{ "id": 12168440, "name": "HAZEL B. SIMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GRAYSTONE OPHTHALMOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.A.; GRAYSTONE SURGERY, LLC; GRAYSTONE EYE SURGERY OF HICKORY, LP d/b/a GRAYSTONE EYE SURGERY CENTER; GRAYSTONE OPHTHALMOLOGY SUGERY CENTER, PLLC; JAMES W. HARRIS; RANDALL J. WILLIAMS; ANN K. JOSLYN; T. REGINALD WILLIAMS; JOHN G. TYE; RALPH E. OURSLER; and RICHARD I. CHANG, Defendant-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Sims v. Graystone Ophthalmology Associates, P.A.", "decision_date": "2014-05-20", "docket_number": "No. COA13-870", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "70", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 N.C. App. 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631472 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631460, 12631464, 12631499, 12631468, 12631471, 12631472, 12631474 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0040-01", "/se2d/599/0042-03", "/se2d/599/0907-01", "/se2d/599/0043-01", "/se2d/599/0045-01", "/se2d/599/0046-01", "/se2d/599/0048-02" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639168 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95", "parenthetical": "\"There is no duty to protect a lawful visitor from dangers which are either known to him or so obvious and apparent that they may reasonably be expected to be discovered.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. App. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176415 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "\"There is no duty to protect a lawful visitor from dangers which are either known to him or so obvious and apparent that they may reasonably be expected to be discovered.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/203/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "\"In this state, a plaintiff's right to recover in a personal injuiy action is barred upon a finding of contributory negligence.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551291 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545", "parenthetical": "\"In this state, a plaintiff's right to recover in a personal injuiy action is barred upon a finding of contributory negligence.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790126 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566400 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551769 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "917", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8958742 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497-98", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524635 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "quoting Abner Corp. v. City Roofing & Sheetmetal Co., 73 N.C. App. 470, 472, 326 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8920639 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739", "parenthetical": "quoting Abner Corp. v. City Roofing & Sheetmetal Co., 73 N.C. App. 470, 472, 326 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2490019, 2491402, 2488216, 2490871, 2488856 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0705-01", "/nc/325/0705-05", "/nc/325/0705-04", "/nc/325/0705-02", "/nc/325/0705-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521049 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132102 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 S.E.2d 400", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572515 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "citing Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 464, 186 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4175379 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "citing Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 464, 186 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135724 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739573 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523-24", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153396 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0520-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 743, "char_count": 13517, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.665651525889828e-08, "percentile": 0.40597965364003846 }, "sha256": "1c6dd658ca40ee1b4f34626d3cf3597df5e3defb77e21f8b2c13f8a03ebf909c", "simhash": "1:93a15d3a5c3d3cd8", "word_count": 2196 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:06.319137+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "HAZEL B. SIMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GRAYSTONE OPHTHALMOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.A.; GRAYSTONE SURGERY, LLC; GRAYSTONE EYE SURGERY OF HICKORY, LP d/b/a GRAYSTONE EYE SURGERY CENTER; GRAYSTONE OPHTHALMOLOGY SUGERY CENTER, PLLC; JAMES W. HARRIS; RANDALL J. WILLIAMS; ANN K. JOSLYN; T. REGINALD WILLIAMS; JOHN G. TYE; RALPH E. OURSLER; and RICHARD I. CHANG, Defendant-Appellees" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nHazel B. Sims (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals from the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of Graystone Ophthalmology Associates, PA. (\u201cdefendant\u201d). For the following reasons, we reverse.\nI. Background\nThe underlying facts of this case were agreed to in stipulations by the parties. These stipulations can be summarized as follows: Plaintiff was a patient of Dr. James W. Harris of defendant and was present on the premises of defendant for a vision examination on 5 November 2007. While on defendant\u2019s premises, plaintiff was seated on a rolling chair for her vision examination. After taking a seat, but prior to the examination, plaintiff fell from the rolling chair and fractured her right proximal humerus at the right shoulder and her right hip at the right intertrochanteric femur. Plaintiff incurred considerable costs for treatment and rehabilitation.\nOn 5 November 2010, plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendant and others associated with defendant. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged the named defendants \u201cwere jointly and severally negligent ... by placing [her] in the rolling stool or chair from which she fell. . . when they knew or should or [sic] known that such stools or chairs, without arms or handles, were dangerous to elderly patients such as [her]\u201d and \u201c[t]hat as the direct and proximate result of the negligence ..., [she] has been damaged in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).