{ "id": 6767271, "name": "THOMAS BRANDON SPOON, Plaintiff v. ABBY MELVIN SPOON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Spoon v. Spoon", "decision_date": "2014-03-18", "docket_number": "No. COA13-340", "first_page": "38", "last_page": "50", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 N.C. App. 38" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167461 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748", "parenthetical": "citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529", "parenthetical": "citation and emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4179130 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "citation and emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/207/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080722 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540-41", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "\"Unchallenged findings are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.\" (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. App. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3806209 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "\"Unchallenged findings are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.\" (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/211/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court erred in modifying custody of minor child when \"[t]he only finding of change in circumstances as to [the minor child] was that defendant is now residing in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 N.C. App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553733 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court erred in modifying custody of minor child when \"[t]he only finding of change in circumstances as to [the minor child] was that defendant is now residing in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/16/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" }, { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11078803 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" }, { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564905 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "715 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171", "parenthetical": "\"In granting the Motion to Modify Custody, the trial court must have first appropriately concluded that there was a substantial change in circumstances and that the change affected the welfare of the minor child or children.\"" }, { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "explaining that interference with and attempts to frustrate relationship between children and other parent can be considered in determining whether modification of custody is appropriate" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4233126 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "\"In granting the Motion to Modify Custody, the trial court must have first appropriately concluded that there was a substantial change in circumstances and that the change affected the welfare of the minor child or children.\"" }, { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/213/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 S.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684" }, { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560184 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560069 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "745 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. App. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4078441 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/212/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 F.Supp. 434", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7382861 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436", "parenthetical": "\"The primary putpose of a Rule 52(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/747/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "899 F.2d 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10526886 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/899/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555713 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549543 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253-54" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "internal citations and emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491698 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0471-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 988, "char_count": 28509, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0072016027051746e-07, "percentile": 0.5410288399053381 }, "sha256": "633daa46d5ea8f9530b218d11d08d91db89b235948a2dc3f793e0fc1bd011071", "simhash": "1:cbebd6eb764ebc74", "word_count": 4552 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:00.832613+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, JR. and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "THOMAS BRANDON SPOON, Plaintiff v. ABBY MELVIN SPOON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "DAVIS, Judge.-\nAbby Melvin Spoon, now Abby Melvin Brown (\u201cDefendant\u201d), appeals from the trial court\u2019s amended order modifying the custody arrangements for the parties\u2019 three children. Defendant\u2019s primary arguments on appeal are that the trial court erred by (1) supplementing its conclusions of law in response to a Rule 52(b) motion filed by Thomas Brandon Spoon (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019); and (2) concluding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances warranting the modification of custody. After careful review, we affirm the trial court\u2019s amended order.\nFactual Background\nPlaintiff and Defendant were married on 8 July 2000, separated on 19 October 2007, and divorced on 15 July 2009. The parties have three minor children: Allison, age 12; Rebecca, age 11; and Trevor, age 7.