{ "id": 6778456, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRANCE WILKERSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wilkerson", "decision_date": "2014-02-18", "docket_number": "No. COA13-365", "first_page": "482", "last_page": "496", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 N.C. App. 482" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "525 U.S. 1111", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11215905, 11215426, 11216068, 11215368, 11216203, 11215982, 11216145, 11215729, 11215604, 11215829, 11215222, 11215542, 11215285, 11215485 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole based upon a thirteen year old defendant's conviction for first degree sexual offense did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/1111-10", "/us/525/1111-04", "/us/525/1111-12", "/us/525/1111-03", "/us/525/1111-14", "/us/525/1111-11", "/us/525/1111-13", "/us/525/1111-08", "/us/525/1111-07", "/us/525/1111-09", "/us/525/1111-01", "/us/525/1111-06", "/us/525/1111-02", "/us/525/1111-05" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 883", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11773537, 11773956, 11773733, 11774025, 11773609, 11773407, 11773898, 11773485, 11774102, 11773657, 11773818, 11773342, 11774175 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0883-04", "/us/449/0883-10", "/us/449/0883-07", "/us/449/0883-11", "/us/449/0883-05", "/us/449/0883-02", "/us/449/0883-09", "/us/449/0883-03", "/us/449/0883-12", "/us/449/0883-06", "/us/449/0883-08", "/us/449/0883-01", "/us/449/0883-13" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635555 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Wilkins, 131 N.C. App. 220, 223, 506 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 994", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9671109, 9671303, 9671208, 9671240, 9671466, 9671147, 9671276, 9671339, 9671186, 9671572, 9671125, 9671382, 9671512, 9671166, 9671423 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0994-01", "/us/531/0994-09", "/us/531/0994-06", "/us/531/0994-07", "/us/531/0994-13", "/us/531/0994-03", "/us/531/0994-08", "/us/531/0994-10", "/us/531/0994-05", "/us/531/0994-15", "/us/531/0994-02", "/us/531/0994-11", "/us/531/0994-14", "/us/531/0994-04", "/us/531/0994-12" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636973, 12636974 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0196-01", "/se2d/636/0196-02" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635586 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that this Court is not bound by a prior unpublished decision of another panel of this Court" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551140, 551241, 551058, 551257, 551261 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that this Court is not bound by a prior unpublished decision of another panel of this Court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0141-04", "/nc/347/0141-03", "/nc/347/0141-05", "/nc/347/0141-02", "/nc/347/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "holding that this Court is not bound by a prior unpublished decision of another panel of this Court" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11710933 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396", "parenthetical": "holding that this Court is not bound by a prior unpublished decision of another panel of this Court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1422(c)(3) as the basis for asserting jurisdiction over an order granting a defendant's motion for appropriate relief" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "732 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "706 S.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of 32 to 40 years imprisonment for two counts of first degree sexual offense committed when the defendant was sixteen years old did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of 32 to 40 years imprisonment for two counts of first degree sexual offense committed when the defendant was sixteen years old did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "693 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705", "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of 32 to 40 years imprisonment for two counts of first degree sexual offense committed when the defendant was sixteen years old did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 N.C. App. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176381 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/204/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536", "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree burglary did not constitute .cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558324 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384-85", "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree burglary did not constitute .cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree burglary did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566549 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32", "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree burglary did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 783", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole based upon a thirteen year old defendant's conviction for first degree sexual offense did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 S. Ct. 883", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole based upon a thirteen year old defendant's conviction for first degree sexual offense did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659735 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 11", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9030344 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30-31", "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for larceny pursuant to a \"three strikes and you're out\" law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" }, { "page": "1190", "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for larceny pursuant to a \"three strikes and you're out\" law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" }, { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for larceny pursuant to a \"three strikes and you're out\" law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he distinction between the two degrees [of burglary] depends upon the actual occupancy of the dwelling house or sleeping apartment at the time of the commission of the crime\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557412 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he distinction between the two degrees [of burglary] depends upon the actual occupancy of the dwelling house or sleeping apartment at the time of the commission of the crime\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777320 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" }, { "page": "1138" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491776, 491745, 491559, 491849, 491402, 491916, 491570, 491862, 491832, 491865 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0463-03", "/nc/357/0463-01", "/nc/357/0463-02", "/nc/357/0463-07", "/nc/357/0463-05", "/nc/357/0463-04", "/nc/357/0463-09", "/nc/357/0463-08", "/nc/357/0463-10", "/nc/357/0463-06" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4767890 