{ "id": 6776943, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF MARY ELLEN BRANNON THOMPSON", "name_abbreviation": "In re Thompson", "decision_date": "2014-02-04", "docket_number": "No. COA13-564", "first_page": "224", "last_page": "232", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 N.C. App. 224" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "667 S.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642039 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "asserting that a filing date is to be determined by the date indicated on the file-stamp" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/667/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642456 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912", "parenthetical": "internal quotation mark omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0910-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 S.E.2d 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4233725 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/213/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11218736 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3821987 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/210/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491380 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736107 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527547 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4175288 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734194 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650", "parenthetical": "\"[A] judgment is ... not enforceable between the parties until it is entered.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890802 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784", "parenthetical": "\"[A] judgment is ... not enforceable between the parties until it is entered.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "holding that where judgment was not entered, the appeals period neither triggered nor expired" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527959 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549", "parenthetical": "holding that where judgment was not entered, the appeals period neither triggered nor expired" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162058 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "asserting that a filing date is to be determined by the date indicated on the file-stamp" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4164947 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122", "parenthetical": "internal quotation mark omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622348 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11219648 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "internal quotation mark omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470348 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756", "parenthetical": "internal quotation mark omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0751-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3806475 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/211/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-393", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-301.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149685 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "'\"[Fjindings of fact made by the trial judge are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if... there is evidence to the contrary.' \" (quoting Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 100-01, 655 S.E.2d 362, 369 (2008))" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152746 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "'\"[Fjindings of fact made by the trial judge are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if... there is evidence to the contrary.' \" (quoting Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 100-01, 655 S.E.2d 362, 369 (2008))" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150837 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "\"Conclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987016 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "\"Conclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153463 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0162-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 837, "char_count": 20678, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.681067843394413e-08, "percentile": 0.5292123208727613 }, "sha256": "c853499cf7498bbd8f0aeb96e324dfff9c2f6cc0a50d3bbea08377f4c18000f8", "simhash": "1:dea9d3e8b6ed2d74", "word_count": 3385 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:41.441392+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and DAVIS concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF MARY ELLEN BRANNON THOMPSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nOn 20 November 2012, Judge Anderson D. Cromer (Judge Cromer) entered an order that denied all four of Calvin Brannon\u2019s (appellant) motions, dismissed them with prejudice, and issued sanctions against appellant. Each of appellant\u2019s motions hinged on the argument that an incompetency order dated 3 May 2007 declaring Mary Ellen Brannon Thompson (respondent) incompetent was never entered. After careful consideration, we reverse and remand the trial court\u2019s order.