\nOn 25 September 2007, Plaintiff filed an action seeking child custody, equitable distribution, and divorce from bed and board. On 26 September 2007, the trial court granted Plaintiff temporary custody of the minor children. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaims on 19 October 2007 seeking child custody, child support, divorce from bed and board, post-separation support, alimony, and equitable distribution. Both parties voluntarily dismissed their claims, and a consent order was entered on 14 November 2007 granting the parties joint custody of the children. The consent order also required the minor children to attend school in the Alamance Burlington School System (\u201cABSS\u201d).\nBetween December 2007 and December 2009, the parties filed various motions for contempt and to modify custody. On 15 June 2011, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting primary placement. A hearing was held on 1 August 2011. Before this hearing, the parties filed a written set of stipulations, stating the following:\n1. Defendant, Abby Melvin Spoon, is moving to Orange County, North Carolina. A move to Orange County, North Carolina constitutes a substantial change in circumstances affecting the minor children of the parties.\n2. If this Court determines that it is in the best interest of the minor children to remain in Alamance County, North Carolina, then Abby Melvin will not move from Alamance County, North Carolina, and placement will remain the same.\nThe trial court proceeded to enter an order determining that \u201c[i]t is in the best interests of the minor children to remain in Alamance County, North Carolina.\u201d\nIn August of 2011, Defendant moved from Burlington to Mebane. On 28 October 2011, the trial court entered a consent order concerning custody and the children\u2019s school placement after Defendant withdrew the children from their previous school in Burlington and enrolled them in E.M. Yoder Elementary School in Mebane. In May of 2012, Defendant moved from Mebane to Chapel Hill. On 3 May 2012, Defendant filed motions seeking to modify the children\u2019s school placement to the Chapel Hill-Carrboro School District and to hold Plaintiff in contempt. On 22 May 2012, Plaintiff filed motions seeking to modify custody and hold Defendant in contempt. Plaintiff filed a second motion to hold Defendant in contempt on 31 July 2012.\nOn 14 August 2012, the trial court held a hearing on Plaintiff\u2019s motion to modify custody, Defendant\u2019s motion to modify school placement, and the parties\u2019 cross motions for contempt. The trial court entered an order on 24 August 2012 modifying the 28 October 2011 consent order. The trial court granted Plaintiff primary physical custody, giving him custody of the minor children for nine days out of every fourteen days, and Defendant secondary physical custody, giving her custody for the remaining five days. The trial court also held Defendant in contempt for moving the minor children without giving Plaintiff 90 days written notice as required by a previous court order; however, the trial court declined to sanction her.\nOn 4 September 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion under Rule 52(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure requesting that the trial court make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. In response to Plaintiff\u2019s motion, the trial court entered an amended order on 20 September 2012. Defendant appealed to this Court.\nAnalysis\nA trial court may order the modification of an existing child custody order if the court determines that there has been a substantial change of circumstances affecting the child\u2019s welfare and that modification is in the child\u2019s best interests. Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 473, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003). Our review of a trial court\u2019s decision to modify an existing child custody order is limited to determining (1) whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) whether those findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Id. at 474-75, 586 S.E.2d at 253-54. Evidence is substantial if \u201ca reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Id. at 474, 586 S.E.2d at 253. Because our trial courts \u201care vested with broad discretion in child custody matters\u201d and have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and the parties, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by evidence in the record, even if the evidence might also support a contrary finding. Balawejder v. Balawejder,_N.C. App._, _, 721 S.E.2d 679, 689 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nDefendant asserts a number of arguments on appeal. We address each in turn.\nI. Rule 52(b) Motion\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in amending its 24 August 2012 order in response to Plaintiff\u2019s Rule 52(b) motion. Rule 52(b) provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[u]pon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.\u201d N.C. R. Civ. P.52(b).\nBased on Plaintiff\u2019s Rule 52(b) motion, the trial court amended its prior order by adding the following italicized language to its second conclusion of law:\n2. There has been a substantial change in circumstances that affects the welfare of the minor children related to the defendant\u2019s moves to Mebane, North Carolina and Chapel Hill, North Carolina.\nThe trial court also added a conclusion of law number 6 stating that \u201c[t]he plaintiff is not in contempt.\u201d Defendant asserts that the plain language of Rule 52(b) does not allow such amendments to a trial court\u2019s original conclusions of law.\nHowever, this Court has stated that \u201cRule 52(b) concerns amendments to the findings and conclusions relating to a final judgment ....