parenthetical": "\"In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called 'community caretaking functions,' automobiles are frequently taken into police custody.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 S.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525992 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356-57", "parenthetical": "\"As a general rule, searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" }, { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436295 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" }, { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716341 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "quoting U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "quoting U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079755 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" }, { "page": "667" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "\"A traffic stop is a seizure even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.\"" }, { "page": "439" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150881 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "\"A traffic stop is a seizure even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.\"" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135935 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1356, "char_count": 31837, "ocr_confidence": 0.713, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.788840532016958e-08, "percentile": 0.5324584560721494 }, "sha256": "ac70f14079ca320d03c417f05000e382329e7c5d427483439fc16df69e05b6b2", "simhash": "1:d969362157c28546", "word_count": 5038 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:41.441392+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AUDRA LINDSEY SMATHERS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nAudra Lindsey Smathers (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgment entered pursuant to her Alford plea to driving while impaired. Specifically, defendant challenges the order entered by the trial court denying her motion to suppress evidence gathered during a traffic stop. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion because the officer had neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to seize her, and the seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\nAfter careful review, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nBackground\nThe facts of this case are largely undisputed. Shortly after 10:00 p.m. on 27 May 2010, Transylvania Sheriffs Deputy Brian Kreigsman (\u201cOfficer Kreigsman\u201d) was traveling down Highway 280 in the interior lane adjacent to the center turning lane roughly one car length behind defendant, who was driving a red Corvette in the right lane. Defendant was traveling at speeds close to the posted limit of 45 miles per hour, and Officer Kreigsman did not observe anything illegal or suspicious about her driving.\nOfficer Kreigsman then saw a large animal run in front of defendant\u2019s vehicle. Defendant struck the animal, causing her vehicle to bounce and produce sparks as it scraped the road. Officer Kreigsman pulled his police cruiser behind defendant, who had decreased her speed to about 35 miles per hour, and activated his blue lights. He testified that because he knew Corvettes have a fiberglass body, he stopped defendant to ensure that she and the vehicle were \u201cokay.\u201d Defendant continued without stopping after Officer Kreigsman activated his blue lights, so he turned on his siren; defendant continued for about 1.1 to 1.2 miles before stopping. Officer Kreigsman called in for backup after defendant did not immediately stop her vehicle and relayed over the radio that he was making a stop because the vehicle had struck an animal. Deputy Justin Bell (\u201cDeputy Bell\u201d) arrived shortly thereafter with other officers.\nOnce stopped, Officer Kreigsman approached the driver\u2019s side of the vehicle and saw defendant crying. She and her passenger told Officer Kreigsman that they had hit a dog. He examined defendant\u2019s vehicle and saw that the front had been cracked and damaged, presumably by the collision with the animal. Both Officer Kreigsman and Deputy Bell detected the scent of alcohol coming from defendant. Officer Bell noticed that she also had glassy eyes and slurred speech. He conducted roadside sobriety tests, which defendant failed. After failing the field tests, defendant submitted to roadside breath tests, which produced a positive indication of alcohol consumption. Defendant was then taken into custody and charged with driving while impaired. Later testing showed that her blood alcohol concentration was .18.\nDefendant pled guilty to the charge of driving while impaired in District Court and appealed to the Superior Court. She moved to suppress all evidence gathered from Officer Kreigsman\u2019s stopping of her vehicle on the ground that he had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to seize her and that the seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. Defendant entered an Alford plea on 20 December 2012 and appealed in open court from the judgment and ruling on her motion to suppress.\nDiscussion\nI. The Community Caretaking Doctrine\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress. Specifically, she claims that Officer Kreigsman had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to seize her, and the seizure was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment. The State concedes that Officer Kreigsman had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to seize defendant, but instead asks this Court to adopt a version of the \u201ccommunity caretaking\u201d doctrine to affirm the trial court\u2019s order. After careful review, we formally recognize the community caretaking doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and we hold that Officer Kreigsman\u2019s seizure of defendant falls under this exception. Therefore, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nOur review of a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress is \u201cstrictly limited to determining whether the trial judge\u2019s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge\u2019s ultimate conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). \u201cThe trial court\u2019s conclusions of law . . . axe fully reviewable on appeal.\u201d State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).\nThe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 20. Traffic stops are recognized as seizures under both constitutions. See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (\u201cA traffic stop is a seizure even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.