\u201d\nThe named defendants answered plaintiff\u2019s complaint on 26 May 2011 asserting various affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence. The named defendants later filed a motion for summary judgment on 4 December 2012.\nPrior to a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated that defendant was the proper party to be sued and all other named defendants were dismissed from the action. The motion for summary judgment then came on to be heard in Catawba County Superior Court on 14 January 2013, the Honorable Timothy S. Kincaid, Judge presiding.\nUpon consideration of the pleadings, depositions, stipulations, and arguments of counsel, by order filed 15 January 2013, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and taxed the costs of the action against plaintiff. Plaintiff filed notice of appeal on 14 February 2013.\nII. Discussion\nThe sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nStandard of Review\n\u201cThe standard of review for an order of summary judgment is firmly established in this state. We review a trial court\u2019s order granting or denying summary judgment de novo.\u201d Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Services, LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523, 723 S.E.2d 744, 747 (2012).\n[S]uch judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that \u201cthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007) (citations and quotation omitted). \u201cWhen considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must view the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\u201d Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001) (citation omitted).\nIn re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008).\nThe party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue. The movant may meet this burden by proving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is non-existent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim.\nCollingwood v. General Elec. Real Estate Equities, Inc., 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989) (citations omitted). \u201cIf the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present specific facts which establish the presence of a genuine factual dispute for trial.\u201d In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. at 573, 669 S.E.2d at 576.\n\u201cThe trial court may not resolve issues of fact in deciding a motion for summary judgment and must deny the motion if there is a genuine issue as to any material fact.\u201d Daily Exp., Inc. v. Beatty, 202 N.C. App. 441, 444, 688 S.E.2d 791, 795 (2010) (citing Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 464, 186 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1972)). \u201cIf there is any question as to the weight of evidence, summary judgment should be denied.\u201d Marcus Bros. Textiles, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, LLP, 350 N.C. 214, 220, 513 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1999).\nNegligence\nPlaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment in the present case because there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether defendant was negligent in causing plaintiff\u2019s injuries and whether plaintiff was negligent in contributing to her injuries.\nAs our appellate courts have long recognized, \u201c[njegligence claims and allegations of contributory negligence should rarely be disposed of by summary judgment.\u201d DeHaven v. Hoskins, 95 N.C. App. 397, 402, 382 S.E.2d 856, 859, disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 705, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989). This is because \u201c \u2018ordinarily it is the duty of the jury to apply the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person.\u2019 \u201d Finley Forest Condominium Ass\u2019n v. Perry, 163 N.C. App. 735, 739, 594 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2004) (quoting Abner Corp. v. City Roofing & Sheetmetal Co., 73 N.C. App. 470, 472, 326 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1985)). Yet, \u201c \u2018summary judgment for defendant is proper where the evidence fails to establish negligence on the part of defendant, establishes contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, or establishes that the alleged negligent conduct was not the proximate cause of the injury.\u2019 \u201d Hahne v. Hanzel, 161 N.C. App. 494, 497-98, 588 S.E.2d 915, 917 (2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Williams v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 36 N.C. App. 146, 147, 243 S.E.2d 143, 144 (1978), rev\u2019d on factual grounds, 296 N.C. 400, 250 S.E.2d 255 (1979)), disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 46 (2004).\n\u201cIt is well established that in order to prevail in a negligence action, plaintiff[] must offer evidence of the essential elements of negligence: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages.\u201d Camalier v. Jeffries, 340 N.C. 699, 706, 460 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1995). Even if evidence of negligence is presented, plaintiff cannot prevail if the evidence reveals plaintiff was contributorily negligent. See Cobo v. Raba, 347 N.C. 541, 545, 495 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1998) (\u201cIn this state, a plaintiff\u2019s right to recover in a personal injuiy action is barred upon a finding of contributory negligence.\u201d).\nIn this case, it is uncontested that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of reasonable care and plaintiff suffered damages as a result of her fall from the rolling chair. But in response to plaintiff\u2019s arguments that there are issues of fact concerning negligence and contributory negligence, defendant maintains, as it did below, that summary judgment is appropriate because there is no evidence of actionable negligence, there is no evidence of proximate cause, and, in the alternative, plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we disagree with defendant and hold the issues of negligence and contributory negligence should have been presented to a jury. Thus, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nIn this case, the issue is not solely whether the chair was a dangerous condition, but, as plaintiff alleged in her complaint, whether defendant was negligent in placing plaintiff on the rolling chair from which she fell.