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186055 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 957", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1107767 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1001", "parenthetical": "Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concurring" }, { "page": "2705", "parenthetical": "Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concurring" }, { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concurring" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "2707" }, { "page": "871", "parenthetical": "Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concurring" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "2707" }, { "page": "871" }, { "page": "1008-09" }, { "page": "2709" }, { "page": "874", "parenthetical": "holding that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for possession of cocaine was not so grossly disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0957-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 97", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 7354 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S. Ct. 2455", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12407312 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2463", "parenthetical": "quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 259 (1976)" }, { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 259 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/567/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 U.S. 349", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 407817 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/217/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 U.S. 48", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12448995, 3641893 ], "weight": 13, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, 549, 54 L. Ed. 793, 798 (1910)" }, { "page": "2021", "parenthetical": "quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, 549, 54 L. Ed. 793, 798 (1910)" }, { "page": "835", "parenthetical": "quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, 549, 54 L. Ed. 793, 798 (1910)" }, { "page": "59" }, { "page": "2021" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "2022" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "2022" }, { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/176/0825-01", "/us/560/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 L. Ed. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 S. Ct. 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 S.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561899, 8562000, 8561969, 8561941, 8561913 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0376-01", "/nc/300/0376-05", "/nc/300/0376-04", "/nc/300/0376-03", "/nc/300/0376-02" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547258 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "748 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "746 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987016 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198507 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301029 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Wilkins, 131 N.C. App. 220, 223, 506 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573095 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that, \"because that case is inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court, we decline to follow it.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659786 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that, \"because that case is inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court, we decline to follow it.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11712661 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 S.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "this Court \"decline[d] to follow\" an earlier Court of Appeals decision \"inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169311 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "this Court \"decline[d] to follow\" an earlier Court of Appeals decision \"inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "allowing a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari filed by the State seeking review of a trial court order granting defendant's motion for appropriate relief" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2394579 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "allowing a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari filed by the State seeking review of a trial court order granting defendant's motion for appropriate relief" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 459", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 S. Ct. 487", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628-29", "parenthetical": "granting a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing review of a trial court order granting a defendant's motion for appropriate relief" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793758 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "granting a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing review of a trial court order granting a defendant's motion for appropriate relief" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "granting the State's petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for the purpose of reviewing a trial court order granting a motion for appropriate relief" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154353 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445-46", "parenthetical": "granting the State's petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for the purpose of reviewing a trial court order granting a motion for appropriate relief" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301186 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87", "parenthetical": "granting certiorari \"pursuant to [this Court's] supervisory power under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 7A-32(c)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918821 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875", "parenthetical": "granting certiorari \"pursuant to [this Court's] supervisory power under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 7A-32(c)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99", "parenthetical": "recognizing the existence of our supervisory jurisdiction over the trial courts as authorized by N.C. Const. art. IV, \u00a7 12 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-32(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11709643 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "recognizing the existence of our supervisory jurisdiction over the trial courts as authorized by N.C. Const. art. IV, \u00a7 12 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-32(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a] trial 'court's ruling on a motion for appropriate relief pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 15A-1415 is subject to review . . . [i]f the time for appeal has expired and no appeal is pending, by writ of certiorari' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11919197 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a] trial 'court's