\u201d) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667 (1979)). Although a warrant supported by probable cause is typically required for a search or seizure to be reasonable, State v. Phillips, 151 N.C. App. 185, 191, 565 S.E.2d 697, 702 (2002), traffic stops are analyzed under the \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d standard created by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). Styles, 362 N.C. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 439. \u201cReasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence. The standard is satisfied by some minimal level of objective justification.\u201d Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cA court must consider \u2018the totality of the circumstances \u2014 the whole picture\u2019 in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists.\u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)). \u201cWhen a defendant in a criminal prosecution makes a motion to suppress evidence obtained by means of a warrantless search, the State has the burden of showing, at the suppression hearing, how the [war-rantless search] was exempted from the general constitutional demand for a warrant.\u201d State v. Nowell, 144 N.C. App. 636, 642, 550 S.E.2d 807, 812 (2001).\nHere, the trial court concluded, and the State concedes, that no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity existed when defendant was seized. Officer Kreigsman\u2019s seizure of defendant was not predicated on criminal investigation or prevention of any kind; rather, he was checking to make sure that defendant and her vehicle were \u201cokay\u201d after hitting a large animal. Thus, the trial court did not apply the Terry doctrine, but instead utilized an unspecified \u201cbalancing test\u201d, to conclude that a seizure was made on defendant, but the seizure was \u201cjustified under the situation as observed by Officer Kreigsman.\u201d In so concluding, the trial court rejected defendant\u2019s contention that the stop was arbitrary and unreasonable, but also rejected the State\u2019s argument that the community caretaking exception was applicable, noting that the doctrine has not yet been explicitly recognized in North Carolina. We find that the generic \u201cbalancing test\u201d applied by the trial court is not one of the \u201cspecifically established and well-delineated exceptions\u201d which would otherwise render Officer Kreigsman\u2019s warrantless seizure of defendant constitutional. See State v. Grice,_N.C. App._, _, 735 S.E.2d 354, 356-57 (2012) (\u201cAs a general rule, searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment \u2014 subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.\u201d) (citation and quotation marks omitted). These exceptions, such as exigent circumstances, Nowell, 144 N.C. App. at 643, 550 S.E.2d at 812, or the automobile exception, State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586, 589, 427 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1993), are unhelpful here, because they apply only to situations where officers are investigating or preventing criminal activity. Thus, we address the State\u2019s alternative argument - that this Court should recognize some variant of the community caretaking exception to affirm the order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nSo far, North Carolina courts have only referenced the community caretaking exception in the limited context of impounding abandoned vehicles. See State v. Phifer, 297 N.C. 216, 219, 254 S.E.2d 586, 587 (1979) (\u201cIn the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called \u2018community caretaking functions,\u2019 automobiles are frequently taken into police custody.\u201d) (quoting South Dakota v. Oppennan, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1002 (1976)); see also State v. Peaten, 110 N.C. App. 749, 752-53, 431 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1993). Application of this doctrine outside the context of vehicle impoundment, specifically in regard to the seizure of citizens, is a matter of first impression. As such, an overview of how the exception has developed in similar contexts by courts in other jurisdictions is helpful to our determination here.\nThe community caretaking exception was established by the United States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413 U.S. 433, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973). In Cady, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle after impoundment did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the vehicle was damaged and constituted a nuisance on the highway, the defendant could not arrange for the vehicle to be moved, and the standard police procedure of impounding the vehicle and searching it was reasonable under the circumstances to promote public safety. Cady, 413 U.S. at 443, 447-478, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 715-18. The Court reasoned that:\nBecause of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.\nCady, 413 U.S. at 441, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 714-15.\nSince the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Cady, a large majority of state courts have recognized the community caxetaking doctrine as a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170, 187, n. 8 (Tenn. 2013); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 764 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Mass. 2002); State v. Martinez, 615 A.2d 279, 281 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). The overarching public policy behind this widespread adoption is the desire to give police officers the flexibility to help citizens in need or protect the public even if the prerequisite suspicion of criminal activity which would otherwise be necessary for a constitutional intrusion is nonexistent.\nThe doctrine recognizes that, in our communities, law enforcement personnel are expected to engage in activities and interact with citizens in a number of ways beyond the investigation of criminal conduct. Such activities include a general safety and welfare role for police officers in helping citizens who may be in peril or who may otherwise be in need of some form of assistance.