\nI. Facts\nOn 4 April 2007, a Petition for Adjudication of Incompetence and Application for Appointment of Guardian or Limited Guardian was filed by Leslie Poe Parker in Forsyth County Superior Court. The petition alleged that respondent lacked the capacity to manage her own affairs or to make important decisions concerning her \u201cperson, family [sic] or property[.]\u201d The same day, a notice of \u201cHearing on Incompetence and Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem\u201d was filed. A hearing was conducted on 26 April 2007 by Theresa Hinshaw, assistant clerk of Forsyth County Superior Court (clerk Hinshaw). Numerous individuals were present at the hearing, including appellant, who is the brother of respondent. After the hearing, clerk Hinshaw announced in open court that she found respondent to be incompetent, and she orally appointed Bryan Thompson (Mr. Thompson) as guardian of the estate. On 3 May 2007, clerk Hinshaw signed and dated an order (incompetency order) finding \u201cby clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent [was] incompetent.\u201d Additionally, clerk Hinshaw signed and dated an order authorizing issuance of letters appointing Mr. Thompson guardian of the estate.\nThereafter, appellant filed a \u201cPetition for Removal of Guardianship of the Person\u201d and a \u201cMotion to Set Aside the Adjudication of Incompetence Order and Ask For a Rehearing[.]\u201d Lawrence G. Gordon, Jr., Forsyth County Superior Court Clerk (clerk Gordon), signed and dated an order on 8 December 2009 denying the motions and concluded that the matters were time barred because appellant failed to timely appeal clerk Hinshaw\u2019s incompetency order. Appellant then appealed clerk Gordon\u2019s order to superior court. In an order entered 6 April 2010, Forsyth County Superior Court Judge James M. Webb (Judge Webb) dismissed both motions with prejudice.\nOn 27 March 2012, appellant filed four motions giving rise to this appeal. These motions were:\n(a) for relief in the cause from a guardianship granted to Mr. Thompson dated May 1, 2007;\n(b) to declare that Leslie Parker did not have the capacity to represent respondent in the filings of motions and petitions on April 4, 2007;\n(c) to declare that Mr. Thompson was not appointed the guardian of respondent after an adjudication of incompetence under G.S. 35A 1112(e) and G.S. 35A-1120.\n(d) to declare Mr. Thompson\u2019s act of filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C. 301 as a state court guardian of the estate of respondent invalid.\nThese motions were heard before Susan Frye (clerk Frye), Forsyth Superior Court Clerk, and she entered an order on 4 May 2012 denying appellant\u2019s motions. She also granted Mr. Thompson\u2019s motion for sanctions. In her order, clerk Frye denied motions (a), (b), and (c) because clerk Gordon and Judge Webb had previously \u201cclearly ruled\u201d on appellant\u2019s motions, \u201cno appeals were ever entered[,]\u201d \u201cno new evidence was presented[,]\u201d and \u201c[t]he pleadings filed . . . [were] repetitious].]\u201d Clerk Frye declined to rule on motion (d) because she \u201c[did] not have jurisdiction to hear this matter as the jurisdiction is presently under the Federal Bankruptcy Court.\u201d Appellant appealed clerk Frye\u2019s order to Forsyth County Superior Court. For the same reasons decreed by clerk Frye, Judge Cromer entered an order on 20 November 2012 denying and dismissing with prejudice appellant\u2019s motions (a), (b), and (c). Judge Cromer denied appellant\u2019s motion (d) with prejudice because it was \u201cbaseless.\u201d He also granted Mr. Thompson\u2019s motion for sanctions.\nII. Analysis\na.) Law of the Case\nAppellant first argues that the incompetency order was invalid because judgment was never entered, and therefore the trial court erred in concluding that the incompetency order was the law of the case. We agree.\n\u201cConclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review.\u201d State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011); see also Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 517, 597 S.E.2d 717, 721 (2004) (\u201cConclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal.\u201d). \u201cIn reviewing a trial judge\u2019s findings of fact, we are \u2018strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge\u2019s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge\u2019s ultimate conclusions of law.\u2019 \u201d State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)); see also Sisk v. Transylvania Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 364 N.C. 172, 179, 695 S.E.2d 429, 434 (2010) (\u2018\u201c[Fjindings of fact made by the trial judge are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if... there is evidence to the contrary.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 100-01, 655 S.E.2d 362, 369 (2008))). \u201cAppeal from an order adjudicating incompetence shall be to the superior court for hearing de novo and thence to the Court of Appeals.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1115 (2013).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1112 provides a superior court clerk with the authority to find that an individual is incompetent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1112 (2013). After such a finding is made, \u201cthe clerk shall enter an order adjudicating the respondent incompetent.