{ "id": 6769137, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. COREY DINAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Dinan", "decision_date": "2014-05-06", "docket_number": "No. COA13-1022", "first_page": "694", "last_page": "701", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 N.C. App. 694" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "482 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "dismissing the defendant's appeal where the issues could not be determined from the record and concluding that \"[t]o properly advance these arguments, defendant must move for appropriate relief pursuant to G.S. 15A-1415[ ] and G.S. 15A-1420[ ]\"" }, { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11871337 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697", "parenthetical": "dismissing the defendant's appeal where the issues could not be determined from the record and concluding that \"[t]o properly advance these arguments, defendant must move for appropriate relief pursuant to G.S. 15A-1415[ ] and G.S. 15A-1420[ ]\"" }, { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "quotation and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9380605 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "quotation and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520248 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 L. Ed. 2d 641", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[An] empty assertion of plain error, without supporting argument or analysis of prejudicial impact, does not meet the spirit or intent of the plain error rule.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 S. Ct. 1660", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[An] empty assertion of plain error, without supporting argument or analysis of prejudicial impact, does not meet the spirit or intent of the plain error rule.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "532 U.S. 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9356447, 9356864, 9356515, 9356644, 9356390, 9356799, 9356683, 9356334, 9356241, 9356982, 9356568, 9356733, 9356926, 9356287 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[An] empty assertion of plain error, without supporting argument or analysis of prejudicial impact, does not meet the spirit or intent of the plain error rule.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/532/0997-05", "/us/532/0997-12", "/us/532/0997-06", "/us/532/0997-08", "/us/532/0997-04", "/us/532/0997-11", "/us/532/0997-09", "/us/532/0997-03", "/us/532/0997-01", "/us/532/0997-14", "/us/532/0997-07", "/us/532/0997-10", "/us/532/0997-13", "/us/532/0997-02" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685069 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154240 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518633 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834", "parenthetical": "\"[Because [defendant did not 'specifically and distinctly' allege plain error as required by [our appellate rules], [defendant is not entitled to plain error review of this issue.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4175335 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497", "parenthetical": "\"[Because [defendant did not 'specifically and distinctly' allege plain error as required by [our appellate rules], [defendant is not entitled to plain error review of this issue.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "697 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "citations and quotations marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152715 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "citations and quotations marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 889, "char_count": 17950, "ocr_confidence": 0.72, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.034276304134856e-08, "percentile": 0.46569240137166296 }, "sha256": "c98f18479c4d726f54d5ded73a63e4b7899b7a01cc8a8344575aaa58f26b956c", "simhash": "1:abd8407863e75edf", "word_count": 2859 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:00.832613+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and HUNTER, Robert N., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. COREY DINAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nCorey Dinan (defendant) appeals his convictions of intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14~318.4(a3) and of assault on a child under the age of twelve in violation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33(c)(3). We hold that defendant received a trial free from error in part. Defendant\u2019s final issue is dismissed without prejudice and allows defendant the opportunity to file appropriate motions with the trial court.\nI. Factual Background\nAbby, the victim in this case, is the biological daughter of defendant and Sarah E, defendant\u2019s now ex-wife. Abby was bom 17 February 2010 and was approximately six-weeks-old at the time of the requisite child-abuse incident. At defendant\u2019s -trial, Ms. F. testified that on 4 April 2010, defendant gave Abby her early-morning bottle. When Ms. F. woke, she went to the family room and saw Abby in her \u201cprincess swing\u201d and defendant sitting \u201cIndian style\u201d on the floor. Abby was straggling to breathe. Ms. F. asked, \u201cwhat\u2019s wrong with my baby?\u201d Defendant responded, \u201cI don\u2019t know. I don\u2019t know. She\u2019s been like that all morning.\u201d Ms. F. demanded that they take Abby to Onslow Memorial Hospital (Onslow). Abby was kept over-night at Onslow before being transferred to Pitt Memorial Hospital (how Vidant) for additional treatment.