{ "id": 6769163, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NICHOLAS JAMES JACOBS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jacobs", "decision_date": "2014-05-06", "docket_number": "No. COA13-1159", "first_page": "701", "last_page": "705", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 N.C. App. 701" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639794 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632943 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8373781 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9006333 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518853 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569335 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 L. Ed. 2d 221", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 S Ct. 1312", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 934", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355072, 352646, 351943, 354248, 354057, 352170, 354475, 352013, 351696, 353681, 353339, 352126, 352159 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/0934-04", "/us/535/0934-02", "/us/535/0934-13", "/us/535/0934-10", "/us/535/0934-11", "/us/535/0934-09", "/us/535/0934-06", "/us/535/0934-03", "/us/535/0934-01", "/us/535/0934-05", "/us/535/0934-08", "/us/535/0934-12", "/us/535/0934-07" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138382 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0028-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 557, "char_count": 9537, "ocr_confidence": 0.705, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.3338484212786151 }, "sha256": "460eaac5548a5a3f4c637dc0daa1d96803a2038aa2100b84e54ee387c9f7ae9f", "simhash": "1:4b68da664c530db7", "word_count": 1560 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:00.832613+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and HUNTER, Robert N., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NICHOLAS JAMES JACOBS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nOn 15 November 2013, Nicholas James Jacobs (defendant) filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court, seeking review of the trial court\u2019s order revoking his probation and activating his prison sentence. This case arose after defendant pled guilty to five counts of obtaining property by false pretenses and five counts of breaking or entering a motor vehicle, which were consolidated into five sentences. This Court will hear defendant\u2019s appeal pursuant to his petition for writ of certiorari for the purpose of reviewing the criminal judgment. After careful consideration, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand for further action consistent with this opinion.\nI. Factual Background\nOn 25 April 2012, defendant pled guilty to the above mentioned offenses. Pursuant to defendant\u2019s plea, the trial court sentenced defendant to one term of 6 to 8 months active time; four consecutive, suspended 8 to 10 months sentences; and probation for 36 months. On 4 January 2012, defendant\u2019s probation officer filed notices of probation violations against defendant in Columbus County. The notices alleged that defendant failed (1) to attend a scheduled appointment, (2) to make required payments to the Clerk of Superior Court, (3) to obtain approval before moving, (4) to remain within the jurisdiction of the court, (5) attend TASC (Treatment Accountability for Safer Communities), and (6) was charged with criminal offenses that could result in probation violations.\nOn 8 May 2013, a probation violation hearing was held in Columbus County Superior Court. Defendant proceeded pro se at the hearing. The trial court revoked defendant\u2019s probation and activated his sentences. That same day, defendant filed a written notice of appeal. However, the record shows that defendant\u2019s notice of appeal was defective. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s appeal is before us on writ of certiorari.\nII. Analysis\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself without establishing that defendant\u2019s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as prescribed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242. We agree.\n\u201cIt is well[-]settled that an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel at every critical stage of the criminal process as constitutionally required under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.\u201d State v. Taylor, 354 N.C. 28, 35, 550 S.E.2d 141, 147 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 934, 122 S Ct. 1312, 152 L. Ed. 2d 221 (2002). Specifically, a defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel at a probation revocation hearing and, if indigent, to have counsel appointed for him. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1345(e) (2013). A defendant also has the right to refuse the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. State v. Gerald, 304 N.C. 511, 516, 284 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1981).\n\u201cBefore a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure [sic] that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied.\u201d State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581, 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (citation omitted). To satisfy the trial court, a defendant must first \u201c \u2018clearly and unequivocally\u2019 waive his right to counsel and instead elect to proceed pro se.\u201d Id. Second, the trial court must determine whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to in-court representation by counsel.\u201d Id. \u201cA signed written waiver is presumptive evidence that a defendant wishes to act as his or her own attorney. However, the trial court must still comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242[.]\u201d State v. Whitfield, 170 N.C. App. 618, 620, 613 S.E.2d 289, 291 (2005) (internal citation omitted).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 allows a defendant to proceed without counsel if the trial judge makes a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that defendant:\n1. Has been clearly advised of his right to the assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of counsel when he is so entitled;\n2. Understands and appreciates the consequences of this decision; and\n3. Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.\nIn the instant case, defendant\u2019s appointed counsel withdrew at the outset of defendant\u2019s revocation hearing due to a conflict in representation. In an attempt to appoint defendant new counsel, the trial judge asked the clerk, \u201c[h]ow about Mr. Bill Gore?\u201d Before the clerk responded, defendant interrupted and the following colloquy occurred:\nDEFENDANT: This case has been continued since January. It\u2019s the fourth \u2014 this will be the fifth time it\u2019s [sic] been continued. I\u2019m not happy about that. I have numerous co-defendants in this case.\nTHE COURT: You understand if you want a lawyer, I will be happy to appoint another for you, you understand. If you go forward with it today without an attorney, you are held to the same standard. The Court can\u2019t walk you through it, you are held to the same standard and I assume the State is seeking revocation.\nP.O.: Yes, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: You understand they are going to ask me to put you in prison on this, so it may be you will want to wait at this point and have it continued for another 30 days and have a lawyer come in and help out on it as opposed to doing it yourself.\nDEFENDANT: If they\u2019re going to violate me, they\u2019re going to violate me anyway with a lawyer or without a lawyer.\nTHE COURT: If you are in violation, the Court could find that and there\u2019s a chance you might be violated anyway. What\u2019s the underlying sentence?\nTHE STATE: There\u2019s four, boxcar(ed), eight to ten.\nTHE COURT: If he takes care of it himself today and admits and I take one of those boxcar(ed) and consolidate it with the rest, which would be a pretty good offer.\nTHE STATE: If he would want to accept that today and be done with it, the State wouldn\u2019t object.\nTHE COURT: The State wouldn\u2019t object.\nDEFENDANT: I\u2019m not going to-if y\u2019all are going to give it to me, you\u2019re going to have to give it to me because I\u2019m not going to ask that my probation be revoked.\nTHE COURT: Okay, and I don\u2019t have to give you one day off, you understand that.\nDEFENDANT: I understand.\n(the hearing began and defendant\u2019s parole officer began testifying)\nTHE COURT: One moment. Let\u2019s get a waiver in the file. You indicated you didn\u2019t want an attorney, I\u2019m going to let you sign a waiver that you don\u2019t want an attorney.\nThis exchange reveals that the trial judge made no inquiry as to whether defendant understood the \u201crange of permissible punishments\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242(3). The State contends that defendant understood the range of permissible punishments because \u201cthe probation officer told the court that the State was seeking probation revocation.\u201d This is insufficient to satisfy N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242(3). As to defendant\u2019s underlying sentence, defendant was told only that, \u201c[tjhere\u2019s four, boxcar(ed), eight to ten.\u201d The trial judge then made defendant the \u201cgood offer\u201d of having \u201cone of those boxcar(ed)\u201d consolidated. However, there was no discussion pertaining to the specific range of punishment.\nWe cannot assume that defendant understood the legal jargon \u201cboxcared\u201d and \u201ceight to ten\u201d as it related to his sentence. The phrase \u201ceight to ten\u201d is uncertain-~is it in reference to eight to ten days, weeks, months, or years? Further, the trial judge had an unequivocal duty to ask defendant whether he understood the nature of the charges and proceedings and disclose the range of permissible punishments. State v. Pruitt, 322 N.C. 600, 604, 369 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1988) (citations omitted). He neglected to do so. The foregoing is clearly inadequate to constitute the \u201cthorough inquiry\u201d necessary to satisfy N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242(3). See State v. Taylor, 187 N.C. App. 291, 294, 652 S.E.2d 741, 743 (2007) (holding that the trial court failed to properly inform the defendant regarding the range of permissible punishments when it correctly informed defendant of the maximum 60-day imprisonment penalty, but failed to inform defendant that he also faced a maximum $1,000.00 fine for each of the charges).\nAlthough we recognize that defendant signed a written waiver of his right to assistance of counsel, the trial court was not abrogated of its responsibility to ensure the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 were fulfilled. Whitfield, supra. We need not discern whether the first two subparts of the statute were satisfied \u2014 all three must be met to ensure that a defendant\u2019s waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment revoking defendant\u2019s probation and remand for a new probation revocation hearing.\nReversed and remanded.\nChief Judge MARTIN and HUNTER, Robert N., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney GeneralRoy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jason R. Rosser, for the State.", "Edward Eldredfor defendant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NICHOLAS JAMES JACOBS\nNo. COA13-1159\nFiled 6 May 2014\nConstitutional Law \u2014 right to counsel \u2014 waiver\u2014knowing, voluntary, and intelligent \u2014 not established\nThe trial court erred in a probation violation hearing by allowing defendant to represent himself without establishing that defendant\u2019s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as prescribed by N.C..G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242.\nOn a writ of certiorari by defendant from judgment entered 8 May 2013 by Judge Douglas B. Sasser in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 February 2014.\nAttorney GeneralRoy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jason R. Rosser, for the State.\nEdward Eldredfor defendant" }, "file_name": "0701-01", "first_page_order": 711, "last_page_order": 715 }