{ "id": 6779235, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAMAR MONQUEE CARPENTER, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Carpenter", "decision_date": "2014-03-04", "docket_number": "No. COA13-898", "first_page": "637", "last_page": "647", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 N.C. App. 637" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640370 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 S.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691", "parenthetical": "holding that eyewitness identification of defendant as the perpetrator is sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss on the basis of identity" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12136286 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "holding that eyewitness identification of defendant as the perpetrator is sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss on the basis of identity" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560790 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553707 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459-60", "parenthetical": "finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court concluded that general expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitnesses was unduly prejudicial to the State" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524328 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621-22", "parenthetical": "finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court concluded that general expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitnesses was unduly prejudicial to the State" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "holding that the exclusion of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitnesses was within the trial court's discretion where the expert on voir dire only testified generally" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522281 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496-97", "parenthetical": "holding that the exclusion of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitnesses was within the trial court's discretion where the expert on voir dire only testified generally" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 S.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "715 S.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Kan. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 8370092 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "1099-1100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/278/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "704 S.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "44-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. App. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4181447 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/208/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 S.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394", "parenthetical": "holding that testimony identifying the jacket the defendant was wearing at his arrest as similar to that of the perpetrator was relevant and admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572439 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "holding that testimony identifying the jacket the defendant was wearing at his arrest as similar to that of the perpetrator was relevant and admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99", "parenthetical": "\"Under the facts in this case it was not necessary that the victim give testimony positively identifying the clothing as that worn by the robber, only that it was similar.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548474 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252", "parenthetical": "\"Under the facts in this case it was not necessary that the victim give testimony positively identifying the clothing as that worn by the robber, only that it was similar.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 S.E.2d 911", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" }, { "page": "915-16", "parenthetical": "holding that evidence that a pair of shoes owned by defendant matched the shoe prints found at the crime scene is relevant to identity, even if the witnesses were unsure if he was wearing those shoes on the night of the crime" }, { "page": "916" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491642 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" }, { "page": "397-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-97", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525111 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "685 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167734 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155039 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154240 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0506-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 961, "char_count": 24846, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.835965197106447e-08, "percentile": 0.41710578493186284 }, "sha256": "c09225206e444777f59b67b52887f3bf701905c3c7dff7e8f07a9d2e7e770276", "simhash": "1:a7797e3e75541d7b", "word_count": 4100 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:41.441392+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, JR., Robert N. and DILLON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAMAR MONQUEE CARPENTER, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nLamar Carpenter (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgments entered on or about 21 March 2013 after a Forsyth County jury found him guilty on two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We conclude that defendant has failed to show error at his trial, but dismiss his ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice to his ability to raise it by motion for appropriate relief.