\nDr. Coral Steffey (Dr. Steffey), pediatrician and expert in the field of pediatrics and child abuse, testified that on 5 April 2010 she was called to Vidant to consult on Abby\u2019s condition-. She testified that Abby was transferred from Onslow to Vidant for additional treatment after physicians discovered that Abby\u2019s oxygen saturations were low, that she was having difficulty breathing, that she was dehydrated, and that x-rays showed multiple rib fractures and a hemothorax. In fact, Abby had 24 identifiable rib fractures, both new and healing. X-rays taken of Abby\u2019s ribs 17 days prior did not reveal any rib fractures. Accordingly, Dr. Steffey opined that between 18 March and 4 April 2010, someone injured Abby on at least two occasions to the point that she sustained multiple rib fractures. Dr. Steffey read the opinion from her medical report into the record, as follows: \u201cThere is no medical explanation for Abby\u2019s constellation of injuries, which include healing and acute rib fractures with hemothorax, intra-crania! hemorrhage, subconjunctival hemorrhages and bruising to her ankle. No history of trauma has been provided to explain Abby\u2019s injuries. The constellation of inexplicable injuries is consistent with a diagnosis of child physical abuse with inflicted injuries, on more than one occasion.\u201d\nElizabeth Pogroszewski, social worker for Onslow County Department of Social Services, testified that on 4 April 2010 she asked defendant his opinion as to what contributed to Abby\u2019s injuries. He responded, \u201c[I] must have held her too tight.\u201d Additionally, four officers with the Jacksonville Police Department testified at trial. Officer Timothy Sawyer testified that defendant made a written statement in which he admitted to holding Abby too tight. Detective Anthony Ramirez testified that defendant demonstrated for him how he picked up Abby and held her with his elbows locked. Detective Trudy Allen testified that when she asked defendant how Abby was injured, he made \u201ca shaking motion, just as if he would shake up the contents of a canister.\u201d At that point, she arrested defendant for felony child abuse. Officer Jason Laga\u00f1a testified that defendant made the following spontaneous statement to him: \u201cI guess you get charged for holding your kid too tight.\u201d\nAt trial, defendant sought to exclude the testimony of Brent Cross, defendant\u2019s friend and fellow Marine, and Megan Dinan, defendant\u2019s former ex-wife. After voir dire, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motions in limine, finding that the proffered testimony was relevant as it went to the issue of \u201cknowledge, absence of mistake and intent.\u201d Further, the trial court found that the probative value of the 404(b) testimony was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.\nBrent Cross testified that in 2006 he was helping defendant with a home-improvement project when defendant\u2019s then wife, Megan Dinan, left the couple\u2019s napping infant son in defendant\u2019s care. When the baby woke crying, Mr. Cross testified that defendant became \u201cagitated.\u201d Defendant went to the baby\u2019s room and, through the monitor, told Mr. Cross, \u201cI got the baby now. You can go ahead and shut the baby monitor off. I got it.\u201d Mr. Cross had an \u201cinstinct\u201d to keep the monitor on. When the baby was picked up, Mr. Cross testified that he heard the baby\u2019s cry become \u201chysterical\u201d and he heard defendant\u2019s tone change from \u201cupset\u201d to \u201cjust anger.\u201d\nMegan Dinan testified that she and defendant had two biological sons together, Ian and Sam. However, after divorcing, defendant relinquished his parental rights. She testified that when Ian was approximately eight-weeks old, he woke one morning with \u201cone tiny little bruise\u201d on his chest. Defendant was responsible for feeding Ian during the night. The following morning, Ian woke \u201ccovered in bruises, head to toe. He was so bruised that his earlobes were bruised.\u201d Ian was hospitalized and diagnosed as having a virus, which doctors thought could account for his severe bruising. After Ian was released from the hospital, Ms. Dinan noted subsequent bruising in the shape of finger prints on Ian. Ms. Dinan testified that when she confronted defendant, he responded, \u201cit is my handprint, [] I was holding him last night and I think I held him too tight.\u201d\nDefendant testified on his own behalf at trial. He alleged that he never \u201cmistreated\u201d Abby on 4 April 2010 or any time prior. He admitted to accidentally treating her like a one-year old instead of a six-week old. After the defense rested, the jury found defendant guilty of intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury and of assault on a child under the age of twelve. The trial court sentenced defendant on 8 March 2013 to a term of 73 months to 97 months imprisonment, plus 60 days.\nII. Analysis\nA. Rule Violation\nInitially, we direct defense counsel\u2019s attention to Rule 28 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 28(b)(4) requires counsel to include \u201ca statement of the grounds for appellate review. Such statement shall include citation of the statute or statutes permitting appellate review.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4). In his brief, defense counsel provides:\nThis Court is called upon to determine whether [defendant] was deprived of his fundamental right to a fair trial where evidence of uncharged prior bad acts were introduced to establish criminal propensity, and where the trial court failed to make a determination that the probative value outweighed any prejudice. . . . Further, this Court is called upon to determine whether [defendant] received ineffective assistance of counsel].]\nDefense counsel has violated Rule 28(b)(4). The above \u201cstatement\u201d fails to reference any statute which would allow for appellate review \u2014 defense counsel has merely reiterated the issues he raises on appeal. Here, defense counsel is licensed in Florida. Nevertheless, we urge defense counsel and all counsel to be mindful of our Rules of Appellate Procedure.