\nUllom v. Miller, 705 S.E.2d 111, 120-23 (W.Va. 2010) (holding that an officer\u2019s seizure of the defendant was reasonable under the community caretaking exception where the officer saw the defendant\u2019s vehicle on the side of a dirt road at dusk with its parking lights on, the officer had a sense that something was wrong, and the \u201croad safety check\u201d that constituted the seizure was based solely on safety and welfare considerations); see also State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 242 (S.D. 2009) (\u201cModem society has come to see the role of police officers as more than basic functionaries enforcing the law. From first responders to the sick and injured, to interveners in domestic disputes, and myriad instances too numerous to list, police officers fulfill a vital role where no other government official can.\u201d). As these courts have demonstrated, there are countless situations where government intrusion into individual privacy for the purposes of rendering aid is reasonable, regardless of whether criminal activity is afoot. We find the analysis utilized by these courts persuasive, and we can identify no reason why the community caretak-ing exception should not apply in North Carolina when it has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court and widely adopted by a majority of state courts throughout the country.\nThus, we now formally recognize the community caretaking exception as a means of establishing the reasonableness of a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Browning, 28 N.C. App. 376, 379, 221 S.E.2d 375, 377 (1976) (adopting a new rale of law based on well-reasoned decisions in other jurisdictions that was consistent with, although not directly supported by, precedent from the North Carolina Supreme Court). In recognizing this exception, we must apply a test that strikes a proper balance between the public\u2019s interest in having officers help citizens when needed and the individual\u2019s interest in being free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. See State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313, 327, 471 S.E.2d 605, 613-14 (1996) (\u201cIn creating exceptions to the general [warrant requirement], this Court must consider the balance between the public interest and the individual\u2019s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.\u201d) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nDespite its wide recognition, \u201c[n]o single set of specific requirements for applicability of the community caretaker exception has been adopted by a majority of those states recognizing the exception.\u201d Ullom, 705 S.E.2d at 122.\nCourts are split as to how the community caretaking doctrine should be classified from a Fourth Amendment perspective. A minority of jurisdictions characterizes community caretaking activities as consensual police-citizen encounters which do not rise to the level of \u201csearches\u201d or \u201cseizures\u201d under the Fourth Amendment. See Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 182, 187 n. 8 (\u201c[T]he community caretaking function exists [in Tennessee] within the third tier of consensual police-citizen encounters that do not require probable cause or reasonable suspicion[.]\u201d). However, North Carolina courts, as well as most courts in other jurisdictions, recognize that police interactions with citizens that do not amount to \u201csearches\u201d or \u201cseizures\u201d under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment do not trigger its safeguards. See State v. Sugg, 61 N.C. App. 106, 108-9, 300 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1983); see also People v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187, 198-99 (Ill. 2006). Thus, we need not create an exception to the Fourth Amendment under the community caretaking doctrine to justify already permissible police-citizen interactions. See State v. Isenhour, 194 N.C. App. 539, 544-45, 670 S.E.2d 264, 268-69 (2008) (holding that reasonable suspicion was not required to justify an interaction that did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment).\nThere are also competing viewpoints as to the manner in which the subjective motivation of an officer should be taken into account when applying the community caretaking exception. A primary concern amongst courts which apply these tests is that the community caretaking exception not serve as pretext for impermissible criminal investigation. See, e.g., Com. v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (\u201cNo seizure, however limited, is a valid exercise of the community caretak-ing function if credible evidence indicates that the stop is a pretext for investigating criminal activity.\u201d). Some courts, like those in the state of Washington, have adopted tests which contain both objective and subjective requirements and only allow a search or seizure if the officer\u2019s motivation is not primarily related to criminal investigation. See State v. Angelos, 936 P.2d 52, 54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (\u201c[T]he [government] must show that the officer, both subjectively and objectively, is actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid or assistance. The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.\u201d) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Other courts, like the Fourth Circuit and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, hold that a warrantless search or seizure will be upheld if there is an objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaking action, regardless of a coinciding subjective intent on the officer\u2019s part to investigate crime. See State v. Kramer, 759 N.W.2d 598, 608 (Wis. 2009) (\u201c[W]e conclude that the \u2018totally divorced\u2019 language from Cady does not mean that if the police officer has any subjective law enforcement concerns, he cannot be engaging in a valid community caretaker function. Rather, we conclude that in a community caretaker context, when under the totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaker function is shown, that determination is not negated by the officer\u2019s subjective law enforcement concerns.\u201d); United States v. Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452, 456 (4th Cir. 1979) (\u201cAn interest in furthering a criminal investigation supplements justifiable concern about hazards presented by an automobile\u2019s contents; it does not negate it, and Cady supports the warrant-less intrusion. Thus the warrantless search should be upheld, whatever the policeman\u2019s subjective state of mind[,] if the objective facts present a reasonable basis for a belief that there is a potential danger similar to or greater than that presented in Cady, which danger should be inactivated.\u201d).