{ "id": 6768540, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONNELL TRACY COUSIN, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Cousin", "decision_date": "2014-04-15", "docket_number": "No. COA13-543", "first_page": "523", "last_page": "537", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 N.C. App. 523" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631478 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "579" }, { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639848 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1563969, 1564577, 1564483, 1564296, 1564008, 1564331, 1564503, 1563855, 1564174, 1564049, 1563795, 1563863, 1563768, 1564252, 1564093 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/1135-02", "/us/515/1135-14", "/us/515/1135-10", "/us/515/1135-15", "/us/515/1135-04", "/us/515/1135-07", "/us/515/1135-08", "/us/515/1135-09", "/us/515/1135-03", "/us/515/1135-01", "/us/515/1135-12", "/us/515/1135-11", "/us/515/1135-05", "/us/515/1135-06", "/us/515/1135-13" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639310 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633574 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "holding that to establish prejudice resulting from an evidentiary ruling by the trial court, a defendant must show a reasonable possibility, that a different result would have been reached had an evidentiary ruling not been made" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12643012, 12643013, 12643014 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0866-04", "/se2d/673/0867-01", "/se2d/673/0867-02" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641072 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 S.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526696 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4768299 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 L.Ed.2d 285", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 909", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5883840, 5878466, 5894978, 5901510, 5894599, 3537800, 5880967, 5898989, 5911695, 5864815, 5900303, 5911316, 5867098, 5893946 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/544/0909-08", "/us/544/0909-04", "/us/544/0909-01", "/us/544/0909-03", "/us/544/0909-12", "/us/544/0909-06", "/us/544/0909-13", "/us/544/0909-07", "/us/544/0909-11", "/us/544/0909-10", "/us/544/0909-09", "/us/544/0909-05", "/us/544/0909-14", "/us/544/0909-02" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2985799 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E. 2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571210 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564463 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 U.S. 161", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177649 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/432/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E. 2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567315 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 U.S. 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5719289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/284/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741158 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 L.Ed.2d 601", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "557 U.S. 934", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149153 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151736 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150343 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 L.Ed.2d 176", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "711 S.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154419 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 L.Ed.2d 80", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 835", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9489058, 9489509, 9489574, 9489290, 9489387, 9489132, 9489679, 9489168, 9489105, 9489200, 9489334, 9489623, 9489435, 9489244 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0835-01", "/us/528/0835-11", "/us/528/0835-12", "/us/528/0835-07", "/us/528/0835-09", "/us/528/0835-03", "/us/528/0835-14", "/us/528/0835-04", "/us/528/0835-02", "/us/528/0835-05", "/us/528/0835-08", "/us/528/0835-13", "/us/528/0835-10", "/us/528/0835-06" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571533 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2393544 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558671 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523689 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 495", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569514 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" }, { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 N.C. App. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2675775 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" }, { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/50/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. App. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4178331 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/206/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. App. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4079129 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/212/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 L.Ed.2d 818", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556681 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L.Ed.2d 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 890", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9564641, 9565507, 9564931, 9565413, 9565127, 9565834, 9565644, 9565933, 9565235, 9565023, 9564441, 9564731, 9564539, 9564829, 9565727 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0890-03", "/us/531/0890-11", "/us/531/0890-06", "/us/531/0890-10", "/us/531/0890-08", "/us/531/0890-14", "/us/531/0890-12", "/us/531/0890-15", "/us/531/0890-09", "/us/531/0890-07", "/us/531/0890-01", "/us/531/0890-04", "/us/531/0890-02", "/us/531/0890-05", "/us/531/0890-13" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 451", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155599 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154614 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "715 S.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900-01", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. App. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4343172 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/216/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "927", "parenthetical": "holding that \"any error by the trial court in sustaining the State's objections was cured when the evidence sought to be admitted was subsequently admitted without objection.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574927 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572", "parenthetical": "holding that \"any error by the trial court in sustaining the State's objections was cured when the evidence sought to be admitted was subsequently admitted without objection.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 L.Ed.2d 988", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "548 U.S. 925", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3802205 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "holding that to establish prejudice resulting from an evidentiary ruling by the trial court, a defendant must show a reasonable possibility, that a different result would have been reached had an evidentiary ruling not been made" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 L.Ed.2d 53", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12442031, 12442032, 12442033, 12442034, 12442035, 12442036, 12442037, 12442038 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/181/0053-01", "/l-ed-2d/181/0053-02", "/l-ed-2d/181/0053-03", "/l-ed-2d/181/0053-04", "/l-ed-2d/181/0053-05", "/l-ed-2d/181/0053-06", "/l-ed-2d/181/0053-07", "/l-ed-2d/181/0053-08" ] }, { "cite": "701 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152569 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158082 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0620-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1401, "char_count": 36422, "ocr_confidence": 0.716, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.40576461183852e-08, "percentile": 0.4430412738348838 }, "sha256": "7447a452e172478d33e021a4e8f3dfb1016615319deb3108024b000b9eccc807", "simhash": "1:8f69d266372d27ea", "word_count": 5993 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:00.832613+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONNELL TRACY COUSIN, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "DAVIS, Judge.\nDefendant Donnell Tracy Cousin (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals from his convictions of felonious obstruction of justice and accessory after the fact. His primary contentions on appeal are that the trial court erred in (1) denying him the opportunity to question and cross-examine an investigator about suspects in the murder out of which Defendant\u2019s charges arose; (2) denying his motions to dismiss; (3) allowing the prosecution to make statements during closing argument that appealed to the passion and prejudice of the jury; and (4) imposing multiple consecutive sentences for the same acts and offenses in violation of his constitutional rights. After careful review, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nFactual Background\nThe State presented evidence at trial tending to establish the following facts: On 8 July 2005, Larry Mebane (\u201cMebane\u201d) was found mortally wounded in his car in Caswell County with three gunshot wounds to his head. Lieutenant Michael Adkins (\u201cLt. Adkins\u201d) of the Caswell County Sheriffs Office was one of the first officers to arrive on the scene after emergency services had been contacted via' a 911 call. He found a handgun wedged between the driver\u2019s seat and the center console of the car. Lt. Adkins also noticed that the front passenger window of Mebane\u2019s car was \u201cbusted out\u201d and that a beer can was lying near the car. The car was running with loud music playing on the radio.\nLaw enforcement officers first became aware of Defendant on 15 July 2005 when he was stopped at a checkpoint set up in the area of the shooting, which led to a subsequent interview of Defendant 11 days later at the Caswell County Sheriff\u2019s Office. When Defendant arrived at the Sheriffs Office on 26 July 2005, he gave a written statement to Investigator Jerald Brown (\u201cInvestigator Brown\u201d), who was heading the investigation into the Mebane shooting along with State Bureau of Investigation (\u201cSBI\u201d) Special Agent Brian Norman (\u201cAgent Norman\u201d). In this statement, Defendant indicated to Investigator Brown that he had seen Mebane around 10:30 p.m. on the night of the shooting. Defendant also named three specific individuals, Josh Anderson, Hugh Anderson, and Terrance Jackson, as having been with Mebane at the time of the shooting.\nDefendant then voluntarily returned to the Caswell County Sheriffs Office on 30 March 2006 and provided additional information to Investigator Brown. During this meeting, Defendant stated that Mebane had been stopped earlier in the day by a man named Jeffrey Murdock and that Murdock had demanded money from Mebane. However, Defendant did not directly implicate Jeffrey Murdock in the shooting.