\nI. Background\nOn 7 February 2011, defendant was indicted in Forsyth County for robbery with a dangerous weapon. This indictment was superseded on 23 January 2012 by one charging two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon and again on 13 August 2012 by indictments charging two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant pled not guilty and the case proceeded to jury trial.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 23 April 2010, Ahmed Khabiry and Shafic Andraos were working at a gas station and convenience store in Winston-Salem. Mr. Khabiry was working as a manager and clerk, while Mr. Andraos, the owner of the store, was working in the back office. At around 9:00 or 9:30 that morning, a young man walked into the convenience store and attempted to use the ATM. Neither Mr. Khabiry nor Mr. Andraos recognized the man. That same man returned a few minutes later with a second man. Both men were wearing bandanas covering the lower half of their faces. Mr. Khabiry was outside sweeping the parking lot when he saw the men arrive. He started heading back inside to assist them when he noticed the first man was carrying a silver gun in his hand. Mr. Khabiry grabbed for the gun, but the second robber came up, pointed another silver gun at him, and pushed him inside. The first robber took Mr. Khabiry back behind the counter to the cash register, while the second robber went back to the office where Mr. Andraos was working.\nMr. Khabiry recognized the second robber as one of his regular customers, who he had nicknamed \u201cBig Money,\u201d but did not recognize the first robber. He recognized \u201cBig Money\u201d from his build and voice, and also from his tattoo. In court, Mr. Khabiry identified defendant as the second robber and the man he knew as \u201cBig Money.\u201d\nThe first robber told Mr. Khabiry to open the cash register, which he did, and then demanded Mr. Khabiry hand over his wallet. When Mr. Khabiry informed the first robber that he did not have a wallet on him, the robber told him to hand over whatever money he had in his pocket, which amounted to five dollars. The second robber took about $6,700 from the back office, where Mr. Andraos had been preparing the store\u2019s cash for deposit. Both robbers then left the store and Mr. Khabiry called the police.\nAround 5 May 2010, the police asked Mr. Khabiry to look at two photo arrays, one of which contained defendant\u2019s photograph. The arrays were administered by an officer with no connection to the investigation and no knowledge of which photograph in the array was the suspect. Mr. Khabiry identified defendant as the regular customer who had robbed the store, stating he was \u201c100 percent sure.\u201d He did not identify the man whom police suspected was the first robber.\nSometime in July 2010, defendant returned to the convenience store. Mr. Khabiry recognized him as the second robber and informed Mr. Andraos. Mr. Andraos went out to look at the car defendant was driving, wrote down the license plate number, and called the police. At trial, Mr. Andraos identified defendant as the man he saw in July whom Mr. Khabiry pointed out. Mr. Andraos testified that he noticed the same tattoo on defendant\u2019s arm in July as the one he saw on the second robber\u2019s arm, but that he did not really know defendant.\nThe State also introduced pictures taken of defendant while he was in jail that showed the tattoo on his right arm and still photographs taken by the store\u2019s surveillance cameras during the robbery. The surveillance camera photographs showed that the second robber had a tattoo on his forearm, but the photographs were not of sufficient quality to show the details of the tattoo.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss all of the charges against him and the trial court denied the motion. He then elected not to present evidence and renewed his motion to dismiss. Again, the trial court denied the motion. The jury found defendant guilty on two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of 97-126 months imprisonment and one term of 19-23 months imprisonment. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.\nII. Admission of Photographs\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting three photographs of him and his tattoos taken at the jail after his arrest. He contends that the photographs were not properly authenticated, not relevant, and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude them under Rule 403. We hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs.\nA. Standard of Review\nAt trial, defendant only objected to admission of the photographs under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2011). Defendant did not raise either authentication or relevance below, but asks us to review the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to exclude the photographs on those grounds for plain error.\nFor error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice \u2014 that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty. Moreover, because plain error is to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case, the error will often be one that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\nState v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nDefendant did object on the basis that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403. We review the trial court\u2019s determination under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cunningham, 188 N.C. App. 832, 836-37, 656 S.E.2d 697, 700 (2008). \u201cAn abuse of discretion results only where a decision is manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Black, 197 N.C. App. 731, 737, 678 S.E.2d 689, 693 (citation and quotation marks omitted), app. dismissed, 363 N.C. 657, 685 S.E.2d 108 (2009), cert. dismissed, 365 N.C. 208, 710 S.E.2d 38 (2011).