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). When such an order is entered, \u201ca guardian or guardians shall be appointed[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1120 (2013). A party seeking to appeal an incompetency order entered by a clerk must\nwithin 10 days of entry of the order or judgment, appeal to the appropriate court for a trial or hearing de novo. The order or judgment of the clerk remains in effect until it is modified or replaced by an order or judgment of a judge. Notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk in writing. Notwithstanding the service requirement of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 58, orders of the clerk shall be served on other parties only if otherwise required by law.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-301.1 (2013) (emphasis added).\nThe North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure \u201care applicable to special proceedings, except as otherwise provided.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-393 (2013). Rule 58 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure governs the entry of judgments and orders. N.C.R. Civ. P. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 (2013). Under Rule 58, \u201ca judgment is entered when it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court.\u201d Id. We have also held that \u201cRule 58 applies to orders, as well as judgments, such that an order is likewise entered when it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court.\u201d Watson v. Price, 211 N.C. App. 369, 370, 712 S.E.2d 154, 155 review denied, 365 N.C. 356, 718 S.E.2d 398 (2011) (citation omitted). Thus, an oral ruling announced in open court is \u201cnot enforceable until it is enteredj.]\u201d West v. Marko, 130 N.C. App. 751, 756, 504 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1998) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, a party cannot appeal an order until entry occurs. Mastin v. Griffith, 133 N.C. App. 345, 346, 515 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1999). After entry, a clerk\u2019s order that is not timely appealed \u201cwill stand as a judgment of the court[.]\u201d In re Atkinson-Clark Canal Co., 234 N.C. 374, 377, 67 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1951). This legal proposition stems from the law of the case doctrine, which provides that \u201cwhen a party fails to appeal from a tribunal\u2019s decision that is not interlocutory, the decision below becomes the law of the case and cannot be challenged in subsequent proceedings in the same case.\u201d Boje v. D.W.I.T., 195 N.C. App. 118, 122, 670 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2009) (internal quotation mark omitted).\nHere, both parties agree that the hearing on the Petition for Adjudication of Incompetence was a special proceeding, and thus the Rules of Civil Procedure applied. Clerk Hinshaw orally rendered her decision finding respondent incompetent on 26 April 2007 in open court. Thereafter, she reduced the order to writing and dated it. However, nothing in the record indicates that the order was filed with the clerk of court. The order is devoid of any stamp-file or other marking necessary to indicate a filing date, and therefore it was not entered. See Huebner v. Triangle Research Collaborative, 193 N.C. App. 420, 422, 667 S.E.2d 309, 310 (2008) (asserting that a filing date is to be determined by the date indicated on the file-stamp); see also Watson, 211 N.C. App. at 373, 712 S.E.2d at 157 (standing for the proposition that a signed and dated order is insufficient to be considered filed).\nBecause the order was not filed, it was not entered. Accordingly, the time period to file notice of appeal of clerk Hinshaw\u2019s order has not yet commenced. See Darcy v. Osborne, 101 N.C. App. 546, 549, 400 S.E.2d 95, 96 (1991) (holding that where judgment was not entered, the appeals period neither triggered nor expired). Furthermore, because clerk Hinshaw\u2019s incompetency order is effective only after its entry, the order cannot be the law of the case. See Worsham v. Richbourg\u2019s Sales & Rentals, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 782, 784, 478 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1996) (\u201c[A] judgment is ... not enforceable between the parties until it is entered.\u201d).\nb. 4 Guardian of the Estate\nNext, appellant argues that since the incompetency order was never entered, clerk Hinshaw had no jurisdiction to appoint Mr. Thompson as guardian of the estate. We agree.\n\u201cThe question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even in the Supreme Court.\u201d Lemmerman v. A.T. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 580, 350 S.E.2d 83, 85 (1986). \u201cWhether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.\u201d McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010).\nAs mentioned above, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1112 requires the clerk to enter an order adjudicating incompetency. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1112. Only once the order is entered shall \u201ca guardian or guardians ... be appointed[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1120. Since the order was never entered, the clerk\u2019s appointment of Mr. Thompson as guardian of respondent\u2019s estate immediately thereafter was without legal authority.