\nDefendant gave his next statement on 22 June 2006 at the Alamance County Sheriffs Office where he was being questioned in regard to unrelated felony charges in Alamance County. Defendant told investigators that \u201cI know who the damn shooter is and I ain\u2019t going to tell him [referring to Agent Norman] nothing.\u201d Defendant proceeded to say that \u201cTego [sic] Anderson is your shooter.\u201d Defendant added that \u201cJosh and Hugh (Anderson) were on [sic] Josh\u2019s car and the two of them pulled over in front of Larry and got out.\u201d He then stated that \u201cTego [sic] pulled up behind Larry on [sic] the white truck and boxed him in so Larry couldn\u2019t go forwards or backwards. Larry got out of his car and was arguing with Josh and Hugh when Tego [sic] walked up from behind and shot Larry in the head!\u201d\nOn 26 June 2006, Defendant gave another statement to Investigator Brown in which \u2014 this time \u2014 he stated that he was actually with Mebane when he was shot. Defendant stated that Mebane was being chased by Josh Anderson, Hugh Anderson, and Tino Anderson. He further related that Hugh Anderson \u201ctook a pistol and smacked Larry upside the face with it.\u201d He also said that \u201cHugh was the only one I saw \u2022with my own eyes with a gun.\u201d\nDefendant subsequently gave a different statement on 6 July 2006 to the Alamance County Sheriffs Office. On this occasion he stated that \u201c[t]he night of the shooting I saw the man who shot Larry. It was Tino.\u201d\nOn 17 October 2006, Defendant was interviewed by Sheriff Michael Welch (\u201cSheriff Welch\u201d) of the Caswell County Sheriff\u2019s Office. During this interview, Defendant stated that \u201cTino was there, but he didn\u2019t shoot Larry.\u201d\nOn 14 November 2006, Defendant requested to speak with the \u201csheriff or someone in charge\u201d about Mebane\u2019s murder. Chief Deputy Tim Britt (\u201cChief Deputy Britt\u201d) of the Alamance County Sheriff\u2019s-Office was notified of Defendant\u2019s request and conducted an interview 'with him that was observed by Investigator Brown and Sheriff Welch. Defendant proceeded to give the following statement to Chief Deputy Britt:\nWe [Defendant and Mebane] then turned right onto Dailey Store Road. . . . Sylvester Harris was in the middle of the road waving his hands. Larry Mebane stopped and got out. ... As I was getting out of the car, I heard Sylvester Harris say to Larry Mebane, \u201cWhere is the drugs and money at, I know you got it!\u201d ... Sylvester\u2019s brother was standing beside the car they had been in. His name is Maurice Harris. ... The next thing I saw as I got out of the car was Sylvester Harris shoot Larry Mebane in the back of the head.\nThe last statement that Defendant gave investigators occurred on 14 April 2008. Defendant claimed he had information regarding the gun used in the Mebane murder, and Investigator Brown and Sheriff Welch conducted an interview with him. Defendant denied knowing the location of the weapon but stated he could point them \u201cin the right direction of that.\u201d He stated that Josh Anderson was Mebane\u2019s killer and admitted that his prior statements naming Tino Anderson as the shooter were deliberate falsehoods designed to mislead and misdirect law enforcement in their ongoing investigation into the murder. He admitted that \u201cI put Tino in the middle as a block one time\u201d and that in his earlier statements he had been \u201cmaking you waste your time and gas and your ink pen.\u201d Defendant then stated that \u201cI wasn\u2019t there on the scene period. Never was.\u201d At the end of the interview, Investigator Brown asked if everything he had told the officers was truthful, and Defendant replied \u201cnope.\u201d\nOn 15 November 2011, Defendant was indicted on one count of accessory after the fact to first degree murder and seven counts of felonious obstruction of justice. A jury trial was held in Caswell County Superior Court on 29 October 2012. At the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss all of the charges against him. The motion was denied. Defendant renewed his motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court once again denied the motion.\nDefendant was convicted of all charges. He was sentenced consecutively to: (1) 168 to 211 months on the accessory after the fact charge; and (2) 168 to 211 months on the seven counts of obstruction of justice charges after the charges were consolidated. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.\nAnalysis\nI. Denial of Defendant\u2019s Opportunity to Question Investigator Brown Regarding Other Suspects.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying him the opportunity to question Investigator Brown about other suspects in the Mebane murder. At trial, Defendant\u2019s counsel sought to elicit from Investigator Brown during cross-examination information about his interviews with persons involved in the Mebane murder investigation. Specifically, she inquired whether during his interviews with Oscar Jackson and Terrence Jackson, either of those individuals had discussed or divulged any information relating to the identity of the shooter. The State objected to this entire line of questioning on the ground that the questions sought inadmissible hearsay because the statements sought were being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The trial court sustained the State\u2019s objections. As an alternative basis, the trial court excluded the evidence under Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence based on the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and the possibility of confusing the jury.