\nB. Authentication\n\u201cPhotographs may be used as substantive evidence upon the laying of a proper foundation, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-97, and may be admitted when they are a fair and accurate portrayal of the place in question and are sufficiently authenticated.\u201d Sellers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 102 N.C. App. 563, 565, 402 S.E.2d 872, 873 (1991). A photograph is authentic if there is \u201cevidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901(a) (2011).\nHere, the photographs that defendant challenges are photographs taken of him, including his tattoo, while he was in custody in October 2010. Defendant argues that because the State introduced no evidence that defendant had that tattoo on 23 April 2010, the date of the robbery, the photographs were not what they purported to be. We disagree.\nThe custodial photographs did not purport to show defendant\u2019s arm at the time of the robbery. The photographs clearly show \u2014 and the State introduced them to show \u2014 that defendant had a tattoo on a particular place on his forearm at the time the photograph was taken. The officer who took the photographs testified about the procedure used to take them and testified that they fairly and accurately depicted defendant\u2019s tattoo as it appeared in October 2010. Indeed, defendant does not contest that the photographs fairly and accurately depict defendant\u2019s arm while he was in custody. Therefore, there is no authentication issue with the photographs under either N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901(a) or N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-97.\nC. Relevance\nSimilarly, defendant argues that the custodial photographs were irrelevant because the State has failed to show that he had the tattoo on 23 April 2010. Defendant contends that the fact that he had a tattoo on his forearm in October 2010 is not probative at all as to identity. Again, we disagree.\n\u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2011). \u201cEvidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact- in issue in the case.\u201d State v. Whiteside, 325 N.C. 389, 397, 383 S.E.2d 911, 915 (1989). A piece of evidence does not have to positively identify the perpetrator to be relevant to the issue of identity. See State v. Collins, 35 N.C. App. 250, 252, 241 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1978) (\u201cUnder the facts in this case it was not necessary that the victim give testimony positively identifying the clothing as that worn by the robber, only that it was similar.\u201d); State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 449, 186 S.E.2d 384, 394 (1972) (holding that testimony identifying the jacket the defendant was wearing at his arrest as similar to that of the perpetrator was relevant and admissible).\nHere, the photographs of defendant\u2019s tattoo taken after his arrest were relevant to proving his identify as the perpetrator. Detective Clark did testify that he could not make out what the tattoo said, in the surveillance camera still photographs but noted that he could tell it was a tattoo. Additionally, the surveillance camera photographs clearly show the location and general dimensions of the tattoo of the second robber. It would be reasonable for a juror to conclude that the photographs taken after defendant\u2019s arrest show a tattoo in approximately the same location and approximately the same size as that of the second robber. That defendant had a tattoo on his forearm in October 2010 similar to that of the second robber is at least some evidence that he was the second robber. Such evidence makes it \u201cmore probable\u201d that defendant was the peipetrator \u201cthan it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401. Therefore, the evidence is relevant to the issue of identify. See Whiteside, 325 N.C. at 397-98, 383 S.E.2d at 915-16 (holding that evidence that a pair of shoes owned by defendant matched the shoe prints found at the crime scene is relevant to identity, even if the witnesses were unsure if he was wearing those shoes on the night of the crime). \u201cOnce properly admitted, the weight to be given the evidence was a decision for the jury.\u201d Id. at 398, 383 S.E.2d at 916.\nD. Rule 403\nWe have held that the photographs of defendant\u2019s tattoos were properly authenticated and relevant to identify the second robber. Now, we must address defendant\u2019s argument \u2014 the only one raised below\u2014 that the photographs are inadmissible under Rule 403 because \u201c[a]ny probative value from the custodial photographs was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.\u201d\nDefendant first contends that the photographs had no probative value and tended to confuse the jury, largely repeating the same arguments made as to authentication and relevance. For the reasons discussed in the sections addressing those arguments, this argument is similarly unconvincing. Next, defendant argues that the photographs were unfairly prejudicial because they showed him in a jail setting. Defendant fails to highlight anything in the photographs that clearly identify where they were taken other than \u201csome type of institutional setting\u201d and the reflections of two officers.\nWhile all evidence offered against a party involves some prejudicial effect, the fact that evidence is prejudicial does not mean that it is necessarily unfairly prejudicial. The meaning of unfair prejudice in the context of Rule 403 is an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, as an emotional one.\nState v. Capers, 208 N.C. App. 605, 617, 704 S.E.2d 39, 46 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. rev. denied and app. dismissed, 365 N.C. 187, 707 S.E.2d 236 (2011).