ruling on a motion for appropriate relief pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 15A-1415 is subject to review . . . [i]f the time for appeal has expired and no appeal is pending, by writ of certiorari' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796001, 796074, 796010, 796144, 796125 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0660-03", "/nc/342/0660-01", "/nc/342/0660-04", "/nc/342/0660-02", "/nc/342/0660-05" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11651871 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 32", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564174 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0563-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1230, "char_count": 40297, "ocr_confidence": 0.71, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.417441169658951e-08, "percentile": 0.2771321802931368 }, "sha256": "84e5d708c4034628264dc4e78121fd1b24deb70fd7b0095d8cf33eb64ed50711", "simhash": "1:e2eb1133762a1461", "word_count": 6571 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:41.441392+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., and DAVIS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRANCE WILKERSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nThe State has sought appellate review of an order granting Defendant Terrance Wilkerson\u2019s motion for appropriate relief; vacating judgments entered on 5 December 1991 stemming from Defendant\u2019s convictions for second degree burglary, three counts of felonious breaking or entering, four counts of felonious larceny, and two counts of possession of stolen property; and resentencing Defendant to a term of 21 years imprisonment. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that the sentences contained in the original judgments entered in these cases resulted in the imposition of a cruel and unusual punishment upon Defendant. After careful consideration of the State\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s order in fight of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order should be reversed and that this case should be remanded to the Cumberland County Superior Court for reinstatement of the original judgments imposed in these cases.\nI. Factual Background\nBetween 14 December 1990 and 12 January 1991, Defendant broke into several homes and stole various items of properly. At the time that he committed these criminal offenses, Defendant was sixteen years old and had no prior criminal record.\nOn 13 January 1991, warrants for arrest were issued charging Defendant with two counts of possession of stolen property, second degree burglary, two counts of felonious breaking or entering, and three counts of felonious larceny. On 2 April 1991, the Cumberland County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with two counts of second degree burglary, four counts of felonious breaking or entering, six counts of felonious larceny, and six counts of possession of stolen property. On 4 December 1991, Defendant entered pleas of guilty to one count of second degree burglary, four counts of felonious larceny, three counts of felonious breaking or entering, and two counts of possession of stolen property. In return for Defendant\u2019s guilty pleas, the State voluntarily dismissed the remaining charges that had been lodged against him. At the conclusion of the proceedings that occurred in connection with the entry of Defendant\u2019s guilty pleas, Judge William C. Gore, Jr., found as aggravating factors that \u201c[t]he defendant involved a person under the age of 16 in the commission of the crime\u201d and that \u201c[tjhe offense involved the actual taking of property of great monetary value\u201d; found as mitigating factors that \u201c[t]he defendant ha[d] no record of criminal convictions\u201d and that, \u201c[a]t an early stage of the criminal process, the defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing in connection with the offense to a law enforcement officer\u201d; determined that the \u201cfactors in aggravation outweigh[ed] the factors in mitigation\u201d; and entered a judgment in the case in which Defendant had been convicted of second degree burglary sentencing him to a term of 40 years imprisonment. In addition, based upon the same findings in aggravation and mitigation, Judge Gore consolidated one of Defendant\u2019s convictions for felonious breaking or entering and one of Defendant\u2019s convictions for felonious larceny for judgment and sentenced Defendant to a consecutive term of ten years imprisonment. Finally, Judge Gore entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a concurrent term of three years imprisonment based upon a conviction for felonious larceny, to a concurrent term of three years imprisonment based upon consolidated convictions for felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny, to a concurrent term of three years imprisonment based upon a conviction for possession of stolen property, to a concurrent term of three years imprisonment based upon convictions for felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny, and to a concurrent term of three years imprisonment based upon a conviction for possession of stolen property. As a result, Judge Gore\u2019s judgments effectively required Defendant to serve a term of fifty years imprisonment based upon these convictions.\nOn 27 June 2012, Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief in which he requested the court to \u201carrest\u201d his sentences and resentence him in such a manner as to avoid subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief rested upon the contention that his fifty year sentence for a series of nonviolent property crimes committed when he was sixteen years old was grossly disproportionate to the maximum sentence that he could receive in the event that he was sentenced for committing the same crimes under the current sentencing statutes and contravened the protections against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 27. On 25 July 2012, the trial court entered an order concluding that \u201cDefendant\u2019s Motion for Appropriate Relief has merit, that summary disposition is inappropriate, and that a hearing is necessary.\u201d The State filed a written response to Defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief on 24 August 2012 in which it requested that Defendant receive no relief.\nA hearing was held with respect to Defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief on 11 December 2012. On 17 December 2012, the trial court entered an order granting Defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief on the grounds that, \u201c[ujnder evolving standards of decency,\u201d the sentence embodied in the judgments entered by Judge Gore was excessive and disproportionate to the crimes for which Defendant had been convicted in violation of the Eighth Amendment and was, for that reason, invalid. As a result, the trial court vacated the judgments that had been entered by Judge Gore, resentenced Defendant to a term of 21 years imprisonment, gave Defendant credit for 21 years and 6 days in pretrial confinement, and ordered that Defendant be immediately released.