\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court, in two relatively recent opinions, has made clear that the subjective mentality of a police officer will not make a seizure under the Terry doctrine unconstitutional if the intrusion was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 248, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008) (noting that \u201c[t]he constitutionality of a traffic stop depends on the objective facts, not the officer\u2019s subjective motivation\u201d in holding that an officer\u2019s subjective mistake of law did not cause a traffic stop to be unconstitutional where there was articulable, reasonable suspicion that the individual was violating a different, actual law), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008); State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 283, 737 S.E.2d 351, 359 (2012) (holding that where an officer\u2019s subjective mistake of law was itself objectively reasonable, there may still be reasonable suspicion to justify a warrantless traffic stop). Thus, in keeping with the \u201cfoundational principle\u201d recognized by our Supreme Court that the Fourth Amendment requires only that an officer\u2019s actions be \u201cobjectively reasonable in the circumstances,\u201d Heien, 366 N.C. at 278, 737 S.E.2d at 356 (citation omitted), we adopt an objective method of inquiry into the purpose of a seizure in the community caretaking context. The public safety concerns which underlie the community caretaking exception are not mutually exclusive of criminal prevention and investigation, and therefore we decline to formulate a test where existence of the latter negates the former. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court aptly noted, \u201cto interpret. . . [Cady] to mean that an officer could not engage in a community caretaker function if he or she had any law enforcement concerns would, for practical purposes, preclude police officers from engaging in any community caretaker functions at all. This result is neither sensible nor desirable.\u201d Kramer, 759 N.W.2d at 609.\nAfter assessing the analytical methods developed by courts in other jurisdictions, we find that the current three-pronged test used by courts in Wisconsin in applying the community caretaking exception provides a flexible framework within which officers can safely perform their duties in the public\u2019s interest while still protecting individuals from unreasonable government intrusions. See State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990); Kramer, 759 N.W.2d at 608. Under this test, which we now adopt, the State has the burden of proving that: (1) a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if so, that under the totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for a community caretaking function is shown; and (3) if so, that the public need or interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of the individual. See Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 414; Kramer, 759 N.W.2d at 608. Relevant considerations in assessing the weight of public need against the intrusion of privacy include, but are not limited to:\n(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3) whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of alternatives to the type of intrusion actually accomplished.\nAnderson, 417 N.W.2d at 414. We note that many courts which apply a similar balancing test place great weight on the exigency of the situation, with some holding that only imminent danger to life or limb can outweigh the individual\u2019s privacy interest. See, e.g., Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 364-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994). Because such a requirement may prevent aid in situations where danger to life and limb may not be imminent, but could be prevented by swift action, we decline to make imminent danger to life or limb a required element of our test. However, we agree with the proposition espoused by many courts that this exception should be applied narrowly and carefully to mitigate the risk of abuse. See, e.g., State v. Rinehart, 617 N.W.2d 842 (S.D. 2000); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704, 708 (D. Conn. 1979) (\u201cThe investigative stop authority announced in Terry v. Ohio has led to cases where the officer says, \u2018He looked suspicious.\u2019 The Fourth Amendment stands against initiating a new line of cases in which the officer says, \u2018I thought he was lost.\u2019 \u201d) (citation and quotation omitted), aff'd, 610 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1979).\nHaving set out a community caretaking exception that we feel properly frames our inquiry into the reasonableness of a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we must apply our rule to the facts of this case. After careful review, we hold that all three elements are met. First, it is uncontested that the traffic stop was a seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Styles, 362 N.C. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 439. Second, given that Officer Kreigsman witnessed defendant strike a large animal and saw sparks fly when her car struck the road, there was an objectively reasonable basis under the totality of the circumstances to conclude that the seizure was predicated on the community caretak-ing function of ensuring the safety of defendant and her vehicle. Third, as discussed below, we find that the public need and interest in having Officer Kreigsman seize defendant outweighed her privacy interest in being free from the intrusion.\nThe facts that weigh in favor of defendant are as follows. First, the trial court entered an uncontested finding of fact that defendant was only affected by the collision with the animal at the point of impact. According to Officer Kreigsman, at that moment \u201ca little bit of sparks [came] from the rear end where the car struck the roadway. And then the car continued on.\u201d Officer Kreigsman followed defendant at a steady speed for almost two miles without noticing anything which indicated that defendant was injured or otherwise unfit to drive, or that the vehicle itself could not be operated safely. Although later inspection revealed that the front of defendant\u2019s car was damaged by the collision, Officer Kreigsman was unaware of this fact at the time he executed the seizure. Thus, the circumstances lacked an exigency that would weigh in favor of police intervention. Second, this was a substantial intrusion on defendant\u2019s liberty. Unlike a situation where an officer might approach an already stopped vehicle to check on its occupants, Officer Kreigsman interrupted defendant\u2019s mobility by executing a traffic stop, using his blue lights and siren as displays of overt authority to do so. The United States Supreme Court has noted that traffic stops may create \u201csubstantial anxiety\u201d and may be brought about by an \u201cunsettling show of authority;\u201d farther, they \u201cinterfere with freedom and movement\u201d and are \u201cinconvenient.