\u201d O\u2019Neill v. S. Nat\u2019l Bank, 40 N.C. App. 227, 231, 252 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1979) (emphasis added). We also look to federal cases for guidance on this issue as our Court has held that \u201cfederal court decisions are pertinent\u201d to our analysis of Rule 52(b) because \u201cNorth Carolina\u2019s Rule 52(b) mirrors Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\u201d Parrish v. Cole, 38 N.C. App. 691, 693, 248 S.E.2d 878, 879 (1978). Federal case law supports the proposition that Rule 52(b) gives a trial court \u201cthe power to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law.\u201d Nat\u2019l Metal Finishing Co. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 124 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); see Shivers v. Grubbs, 747 F.Supp. 434, 436 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (\u201cThe primary putpose of a Rule 52(b) motion is to enable the party to obtain a correct understanding of the Court\u2019s findings, typically for appeal purposes. In doing so the movant raises questions of substance by seeking reconsideration of material findings of fact or conclusions of law.\u201d (emphasis added)). Thus, we conclude that the trial court possessed authority under Rule 52(b) to amend its conclusions of law.\nII. 3 August 2011 Stipulation\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by relying on the 3 August 2011 stipulation \u2014 which stated that \u201c[a] move to Orange County, North Carolina constitutes a substantial change in circumstances affecting the minor children of the parties\u201d \u2014 in concluding that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. Specifically, she argues that \u201c[t]he fact that Judge Overby drafted her own order, the presence of certain Findings of Fact in that order which suggest she may have worked off a previous electronic file, the addition of conclusions of law pursuant to a Rule 52 motion, and the absence of required findings of fact strongly indicate that the trial court had again accepted the Stipulation as a conclusion of law.\u201d\nDefendant correctly notes that \u201cwhether there has been a substantial change of circumstances is a legal conclusion, which must be supported by adequate findings of fact\u201d and that the requirement that a trial court find a substantial change in circumstances before modifying custody cannot be waived by the parties. Hibshman v. Hibshman, 212 N.C. App. 113, 121, 710 S.E.2d 438, 444 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Our Court has also explained that \u201cstipulations as to questions of law are generally held invalid and ineffective, and not binding upon the courts, either trial or appellate.\u201d In re A.K.D.,_N.C. App._,_, 745 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2013) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).\nHowever, it is well established that \u201c[a]n appellate court is not required to, and should not, assume error by the trial judge when none appears on the record before the appellate court.\u201d State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 333, 163 S.E.2d 353, 357 (1968). Here, the only reference the trial court made to the parties\u2019 3 August 2011 stipulation is in finding of fact 5 in which the trial court provides the entire procedural history of the case. There is no indication that the trial court sought to avoid its obligation to determine whether a substantial change in circumstances had occurred \u2014 in stark contrast to the trial court\u2019s actions in Hibshman.\nIn Hibshman, the trial court initially granted custody of the minor children to the mother during the school year. Hibshman, 212 N.C. App. at 122, 710 S.E.2d at 444. The order conditioned this custody arrangement on the mother \u201cmaintaining a home in the Granite Quarry Elementary School district\u201d and provided that if she moved out of the school district, \u201cthis order may be modified without a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.\u201d Id. When the trial court later modified the custody order, it \u201cexplicitly stated that it was not considering whether a substantial change in circumstances warranting a change in custody had occurred\u201d and instead expressly relied upon the above-quoted provision of the original custody order. Id.\nUnlike in Hibshman, the trial court here did not disregard its duty to determine whether a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. The trial court\u2019s order does not suggest that it relied upon the parties\u2019 prior stipulation in any way when it concluded that there had been a substantial change in circumstances. Therefore, we decline to assume error.\nIII. Substantial Change in Circumstances\nDefendant\u2019s next several arguments on appeal relate to the trial court\u2019s conclusion that \u201c[t]here has been a substantial change in circumstances that affects the welfare of the minor children related to the defendant\u2019s moves to Mebane, North Carolina and Chapel Hill, North Carolina.\u201d Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in making this conclusion because (1) the change in circumstances must \u201csubstantially affect\u201d the children\u2019s welfare; (2) the trial court relied on a change that occurred prior to the entry of the previous custody order; and (3) relocating to another county is not a substantial change in circumstances where the evidence fails to establish a sufficient nexus between the relocation and the children\u2019s welfare.\nA. \u201cSubstantially affects\u201d the children\u2019s welfare\nCiting Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), Defendant claims that modification was improper here because the trial court was required to find that the moves to Mebane and Chapel Hill constituted a substantial change in circumstances that substantially affected the children\u2019s welfare.