{ "id": 6767513, "name": "MARK R. PATMORE; MERCIA RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES, LLC; WILLIAM T. GARTLAND; and 318 BROOKS LLC, Plaintiffs v. TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Patmore v. Town of Chapel Hill", "decision_date": "2014-04-01", "docket_number": "No. 13-1049", "first_page": "133", "last_page": "144", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 N.C. App. 133" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "366 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4351487 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633154 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491, 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (1998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517410 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551355 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S.E. 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 N.C. 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661843 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/170/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S.E. 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 170 N.C. 685, 690, 86 S.E. 788, 791 (1915) (other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654161 ], "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489-90", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 170 N.C. 685, 690, 86 S.E. 788, 791 (1915) (other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/187/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155827 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722", "parenthetical": "quoting Spruill v. Lake Phelps Vol. Fire Dep't, Inc., 351 N.C. 318, 320, 523 S.E.2d 672, 674 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987016 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "quoting Spruill v. Lake Phelps Vol. Fire Dep't, Inc., 351 N.C. 318, 320, 523 S.E.2d 672, 674 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 55", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 353857 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 U.S. 149", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9190904 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90, 122 S. Ct. 1043 (2002" }, { "page": "760", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90, 122 S. Ct. 1043 (2002" }, { "page": "671", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90, 122 S. Ct. 1043 (2002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/537/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2544923 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779-80", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E. 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628580, 8633574 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0051-01", "/nc/214/0850-02" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526839 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15967", "category": "reporters:specialty_lexis", "reporter": "U.S. Dist. LEXIS", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*7-8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "718 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "696 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167655 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. App. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4233272 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/213/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "quoting Lowe, 313 N.C. at 462, 329 S.E.2d at 650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986939 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181", "parenthetical": "quoting Lowe, 313 N.C. at 462, 329 S.E.2d at 650" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 S.E. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566789 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E. 2d 320 (1975)" }, { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718547 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E. 2d 320 (1975)" }, { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 S.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 564", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782964 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" }, { "page": "2705" }, { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875", "parenthetical": "quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 556 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571662 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794414 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563-64", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491, 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (1998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 S.E. 2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566711 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "citing Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E. 2d 764 (1962)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566779 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "citing Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E. 2d 764 (1962)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511442 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151090 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568529 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "citing Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 378, 218 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467", "parenthetical": "citing Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 378, 218 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "733 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4349824, 4350241, 4351880, 4358990, 4360433, 4345461, 4347229, 4361117, 4347999 ], "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0416-01", "/nc/366/0416-06", "/nc/366/0416-03", "/nc/366/0416-05", "/nc/366/0416-02", "/nc/366/0416-04", "/nc/366/0416-08", "/nc/366/0416-09", "/nc/366/0416-07" ] }, { "cite": "731 