\nOn 17 December 2012, the State filed petitions seeking the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing appellate review of the 17 December 2012 order and the issuance of a writ of superseadeas staying the trial court\u2019s order pending the completion of the appellate review process. On 2 January 2013, this Court granted the State\u2019s petitions.\nII. Substantive Legal Analysis\nA. Appellate Jurisdiction\nAs an initial matter, we are required to address Defendant\u2019s contention that this Court lacked the authority to grant the State\u2019s petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. In view of the fact that a panel of this Court has previously rejected this contention in the course of granting the State\u2019s certiorari petition, we are required to do so as well. N.G.N.B. v. Virginia Carolina Builders, 307 N.C. 563, 567, 299 S.E.2d 629, 631-32 (1983) (stating that, \u201conce a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question in a given case[,] that decision becomes the law of the case and governs other panels which may thereafter consider the case\u201d and that, \u201csince the power of one panel of the Court of Appeals is equal to and coordinate with that of another, a succeeding panel of that court has no power to review the decision of another panel on the same question in the same case\u201d). In addition, for the reasons set forth in detail below, we also believe that this Court had the authority to grant the State\u2019s certiorari petition.\n\u201cThe Court of Appeals shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the General Assembly may prescribe.\u201d N.C. Const. art. IV, \u00a7 12(2). According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-32(c), this Court has the authority to issue writs of certiorari \u201cin aid of its own jurisdiction, or to supervise and control the proceedings of any of the trial courts of the General Court of Justice.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 32(c). As a result, given that a \u201c[trial] court\u2019s ruling on a motion for appropriate relief pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 15A-1415 is subject to review . . . [i]f the time for appeal has expired and no appeal is pending, by writ of certiorari,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1422(c) (3), see State v. Dammons, 128 N.C. App. 16, 22, 493 S.E.2d 480, 484 (stating that \u201c[t]his Court may review a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion for appropriate relief if \u2018the time for appeal has expired and no appeal is pending, by writ of certiorari\u2019 \u201d) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1422(c) (3)), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 660, 465 S.E.2d 547 (1997); State v. Morgan, 118 N.C. App. 461, 463, 455 S.E.2d 490, 491 (1995) (stating that \u201c[a] trial \u2018court\u2019s ruling on a motion for appropriate relief pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 15A-1415 is subject to review . . . [i]f the time for appeal has expired and no appeal is pending, by writ of certiorari\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted), and given that the issuance of a writ of certiorari in situations such as this one is necessary to \u201csupervise and control\u201d proceedings in the trial courts, see Troy v. Tucker, 126 N.C. App. 213, 215, 484 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1997) (recognizing the existence of our supervisory jurisdiction over the trial courts as authorized by N.C. Const. art. IV, \u00a7 12 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-32(c)); In re Robinson, 120 N.C. App. 874, 875, 464 S.E.2d 86, 87 (1995) (granting certiorari \u201cpursuant to [this Court\u2019s] supervisory power under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 7A-32(c)\u201d), we clearly had ample authority to grant the State\u2019s request for the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing review of the trial court\u2019s order in this case.\nIn support of his contention to the contrary, Defendant cites a previous decision by this Court refusing to issue a writ of certiorari requested by the State on the grounds that the issuance of the requested writ was not authorized by N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1), which provides that a writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to \u201c \u2018permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action, or when no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists, or for review pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 15A-1422(c)(3) of an order of the trial court denying a motion for appropriate relief.\u2019 \u201d State v. Starkey, 177 N.C. App. 264, 268, 628 S.E.2d 424, 426, cert denied, _ N.C. _, 636 S.E.2d 196 (2006) (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1). According to the logic enunciated in Starkey, since N.C. R. App. P. 21 limits certiorari review of orders granting or denying motions for appropriate relief to orders denying such motions and since the State sought review of an order granting a defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief, we lacked authority to issue the requested writ. Id. As a result, however, of the fact that Starkey conflicts with several decisions of the Supreme Court that authorize review of trial court decisions granting motions for appropriate relief filed by a defendant, our decision in Starkey does not stand as an obstacle to the allowance of the State\u2019s certiorari petition. See State v. Whitehead, 365 N.C. 444, 445-46, 722 S.E.2d 492, 494 (2012) (granting the State\u2019s petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for the purpose of reviewing a trial court order granting a motion for appropriate relief); State v. Frogge, 359 N.C. 228, 230, 607 S.E.2d 627, 628-29 (2005) (granting a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing review of a trial court order granting a defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 994, 121 S. Ct. 487, 148 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2000); State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 62, 310 S.E.2d 301, 301 (1984) (allowing a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari filed by the State seeking review of a trial court order granting defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief). As a result of the fact that the logic adopted in Starkey would be equally applicable to the situations at issue in Whitehead, Frogge, and McDowell, and since nothing in N.C. R. App. R 21 makes any distinction between our authority to issue writs of certiorari in response to petitions filed by the State seeking review of orders granting a motion for appropriate relief and that of the Supreme Court, we believe that our decision in Starkey is inconsistent with prior and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and is not, for that reason, controlling in the present case. See State v. Davis, 198 N.C. App. 443, 449, 680 S.E.2d 239, 244 (2009) (this Court \u201cdecline[d] to follow\u201d an earlier Court of Appeals decision \u201cinconsistent with prior decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court\u201d); Cissell v. Glover Landscape Supply, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 667, 670 n.1, 486 S.E.2d 472, 473 n.1 (1997), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 348 N.C. 67, 497 S.E.2d 283 (1998) (stating that, \u201cbecause that case is inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court, we decline to follow it.