{ "id": 12168731, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PIERCE McCOY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McCoy", "decision_date": "2014-06-03", "docket_number": "No. COA13-933", "first_page": "268", "last_page": "273", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 N.C. App. 268" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "735 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442-43", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "443" }, { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "720 S.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "715 S.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "923" }, { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. App. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4343400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "105" }, { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/216/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566310 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571664, 571660 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0372-01", "/nc/349/0372-02" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "614" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567420 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "429-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11468718 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0505-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 13269, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3195945014554903 }, "sha256": "4055afe4035e90e29756a4f49057fac1cefab6a79b1824dc1a629ccb97bd24e5", "simhash": "1:8c2a432095cebcd9", "word_count": 2206 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:06.319137+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, JR., Robert N. and DILLON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PIERCE McCOY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant appeals judgment convicting him of possession of firearm by felon. For the following reasons, we find no error.\nI. Background\nDefendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon based upon an investigation conducted by Officer Charles Britt of the fraud unit of the Durham Police Department Investigations Bureau. Officer Britt testified that he \u201cdownloadfs] pawn [shop] files every morning and check[s] for stolen property].]\u201d \u201c[A]t the end of every month [Officer Britt] run[s] all firearms that are pawned at the pawn shops in Durham. Then [Officer Britt] check[s] to see if either persons that have sold or pawned firearms are convicted felons.\u201d In 2011, Officer Britt picked up a buy transaction (\u201cbuy ticket\u201d) for a firearm which listed defendant\u2019s name and date of birth. Defendant had previously been convicted of a felony. At defendant\u2019s trial the State admitted exhibits, including the buy ticket, a DVD, and an affidavit of indigency (\u201caffidavit\u201d). A jury found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon, and the trial court entered judgment upon the conviction. Defendant appeals.\nII. Defendant\u2019s Signature\nDefendant first contends that \u201cthe trial court committed error or plain error in allowing the signature on the affidavit to be compared to the signature on the buy ticket where the signatures on the documents were not sufficiently authenticated nor ruled to be sufficiently similar to each other in violation of... [defendant\u2019s] rights.\u201d (Original in all caps.) Defendant\u2019s arguments are based upon the comparison of his signature on the buy ticket and his affidavit; defendant claims that each signature required authentication by either an expert in handwriting analysis or by a witness who was familiar with his handwriting based upon knowledge gained outside of this case in order for the jury to be able to compare them. Defendant is correct that no witness testified who could identify the signatures as an expert or based upon familiarity with defendant\u2019s signature outside of the case, but we disagree with defendant that such testimony was necessary.\nA. Affidavit of Indigency\nThe State\u2019s last witness was \u201ca Deputy Clerk with the Durham County Superior Criminal Division.\u201d Through the Deputy Clerk the State admitted \u201ca certified, true copy\u201d of the affidavit which was signed by defendant and had his date of birth on it. The affidavit was \u201cSWORN/AFFIRMED AND SUBSCRIBED TO BEFORE\u201d a Deputy Clerk of Superior Clerk who also signed the document, which is a self-authenticating document pursuant to North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 902, and thus the affidavit did not need to be authenticated pursuant to Rule 901. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 901 and 902 (2011). As such, the trial court did not err in admitting the affidavit without consideration of North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901.\nB. Comparison of Defendant\u2019s Signature\nIn determining the authenticity of a document, it is a well-settled evidentiary principle that a jury may compare a known sample of a person\u2019s handwriting with the handwriting on a contested document without the aid of either expert or lay testimony. However, before handwritings may be submitted to a jury for its comparison, the trial court must satisfy itself that there is enough similarity between the genuine handwriting and the disputed handwriting, such that the jury could reasonably infer that the disputed handwriting is also genuine.\nState v. Owen, 130 N.C. App. 505, 509, 503 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing State v. LeDuc, 306 N.C. 62, 291 S.E.2d 607 (1982)), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 349 N.C. 372, 525 S.E.2d 187-88 (1998).\nIn State v. LeDuc, the case cited in Owen, id., the Supreme Court noted that the \u201cpreliminary determinations[,]\u201d both of whether one of the handwritings was genuine and whether the genuine and disputed handwritings were similar, were to be made by the trial court. 306 N.C. 62, 74, 291 S.E.2d 607, 614 (1982), overruled on other grounds, State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 362 S.E.2d 263 (1987). Yet the Court also stated that \u201c[b]oth of these preliminary determinations by the trial judge are questions of law fully reviewable on appeal.\u201d Id. Thus in LeDuc, this Court itself made \u201cthese preliminary determinations!.]\u201d Id. (\u201cIn the instant case, the samples shown to the jury for comparison with the disputed charter were given by the defendant himself. Having examined these samples with the disputed signature on the charter, we are satisfied that there is enough similarity between them for the documents to have been submitted to the jury for its comparison.\u201d) In Owen, this Court noted that both the trial court and this Court itself had compared the genuine and disputed handwritings. See Owen, 130 N.C. App. at 509, 503 S.E.2d at 429-30.