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" }, { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4351487 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0142-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1250, "char_count": 28403, "ocr_confidence": 0.73, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.190185616648924e-08, "percentile": 0.4756854550207367 }, "sha256": "659de49e82c785a27a6974c9a077bdc76ce783e59ba4434d66ad67fc1781cde7", "simhash": "1:90819046373da692", "word_count": 4507 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:00.832613+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "MARK R. PATMORE; MERCIA RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES, LLC; WILLIAM T. GARTLAND; and 318 BROOKS LLC, Plaintiffs v. TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nWhere defendant enforced a zoning amendment by citing the owners of rental properties rather than their tenants because it was a more effective method of enforcement, their enforcement against property owners was rationally related to the purpose of the zoning restriction and did not violate plaintiffs\u2019 right to substantive due process. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 governs a municipality\u2019s authority to regulate parking in public vehicular areas, while the zoning amendment was a land use restriction intended to curb over-occupancy of rental properties by limiting the number of cars parked on a rental property. Because the zoning amendment and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 do not address the same subject, the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply. Lanvale Properties, LLC v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 731 S.E.2d 800, reh\u2019g denied, 366 N.C. 416, 733 S.E.2d 156 (2012), held that an ordinance was not a zoning ordinance, and did not change the law governing the requirements for a valid zoning ordinance.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nDefendant Town of Chapel Hill enacted a zoning ordinance as part of its Land Use Management Ordinance. One of the zoning districts created is the Northside Neighborhood Conservation District (NNC district), a residential neighborhood located near the campus of UNC-Chapel Hill. Special design standards apply to development in the NNC district and govern such things as maximum building height and the bedroom to bathroom ratio of rental houses. Despite the standards in the zoning ordinance, over-occupancy, or rental to a greater number of tenants than bedrooms, was a \u201csignificant problem\u201d in the NNC district for several years, and was associated with a number of problems, including parking and traffic congestion, excess garbage, and \u201csignificantly higher complaints of violations\u201d of town regulations than in other town residential neighborhoods.\nDefendant\u2019s planning department determined that although \u201cit is not a perfect measure, the number of vehicles parked on a residential lot in the [NNC] is a reasonable approximation of how many people are living at the property.\u201d After conducting a public hearing to address \u201cthe community\u2019s concerns about student rental,\u201d the Town Council adopted an amendment to the zoning ordinance that limited the number of cars that may be parked on a residential lot in the NNC district to four cars. The amendment was adopted on 9 January 2012 and took effect on 1 September 2012. The amendment is applied to both owner-occupied and rental properties. If a property is rented, the amendment is enforced by citing the owner of the property for violations, rather than the tenants. Plaintiffs are property owners who rent houses in the NNC district and were cited for violation of the amendment. Plaintiffs do not dispute that their properties were in violation of the ordinance.\nOn 27 November 2012 plaintiffs filed a complaint and an application for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant enforced the zoning amendment \u201csolely against the owner(s) of record of the real properties subject to the Zoning Regulation\u201d \u201cwithout any determination as to the reason for the parking of those cars\u201d and that plaintiffs were not \u201cin any position to control the number of cars parked\u201d on the properties that they owned and rented. Plaintiffs asserted that the zoning amendment was \u201cunlawful, ultra vires, and void\u201d and that \u201cits enforcement and application is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and violates Article I \u00a7 19 of the North Carolina Constitution and substantive due process [.]\u201d On 7 December 2012 plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking either \u201ca judgment declaring the Zoning Regulation unlawful, void and unenforceable, and permanently enjoin[ing] the enforcement of the Zoning Regulation\u201d or an injunction \u201cpermanently enjoin[ing] the enforcement of the Zoning Regulation against property owners who have no knowledge of and/or have taken no action to create or maintain any violation of the Zoning Regulation^]\u201d In its answer to the amended complaint, defendant admitted citing plaintiffs for violation of the zoning amendment, but denied plaintiffs\u2019 allegations concerning their ability to control the number of cars on their properties, and moved for dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\nDefendant and plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment on 22 and 28 May 2013, respectively. The parties\u2019 summary judgment motions were heard by the trial court on 3 June 2013, and on 4 June 2013 the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nPlaintiffs appeal.\nII. Standard of Review\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(a), summary judgment is properly entered \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d \u201cIn a motion for summary judgment, the evidence presented to the trial court must be admissible at trial, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2003), and must be viewed in a fight most favorable to the non-moving party.