\u201d Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 666 (1979). Thus, the \u201cpossibly unsettling show of authority,\u201d id., used to seize defendant, in addition to the interruption of her freedom to travel, weigh in favor of defendant\u2019s argument that the seizure was unreasonable.\nAlthough these factors support defendant\u2019s argument, we hold that the public\u2019s need and interest in Officer Kreigsman\u2019s actions outweigh defendant\u2019s competing privacy interest. First, the seizure occurred at nighttime in what was described by Officer Kreigsman as a rural and dimly fit stretch of road. Since there was a lower probability that defendant could have gotten help from someone if she needed it, compared to if she had a similar collision during the day time in a highly populated area, this setting weighs in favor of the State\u2019s argument that the public need or interest was furthered by Officer Kreigsman\u2019s conduct. Second, Officer Kreigsman witnessed defendant strike a large animal with her vehicle and saw sparks when the car bounced on the road. Thus, he was able to identify specific facts which led him to believe that help may have been needed, rather than a general sense that something was wrong. Finally, defendant was operating a vehicle when she was seized rather than enjoying the privacy of her home. As this Court has noted, \u201c[o]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one\u2019s residence or as the repository of personal effects .... It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.\u201d State v. Francum, 39 N.C. App. 429, 432, 250 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1979) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, 335 (1974)). Thus, the lessened expectation of privacy weighs in favor of the State\u2019s argument that the seizure was reasonable.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(33b) defines a \u201creportable crash\u201d as one resulting in death or injury to a human being or in property damage of over $1000.00. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(4b) defines a \u201ccrash\u201d as \u201c[a]ny event that results in an injury or property damage attributable directly to the motion of a motor vehicle or its load. The terms collision, accident and crash and their cognates are synonymous.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-166.1(e) states that the \u201cappropriate law enforcement agency must investigate a reportable accident.\u201d In addition to the other factors that weigh in favor of the State, these statutes underscore the significance of the public interest involved. Based upon Officer Kreigsman\u2019s statutory duty under section 20-166.1(e), he had an objectively reasonable basis to seize defendant in order to ascertain the nature and extent of the damage to defendant\u2019s vehicle. Thus, when considering this statutory duty along with all of the other factors that support the public need and interest in Officer Kreigsman\u2019s actions, the scales are tipped in favor of the State.\nAfter weighing these facts, keeping in mind the general principle that the community caretaking exception should be applied narrowly to prevent potential abuses, we hold that the public need and interest did outweigh defendant\u2019s privacy interest in being free from government seizure here. Thus, because the stop fits into the community caretaking exception as we apply it, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\nConclusion\nAfter careful review, we recognize the community caretaking doctrine as a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and hold that Officer Kreigsman\u2019s seizure of defendant fits into this exception as we apply it. Thus, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.\n. Officer Kreigsman testified that this procedure was not uncommon due to \u201cblue light bandits\u201d in the area who would impersonate police officers by attaching blue lights to their vehicles. It is uncontested that defendant\u2019s continued driving did not produce reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.\n. For example, where an officer executes a search or seizure to fix a gas leak before an explosion might have occurred.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Martin T McCracken, for the State.", "Leslie C. Rawls for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AUDRA LINDSEY SMATHERS\nNo. COA13-496\nFiled 21 January 2014\n1. Search and Seizure \u2014 community caretaking doctrine \u2014 recognized in North Carolina\nThe community caretaking doctrine is formally recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment in North Carolina. The State has the burden of proving that a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred, that under the totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for a community caretaking function is shown, and that the public need or interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of the individual. Imminent danger to life or limb is not a required element of the test.\n2. Search and Seizure \u2014 Fourth Amendment \u2014 community care-taking exception \u2014 requirements satisfied\nThe three elements of the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment were satisfied in a driving while impaired case. Applying the exception narrowly, it was uncontested that the traffic stop was a seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; there was an objectively reasonable basis under the totality of the circumstances to conclude that the seizure was predicated on the community caretaking function of ensuring the safety of defendant and her vehicle; and there was a public need and interest in having the officer seize defendant that outweighed her privacy interest in being free from the intrusion. The officer was able to identify specific facts which led him to believe that help may have been needed, rather than a general sense that something was wrong.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 July 2012 by Judge Mark E. Powell in Transylvania County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Martin T McCracken, for the State.\nLeslie C. Rawls for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0120-01", "first_page_order": 130, "last_page_order": 142 }