\u201d). Our conclusion to this effect is reinforced by our recognition of the fact that the rules of appellate procedure \u201cshall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the appellate division as that is established by law,\u201d N.C. R. App. R 1(c); the fact that our authority to grant certiorari for the purpose of reviewing orders granting or denying motions for appropriate relief is established by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1422(c)(3); and the fact that the approach adopted in Starkey, contrary to N.C. R. App. P. 1, treats N.C. R. App. P. 21 as limiting the jurisdiction afforded to this Court by the General Assembly. As a result, we have no hesitation in concluding that this Court did, in fact, have the authority to grant the State\u2019s petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari in this case and will proceed to address the merits of the State\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s order.\nB. Validity of Trial Court\u2019s Order\n1. Standard of Review\n\u201cWhen considering rulings on motions for appropriate relief, we review the trial court\u2019s order to determine \u2018whether the findings of fact are supported by evidence, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and whether the conclusions of law support the order entered by the trial court.\u2019 \u201d Frogge, 359 N.C. at 240, 607 S.E.2d at 634 (quoting State v. Stevens, 305 N.C. 712, 720, 291 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1982)). \u201c \u2018When a trial court\u2019s findings on a motion for appropriate relief are reviewed, these findings are binding if they are supported by competent evidence and may be disturbed only upon a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. However, the trial court\u2019s conclusions are fully reviewable on appeal.\u2019 \u201d State v. Lutz, 177 N.C. App. 140, 142, 628 S.E.2d 34, 35 (2006) (quoting State v. Wilkins, 131 N.C. App. 220, 223, 506 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1998)). \u201cConclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal.\u201d Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 517, 597 S.E.2d 717, 721 (2004). Because the facts underlying this case as described in the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are essentially undisputed, the only issue that we are required to address in this case is whether the trial court correctly concluded that, on the basis of the present record, Defendant was entitled to relief from Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments on Eighth Amendment grounds.\n2. Trial Court\u2019s Jurisdiction Over Defendant\u2019s Motion\nIn its initial challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgment, the State argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments. More specifically, the State contends that no provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415 authorized the trial court to enter an order vacating Defendant\u2019s original judgments, resentencing Defendant, and ordering that he be released. We do not find this aspect of the State\u2019s argument persuasive.\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b), a convicted criminal defendant is entitled to seek relief from a trial court judgment by means of a motion for appropriate relief filed more than ten days after the entry of judgment on the basis of certain specifically enumerated grounds. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b). As we have recently stated, \u201cN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b) clearly provides that the eight specific grounds listed in that statutory subsection are \u2018the only grounds which the defendant may assert by a motion for appropriate relief made more than 10 days after the entry of judgment,\u2019 \u201d so that \u201catrial court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim for postconviction relief which does not fall within one of the categories specified in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b).\u201d State v. Harwood,_N.C. App._,_, 746 S.E.2d 445, 450, disc. review dismissed,_N.C._, 748 S.E.2d 320 (2013).\nIn its order, the trial court concluded that it had the authority to grant the requested relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1415(b) (4) and (b)(8), which authorize an award of postconviction relief in the event that \u201c[t]he defendant was convicted or sentenced under a statute that was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b)(4), or that \u201c[t]he sentence imposed was unauthorized at the time imposed, contained a type of sentence disposition or a term of imprisonment not authorized for the particular class of offense and prior record or conviction level was illegally imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b)(8). The fact that Defendant did not cite N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b)(4) before the trial court is irrelevant to the required jurisdictional determination given the fact that the constitutional nature of Defendant\u2019s challenge to Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments was clearly stated in Defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief and the fact that the trial court has the authority, in appropriate cases, to grant postconviction relief on its own motion. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1420(d) (stating that, \u201c[a]t any time that a defendant would be entitled to relief by motion for appropriate relief, the court may grant such relief upon its own motion\u201d). Similarly, the fact that the sentences imposed in Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments were not unauthorized, invalid, or otherwise unlawful at the time that they were imposed does not, contrary to the State\u2019s argument, preclude an award of relief based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b)(8) given that the reference to \u201cat the time imposed\u201d in the relevant statutory language does not modify the language authorizing a grant of relief in the event that the defendant\u2019s sentence \u201cis otherwise invalid as a matter of law.\u201d In fact, acceptance of the State\u2019s argument that the trial court lacked the authority to enter the challenged order would necessarily mean that trial judges have no authority to grant post-conviction sentencing relief on Eighth Amendment grounds after the time for noting a direct appeal has expired, an outcome which we do not believe to have been within the General Assembly\u2019s contemplation and which is not consistent with our postconviction jurisprudence. State v. Bonds, 45 N.C. App. 62, 64, 262 S.E.2d 340, 342 (stating that, \u201c[i]f a judgment is invalid as a matter of law, the courts of North Carolina have always had the authority to vacate such judgments pursuant to petition for writ of habeas corpus and, more recently, by way of postconviction proceedings\u201d), app. dismissed, 300 N.C. 376, 267 S.E.2d 687, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 883, 101 S. Ct. 235, 66 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1980). As a result of the fact that Defendant has asserted in his motion for appropriate relief that the sentences imposed in Judge Gore\u2019s original judgment are disproportionate to the offenses for which he was convicted in violation of the Eighth Amendment and that those sentences were, for that reason, invalid, the trial court clearly had jurisdiction to reach the merits of Defendant\u2019s challenge to Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1415(b)(4) and (b)(8).