{ "id": 6769279, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHAUNCEY LAJARVIS STERLING, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sterling", "decision_date": "2014-05-06", "docket_number": "No. COA13-1191", "first_page": "730", "last_page": "735", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 N.C. App. 730" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "175 L.Ed. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "558 U.S. 999", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151736 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 L.Ed.2d 407", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12407312 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" }, { "page": "414-15", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "414-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/567/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 L.Ed. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "558 U.S. 851", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted" }, { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150820 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530-31", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted" }, { "page": "530-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L.Ed. 2d 881", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 1246", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39440, 39192, 39593 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/1246-03", "/us/512/1246-02", "/us/512/1246-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "noting that \"felony murder is committed when a victim is killed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain enumerated felonies or a felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon\"" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531885 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "noting that \"felony murder is committed when a victim is killed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain enumerated felonies or a felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon\"" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L.Ed. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 846", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 325702, 322887, 325580, 328589, 323982, 324399, 326639, 324369, 324494, 323989, 326294, 323511, 328536, 327772, 327805 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0846-03", "/us/516/0846-08", "/us/516/0846-05", "/us/516/0846-01", "/us/516/0846-10", "/us/516/0846-14", "/us/516/0846-04", "/us/516/0846-02", "/us/516/0846-09", "/us/516/0846-12", "/us/516/0846-06", "/us/516/0846-11", "/us/516/0846-07", "/us/516/0846-13", "/us/516/0846-15" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790138 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154240 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0506-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 12436, "ocr_confidence": 0.718, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.18206544088091622 }, "sha256": "2f263c035109cfa84e7fc277d326cf6a48212c9566a33bf957dd0e875e59c3b7", "simhash": "1:40b74822462a1c54", "word_count": 2028 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:00.832613+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and DAVIS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHAUNCEY LAJARVIS STERLING, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant appeals his convictions of first degree murder and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. For the following reasons, we find no error.\nI. Background\nDefendant was indicted for murder and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. During defendant\u2019s trial he testified that on 22 April 2011, he \u201cgot the feeling\u201d that he \u201cneed[ed] money.\u201d Defendant had spent the night in his sister\u2019s apartment and after she had left for work he went into her room and got her gun. Defendant left the apartment and saw Mr. Robert Barber leave a coffee shop. Defendant followed Mr. Barber thinking he could \u201ctry to take some money from him.\u201d Defendant then pulled out his gun. According to defendant, Mr. Barber attempted to take the gun away from him. Defendant then shot Mr. Barber twice. Mr. Barber died from a gunshot wound to the chest. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder based upon the felony murder rule and attempted robbery with a firearm. The trial court entered judgment sentencing defendant to life imprisonment without parole for the conviction of first degree murder and arrested judgment on the conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant appeals.\nII. Photographs\nDefendant turned 18 years old on 22 March 2011, a month before the crimes committed in this case. During defendant\u2019s trial, the State admitted photos of defendant and/or his friends which defendant claims portray him as a juvenile \u201cpretending to be [a] rapper[.]\u201d Defendant argues the photos were irrelevant and used only to create an impression in the jury that defendant was a gang member. Defendant did not object to the photos at trial but now argues that \u201cthe trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to introduce and publish photos of the defendant and his friends when they were juveniles posing for Facebook photos.\u201d (Original in all caps.)\nFor error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice \u2014 that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty. Moreover, because plain error is to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case, the error will often be one that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\nState v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We have reviewed the photos portraying defendant and others making various hand gestures that the State questioned defendant about regarding gang activity. Although we are uncertain of the relevance of these photos, in light of defendant\u2019s own testimony that he pulled a gun on Mr. Barber because he wanted to \u201ctry to take some money from him\u201d and then shot Mr. Barber twice, we do not believe any of the photos we have viewed of defendant or his friends \u201chad a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d Id.; see generally State v. Davis, 340 N.C. 1, 12, 455 S.E.2d 627, 632 (noting that \u201c[t]he two elements of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon are: (1) an intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation but falls short of the completed offense\u201d), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 846, 133 L.Ed. 2d 83 (1995); State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 51, 436 S.E.2d 321, 350 (1993) (noting that \u201cfelony murder is committed when a victim is killed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain enumerated felonies or a felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon\u201d), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L.Ed. 2d 881 (1994). This argument is overruled.\nIII. Second Degree Murder Instruction\nDefendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury on second degree murder, which the trial court denied. Defendant contends that \u201cthe trial court erred by denying [his] request to instruct on second degree murder including lesser offenses.\u201d (Original in all caps.)\nAn instruction on a lesser-included offense must be given only if the evidence would permit the jury rationally to find defendant guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit him of the greater. The trial court should refrain from indiscriminately or automatically instructing on lesser included offenses. Such restraint ensures that the jury\u2019s discretion is channelled so that it may convict a defendant of only those crimes fairly supported by the evidence.