\nc.) Res Judicata\nAppellant also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the issues raised in his appeal to the trial court were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, appellant avers that the other orders relied upon by the trial court in determining res judicata were invalid. We agree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-251 (2013) states that \u201c[i]n all matters properly cognizable in the superior court division which are heard originally before the clerk of superior court, appeals lie to the judge of superior court having jurisdiction from all orders and judgments of the clerk[.]\u201d A court acting in an appellate capacity is \u201cwithout authority to entertain an appeal where there has been no entry of judgment\u201d because entry of judgment is jurisdictional. Searles v. Searles, 100 N.C. App. 723, 725, 398 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1990) (citation omitted). Under the doctrine of res judicata, \u201ca final judgment on the merits in a prior action will prevent a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties or those in privity with them.\u201d Thomas M. McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986).\nHere, appellant appealed clerk Frye\u2019s decision de novo to superior court. Judge Cromer declined to rule on the merits of appellant\u2019s motions and concluded that \u201c[a]ll the previous [mjotions were denied by the [c]lerk and/or another [s]uperior [c]ourt [j]udge or the Bankruptcy Court and, other than the Bankruptcy Order, said Orders were never appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Based upon the previous [ojrders entered in this matter, the issues raised in the appeal are barred by the doctrine of res judicata[.]\u201d The \u201cprevious orders\u201d referred to superior court Judge Webb\u2019s order entered 6 April 2010, which was appealed from clerk Lawrence Gordon\u2019s order dated 8 December 2009. According to Judge Cromer, he \u201c[could not] reverse Judge Webb\u201d on \u201ca case that [Judge Webb] already ruled on.\u201d However, Judge Cromer\u2019s conclusion assumed that Judge Webb had jurisdiction to rule on appellant\u2019s appeal of clerk Gordon\u2019s order to superior court. It is clear from the record that clerk Gordon\u2019s order was never entered as it was merely signed and dated, but devoid of a filing date. See Watson, supra. The entry of clerk Gordon\u2019s order was necessary to vest Judge Webb with jurisdiction to hear appellant\u2019s appeal in superior court. See Searles, supra. Accordingly, no entry of final judgment on the merits of appellant\u2019s prior motions occurred such that the issues before Judge Cromer were barred by res judicata.\nd.J Sanctions\nAppellant further argues that the trial court erred in imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We agree.\nThe trial court\u2019s decision to impose or not to impose mandatory sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(a) is reviewable de novo as a legal issue. In the de novo review, the appellate court will determine (1) whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law support its judgment or determination, (2) whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact, and (3) whether the findings of fact are supported by a sufficiency of the evidence. If the appellate court makes these three determinations in the affirmative, it must uphold the trial court\u2019s decision to impose or deny the imposition of mandatory sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(a).\nTurner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 165, 381 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1989). An analysis of sanctions under Rule 11 consists of a three-pronged analysis: \u201c(1) factual sufficiency, (2) legal sufficiency, and (3) improper purpose.\u201d Peters v. Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 27, 707 S.E.2d 724, 742 (2011) (citation and quotation omitted). A violation of any of these prongs requires the imposition of sanctions. Id. (citation omitted). In determining factual sufficiency, we must decide \u201c(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.\u201d Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Whether a motion is legally sufficient requires this Corut to look at \u201cthe facial plausibility of the pleading and only then, if the pleading is implausible under existing law, to the issue of whether to the best of the signer\u2019s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the complaint was warranted by the existing law.\u201d Polygenex Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Polyzen, Inc., 133 N.C. App. 245, 249, 515 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1999) (citation and quotation omitted). \u201cAn objective standard is used to determine whether a paper has been interposed for an improper purpose, with the burden on the movant to prove such improper purpose.\u201d Coventry Woods Neighborhood Ass\u2019n Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 213 N.C. App. 236, 241, 713 S.E.2d 162, 166 (2011) (citation and quotation omitted). A signer\u2019s purpose is heavily influenced by \u201cwhether or not a pleading has a foundation in fact or is well grounded in law[.]\u201d Id. at 242, 713 S.E.2d at 166 (citation and quotation omitted).