\nHere, the trial court admitted the photographs that it determined showed the least amount of information regarding the location, but excluded as cumulative one of the photographs that showed more of defendant\u2019s jail jumpsuit. The photographs admitted by the trial court did not clearly show defendant in jail garb or in handcuffs. The pictures only showed defendant in a white t-shirt in a cinderblock room with large windows. The trial court specifically found that it was unable to determine from the pictures that they were taken in a jail. Therefore, we fail to see how the admission of these pictures was unfairly prejudicial.\nEven to the extent that a juror could have deduced that the pictures were taken in a jail, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value. It is common knowledge that defendants charged with armed robbery are often arrested and that when people are arrested they are taken to jail. See id. at 614, 704 S.E.2d at 44-45 (noting that it is common knowledge that arrestees are handcuffed and citing State v. Smith, 278 Kan. 45, 49, 92 P.3d 1096, 1099-1100 (2004), which held that the \u201ctrial court did not err in admitting photographs of defendant in jail clothing because most jurors would hardly be shocked to learn that a murder suspect was taken into custody for some period of time, the only information communicated by jail clothing.\u201d). These photographs, at most, conveyed only the limited information that defendant had been arrested, taken to jail, and photographed. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant\u2019s objection based on Rule 403 and did not err in admitting the photographs of defendant.\nIII. Motion to Dismiss\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State presented insufficient evidence identifying him as the second robber. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nA. Standard of Review\nThe standard of review for a motion to dismiss is well known. A defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss should be denied if there is substantial evidence of: (1) each essential element of the offense charged, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of the charged offense. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from that evidence. Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve.\nState v. Teague,_N.C. App._,_, 715 S.E.2d 919, 923 (2011) (citation omitted), app. dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 365 N.C. 547, 742 S.E.2d 177 (2012).\nB. Analysis\nDefendant contends that there was insufficient evidence identifying him as the second robber. He cites a number of articles and cases from other states discussing the weaknesses of eyewitness identification, especially when the identification is cross-racial and when a firearm is pointed at the eyewitness. Such arguments have no bearing on the sufficiency of the evidence when considering amotion to dismiss. If relevant at all, these arguments would go only to the credibility of an eyewitness identification. See generally State v. Knox, 78 N.C. App. 493, 496-97, 337 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1985) (holding that the exclusion of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitnesses was within the trial court\u2019s discretion where the expert on voir dire only testified generally); State v. Cotton, 99 N.C. App. 615, 621-22, 394 S.E.2d 456, 459-60 (1990) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court concluded that general expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitnesses was unduly prejudicial to the State), aff'd, 329 N.C. 764, 407 S.E.2d 514 (1991).\nThe State called two eyewitnesses who were present at the time of the robbery \u2014 the store clerk, Mr. Khabiry, and the owner, Mr. Andraos. Mr. Khabiry testified that he recognized the second robber by his eyes and his voice as one of his regular customers both from working at the convenience store and from his previous business operating an ice cream truck in the area. Although he did not know the customer\u2019s name, Mr. Khabiry had been calling him \u201cBig Money.\u201d He also testified that he recognized defendant as the second robber from his tattoo. Further, as previously mentioned, although the surveillance video was not clear enough to positively identify what the second robber\u2019s tattoo said, it was clear enough for a reasonable juror to conclude that the robber\u2019s tattoo was in approximately the same location, and approximately the same size and shape, as defendant\u2019s tattoo.\nMr. Khabiry was later asked to do two photo lineups, one of which contained defendant\u2019s photograph, and one of which contained a photograph of the suspected first robber. He identified defendant\u2019s photograph as one of the robbers and as the man he knew as \u201cBig Money.\u201d He indicated that he was 100% certain. In court, he again identified defendant as the second robber. The police officers who investigated the robbery confirmed that Mr. Khabiry had told them that he knew the second robber as \u201cBig Money\u201d and that he told them he recognized that robber as a regular customer, but testified that he had not mentioned anything about a tattoo. Mr. Khabiry was unable to identify anyone as the first robber.\nIn July 2010, defendant drove up to the gas station and walked into the convenience store. Mr. Khabiry testified that he recognized defendant and told Mr. Andraos that he was the one who had robbed them. Mr. Andraos then went outside, took down the car\u2019s license plate number and called the police. Mr. Andraos did not recognize either of the robbers, but confirmed that Mr. Khabiry had identified defendant as the second robber when he returned to the store in July.\nDefendant argues that this evidence is insufficient to identify him as the second robber because the eyewitnesses had not mentioned a tattoo when interviewed by the police and because there was no corroborating physical evidence. First, the argument about the witness\u2019 failure to mention the tattoo simply goes to the credibility of eyewitness\u2019 testimony. \u201cThe credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is exclusively a matter for the jury.