\nDefendant argues the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the statements as inadmissible hearsay and under Rule 403 was erroneous. Defendant contends that this evidence was directly relevant to the issues presented and that its exclusion violated his constitutional right to present a defense.\nRule 801(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence defines \u201chearsay\u201d as \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 801(c).\nDefendant asserts that in pursuing this line of questioning, he sought to \u201cshow how the investigation of Larry Mebane unfolded. More importantly, these questions were designed to determine if any of Cousin\u2019s statements to law enforcement were true and/or corroborated.\u201d\nWe rejected a similar argument in State v. Hairston, 190 N.C. App. 620, 625, 661 S.E.2d 39, 42 (2008), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 133, 676 S.E.2d 47 (2009). In Hairston, this Court found no error in the trial court\u2019s ruling that testimony by a detective about a third party\u2019s statements indicating that the third party did not know the defendant would constitute inadmissible hearsay:\nDefendant contends that the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but instead was offered as a historical fact \u2014 that is, whether Hicks knew defendant or not. Defendant, however, goes on to argue that the trial court\u2019s ruling requires reversal because, according to defendant, such evidence would have aided defendant\u2019s arguments concerning his alibi defense. According to defendant, had the testimony been admitted, the jury could have used the information as \u201cproof\u2019 that Brown and another person, not defendant, committed the robbery. In essence, defendant argues that the testimony was not elicited for its truth, but had it been admitted, the jury could have used the statement for the truth of the matter asserted, that Hicks, who had used the stolen credit cards, did not know defendant \u2014 thus making it less likely that defendant participated in the robbery of Moore. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sustaining the State\u2019s objection as the testimony was offered for the truth of the matter asserted.\nId.\nWe believe the same is true here. By Defendant\u2019s own admission, he sought to offer this testimony at least in part for the purpose of demonstrating the truth of the matter asserted. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State\u2019s objections to this line of questioning on hearsay grounds. See State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 498, 701 S.E.2d 615, 649 (2010) (holding that \u201c[t]he range of cross-examination, though broad, is subject to the trial judge\u2019s discretionary powers to keep it within reasonable bounds. The trial court\u2019s rulings on cross-examination will not be held in error absent a showing that the verdict was improperly influenced thereby.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied,_U.S._, 181 L.Ed.2d 53 (2011).\nEven assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, we believe any such error was harmless. See State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 731, 616 S.E.2d 515, 531 (2005) (holding that to establish prejudice resulting from an evidentiary ruling by the trial court, a defendant must show a reasonable possibility, that a different result would have been reached had an evidentiary ruling not been made), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 925, 165 L.Ed.2d 988 (2006).\nHere, no prejudice to Defendant occurred as a result of the trial court\u2019s ruling. Our review of the record reveals that Defendant was still able to elicit similar evidence concerning the Mebane murder investigation by alternative means. See State v. Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 572, 280 S.E.2d 912, 927 (1981) (holding that \u201cany error by the trial court in sustaining the State\u2019s objections was cured when the evidence sought to be admitted was subsequently admitted without objection.\u201d). At trial, evidence concerning persons of interest in Investigator Brown\u2019s investigation was elicited through Defendant\u2019s subsequent line of questioning to Investigator Brown. Therefore, any error in the exclusion of this evidence was harmless.\nDefendant also contends that the exclusion of this evidence violated his constitutional rights but concedes that no constitutional argument was asserted by him at trial. \u201cConstitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal, not even for plain error.\u201d State v. Jones, 216 N.C. App. 225, 230, 715 S.E.2d 896, 900-01 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore this claim is not properly before us.\nII. Denial of Motions to Dismiss\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the charges of felonious obstruction of justice and accessory after the fact based on the insufficiency of the evidence. A trial court\u2019s denial of a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). On appeal, this Court must determine \u201cwhether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator.\u201d State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (citation and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L.Ed.2d 150 (2000). Substantial evidence is \u201csuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State with every reasonable inference drawn in the State\u2019s favor. State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L.Ed.2d 818 (1995).