\u201d Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 467, 597 S.E.2d 674, 692 (2004) (citing Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 378, 218 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975)). \u201cWe review atrial court\u2019s order granting or denying summary judgment de novo. \u2018Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment\u2019 for that of the lower tribunal.\u201d Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (quoting In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P\u2019ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).\nIII. N.C. Constitution Art. I \u00a7 19\nIn their first argument, plaintiffs contend that the \u201cenforcement and application\u201d of the zoning amendment \u201cagainst Plaintiffs violates substantive due process under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, the Law of the Land Clause\u201d \u201cbecause the ordinance is enforced exclusively based on the existence of more than four parked cars on a lot without any determination as to the reason for the parking of those cars.\u201d We disagree.\nN. C. Constitution Art. I, \u00a7 19 provides that:\nNo person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin.\n\u201cThe term \u2018law of the land\u2019 as used in Article I, Section 19, of the Constitution of North Carolina, is synonymous with \u2018due process of law\u2019 as used in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.\u201d In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 98, 221 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1976) (citing Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E. 2d 764 (1962)).\n\u201cDue process has come to provide two types of protection for individuals against improper governmental action, substantive and procedural due process.\u201d State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 563-64, 614 S.E.2d 479, 485 (2005) (citing State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491, 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (1998). \u201c \u2018The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s protection of liberty and property.\u2019 \u201d Johnston v. State,_ N.C. App._,_, 735 S.E.2d 859, 875, (2012) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 556 (1972)), aff\u2019d_N.C._, 749 S.E.2d 278 (2013). In this case, plaintiffs do not allege the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest. Rather, plaintiffs assert a violation of their right to substantive due process.\n\u201cSubstantive due process is a guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained.\u201d Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 461, 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985) (citing State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E. 2d 320 (1975)). \u201cSimilar to the rational basis test for equal protection challenges, \u2018as long as there could be some rational basis for enacting [the statute at issue], this Court may not invoke [principles of due process] to disturb the statute.\u2019 \u201d Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 181, 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (quoting Lowe, 313 N.C. at 462, 329 S.E.2d at 650) (alterations in Rhyne). \u201cIf the challenging party cannot prove that the statute bears no rational relationship to any legitimate government interest, the statute is valid.\u201d Liebes v. Guilford Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Pub. Health, 213 N.C. App. 426, 429, 724 S.E.2d 70, 73 (citing State v. Fowler, 197 N.C. App. 1, 26, 676 S.E.2d 523, 544 (2009), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 129, 696 S.E.2d 695 (2010)), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 361, 718 S.E.2d 396 (2011). Plaintiffs concede that their complaint \u201cdoes not challenge the ordinance on any substantive due process ground that the ordinance was enacted without any conceivable rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.\u201d \u201cInstead, Plaintiffs challenge the ordinance on the ground\u201d that \u201cenforcement of the ordinance solely against non-culpable landowner-lessors is arbitrary and capricious in violation of [Art.] I, [\u00a7] 19 of the North Carolina Constitution].]\u201d\nAlthough plaintiffs characterize themselves as \u201cnon-culpable\u201d and assert that they have no ability to control the number of cars on their rental properties, they failed to submit any affidavits or other evidence addressing this issue. Furthermore, plaintiffs proffered leases establishing that they have a number of mechanisms for enforcing the terms of such agreements, including eviction, indemnification, and security deposits. Therefore, we do not consider plaintiffs\u2019 allegations regarding their \u201cinnocence\u201d or their inability to enforce the terms of the leases executed with their tenants, as these assertions were not supported by affidavits before the trial court. Moreover, plaintiffs have not challenged defendant\u2019s determination that the number of cars on a lot generally indicates the number of residents, which we accept as accurate for purposes of this appeal.\nPlaintiffs do not allege that enforcement of the zoning amendment implicated a fundamental right, protected class, or denial of their right to equal protection. Instead, plaintiffs assert, without citation to authority, that \u201cthe enforcement of the Town\u2019s ordinance solely against owners or lessors of property, based solely on the existence of more than four cars on a lot and irrespective of the actual reasons for and person(s) who caused or permitted the violation, is entirely irrational, arbitrary and capricious.