\nIn Spence, our Supreme Court stated that modification of a child custody order is appropriate upon a showing of \u201cany change of circumstances substantially affecting the welfare of the children.\u201d Id. at 684, 198 S.E.2d at 545. Since Spence, however, our appellate courts have repeatedly articulated the standard for modification of a child custody order as a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children. See Shipman, 357 N.C. at 473, 586 S.E.2d at 253 (\u201cIt is well established in this jurisdiction that a trial court may order a modification of an existing child custody order between two natural parents if the party moving for modification shows that a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child warrants a change in custody\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Stephens v. Stephens, 213 N.C. App. 495, 498, 715 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2011) (\u201cIn granting the Motion to Modify Custody, the trial court must have first appropriately concluded that there was a substantial change in circumstances and that the change affected the welfare of the minor child or children.\u201d).\nThus, the trial court applied the appropriate standard in concluding that \u201c[t]here has been a substantial change in circumstances that affects the welfare of the minor children related to the defendant\u2019s moves to Mebane, North Carolina and Chapel Hill, North Carolina.\u201d Defendant\u2019s argument, therefore, is overruled.\nB. Significance of Fact that Defendant\u2019s Move to Mebane Occurred Prior to Entry of 28 October 2011 Custody Order\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in considering her move to Mebane, North Carolina when making its determination that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred, claiming that she had moved to Mebane in August of 2011, which was prior to the entry of the 28 October 2011 custody order. As such, Defendant, citing Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 216 S.E.2d 1 (1975), asserts that her relocation to Mebane was not relevant because only changes that have occurred since 28 October 2011 should be considered when ruling on the motion to modify custody.\nDefendant is mistaken, however, because the trial court\u2019s actual conclusion was that a substantial change of circumstances \u201crelated to the defendant\u2019s moves to Mebane, North Carolina and Chapel Hill, North Carolina\u201d had occurred. (Emphasis added.) While the move to Mebane did, in fact, take place two months before the previous custody order was entered, the trial court\u2019s findings and the record evidence show that the effects of the relocation on the minor children did not manifest themselves until after the entry of that order. Our review of the trial court\u2019s findings reveals that the trial court was concerned about Defendant\u2019s history of uprooting, or attempting to uproot, the minor children without first consulting Plaintiff and the ramifications that these actions had on the children.\nIndeed, the trial court\u2019s findings pertaining to Defendant\u2019s move to Mebane primarily refer to (1) the children\u2019s emotional well-being and school performance; and (2) Defendant\u2019s actions in attempting to diminish the amount of time the children spent with Plaintiff, once they had moved. As such, the effects of the move to Mebane, which became apparent following the entry of the 28 October 2011 consent order, were relevant and properly considered by the trial court in determining whether a substantial change in circumstances had occurred.\nC. Sufficiency of Defendant\u2019s Relocations to Show a Substantial Change in Circumstances\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances because \u201ca change in the custodial parent\u2019s residence is not itself a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child which justifies a modification of a custody decree.\u201d Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 140, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000); see Harrington v. Harrington, 16 N.C. App. 628, 630, 192 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1972) (holding that trial court erred in modifying custody of minor child when \u201c[t]he only finding of change in circumstances as to [the minor child] was that defendant is now residing in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)).\nIn Evans, our Court explained that the relocation and remarriage of one of the parties could not have been deemed a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of custody because the trial court \u201cmade no findings of fact indicating the effect of the remarriage and relocation on the child himself... [and did] not discuss the impact of the proposed move on the child.\u201d Evans, 138 N.C. App. at 141, 530 S.E.2d at 580.\nIn Shipman, our Supreme Court further elaborated on the need to show the relationship between the change in circumstances and the welfare of the child, holding that\n[i]n situations where the substantial change involves a discrete set of circumstances such as a move on the part of a parent, a parent\u2019s cohabitation, or a change in a parent\u2019s sexual orientation, the effects of the change on the welfare of the child are not self-evident and therefore necessitate a showing of evidence directly linking the change to the welfare of the child.. .. Evidence linking these and other circumstances to the child\u2019s welfare might consist of assessments of the minor child\u2019s mental well-being by a qualified mental health professional, school records, or testimony from the child or the parent.\nShipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 256 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).