\nA. Felonious Obstruction of Justice\n[I]n order to convict [a] Defendant of the common law offense of obstruction of justice, the State [is] required to demonstrate that Defendant ha[s] committed an act that prevented, obstructed, impeded or hindered public or legal justice. Although obstruction of justice is ordinarily a common law misdemeanor, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-3(b) provides that \u201c [i]f a misdemeanor offense as to which no specific punishment is prescribed be infamous, done in secrecy and malice, or with deceit and intent to defraud, the offender shall... be guilty of a Class H felony.\u201d For that reason, [u]nder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-3(b) (1979), for a misdemeanor at common law to be raised to a Class H felony, it must be infamous, or done in secret and with malice, or committed with deceit and intent to defraud. If the offense falls within any of these categories, it becomes a Class H felony and is punishable as such.\nState v. Taylor, 212 N.C. App. 238, 246, 713 S.E.2d 82, 88 (2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We have previously noted that \u201cthis State has a policy against parties deliberately frustrating and causing undue expense to adverse parties gathering information about their claims. . . .\u201d State v. Wright, 206 N.C. App. 239, 242, 696 S.E.2d 832, 835 (2010).\nIn the present case, Defendant gave eight written statements to law enforcement officers concerning the events surrounding the murder of Mebane. In his first two written statements on 26 July 2005 and 30 March 2006, he denied being at the scene of Mebane\u2019s murder but identified individuals who may have been involved with Mebane\u2019s death.\nIn his next six statements on 22 June 2006, 26 June 2006, 6 July 2006,17 October 2006, 14 November 2006, and 14 April 2008, Defendant admitted being present at the scene of the crime. In these statements, Defendant identified various alternating persons as the killer. On 22 June 2006, Defendant named Tino Anderson as the shooter and stated that Hugh Anderson and Josh Anderson were also involved. On 26 June 2006, Defendant named Hugh Anderson as the killer as he was \u201cthe only one I saw with my own eyes with a gun.\u201d\nOn 17 October 2006, Defendant did not identify any specific individual as the shooter but placed Tino, Hugh, and Josh Anderson at the scene and stated: \u201cTino was there, but he didn\u2019t shoot Larry.\u201d On 14 November 2006, Defendant gave a different story, indicating that Maurice Harris and Sylvester Harris tried to rob Mebane and that Sylvester Harris was the shooter and then stated that \u201cthe next thing I saw as I got out of the car was Sylvester Harris shoot Larry Mebane in the back of the head.\u201d\nOn 15 April 2008, Defendant changed his story once again, stating that \u201cI done already gave [sic] told you the name of who killed him already . . . Josh Anderson.\u201d Defendant also claimed in that statement that he was not at the scene when Mebane was murdered. Defendant then admitted that he had named Tino Anderson as the shooter in a previous statement as a \u201cblock.\u201d At the end of the interview, Defendant was asked if he was telling the truth and he responded \u201cnope.\u201d\nDefendant argues that the State offered no evidence that any of his statements were false or misleading and instead simply relied on the contradictory nature of Defendant\u2019s statements. We disagree.\nAgent N orman of the SBI testified as to the significant burden imposed on the investigation of Mebane\u2019s murder resulting from Defendant\u2019s various conflicting statements. Agent Norman further explained that each lead was \u201cfollowed up\u201d and that the SBI ultimately determined that each person identified by Defendant had an alibi and was not present at the scene when the shooting occurred.\nClearly, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a jury question existed as to whether Defendant (1) unlawfully and willfully (2) obstructed justice by providing false statements to law enforcement officers investigating the death of Larry Mebane (3) with deceit and intent to defraud. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the felonious obstruction of justice charges.\nB. Accessory After the Fact\nDefendant also asserts the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the charge of accessory after the fact because the State failed to produce substantial evidence that Defendant made false statements with the intent to help the actual perpetrator escape detection, arrest, or punishment.\nThe elements of accessory after the fact are as follows: \u201c(1) the felony has been committed by the principal; (2) the alleged accessory gave personal assistance to that principal to aid in his escaping detection, arrest, or punishment; and (3) the alleged accessory knew the principal committed the felony.\u201d State v. Duvall, 50 N.C. App. 684, 691, 275 S.E.2d 842, 849, rev\u2019d, on other grounds, 304 N.C. 557, 284 S.E.2d 495 (1981); see also N.C. Gen Stat. \u00a7 14-7; State v. Barnes, 116 N.C. App. 311, 316, 447 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1994). We note that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7 permits the conviction of an accessory after the fact \u201cwhether the principal felon shall or shall not have been previously convicted, or shall or shall not be amenable to justice_\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7 (2013). Furthermore,\n[t]his Court has recognized that an indictment may properly allege unknown conspirators in charging a criminal conspiracy. It rationally follows that an indictment is valid which alleges the existence of an unknown co-principal in charging a crime. Here the bills of indictment do not allege that [the defendant\u2019s co-conspirator] was the person who actually perpetrated the offenses. The indictments charged that a crime was committed by an unknown person and that defendant was present, aiding and abetting in the deed. Thus the acquittal of [the defendant\u2019s co-conspirator] was not a sufficient basis for dismissal of the charges.