\u201d However, as discussed above, the zoning amendment was enacted to address the problem of over-occupancy of rental houses, and thereby reduce the problems associated with over-occupancy. Plaintiffs do not dispute that over-occupancy leads to other problems, or that decreasing the over-occupancy of rental properties is a valid goal of a zoning ordinance. In addition, in support of their summary judgment motion, defendant submitted the affidavit of Judy Johnson, defendant\u2019s Senior Planner in the town\u2019s Planning Department, which averred that:\nWhen the parking regulation at issue is violated with respect to a [rental] property . . . the Town cites the Property\u2019s owner for the violation rather than the tenants. Trying to cite tenants and enforce the parking regulation directly against them would be burdensome, impractical, and ineffective. Based on my years of experience with enforcing zoning regulations, compared to property owners, tenants tend to be more transient and difficult to locate, and many District tenants are students who are not permanent residents of the Town. If the Town issued citations to tenants, it often would be difficult to locate those tenants once they moved out of the District, and it would be administratively difficult to collect fines from such tenants if they no longer lived in Town or even in the State of North Carolina. By comparison, someone who owns property in the District will generally be easier to locate for purposes of issuing citations and enforcing zoning regulations. And, because a property owner will have a lease with his or [her] tenants, the owner can use his authority under the lease to help ensure that tenants comply with the parking regulations. As a result, enforcing the parking regulation against property owners instead of against tenants makes the regulation more effective and reduces the Town\u2019s administrative burdens and costs in enforcing the regulation.\n(emphasis added). Defendant also submitted the affidavit of Chelsea Laws, defendant\u2019s Senior Code Enforcement Officer, who averred that:\nBased on my experience as a Senior Code Enforcement Officer for the Town, enforcing the new parking regulation against property owners is less burdensome and difficult, and more effective, than it would be to enforce the regulation against tenants. Tenants tend to change their places of residence frequently. This is especially true of students, who represent a significant portion of the tenants in the NNC District. In contrast with tenants, owners of District properties . . . are easier to locate. This make it less burdensome and more effective to enforce zoning regulations and penalties against the owners rather than against tenants, as the tenants may be hard to locate and may move away without paying any penalties assessed against them for violating Town regulations.\n(emphasis added). These affidavits, which were tendered by defendant\u2019s employees with experience in enforcing zoning regulations, state that enforcement of the zoning amendment against property owners was more effective than trying to track down transient student tenants. We hold that the increased effectiveness of this enforcement mechanism is rationally related to the goal of decreasing over-occupancy in the NNC district. \u201cOn its face, the practice of more avidly enforcing the Code agains'towners ofproperty in the Citythan against their relatively transient tenants appears to be reasonably calculated to efficiently and effectively secure compliance with the Housing Code.\u201d Cunningham v. City of E. Lansing, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15967, *7-8 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2001).\nPlaintiffs do not dispute that it is more effective to enforce the zoning amendment against property owners than their tenants, but simply argue that it is wrong to impose liability on property owners for the number of cars parked on a rental property without proof that the landlord had \u201cknowledge of the violation or any ability to prevent or correct the violation.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 argument is that an alternative enforcement plan might have been fairer to them. However, \u201c[a] duly adopted zoning ordinance is presumed to be valid. The burden is on the complaining party to show it to be invalid. \u2018When the most that can be said against such ordinances is that whether it was an unreasonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise of power is fairly debatable, the courts will not interfere.\u2019\u201d Graham v. City of Raleigh, 55 N.C. App. 107, 110, 284 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1981) (quoting In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938)). We conclude that the zoning amendment did not violate plaintiffs\u2019 rights to substantive due process of law. This argument is without merit.\nIII. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301\nIn their next argument, plaintiffs contend that the zoning amendment \u201cis invalid as being unauthorized under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301.\u201d We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 is part of Chapter 160A Article 15, \u201cStreets, Traffic and Parking,\u201d and provides that a city \u201cmay by ordinance regulate, restrict, and prohibit the parking of vehicles on the public streets, alleys, and bridges within the city.\u201d The statute addresses a city\u2019s authority to \u201cregulate the use of lots, garages, or other facilities owned or leased by the city and designated for use by the public as parking facilities,\u201d or to \u201cregulate the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles in specified areas of any parking areas or driveways of a hospital, shopping center, apartment house, condominium complex, or commercial office complex, or any other privately owned public vehicular axea[.]\u201d Plaintiffs contend that the fact that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 only addresses a city\u2019s authority to regulate parking in public vehicular areas represents a legislative intent to prohibit municipalities from regulating parking on private property, and that \u201cthe doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius forecloses\u201d any argument that defendant had the authority to enact the zoning amendment. We do not agree.