\nViewing the evidence contained in the depositions and stipulations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence tends to show the following: Plaintiff was 86 years old at the time of her fall. Plaintiff had been a patient of defendant\u2019s for over ten years, having two to three appointments per year. A typical appointment begins with a technician conducting a vision examination. Plaintiff recalled that the technician usually instructs her to take a seat on an armless rolling chair and move up to the table where the examination machine was located. This was common procedure and nothing different happened on the day plaintiff fell.\nDuring plaintiffs deposition, plaintiff could not recall exactly what caused her to fall. But plaintiff did recall she never made it to the table. Plaintiff testified \u201cI was trying to get my balance and I was trying to get up to the table, but I know I wasn\u2019t at the table \u2019cause I couldn\u2019t touch anything. It seemed like a long time, like I was fighting to get my balance.\u201d\nAlthough plaintiff could not remember at her deposition how she fell, stipulations agreed to by the parties provide statements made by plaintiff during an interview just days after the incident. These statements indicate that after plaintiff was seated in the rolling chair, she leaned to place her.purse on another chair in the examination room. Then, as plaintiff shifted her weight back down on the rolling chair, the chair started to roll. Plaintiff attempted to catch herself but there was nothing to grab onto and the chair slipped out from under her, causing plaintiff to fall.\nPlaintiff testified no one had ever assisted her with the chair prior to her fall. Athough plaintiff was aware the chair was on rollers, plaintiff testified she was unaware of how dangerous it could be. At appointments subsequent to her fall, defendant has assisted plaintiff with the chair.\nThe evidence tends to show that the staff of defendant was aware of the dangers of the rolling chair. Specifically, the CEO of defendant testified that defendant was aware of one incident prior to plaintiff\u2019s fall in which a patient fell when a rolling chair slid out from underneath the patient while she was being seated. Furthermore, at the deposition of the technician performing plaintiff\u2019s vision examination on the day of the incident, the technician stated that it was her usual practice to hold the chair and place her foot on the bottom of the chair while a patient is being seated in order to keep the chair from rolling. Yet, when questioned about the specifics of how plaintiff was seated on the day of plaintiff\u2019s fall, the technician indicated she had no specific recollection. The technician did not witness the fall as she was facing away from plaintiff at the time of the fall.\nWe hold this evidence sufficient to carry the issue of negligence to a jury for determination of whether defendant exercised the degree of care that a reasonable and prudent person would exercise under the circumstances. Although defendant\u2019s use of the rolling chair may not itself be negligent, instructing an elderly patient with a purse to sit on the rolling chair and move up to the examination table without offering assistance may be found to be negligent. Additionally, the evidence supports plaintiff\u2019s argument that the nature of the rolling stool, i.e. the rollers and lack of arms, was the proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s fall.\nDefendant further argues that if it was negligent, summary judgment is appropriate because the danger was open and obvious. See Kelly v. Regency Centers Corp., 203 N.C. App. 339, 343, 691 S.E.2d 92, 95 (2010) (\u201cThere is no duty to protect a lawful visitor from dangers which are either known to him or so obvious and apparent that they may reasonably be expected to be discovered.\u201d). While plaintiff was aware the chair was on rollers, in this case, plaintiff was instructed to sit on the rolling chair and move up to the table. Although plaintiff\u2019s actions may be found by the jury to constitute contributory negligence, we hold the evidence does not establish contributory negligence as a matter of law.\nIIL Conclusion\nTaking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we hold material issues of fact exist as to whether defendant was negligent and whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Thus, we hold the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nReversed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Grant Richman, PLLC, by Robert M. Grant, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.", "Baucom, Clay tor, Benton, Morgan & Wood, P.A., by James F. Wood, III, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HAZEL B. SIMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GRAYSTONE OPHTHALMOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.A.; GRAYSTONE SURGERY, LLC; GRAYSTONE EYE SURGERY OF HICKORY, LP d/b/a GRAYSTONE EYE SURGERY CENTER; GRAYSTONE OPHTHALMOLOGY SUGERY CENTER, PLLC; JAMES W. HARRIS; RANDALL J. WILLIAMS; ANN K. JOSLYN; T. REGINALD WILLIAMS; JOHN G. TYE; RALPH E. OURSLER; and RICHARD I. CHANG, Defendant-Appellees\nNo. COA13-870\nFiled 20 May 2014\nNegligence\u2014summary judgment\u2014genuine issue of material fact\nThe trial court erred in a negligence case arising out of injuries the 86-year-old plaintiff sustained when she fell from a rolling chair during a visit to her eye doctor by granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. There were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether defendant was negligent in causing plaintiff\u2019s injuries and whether plaintiff was negligent in contributing to her injuries.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 15 January 2013 by Judge Timothy S. Kincaid in Catawba County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 January 2014.\nGrant Richman, PLLC, by Robert M. Grant, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nBaucom, Clay tor, Benton, Morgan & Wood, P.A., by James F. Wood, III, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 75, "last_page_order": 80 }