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony relating to his \u201cuncharged prior bad acts\u201d under Rule 404(b). We are unable to address the merits of this issue because defendant offers no clear or reasoned argument in support of his position as required by Rule 28(b)(6). See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Specifically, in defendant\u2019s first issue he fails to direct us to the testimony that he argues it was error for the trial court to admit. We assume that defendant challenges the testimony of Mr. Cross and Ms. Dinan pursuant to Rules 404(b) and 403, as these witnesses are referenced in this issue. Further, defendant\u2019s argument is presented in a nonsensical manner. At the very least, defendant is required to direct us to the challenged testimony- \u2014 it is not this Court\u2019s duty to craft defendant\u2019s argument for him. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s first argument is abandoned on appeal pursuant to Rule 28(b)(6).\nB. Admission of 404(b) Evidence\nAlternatively, based on defendant\u2019s recitation of the facts and a review of the transcript, we assume arguendo that in his first issue, defendant is objecting to the admission of the unfavorable character evidence offered by Mr. Cross and Ms. Dinan. Nevertheless, we remain unable to address the merits as defendant has failed to preserve this issue for our review.\n\u201c[T]o preserve for appellate review a trial court\u2019s decision to admit testimony, objections to [that] testimony must be contemporaneous with the time such testimony is offered into evidence and not made only during a hearing out of the jury\u2019s presence prior to the actual introduction of the testimony.\u201d State v. Ray, 364 N.C. 272, 277, 697 S.E.2d 319, 322 (2010) (citations and quotations marks omitted). At trial, defendant did not object to the admission of what we believe constitutes the challenged testimony of Mr. Cross and Ms. Dinan. Therefore, he did not preserve the issue of the admissibility of this testimony for our review. Id.\nFailure to properly preserve an argument restricts this Court\u2019s review on appeal to plain error. However, Rule 10(a)(4) states that such review is only available \u201cwhen the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 10(a) (4). In his brief, defendant does not ask this Court to review the issue under the plain error standard. When the State noted defendant\u2019s failure to argue plain error in the State\u2019s brief, defendant attempted to cure this deficiency by mentioning plain error in defendant\u2019s reply brief. However, a reply brief is not an avenue to correct the deficiencies contained in the original brief. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6); see also State v. Davis, 202 N.C. App. 490, 497, 688 S.E.2d 829, 834 (2010) (\u201c[Because [defendant did not \u2018specifically and distinctly\u2019 allege plain error as required by [our appellate rules], [defendant is not entitled to plain error review of this issue.\u201d).\nC. Scone of Prosecutor\u2019s Cross-Examination\nDefendant next contends that the prosecutor\u2019s improper cross-examination deprived him of a fair trial. We are not persuaded that the prosecutor questioned defendant in an unreasonable maimer.\nGenerally, \u201c[t]he scope of cross-examination ... is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling thereon will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 743, 370 S.E.2d 363, 370 (1988) (citation omitted). However, here defendant argues that we should review this issue under the plain error standard of review. We agree. As such, defendant \u201cmust demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial.\u201d State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012). \u201cTo show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jurys finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d Id. (citation and quotation omitted).\nIn the instant case, defendant takes issue with the prosecutor\u2019s line of questioning in three specific instances. First, he contends that the prosecutor inappropriately tried to \u201cplace him at odds\u201d with Sarah F. by asking, \u201c[y]ou don\u2019t believe Sarah caused these injuries at all, do you?\u201d and \u201c[d]o you believe that Sarah F. caused these injuries to Abby?\u201d Second, defendant argues that it was error for the prosecutor to \u201cchallenge[] defendant to call [Detective Allen] a liar[.]\u201d We assume that defendant is referencing the following question: \u201cSo Detective Allen, then, is lying about you [showing her how you shook Abby]?\u201d Defendant replied, \u201cI wouldn\u2019t say lie, just changing facts about who said what.\u201d Third, defendant argues that it was inappropriate for the prosecutor to ask, \u201chow long are you going to wait with that infant before you begin holding him or her too tightly?\u201d However, as to this last question, the record shows that the trial judge sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection to the question and instructed the jury to disregard it. In addition, the prosecutor withdrew the question. Thus, defendant\u2019s argument as to this question is moot.\nFurther, defendant makes no argument as to how he was prejudiced by these questions; he merely contends that he was \u201chighly prejudiced by this impossible questioning!) ] \u201d Without a showing of prejudice, defendant cannot establish that any alleged error was a fundamental error. See State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 637, 536 S.E.2d 36, 61 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997, 121 S. Ct. 1660, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2001) (\u201c[An] empty assertion of plain error, witho\u00fat supporting argument or analysis of prejudicial impact, does not meet the spirit or intent of the plain error rule.