\n\u201cUnder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, when a statute lists the situations to which it applies, it implies the exclusion of situations not contained in the list.\u201d Evans v. Diaz, 333 N.C. 774, 779-80, 430 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1993) (citations omitted). However, \u201cthe canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members of an \u2018associated group or series,\u2019 justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.\u201d Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168, 123 S. Ct. 748, 760, 154 L. Ed. 2d 653, 671 (2003) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90, 122 S. Ct. 1043 (2002).\n\u201cThe foremost task in statutory interpretation is \u2018to determine legislative intent while giving the language of the statute its natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires otherwise.\u2019 \u201d Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 518, 597 S.E.2d 717, 722 (2004) (quoting Spruill v. Lake Phelps Vol. Fire Dep\u2019t, Inc., 351 N.C. 318, 320, 523 S.E.2d 672, 674 (2000)) (internal quotation omitted). In this regard, we note that the ordinary meaning of \u201cpark\u201d is to \u201cput or leave (a vehicle) for a time in a certain location.\u201d The American Heritage College Dictionary 993 (3rd. ed. 1997). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 clearly deals with regulation of parking in this ordinary sense of the word.\nHowever, the zoning amendment was \u201cdrafted to help address the [NNC] neighborhood\u2019s over-occupancy problem directly.\u201d Defendant\u2019s planning department found that \u201cthe number of vehicles parked on a residential lot\u201d provided a \u201creasonable approximation of how many people are living at the property\u201d and determined that \u201c[l]imiting the number of parked cars therefore helps limit over-occupancy\u201d without \u201ctrying to count and limit the number of occupants directly.\u201d We conclude that, although the parties have referred to the zoning amendment as a \u201cparking\u201d regulation, the context establishes that the amendment was intended to regulate the ratio of bedrooms to tenants in rental properties in the NNC District by restricting the number of vehicles parked in the yard.\nWe hold that regulation of parking in public vehicular areas is fundamentally different from zoning restrictions on the number of cars that may be parked on a private lot by tenants of a house, and that there is no basis for assuming that our General Assembly intended legislation allowing a city to regulate parking in public vehicular areas to diminish a town\u2019s authority to adopt land use zoning regulations that deal with population density or over-occupancy of rental homes. The fact that defendant chose to restrict the number of cars parked on a lawn as a rough proxy for the number of tenants does not transform this into a \u201cparking\u201d ordinance within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301. We hold that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not applicable to the relationship between N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 and the zoning amendment.\nFor similar reasons, we reject plaintiffs\u2019 argument that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 is a more \u201cspecific\u201d statute that renders the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-4 inapplicable. Defendant cites N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-4, \u201cBroad Construction,\u201d which provides that:\nIt is the policy of the General Assembly that the cities of this State should have adequate authority to execute the powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of city charters shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect[.]\nDefendant contends that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-4 should be applied to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-383, which provides in relevant part that:\nZoning regulations shall be designed to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare. To that end, the regulations may address, among other things, the following public purposes: to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and dangers; and to facilitate the efficient and adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements....\nDefendant asserts that its zoning amendment was \u201creasonably necessary\u201d to achieve its statutorily approved purpose of regulating population density and traffic congestion. Plaintiffs do not dispute this contention, but argue that because N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 deals specifically with parking, the general rule stated in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-4 is not applicable, based on the longstanding \u201cprinciple \u2018that where there are two opposing acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same matter, and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act.\u2019 \u201d Blair v. Commissioners, 187 N.C. 488, 489-90, 122 S.E. 298, 299 (1924) (quoting State v. Johnson, 170 N.C. 685, 690, 86 S.E. 788, 791 (1915) (other citation omitted). \u201c[T]o the extent of any necessary repugnancy between them, the special statute ... will prevail over the general statute.\u201d Krauss v. Wayne Cty. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs., 347 N.C. 371, 378, 493 S.E.2d 428, 433 (1997) (internal quotation omitted). However, we have held that the zoning amendment, which addresses the number of vehicles that may be parked on a private lot, does not address the same subject as N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301, which governs ordinary parking on public vehicular areas. Therefore, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 is not a more \u201cspecific\u201d statute, but simply addresses a different subject.