\nState v. Beach, 283 N.C. 261, 269, 196 S.E.2d 214, 220 (1973) (internal citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 33, 310 S.E.2d 587, 605-06 (1981). Moreover, Defendant concedes in his brief that \u201c[t]he State does not have to identify the killer of Larry Mebane, in order to convict [Defendant] of Accessory After the Fact of First Degree Murder.\u201d\nHere, as discussed above, the evidence \u2022\u2014 when viewed in the light most favorable to the State \u2014 tended to show that Defendant gave eight different written statements to authorities on his own volition providing a wide array of scenarios surrounding the death of Mebane. In these various statements, Defendant identified four different individuals as being the person who shot Mebane. Furthermore, he admitted near the end of his 14 April 2008 interview with Investigator Brown and Sheriff Welch that he had not been truthful to investigators. The jury could rationally have concluded that his false statements were made in an effort to shield the identity of the actual shooter.\nThere was competent evidence introduced at trial that allowed the jury to rationally conclude that Defendant knew the identity of Mebane\u2019s shooter and was protecting that person. First, Defendant\u2019s statements to investigators suggested that he had, in fact, been present at the murder scene as his statements revealed his knowledge of information that could only have been obtained by someone physically present at the scene. In addition to knowing the location of the shooting, he also knew that (1) Mebane had been left for dead in the passenger seat of the car; (2) a handgun was found wedged in between the seat and the console of the car; (3) a beer can was left beside the car; (4) Mebane had been shot in the head; (5) the car radio was on and playing loud music following the shooting; and (6) Mebane\u2019s jaw was broken.\nSecond, the fact that Defendant knew the true identity of the shooter was demonstrated by the testimony of his former girlfriend, Sheila Satterfield, who testified as follows:\nQ. Sheila, the question is, did Tracy tell you he was with Larry when he got shot?\nA He did. He did.\nQ. And did Tracy tell you how the shooting occurred?\nA. He said he jumped out the car and ran. All I know somebody was shooting guns. That\u2019s all I know.\nQ. Did Tracy eventually tell you who that shooter was?\nA. I can\u2019t remember the name, but we was at a store one day, and he told me it was a guy that was in a brown Honda.\nQ. Did he actually point out the person in the store?\nA. I - see I wasn\u2019t in the store. I was in the car, and um, when he came back, he said that\u2019s the guy that killed Little Larry. Look. Look. Look. I said, Oh, I ain\u2019t looking. Get in this car, and let\u2019s go.\nFinally, Defendant admitted in his 14 April 2008 statement that \u201cI put Tino [Anderson] in the middle as a block one time,\u201d thereby raising the inference that he was deliberately thwarting the investigators\u2019 attempts to apprehend Mebane\u2019s killer. In that same statement, Defendant further acknowledged that his false statements had made \u201cyou waste your time and gas and your ink pen,\u201d indicating that he was fully aware his false statements were resulting in a misuse of law enforcement time and resources by causing the investigators to chase false leads. The jury could rationally have concluded that the purpose of his actions was to prevent the officers from learning the identity of the actual killer.\nWe conclude that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to raise a jury question as to the accessory after the fact charge. Accordingly, Defendant\u2019s argument is overruled.\nIII. State\u2019s Closing Argument\nDefendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly allowing the State to make a closing argument that appealed to the jury\u2019s passion and prejudice without intervening ex mero mo tu. This argument likewise lacks merit.\n\u201cThe standard of review when a defendant fails to object at trial [to statements in a closing argument] is whether the argument complained of was so grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu.\u201d State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 451 509 S.E.2d 178, 193 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 145 L.Ed.2d 80 (1999).\nIn other words, the reviewing court must determine whether the argument in question strayed far enough from the parameters of propriety that the trial court, in order to protect the rights of the parties and the sanctity of the proceedings, should have intervened on its own accord and: (1) precluded other similar remarks from the offending attorney; and/or (2) instructed the jury to disregard the improper comments already made.\nId. \u201cStatements or remarks in closing argument must be viewed in context and in light of the overall factual circumstances to which they refer.\u201d State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 135, 711 S.E.2d 122, 145 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,_U.S._, 182 L.Ed.2d 176 (2012).\nConsequently, \u201cstatements contained in closing arguments to the jury are not to be placed in isolation or taken out of context on appeal.\u201d State v. Murrell, 362 N.C. 375, 394 665 S.E.2d 61, 74 (2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has further held that \u201c[t]o merit a new trial, the prosecutor\u2019s remarks must have perverted or contaminated the trial such that they rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair.\u201d Phillips, 365 N.C. at 136, 711 S.E.2d at 146.\nHere, Defendant contends that the State\u2019s closing argument was improper because it \u201csought pity and passion for victim\u2019s family, tried to make the jury share the responsibility of the prosecutor for prosecuting this case, and sought to convict Defendant for not cooperating with law enforcement.\u201d Specifically, he appears to be challenging the prosecutor\u2019s statement that \u201c[t]his community deserves to be safe from a murderer.\u201d\nOur Supreme Court has held that \u201cit is not improper for the State to remind the jurors that they are the voice and conscience of the community.\u201d State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 63, 678 S.E.2d 618, 651 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we do not believe that this statement when viewed in the overall context of the closing argument in its totality required intervention ex mero motu by the trial court.\nDefendant also appears to be contending the trial court should have intervened when the prosecutor made a comment that\nthis is still somebody\u2019s child, and he didn\u2019t deserve to die like that, and his Momma didn\u2019t deserve to endure that loss, and his son from last night all the way for the rest of his life will not have his father to take him tricker-treating, to buy his Christmas or be there for Easter or spend summer vacations, and that matters, and the State values that life, and you, the jury, values (sic) that life, and justice cries out that the person who did it be prosecuted. How many times could you have ever imagined that this case, the person who pulled the trigger and killed this young man, this father, in this room right now, in this moment there is one person in here who knows who did it, and it\u2019s the defendant. Right now. The pain and suffering that could be released. The justice that could be done, but instead of that, not once, not twice, not three times, not four times, 5, 6, 7 times over the span of seven years this man chose to lie about it in detail.\nThis portion of the State\u2019s argument sought to convey the notion that Defendant\u2019s pattern of false and misleading statements to investigators had prevented Mebane\u2019s family from learning the identity of his killer. \u201cThe admissibility of victim impact testimony is limited by the requirement that the evidence not be so prejudicial it renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Victim impact testimony is admissible to show the effect the victim\u2019s death had on friends and family members.\u201d State v. Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 15, 653 S.E.2d 126, 135 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 934, 174 L.Ed.2d 601 (2009).\nAfter reviewing the entirety of the State\u2019s closing argument and considering the context in which the challenged statements were made, we hold once again that Defendant has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the trial court had a duty to intervene ex mero motu. Therefore, we reject Defendant\u2019s arguments on this issue.\nIV. Double Jeopardy\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant for two crimes \u2014 felonious obstruction of justice and accessory after the fact \u2022\u2014 arising out of the same transaction, thereby violating his constitutional rights by subjecting him to double jeopardy. This argument likewise lacks merit.\nOur Supreme Court has stated that \u201c [b] oth the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.\u201d State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 50, 352 S.E.2d 673, 683 (1987).\nWhere, as here, a single criminal transaction constitutes a violation of more than one criminal statute, the test to determine if the elements of the offenses are the same is whether each statute requires proof of a fact which the others do not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 287 S.E. 2d 810 (1982). By definition, all the essential elements of a lesser included offense are also elements of the greater offense. Invariably then, a lesser included offense requires no proof beyond that required for the greater offense, and the two crimes are considered identical for double jeopardy purposes. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 53 L.Ed. 2d 187 (1977); State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153, 270 S.E. 2d 476 (1980). If neither crime constitutes a lesser included offense of the other, the convictions will fail to support a plea of double jeopardy. See State v. Walden, 306 N.C. 466, 293 S.E. 2d 780 (1982).\nId.\nThe Supreme Court further clarified the double jeopardy analysis in State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 579, 599 S.E.2d 515, 534 (2004), cert. denied sub nom. Queen v. N.C., 544 U.S. 909, 161 L.Ed.2d 285 (2005):\nEven where evidence to support two or more offenses overlaps, double, jeopardy does not occur unless the evidence required to support the two convictions is identical. If proof of an additional fact is required for each conviction which is not required for the other, even though some of the same acts must be proved in the trial of each, the offenses are not the same.\nId. at 579, 599 S.E.2d at 534, (internal citation and brackets omitted).\nIn Tirado, the Supreme Court determined that the charges of attempted first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury are not comprised of the same elements in that each requires an additional element not included in the other offense. Id. at 579, 599 S.E.2d at 534. Therefore, even though the crimes charged in Tirado arose from the exact same underlying transaction, the Court held that \u201c[bjecause each offense contains at least one element not included in the other, defendants have not been subjected to double jeopardy.