\nThis Court has recently addressed and rejected the same argument in a case in which the trial court granted a defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief and vacated his life sentence, which had been imposed upon him in 1973 as the result of his conviction for second degree burglary, on the basis of a conclusion that, \u201cunder evolving standards, [defendant\u2019s] sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and is invalid as a matter of law.\u201d State v. Stubbs,_N.C. App._,_,_S.E.2d_,_(2014). Although the State argued before this Court in that case, as it has here, that nothing in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415 authorized the trial court to modify the defendant\u2019s original sentence, Id. at_,_S.E.2d at_, we concluded that \u201cthe trial court had jurisdiction over the [original] judgment to consider whether defendant\u2019s sentence was \u2018invalid as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Id. at_,_S.E.2d at_(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b) (8)). As a result, in light of the literal language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1415(b)(4) and (b)(8) and our decision in Stubbs, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider Defendant\u2019s challenges to Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments on the merits.\n3. Gross Disproportionalitv\nSecondly, the State contends that, even if the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the validity of Defendant\u2019s challenge to Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments, it erred by determining that the sentences that Defendant was currently serving subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We agree.\nThe Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which has been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that \u201c[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.\u201d U.S. Const. amend. VIII. \u201cThe concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment. Embodied in the Constitution\u2019s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the \u2018precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.\u2019 \u201d Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825, 835 (2010) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, 549, 54 L. Ed. 793, 798 (1910)). We view the concept of proportionality according to \u201c \u2018the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.\u2019 \u201d Miller v. Alabama,_U.S._,_, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 417 (2012) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 259 (1976)). \u201cThe Eighth Amendment does not[, however,] require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.\u201d Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2705, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836, 869 (1991) (Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O\u2019Connor and Souter, concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted). As a result, \u201c \u2018[o]nly in exceedingly unusual non-capital cases will the sentences imposed be so grossly disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment\u2019s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.\u2019 \u201d State v. Clifton, 158 N.C. App. 88, 94, 580 S.E.2d 40, 45 (quoting State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 786, 309 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1983)), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 463, 586 S.E.2d 266 (2003). \u201c[I]n the absence of legal error, it is not the role of the judiciary to engage in discretionary sentence reduction,\u201d since \u201cthat power resides in the executive branch, as established by the state constitution and acts of the General Assembly,\u201d Whitehead, 365 N.C. at 448, 722 S.E.2d at 496, and since \u201cour General Assembly has directed the Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission to review matters of proportionality\u201d arising from the changes in the statutory provisions governing the sentencing of convicted criminal defendants that have been enacted in recent years. Stubbs,_N.C. App. at_,_S.E.2d at_\nAs the United States Supreme Court has explained, \u201ccases addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within two general classifications [:]\u201d first, \u201cchallenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case[;]\u201d and second, \u201ccases in which the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death penalty.\u201d Graham, 560 U.S. at 59, 130 S. Ct. at 2021, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 836. \u201cIn the first classification the Court considers all of the circumstances of the case to determine whether the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive\u201d Id., with that determination beginning with a comparison of \u201cthe gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.\u201d Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 836 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S. Ct. at 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 871 (Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O\u2019Connor and Souter, concurring)). \u201c \u2018[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison ... leads to an inference of gross disproportionality[,]\u2019 the court should then compare the defendant\u2019s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.\u201d Id. \u201cOutside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.\u201d Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1138, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 390 (1980).\nThe trial court reached the conclusion that Defendant had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment based upon a consideration of \u201c(1) the gravity of the offense, (2) the harshness of the penalty, and (3) the sentences for other crimes within the jurisdiction.\u201d In seeking to persuade us to uphold the trial court\u2019s order, Defendant notes that he was a juvenile at the time that the offenses in question were committed, points out that he would receive a significantly shorter term of imprisonment in the event that he were to be sentenced under current law, and argues that his sentence of 50 years imprisonment with the possibility of parole based upon his convictions for second degree burglary, felonious breaking or entering, felonious larceny, and possession of stolen property was grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed. We do not find Defendant\u2019s argument persuasive.