\nIV. Lanvale Properties. LLCv. Countv of Cabarrus\nIn their next argument, plaintiffs contend that the decision of our Supreme Court in Lanvale Properties, LLC v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 731 S.E.2d 800 (2012), \u201cestablishes that the instant parking regulation is not authorized by the general zoning power.\u201d We disagree.\nLanvale arose from Cabarrus County\u2019s enactment of an \u201cadequate public facilities ordinance (\u2018APFO\u2019) that effectively conditions approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County\u2019s public schools.\u201d Lanvale, 366 N.C. at 143, 731 S.E.2d at 803. Defendant appealed from the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-developer and from its ruling that defendant did not have the authority under zoning or subdivision statutes to enact an APFO. This Court affirmed the trial court, and defendant appealed to our Supreme Court, arguing that it was authorized under its general zoning power to adopt the APFO. The Supreme Court first addressed the \u201cdistinction between zoning ordinances and subdivision ordinances[,]\u201d and observed that \u201cthe primary purpose of county zoning ordinances is to specify the types of land use activities that are permitted, and prohibited, within particular zoning districts.\u201d Lanvale at 157-58, 731 S.E.2d at 811-12 (citing Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 617, 370 S.E.2d 579, 583 (1988)). Based upon its review of the characteristics of zoning regulations, the Court held that \u201cthe APFO does not define the specific land uses that are permitted, or prohibited, within a particular zoning district\u201d and that \u201cthe County\u2019s APFO cannot be classified as a zoning ordinance because... [it] simply does not \u2018zone.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 160, 731 S.E.2d at 813. Because the Supreme Court held in Lanvale that the ordinance at issue was not a zoning regulation, the Court did not address a local government\u2019s authority to enact a bona fide zoning ordinance or the requirements of a valid zoning regulation. We conclude that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on the basis of the holding in Lanvale.\nFor the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the zoning amendment did not violate plaintiffs\u2019 right to substantive due process, and was not barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-301 or the holding in Lanvale, and that the trial court\u2019s summary judgment order should be affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges McGEE and ERVIN concur.\n. The zoning amendment was enacted to increase compliance with the zoning ordinance\u2019s restrictions on over-occupancy of rental properties, by using the number of cars in a yard as an indication of the number of tenants. Plaintiffs have not challenged the general accuracy of this measure, or asserted that in any specific instance the house where excess cars were parked was not over-occupied. Given this factual scenario, we are not called upon to express an opinion concerning whether it would be a valid defense to a citation that the number of cars on a property did not indicate the number of tenants, but instead were cars belonging to temporary visitors.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Brough Law Firm, by G. Nicholas Herman, for plaintiff-appellants.", "Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Anthony Fox, and Benjamin R. Sullivan, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARK R. PATMORE; MERCIA RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES, LLC; WILLIAM T. GARTLAND; and 318 BROOKS LLC, Plaintiffs v. TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant\nNo. 13-1049\nFiled 1 April 2014\n1. Zoning \u2014 parking ordinance \u2014 cars at rental property \u2014 substantive process \u2014 not violated\nA zoning amendment that limited the number of parked cars at rental properties did not violate substantive due process where the increased effectiveness of this enforcement mechanism was rationally related to the goal of decreasing over-occupancy in the Northside Neighborhood Conservation District.\n2. Zoning \u2014 parking at rental properties and public areas \u2014 fundamentally different\nThe doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius was not applicable to the relationship between N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-301 (which concerns a city\u2019s authority to regulate parking in public areas) and a zoning amendment limiting parking at rental properties. Regulation of parking in public vehicular areas is fundamentally different from zoning restrictions on the number of cars that may be parked on a private lot by tenants of a house.\n3. Zoning \u2014 parking\u2014statutes addressing different subjects\nA town zoning amendment addressing the number of vehicles that may be parked on a private lot did not address ordinary parking in public vehicular areas which was governed N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-301. Therefore, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-301 is not a more specific statute than N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-4 (broad construction of municipal powers), but simply addressed a different subject.\n4. Zoning \u2014 parking regulation \u2014 not controlled by Lanvale\nThe decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, did not address a local government\u2019s authority to enact a bona fide zoning ordinance or the requirements of a valid zoning regulation and did not control this case.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order entered 4 June 2013 by Judge W. Osmond Smith, III, in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 February 2014.\nThe Brough Law Firm, by G. Nicholas Herman, for plaintiff-appellants.\nParker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Anthony Fox, and Benjamin R. Sullivan, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0133-01", "first_page_order": 143, "last_page_order": 154 }