\nHere, unlike in Evans, the trial court made multiple findings concerning how the two relocations (and resultant change in school placement) within a ten month period affected the minor children. The trial court found that the move to Mebane \u2014 abruptly followed by another move to Chapel Hill \u2014 \u201cadded stress to the minor children\u201d because they were distanced from their friends and extracurricular activities when they moved to Mebane and because the situation was repeated when they moved to Chapel Hill. The trial court also determined that both the children\u2019s teachers and Plaintiff had noticed a change in the children \u2014 observing that they were more clingy, tearful, and upset since the moves. The court found that Allison, the oldest child, had especially struggled with moving and going to a new school and that her dance instructor had observed \u201ca change in [her] demeanor\u201d such that she would frequently cry and be \u201cvisibly upset.\u201d\nAdditionally, the trial court made findings that since the two moves and her remarriage, Defendant has withdrawn the children from activities that Plaintiff helps with or coaches and has prioritized the development of relationships between the children and their step-family over their ability to spend time with Plaintiff. See Stephens, 213 N.C. App. at 499, 715 S.E.2d at 172 (explaining that interference with and attempts to frustrate relationship between children and other parent can be considered in determining whether modification of custody is appropriate). These findings are uncontested by Defendant and thus are binding on appeal. See Crenshaw v. Williams, 211 N.C. App. 136, 142, 710 S.E.2d 227, 232 (2011) (\u201cUnchallenged findings are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.\u201d (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).\nThe trial court also made findings regarding Allison\u2019s and Rebecca\u2019s declining academic performance since they changed schools. Defendant only challenges the finding concerning Rebecca\u2019s academic performance. As such, the trial court\u2019s finding regarding Allison\u2019s school performance is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal. See id. With respect to Rebecca\u2019s school performance, the trial court found\n43. The middle child [Rebecca] is a rising 4th grader. She attended Highland for kindergarten, first and second grade. She attended Yoder for third grade. From kindergarten through second grade her grades progressively increased from eleven \u201cneeds improvemenf\u2019s (and 205 \u201csatisfactory\u201d marks) in kindergarten to one \u201cneeds improvement\u201d (and 215 \u201csatisfactory\u201d marks) in first grade to all \u201csatisfactory\u201d (209 \u201csatisfactory\u201d) marks in second grade, with no \u201cneeds improvement\u201d marks. In third grade children receive their first \u201cletter\u201d grades, but they also continue to receive \u201cneeds improvement,\u201d \u201csatisfactory\u201d or \u201cunsatisfactory\u201d marks. In third grade, the middle child received twenty-one \u201cneeds improvement\u201d marks and 170 \u201csatisfactory\u201d marks. The middle child took the end of grade (EOG) tests for the first time while at Yoder. She passed math on the first try. She failed the English EOG and had to retake it. The middle child passed the English EOG on the second try. The middle child\u2019s grades (or marks) have diminished while sh\u00e9 attended Yoder.\nWe cannot agree with Defendant\u2019s assertion that the trial court\u2019s findings on this issue were unsupported by competent evidence. Rebecca\u2019s report cards from her new school in Mebane \u2014 introduced into evidence by Defendant \u2014 show that Rebecca received more \u201cneeds improvement\u201d marks and less \u201csatisfactory\u201d marks than in her previous years of schooling. As such, the trial court\u2019s finding that Rebecca\u2019s grades diminished is supported by competent evidence in the record.\nThus, the trial court determined that the children\u2019s emotional and academic well-being were adversely impacted by the moves to Mebane and Chapel Hill. As such, we hold that the trial court\u2019s order modifying custody (1) demonstrates that there has been a substantial change in circumstances; and (2) establishes a sufficient nexus between the change in circumstances and the children\u2019s welfare.\nIV. Best Interests of the Children\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that it was in the best interests of the minor children to modify the previous custody order because the trial court \u201cfailed to specify in its findings of fact which evidence presented convinced it that modification of the 28 October 2011 Order was in the best interest of the children.\u201d We disagree.\nOnce the trial court makes the threshold determination that a substantial change has occurred, the court then must consider whether a change in custody would be in the best interests of the child. As long as there is competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings, its determination as to the child\u2019s best interests cannot be upset absent a manifest abuse of discretion.\nMetz v. Metz, 138 N.C. App. 538, 540-41, 530 S.E.2d 79, 81 (2000) (internal citation omitted). In determining whether modification of custody is in the best interests of the minor children, \u201cany evidence which is competent and relevant to a showing of the best interest. . . must be heard and considered by the trial court.\u201d In re P.O., 207 N.C. App. 35, 39, 698 S.E.2d 525, 529 (2010) (citation and emphasis omitted).\n\u201cWhen determining whether the findings in an order modifying child custody are adequate to support its conclusions, this Court examines the entire order. The trial court is not constrained to using certain and specific buzz words or phrases in its order.