\u201d State v. Scott, 323 N.C. 350, 353, 372 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1988) (citation omitted). Defendant\u2019s second argument is simply unconvincing. He was positively identified by Mr. Khabiry as the second robber. Mr. Khabiry testified how he recognized defendant and identified him both in court and through an out-of-court photographic array. Additionally, it would be reasonable for a juror to conclude that the photographs from the day of the robbery show that the second perpetrator had a tattoo consistent with defendant\u2019s. Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the above evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable juror that defendant was one of the perpetrators of the armed robbery. See State v. Mobley, 86 N.C. App. 528, 532, 358 S.E.2d 689, 691 (1987) (holding that eyewitness identification of defendant as the perpetrator is sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss on the basis of identity). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. See Teague,_N.C. App. at_, 715 S.E.2d at 923.\nIV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, when his trial counsel failed to cross-examine the two eyewitnesses with prior inconsistent statements they had made to police and the prosecutor.\nAs a general proposition, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be considered through motions for appropriate relief and not on direct appeal. It is well established that ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought on direct review will be decided on the merits when the cold record reveals that no further investigation is required, i.e., claims that may be developed and argued without such ancillary procedures as the appointment of investigators or an evidentiary hearing. Thus, when this Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal and determines that they have been brought prematurely, we dismiss those claims without prejudice, allowing defendants to bring them pursuant to a subsequent motion for appropriate relief in the trial court.\nState v. Hernandez,_N.C. App._,_, 742 S.E.2d 825, 830 (2013) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).\nDefendant asserts that there was no possible strategic reason that his trial counsel would fail to cross-examine the eyewitnesses on any prior inconsistent statements they made. The State counters that there were a number of possible strategic reasons that defendant\u2019s trial counsel would elect not to cross-examine the witnesses using those prior statements. As we cannot resolve this dispute on the cold record before us, we dismiss defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance claim as premature without prejudice to his ability to raise it through a motion for appropriate relief.\nV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs of defendant and his tattoos taken at the jail and that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. We dismiss defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice to his ability to raise it by motion for appropriate relief.\nNO ERROR; DISMISSED in part.\nJudges HUNTER, JR., Robert N. and DILLON concur.\n. Defendant, in Ms interview with a detective, confirmed that he lived in that area and had been to the convenience store on a number of occasions.\n. Mr. Khabiry testified that the tattoo was on the robber\u2019s hand, but when he was examining the photograph of the robber, marked as State\u2019s ExMbit 2, which clearly shows a tattoo on the robber\u2019s arm, he again described the tattoo as being on the robber\u2019s hand. Taken in the light most favorable to the State, this inconsistency could mean that Mr. Khabiry simply misspoke when he said the tattoo was on the second robber\u2019s \u201chand.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Aimee Margolis, for the State.", "Unti & LumsdenLLP, by Sharon L. Smith, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAMAR MONQUEE CARPENTER, Defendant\nNo. COA13-898\nFiled 4 March 2014\n1. Evidence \u2014 photographs\u2014properly authenticated \u2014 relevant \u2014not unduly prejudicial\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a robbery case by admitting three photographs of defendant and his tattoos taken at the jail after his arrest. The photographs were properly authenticated and were relevant to the issue of the identity of defendant as the perpetrator. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant\u2019s motion to exclude them under Rule 403. The photographs were probative of defendant\u2019s identity and were not unduly prejudicial as the trial court specifically found that it was unable to determine from the pictures that they were taken in a jail.\n2. Robbery \u2014 with a dangerous weapon \u2014 sufficient evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of armed robbery. Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to convince a reasonable juror that defendant was one of the perpetrators of the armed robbery.\n3. Constitutional Law \u2014 effective assistance of counsel\u2014 dismissed without prejudice \u2014 motion for appropriate relief\nDefendant\u2019s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, when his trial counsel failed to cross-examine the two eyewitnesses with prior inconsistent statements they had made to police and the prosecutor was dismissed without prejudice to his ability to raise it through a motion for appropriate relief.\nAppeal by defendant from Judgments entered on or about 21 March 2013 by Judge V. Bradford Long in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 January 2014.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Aimee Margolis, for the State.\nUnti & LumsdenLLP, by Sharon L. Smith, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0637-01", "first_page_order": 647, "last_page_order": 657 }