\nHere, appellant appealed the order from clerk Frye to Judge Cromer in superior court based on motions:\n(a) for relief in the cause from a guardianship granted to Mr. Thompson dated May 1, 2007;\n(b) to declare that Leslie Parker did not have the capacity to represent respondent in the filings of motions and petitions on April 4, 2007;\n(c) to declare that Mr. Thompson was not appointed the guardian of respondent after an adjudication of incompetence under G.S. 35A 1112(e) and G.S. 35A-1120.\n(d) to declare Mr. Thompson\u2019s act of filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C. 301 as a state court guardian of the estate of respondent invalid.\nJudge Cromer made findings of fact in support of his conclusion to allow Mr. Thompson\u2019s motion to sanction appellant pursuant to Rule 11. The pertinent findings stated:\n1.) The matters presently before this Court have already been heard by the Clerk of the Forsyth County Superior Court and denied, thereafter they have been appealed to the Forsyth County Superior Court and the court has previously ruled on these matters. None of these rulings were appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.\n2.) [T]hese matters [had] been raised, heard and conclusively established by previous court orders. . . . [Clerk Gordon] [has] found that the underlying decisions related to these issues have not been appealed. Issues raised in the first three motions have been conclusively established in this matter contrary to [appellant] and he is bound by the previous adverse rulings.\n3.) [Motion (d)] is false and any reasonable attorney would have known this to be the case if he reviewed the file prior to filing a pleading asserting this claim.\nIn sum, Judge Cromer sanctioned appellant after finding that his motions were: 1.) time barred from appellate review; 2.) repetitious; 3.) without any factual or legal basis; and 4.) previously ruled on. However, the genesis of appellant\u2019s motions was that \u201cthe [o]rder dated May 3, 2007 declaring [respondent] incompetent was not file stamped thereby negating its validity.\u201d Rooted in our analysis above, it is clear that motions (a), (b), and (c) were never properly ruled on by previous court orders because clerks Hinshaw and Gordon never entered their orders. Moreover, the failed entry of clerk Hinshaw\u2019s incompetency order prevented appellant from fifing timely written notice of appeal of that order. Appellant also had a proper purpose, factual basis, and legal basis to file motion (d) requesting that Mr. Thompson\u2019s voluntary bankruptcy petition be declared invalid based on the incompetency order\u2019s invalidity. Thus, the trial court erred in sanctioning appellant under Rule 11.\nIII. Conclusion\nThe trial court erred in concluding that: 1.) the incompetency order was the law of the case; 2.) the issues raised in appellant\u2019s appeal to superior court were barred by the doctrine of res judicata-, and 3.) sanctions were appropriate pursuant to Rule 11. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court on each of these issues and remand to the superior court for further proceedings.\nReversed and Remanded.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and DAVIS concur.\n. We also note that the Order Authorizing Issuance of Letters purporting to appoint Mr. Thompson as guardian of the estate was never filed with the clerk\u2019s office as it was merely signed and dated by clerk Hinshaw.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney Reginald D. Alston for Galvin Brannon, appellant.", "CRUMPLER, FREEDMAN, PARKER & WITT, by Dudley A. Witt, for Bryan C. Thompson, appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF MARY ELLEN BRANNON THOMPSON\nNo. COA13-564\nFiled 4 February 2014\n1. Civil Procedure \u2014 law of case \u2014 judgment never entered\nThe trial court erred by concluding that an incompetency order was the law of the case. The incompetency order was invalid because judgment was never entered.\n2. Guardian and Ward \u2014 appointment of guardian of estate\u2014 incompetency order never entered\nThe clerk\u2019s appointment of Mr. Thompson as guardian of respondent\u2019s estate was without legal authority. The incompetency order was never entered.\n3. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata \u2014 res judicata \u2014 reliance on invalid orders\nThe trial court erred by concluding that the issues raised in appellant\u2019s appeal to the trial court were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The other orders relied upon by the trial court in determining res judicata were invalid.\n4. Pleadings \u2014 sanctions\u2014improperly assessed\nThe trial court erred by imposing sanctions pursuant N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11. The clerk\u2019s failed entry of the incompetency order prevented appellant from filing timely written notice of appeal of that order. Appellant also had a proper purpose, factual basis, and legal basis to the file motions.\nAppeal by Calvin Brannon from order entered 20 November 2012 by Judge Anderson D. Cromer in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 November 2013.\nAttorney Reginald D. Alston for Galvin Brannon, appellant.\nCRUMPLER, FREEDMAN, PARKER & WITT, by Dudley A. Witt, for Bryan C. Thompson, appellee." }, "file_name": "0224-01", "first_page_order": 234, "last_page_order": 242 }