\u201d). Therefore, defendant\u2019s argument must be overruled. Assuming arguendo that defendant made a showing of prejudice, defendant has not convinced this Court that absent the prosecutor\u2019s questions, the jury probably would have reached a different verdict. The record contains additional evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nD. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nLastly, defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective because he 1) completely misapprehended the law with respect to the element of \u201cintent,\u201d 2) elicited damaging testimony from the State\u2019s witnesses and defendant, and 3) permitted \u201cprosecutorial misconduct\u201d by failing to object to the prosecutor\u2019s questions. Given our conclusion in section \u201cC,\u201d defendant\u2019s third contention moot. We dismiss defendant\u2019s remaining arguments without prejudice to defendant\u2019s right to file appropriate motions in the trial court.\nWhen raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the \u201caccepted practice\u201d is to bring these claims in post-conviction proceedings, rather than on direct appeal. State v. Dockery, 78 N.C. App. 190, 192, 336 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1985). Here, defendant has \u201cprematurely asserted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim\u201d by directly appealing to this Court. State v. Stroud, 147 N.C. App. 549, 556, 557 S.E.2d 544, 548 (2001) (quotation and citation omitted).\nDefendant raises potential questions regarding defense counsel\u2019s trial strategy. However, it is unclear from defendant\u2019s brief what specific conduct he challenges as being ineffective. As such, we are unable to address the merits of defendant\u2019s argument. To best resolve this issue, an evidentiary hearing available through a motion for appropriate relief is our suggested mechanism. Id.; see also State v. Ware, 125 N.C. App. 695, 697, 482 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1997) (dismissing the defendant\u2019s appeal where the issues could not be determined from the record and concluding that \u201c[t]o properly advance these arguments, defendant must move for appropriate relief pursuant to G.S. 15A-1415[ ] and G.S. 15A-1420[ ]\u201d). \u201cUpon the filing of a motion for appropriate relief, the trial court will determine the motion and make appropriate findings of fact.\u201d Ware, 125 N.C. App. at 697, 482 S.E.2d at 16.\nIII. Conclusion\nIn sum, we deem defendant\u2019s first issue abandoned on appeal. Assuming arguendo that it is not abandoned, defendant failed to properly preserve it for our review. We overrule defendant\u2019s second issue that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor\u2019s line of questioning. Finally, defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is dismissed without prejudice so that he may file appropriate motions in the trial court.\nNo error in part; dismissed in part.\nChief Judge MARTIN and HUNTER, Robert N., concur.\n. Pseudonyms are used throughout the opinion to protect the identities of minors and other persons involved in this action.\n. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly questioned Megan Dinan. However, we cannot address the merits of this argument as counsel\u2019s argument lacks sufficient specificity.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David Gordon, for the State.", "James Goldsmith, Jr. for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. COREY DINAN\nNo. COA13-1022\nFiled 6 May 2014\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 statement of grounds for appellate review\nAppellate defense counsel violated N.C. R. App. P. 28(b) by failing to include a statement of the grounds for appellate review.,\n2. Appeal and Error \u2014 argument abandoned \u2014 no clear or reasoned argument\nDefendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in a child abuse case by admitting testimony relating to his uncharged prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) was not addressed and was deemed abandoned. Defendant offered no clear or reasoned argument in support of his position as required by N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\n3. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to object at trial \u2014 failure to allege plain error on appeal\nDefendant failed to preserve for appellate review his argument that the trial court erred in a child abuse case by admitting unfavorable character evidence. Defendant failed to object to the evidence at trial and failed to specifically allege plain error on appeal.\n4. Criminal Law \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s cross-examination \u2014 not inappropriate\nDefendant\u2019s argument in a child abuse case that the prosecutor\u2019s improper cross-examination deprived him of a fair trial was without merit. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded that the prosecutor questioned defendant in an unreasonable manner.\n5. Constitutional Law \u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 dismissed without prejudice\nDefendant\u2019s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed without prejudice to defendant to bring these claims in post-conviction proceedings, rather than on direct appeal.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 8 March 2013 by Judge Jack W. Jenkins in Onslow County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 February 2014.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David Gordon, for the State.\nJames Goldsmith, Jr. for defendant." }, "file_name": "0694-01", "first_page_order": 704, "last_page_order": 711 }