\nThe first problem with the trial court\u2019s order is that the trial court claimed to have erroneously considered a comparison of the sentence imposed upon Defendant with sentences imposed upon others under more recent statutory sentencing provisions in the course of determining whether Defendant\u2019s sentence was grossly disproportionate. However, a comparison of the sentence imposed upon Defendant to the sentences that have been or could be imposed upon other convicted felons is not relevant to the issues raised by Defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief until after a finding of \u201cgross disproportionality\u201d had been made. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 836 (stating that an evaluation of the gravity of the offense for which the defendant had been convicted and the severity of the sentence imposed upon the defendant based upon that conviction for the purpose of determining whether the defendant\u2019s sentence was grossly disproportionate must be undertaken before the court compares a defendant\u2019s sentence to the sentences of others for similar offenses); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S. Ct. at 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 871 (stating that \u201c[a] better reading of our cases leads to the conclusion that intrajurisdictional and interjurisdic-tional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality\u201d) (Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O\u2019Connor and Souter, concurring). For that reason, the extent to which Defendant would have been subject to a less severe sentence in the event that he had been sentenced under current sentencing law has no bearing upon the initial phase of the required Eighth Amendment analysis. As a result, the trial court erred by apparently failing to make a determination that Defendant\u2019s sentence was grossly disproportionate without taking subsequent sentencing amendments into account before concluding that Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments should be vacated and that Defendant should be resentenced.\nIn addition, we are unable to agree that Defendant has established that the sentence embodied in Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments was grossly disproportionate. Although Defendant was a juvenile at the time that he committed the offenses that led to the challenged trial court judgments and although the offenses for which Defendant was convicted were not violent in nature, he pled guilty to one count of second degree burglary, three counts of felonious breaking or entering, four counts of felonious larceny, and two counts of possession of stolen property, resulting in a total of ten felony convictions. Moreover, despite the fact that Defendant\u2019s convictions did, as he points out in his brief, result from the commission of nonviolent property crimes, the fact that he was convicted of committing ten felony offenses, the fact that second degree burglary is a particularly serious offense involving the breaking and entering of a residence in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony or any larceny, State v. Beaver, 291 N.C. 137, 141, 229 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1976) (stating that \u201c[t]he distinction between the two degrees [of burglary] depends upon the actual occupancy of the dwelling house or sleeping apartment at the time of the commission of the crime\u201d), and the fact that, in two of the cases at issue here, Defendant was found to have taken property of great value and involved a young person less than sixteen years old in the criminal activity in which he was engaged, are relevant to the constitutional validity of Judge Gore\u2019s decision to impose a particularly severe sentence in this case. Simply put, in light of the number of felony offenses for which Defendant was convicted, the fact that one of the offenses for which Defendant was convicted was a particularly serious one, and the fact that Defendant\u2019s conduct involved great financial harm and led to criminal activity on the part of a younger individual, we are unable to say that the sentence embodied in Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments was \u201cgrossly disproportionate.\u201d Our conclusion to this effect is buttressed by a careful examination of the reported appellate decisions addressing similar factual circumstances, all of which suggest that this is not one of the \u201cexceedingly rare\u201d and \u201cextreme\u201d cases in which the sentence upon Defendant is \u201cgrossly disproportionate.\u201d See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1190, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108, 123 (2003) (holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for larceny pursuant to a \u201cthree strikes and you\u2019re out\u201d law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1008-09, 111 S. Ct. at 2709, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 874 (holding that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for possession of cocaine was not so grossly disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment) (Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O\u2019Connor and Souter, concurring); State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 612, 502 S.E.2d 819, 834 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111, 119 S. Ct. 883, 142 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1999) (holding that a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole based upon a thirteen year old defendant\u2019s conviction for first degree sexual offense did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); State v. Ford, 297 N.C. 28, 32, 252 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1979) (holding that a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree burglary did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 384-85, 230 S.E.2d 524, 536 (1976) (holding that a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree burglary did not constitute .cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Stubbs,_N.C. App. at_,_S.E.2d at_(holding that a defendant\u2019s sentence of life imprisonment for a second degree burglary committed when the defendant was a juvenile did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); State v. Pettigrew, 204 N.C. App. 248, 258-59, 693 S.E.2d 698, 705, app. dismissed, 364 N.C. 439, 706 S.E.2d 467 (2010) (holding that a sentence of 32 to 40 years imprisonment for two counts of first degree sexual offense committed when the defendant was sixteen years old did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). For all of these reasons, we see no basis for concluding that this is one of the \u201cexceedingly rare noncapital cases\u201d in which the sentence imposed is \u201cgrossly disproportionate\u201d to the crimes for which Defendant stands convicted. As a result, we conclude that the sentence imposed upon Defendant in this case, while undoubtedly severe, is \u201cnot cruel or unusual in the constitutional sense,\u201d Green, 348 N.C. at 612, 502 S.E.2d at 834, and, for that reason, hold that the trial court\u2019s order should be reversed and that this case should be remanded to the Cumberland County Superior Court with instructions to reinstate Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court erred by vacating Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments, resentencing Defendant, and ordering his immediate release. As a result, the trial court\u2019s order should be, and hereby is, reversed, and this case should be, and hereby is, remanded to the Cumberland County Superior Court for reinstatement of Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJudges ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., and DAVIS concur.