\u201d Lang v. Lang, 197 N.C. App. 746, 748, 678 S.E.2d 395, 397 (2009) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). In this case, the trial court\u2019s findings, taken together, support its conclusion that modification of custody was in the best interests of the minor children. As discussed above, the trial court found that the two relocations have had a negative impact on the children\u2019s emotional and academic well-being and that since the moves, Defendant has withdrawn the children from extracurricular activities with which Plaintiff assists in order to limit their time with him.\nThe trial court also found that Plaintiff\u2019s living situation has been more stable over the past several years than Defendant\u2019s. Specifically, the trial court noted that Plaintiff has lived in the same house since his separation from Defendant and has not been engaged or married during this time. The trial court found that, conversely, Defendant has been engaged twice, has moved twice, has transferred the children to a different school district, and is now attempting to change the children\u2019s school placement once again. The trial court also determined that at Plaintiff\u2019s house, the children had their own bedrooms, were closer to their core group of friends and to their extracurricular activities, and that the flexibility of Plaintiff\u2019s work schedule allows him to pick up the children from school and transport them to their afterschool activities. Based on our examination of the entire order and its extensive findings of fact, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that modification of custody was in the best interests of the minor children.\nV. Motion to Modify School Placement\nFinally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to explicitly rule on her motion to modify school placement. We note that the decretal portion of the 20 September 2012 order states that \u201c[t]he plaintiff is responsible for and shall enroll the minor children in school in the ABSS,\u201d indicating that the trial court considered and denied Defendant\u2019s motion to modify the children\u2019s school placement to the Chapel Hill-Carrboro School District. Furthermore, Defendant\u2019s argument on this issue is premised on her assertion that the trial court erred in modifying custody, an assertion we reject for the reasons explained herein.\nConclusion\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order modifying custody.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges HUNTER, JR. and ERVIN concur.\n. Pseudonyms are used in this opinion to protect the identities of the minor children.\n. Defendant claims that findings of fact 14, 16, 18, 32, 33, 37, 47, 49, 62, and 66 address events that occurred before the entry of the consent order and must be disregarded. We first note that Defendant merely lists these findings by number and provides no specific argument regarding any of the findings as required by Rule 28(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Moreover, we believe these findings, which address the numerous times Defendant has attempted to relocate and unilaterally change the children\u2019s school placements, shed light on events occurring after the 28 October 2011 consent order was entered.\n. We decline to address Defendant\u2019s remaining arguments because they merely consist of her contentions as to what should occur in the event that the trial court\u2019s 20 September 2012 order is vacated.", "type": "majority", "author": "DAVIS, Judge.-" } ], "attorneys": [ "Wishart, Norris, Henninger & Pittman, PA, by Hillary D. Whitaker and Kathleen F. Treadwell, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Alexander, Miller, and Schupp, LLP, by Sydenham B. Alexander, Jr. and Jonathan J. Loch, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS BRANDON SPOON, Plaintiff v. ABBY MELVIN SPOON, Defendant\nNo. COA13-340\nFiled 18 March 2014\n1. Civil Procedure \u2014 Rule 52(b) \u2014 court\u2019s authority to amend conclusions of law\nThe trial court did not err in a child custody case by amending its order in response to plaintiff\u2019s N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52(b) motion. The trial court possessed authority under Rule 52(b) to amend its conclusions of law.\n2. Child Custody and Support \u2014 custody\u2014substantial change in circumstances \u2014 moving\u2014stipulation\nThe trial court did not err in a child custody case by concluding that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred based on its alleged reliance on the 3 August 2011 stipulation which stated that a move to Orange County, North Carolina constituted a substantial change in circumstances affecting the minor children. There was no indication that the trial court sought to avoid its obligation to determine whether a substantial change in circumstances had occurred.\n3. Child Custody and Support \u2014 custody modification\u2014 substantial change in circumstances \u2014 moving\u2014nexus\u2014 children\u2019s welfare\nThe trial court did not err by modifying child custody. The order demonstrated that there had been a substantial change in circumstances related to defendant\u2019s moves to Mebane and Chapel Hill. It also established a sufficient nexus between the change in circumstances and the children\u2019s welfare.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 20 September 2012 by Judge Kathryn Whitaker Overby in Alamance County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 September 2013.\nWishart, Norris, Henninger & Pittman, PA, by Hillary D. Whitaker and Kathleen F. Treadwell, for plaintiff-appellee.\nAlexander, Miller, and Schupp, LLP, by Sydenham B. Alexander, Jr. and Jonathan J. Loch, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0038-01", "first_page_order": 48, "last_page_order": 60 }