\nThe standard for determining whether the trial court must instruct on second-degree murder as a lesser included offense of first-degree murder is as follows:\nIf the evidence is sufficient to fully satisfy the State\u2019s burden of proving each and every element of the offense of murder in the first degree . . . and there is no evidence to negate these elements other than defendant\u2019s denial that he committed the offense, the trial judge should properly exclude from jury consideration the possibility of a conviction of second degree murder.\nStated differently, the trial court must determine whether the State\u2019s evidence is positive as to each element of first-degree murder and whether there is any conflicting evidence relating to any of these elements.\nState v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 530-31, 669 S.E.2d 239, 256 (2008) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 851, 175 L.Ed. 2d 84 (2009).\n\u201cFirst-degree murder by reason of felony murder is committed when a victim is killed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain enumerated felonies or a felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon.\u201d Gibbs, 335 N.C at 51, 436 S.E.2d at 350. Defendant\u2019s underlying felony to the murder was attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon.\nThe two elements of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon are: (1) an intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation but falls short of the completed offense. Thus, an attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon occurs when a person, with the specific intent to unlawfully deprive another of personal property by endangering or threatening his life with a dangerous weapon, does some overt act calculated to bring about this result.\nDavis, 340 N.C. at 12, 455 S.E.2d at 632 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).\nDefendant contends that his testimony established that he changed his mind about committing the robbeiy and thus there was evidence contradicting the underlying felony of his murder conviction. But defendant admitted that he had an intent to commit robbery when he confessed his goal was to \u201ctry to take some money from [Mr. Barber].\u201d Defendant also admitted to an overt act when he stated that he pulled out the gun in furtherance of his intent to rob Mr. Barber. Thus, defendant\u2019s testimony alone establishes the elements of attempted robbery, see id., and his further testimony that he then shot Mr. Barber twice, whether he had changed his mind about committing the robbery or not, establishes the elements of first degree murder. See Gibbs, 335 N.C. at 51, 436 S.E.2d at 350. The State\u2019s evidence satisfied the requirements for an instruction on first degree murder, according to Taylor:\nIf the evidence is sufficient to fully satisfy the State\u2019s burden of proving each and every element of the offense of murder in the first degree . . . and there is no evidence to negate these elements other than defendant\u2019s denial that he committed the offense, the trial judge should properly exclude from jury consideration the possibility of a conviction of second degree murder.\nTaylor, 362 N.C. at 530-31, 669 S.E.2d at 256. As such, the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on the charge of second degree murder, and this argument is overruled.\nIV. Sentencing\nLastly, defendant contends that the trial court committed error because of the trial court\u2019s \u201cfailure to consider the defendant\u2019s developmental age before imposition of a sentence of life without parole violates a defendant\u2019s constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.\u201d (Original in all caps.) Defendant bases his argument on the United States Supreme Court case of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S._, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which determines that a sentencing court must take into consideration a juvenile defendant\u2019s \u201cchronological age and its hallmark features \u2014 among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences\u201d before imposing a sentence of fife imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id., 567 U.S. at_, 183 L.Ed. 2d at 423. But the holding in Miller has no application to a person who has attained the age of 18 when the crime is committed: \u201cWe therefore hold that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.\u201d Id. at_, 183 L.Ed. 2d at 414-15 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). Defendant\u2019s argument is based on common sense but not on the law, since it is true that there was likely not a substantial difference between defendant\u2019s level of maturity and understanding on the day before his 18th birthday as compared to one month later, when he committed these crimes.\nYet the law must draw bright-line distinctions based on age in many areas. We find it instructive that the same age-based bright fine applies to capital punishment. See State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 678 S.E.2d 618, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 999, 175 L.Ed. 2d 362 (2009). Where a defendant who was just five months beyond his 18th birthday when he committed murder argued that he should not be subject to capital punishment based on Roper v. Simmons, our Supreme Court rejected this argument and noted that\n[d]efendant\u2019s reliance on Roper v. Simmons is misplaced. The Supreme Court of the United States held in Roper that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed. The Court created a bright line, categorical rule. Furthermore, the Court was very clear that the issue before it concerned a defendant\u2019s age at the time he committed a capital crime, not when his case was tried and he was sentenced.\nId. at 53, 678 S.E.2d at 645. Defendant\u2019s age falls past the bright line drawn by Miller, which applies only to those who commit crimes prior to the age of 18. Miller at_, 183 L.Ed. 2d at 414-15. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.\nV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find no error.\nNO ERROR. .\nJudges CALABRIA and DAVIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel R O\u2019Brien, for the State.", "Marilyn G. Ozer, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHAUNCEY LAJARVIS STERLING, Defendant\nNo. COA13-1191\nFiled 6 May 2014\n1. Evidence \u2014 photographs\u2014no plain error\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a first-degree murder and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon case by allowing the State to introduce and publish photos of defendant and his friends when they were juveniles posing for Facebook photos. None of the photos had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\n2. Homicide \u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 denial of requested second-degree murder instruction\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by denying defendant\u2019s request for a second-degree murder instruction. Defendant\u2019s testimony alone established the elements of attempted robbery, and his further testimony that he then shot the victim twice, whether he had changed his mind about committing the robbery or not, established the elements of first-degree murder.\n3. Sentencing \u2014 life imprisonment without parole \u2014 defendant\u2019s developmental age\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by failing to consider defendant\u2019s developmental age before imposing a life sentence without parole. Defendant\u2019s age fell past the bright line drawn by Miller, which applied only to those who committed crimes prior to the age of 18.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 13 June 2013 by Judge Lisa C. Bell in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County- Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 February 2014.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel R O\u2019Brien, for the State.\nMarilyn G. Ozer, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0730-01", "first_page_order": 740, "last_page_order": 745 }