\n. Although Defendant argued that his sentences violated N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 27, in his motion for appropriate relief, the trial court made no reference to this provision of the state constitution in its order and Defendant has not advanced any argument stemming from the state constitution in his brief. For those reasons, we will treat this case as arising solely under the relevant provision of the United States constitution.\n. In addition, this Court has granted petitions for writs of certiorari filed by the State for the purpose of seeking review of orders allowing motions for appropriate relief in previous cases. See State v. Bonsteel, 160 N.C. App. 709,_S.E.2d_(2003) (unpublished) (granting the State\u2019s petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for the purpose of reviewing a trial court order granting a defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief); State v. Rubio,_N.C. App._, 732 S.E.2d 393 (2012) (unpublished), disc. review dismissed, _N.C._, 735 S.E.2d 824 (2013) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1422(c)(3) as the basis for asserting jurisdiction over an order granting a defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief). Although we are not bound by our prior unpublished decisions, see United Services Automobile Assn. v. Simpson, 126 N.C. App. 393, 396, 485 S.E.2d 337, 339, disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 141, 492 S.E.2d 37 (1997) (holding that this Court is not bound by a prior unpublished decision of another panel of this Court), we believe that Bonsteel and Rubio shed additional light on our authority to grant the State\u2019s request for certiorari review of an order granting a defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief.\n. In support of its argument that the trial court lacked the authority to consider Defendant\u2019s challenge to the judgments at issue here, the State cites the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Whitehead to the effect that, \u201c[h]aving concluded that defendant is not entitled to resentencing under the [Structured Sentencing Act], we also note that defendant\u2019s [motion for appropriate relief] provides no appropriate grounds for resentencing under the [Fair Sentencing Act].\u201d Whitehead, 365 N.C. at 448, 722 S.E.2d at 495. In this case, unlike Whitehead, Defendant has advanced a constitutional, rather than a merely statutory, challenge to the validity of Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments, a fact which distinguishes this case from Whitehead and gave the trial court the authority to consider the merits of Defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief.\n. Although the State has argued at length that, \u201coutside the capital context, there is no general proportionality principle inherent in the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,\u201d we believe that the relevant decisions of the United States Supreme Court clearly state the \u201cgross disproportionality\u201d test discussed in the text of this opinion for use in non-capital cases and do not understand the State to be advancing a contrary assertion.\n. The parties do not appear to agree upon the sentence upon which we should focus our attention in analyzing the validity of the State\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s order. On the one hand, Defendant\u2019s argument rests upon the assumption that we should view the sum total of the sentences embodied in Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments as a single term of imprisonment while the State appears to suggest that we should focus our attention on the specific sentence that Defendant is currently serving. As a result of the fact that we do not believe that this difference of opinion has any bearing on the ultimate outcome that we should reach in this case, we will assume, without deciding, that the approach taken by Defendant is the correct one.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel P. O\u2019Brien, for the State.", "Sarah Jessica Farber, for Defendant-Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRANCE WILKERSON\nNo. COA13-365\nFiled 18 February 2014\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 certiorari granted by prior panel \u2014 authority to issue writs\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the Court of Appeals lacked authority to grant certiorari for the State was decided by a prior panel in the course of granting the State\u2019s certiorari petition. Additionally, according to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-32(c), the Court of Appeals has the authority to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its own jurisdiction, or to supervise and control the proceedings of any of the trial courts.\n2. Criminal Law \u2014 motion for appropriate relief \u2014 constitutional challenge \u2014 trial court jurisdiction\nThe trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief to challenge his original sentence as cruel and unusual punishment under evolving standards of decency. The fact that defendant did not cite N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(b)(4) before the trial court was irrelevant to the required jurisdictional determination given the fact that the constitutional nature of defendant\u2019s challenge to Judge Gore\u2019s original judgments was clearly stated in defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief and the fact that the trial court has the authority, in appropriate cases, to grant postconviction relief on its own motion.\n3. Constitutional Law \u2014 Eighth Amendment \u2014 former sentence\u2014 evolving standards of decency\nThe trial court erred by determining that the sentences that defendant was currently serving subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The trial court failed to make a determination that defendant\u2019s sentence was grossly disproportionate before considering the extent to which defendant would have been subject to a less severe sentence under current law. Additionally, the Court of Appeals was unable to say that the sentence embodied in the original judgments was grossly disproportionate in light of the number of felony offenses for which defendant was convicted, the fact that one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a particularly serious one, and the fact that defendant\u2019s conduct involved great financial harm and led to criminal activity on the part of a younger individual.\nReview stemming from the allowance of a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari filed by the State challenging an order entered 17 December 2012 by Judge Mary Ann Tally in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 September 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel P. O\u2019Brien, for the State.\nSarah Jessica Farber, for Defendant-Appellee." }, "file_name": "0482-01", "first_page_order": 492, "last_page_order": 506 }