\u201d Id. See State v. Mulder, No. COA13-672,_ N.C. App._,_,_S.E.2d._,_(filed Mar. 18, 2014) (\u201c[A] defendant convicted of multiple criminal offenses in the same trial is only protected by double jeopardy principles if (1) those criminal offenses constitute the same offense . . . ; and (2) the legislature did not intend for the offenses to be punished separately. . . . [T]he applicable test to determine whether double jeopardy attaches in a single prosecution is whether each statute requires proof of a fact which the others do not.\u201d (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).\nThe elements of common law felonious obstruction of justice are: (1) the defendant unlawfully and willfully; (2) obstructed justice; (3) with deceit and intent to defraud. In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 670, 309 S.E.2d 442, 462 (1983); State v. Clemmons, 100 N.C. App. 286, 292-93, 396 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1990). The elements of accessory after the fact are: \u201c(1) the felony has been committed by the principal; (2) the alleged accessory gave personal assistance to that principal to aid in his escaping detection, arrest, or punishment; and (3) the alleged accessory knew the principal committed the felony.\u201d Duvall, 50 N.C. App. at 691, 275 S.E.2d at 849.\nTherefore, the elements of these two crimes are clearly not identical. Obstruction of justice, unlike accessory after the fact, requires deceit and intent to defraud. Accessory after the fact, unlike obstruction of justice, requires that the defendant personally assisted the principal who committed the crime in escaping detection, arrest, or punishment. The two offenses are distinct, and neither is a lesser included offense of the other. Consequently, because the charges of felonious obstruction of justice and accessory after the fact contain separate and distinct legal elements, Defendant has failed to show a double jeopardy violation.\nConclusion\nFor the reasons stated above, we hold that Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.\nJudges ELMORE and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. Tino Anderson\u2019s name is spelled in various places in the record as \u201cTego\u201d Anderson. Both spellings refer to the same individual.\n. Because we conclude the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the evidence on hearsay grounds did not constitute an abuse of discretion, we elect not to address the trial court\u2019s alternative basis for exclusion based on Buie 403.", "type": "majority", "author": "DAVIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Ryan Haigh, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "McCotter Ashton, P.A., by Rudolph A. Ashton, III and Kirby H. Smith, III for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONNELL TRACY COUSIN, Defendant\nNo. COA13-543\nFiled 15 April 2014\n1. Evidence \u2014 hearsay\u2014questioning investigator about other murder suspects \u2014 truth of matter asserted \u2014 harmless error\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a felonious obstruction of justice and accessory after the fact case by denying defendant the opportunity to question an investigator about other murder suspects. By defendant\u2019s own admission, he sought to offer this testimony at least in part for the purpose of demonstrating the truth of the matter asserted. Further, any error was harmless since defendant was still able to elicit similar evidence by alternative means. Finally, constitutional arguments that were not raised at trial were dismissed.\n2. Obstruction of Justice \u2014 felonious\u2014motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of felonious obstruction of justice. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a juiy question existed as to whether defendant unlawfully and willfully obstructed justice by providing false statements to law enforcement officers investigating the death with deceit and intent to defraud.\n3. Accomplices and Accessories \u2014 accessory after the fact\u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of accessory after the fact. The jury could rationally have concluded that the purpose of defendant\u2019s actions was to prevent the officers from learning the identity of the actual killer.\n4. Criminal Law \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s arguments \u2014 jurors are voice and conscience of community\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a felonious obstruction of justice and accessoiy after the fact case by allowing the State to make a closing argument that allegedly appealed to the jury\u2019s passion and prejudice without intervening ex mero motu. Our Supreme Court has held that it is not improper for the State to remind the jurors that they are the voice and conscience of the community.\n5. Constitutional Law \u2014 double jeopardy \u2014 sentencing for both felonious obstruction of justice and accessory after the fact\nThe trial court did not subject defendant to double jeopardy by sentencing him for both felonious obstruction of justice and accessory after the fact. The two offenses are distinct, and neither is a lesser-included offense of the other.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 2 November 2012 by Judge W. Osmond Smith, III in Caswell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 October 2013.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Ryan Haigh, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nMcCotter Ashton, P.A., by Rudolph A. Ashton, III and Kirby H. Smith, III for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0523-01", "first_page_order": 533, "last_page_order": 547 }