\nThus, we must review the evidence to determine if there was \u201cenough similarity between them for the documents to have been submitted to the jury for its comparison.\u201d LeDuc, 306 N.C. at 74, 291 S.E.2d at 614. The \u201cknown sample\u201d of the signature, found on defendant\u2019s self-authenticating affidavit, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 902, shows the signature of \u201cPierce E. McKoy[.]\u201d Notable about the signature on the affidavit is the inclusion of the middle initial followed by a period and that the \u201cc\u201d in \u201cMcKoy\u201d is underscored with a zigzag line. On the buy ticket which has the disputed signature, the signature is also by \u201cPierce E. McKoy[,] including the middle initial followed by a period, and the \u201cc\u201d in \u201cMcKoy\u201d underscored by a zigzag line. In fact, all of the letters are formed in essentially the same way and the signatures are nearly identical. We are \u201csatisfied that there is enough similarity between the genuine handwriting and the disputed handwriting, that the jury could reasonably infer that the disputed handwriting is also genuine[.]\u201d LeDuc, 306 N.C. at 74, 291 S.E.2d at 614. Thus, the buy ticket with the disputed signature was properly admitted, and the jury was free to compare the signature on it with the signature on the self-authenticating affidavit. See id. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.\nIII. Motion to Dismiss\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he either actually or constructively possessed the gun which was sold to the pawn shop.\nThe standard of review for a motion to dismiss is well known. A defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss should be denied if there is substantial evidence of: (1) each essential element of the offense charged, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of the charged offense. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from that evidence. Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve.\nState v. Teague, 216 N.C. App. 100, 105, 715 S.E.2d 919, 923 (2011) (citation omitted), disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 365 N.C. 547, 720 S.E.2d 684 (2012).\nThere are two elements to possession of a firearm by a felon: (1) defendant was previously convicted of a felony; and (2) thereafter possessed a firearm. It is uncontested that defendant had been convicted of a felony prior to the date in question. Therefore, the only element we must consider is possession.\nPossession of any item may be actual or constructive. Actual possession requires that a party have physical or personal custody of the item. A person has constructive possession of an item when the item is not in his physical custody, but he nonetheless has the power and intent to control its disposition.\nState v. Mitchell, _ N.C. App. _, _, 735 S.E.2d 438, 442-43 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nHere, as in Mitchell, defendant does not contest that he has previously been convicted of a felony, so possession is the only element at issue on appeal. See id. at _, 735 S.E.2d at 443. Taken in a light most favorable to the State, see Teague, 216 N.C. App. at 105, 715 S.E.2d at 923, the State presented a DVD showing a man consistent with defendant\u2019s appearance placing a gun on the pawn shop counter. The State\u2019s evidence also included a buy ticket with both defendant\u2019s name and date of birth on it along with defendant\u2019s affidavit uncontestably signed by defendant. A director of operations for the pawn shop explained that the individual signing the buy ticket at issue here is \u201cliterally relinquishing [his] rights to the merchandise immediately[,]\u201d in this case the gun. As discussed above, the jury could find based upon comparison of the signatures on the affidavit and the buy ticket that the same person signed both of them, meaning that the person who placed the gun on the counter of the pawn shop, sold the gun to the pawn shop, and filled out the buy ticket, was the defendant. This evidence would permit the jury to find that the defendant actually possessed the gun when he brought it to the pawn shop to sell it. This was substantial evidence upon which to deny defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, see Mitchell, _ N.C. App. at_, 735 S.E.2d at 443; Teague, 216 N.C. App. at 105, 715 S.E.2d at 923, and therefore overrule this argument.\nIV. Jury Instructions\nBefore defendant\u2019s trial he stipulated in writing as to his prior felony conviction. When the trial court was instructing the jury it stated,\n[O]n February 10th, 2000, in Durham County Superior Court, the defendant pled guilty to the felony of possession of a firearm by a felon that was committed on July 2nd, 1999, in violation of the laws of the State of North Carolina. The defendant and the State have stipulated to this prior conviction. So, for purposes of.. . this trial you are to find this element to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Defendant contends it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury in this manner, and the State agrees.\nDefendant failed to object at trial, but now contends it was plain error for the trial court to inform the jury he had previously been convicted of the crime possession of a firearm by a felon. In fight of the evidence as noted above, we are not convinced that the trial court\u2019s statement that defendant had previously been convicted of the same crime \u201chad a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d See Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find no error.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges HUNTER, JR., Robert N. and DILLON concur.\n. The \u201cbuy transaction\u201d is actually a piece of paper signed by the individual selling property to the pawn shop. It is documentary evidence that the individual is selling properly to the pawn shop. The director of operations of the pawn shop testified that \u201c [a] buy transaction and a pawn transaction are two different things.... A pawn is when you\u2019re actually leaving your merchandise in exchange for money for an extended period of time; 30 days. A buy transaction, you\u2019re literally relinquishing your rights to the merchandise immediately!]\u201d\n. We note that the judgment and documents in the record spell defendant\u2019s name McCoy with a \u201cc\u201d rather than a \u201ck\u201d as in McKoy.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Melody Hairston, for the State.", "Anne Bleyman, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PIERCE McCOY, Defendant\nNo. COA13-933\nFiled 3 June 2014\n1. Evidence\u2014authentication\u2014handwriting\u2014self-authenticating affidavit\u2014comparison to buy ticket\nThe trial court did not commit error or plain error in a possession of a firearm by a felon case by allowing the signature on defendant\u2019s affidavit of indigency to be compared to the signature on the buy ticket for a firearm sold to a pawn shop. Defendant\u2019s affidavit was a self-authenticating document pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 902, and there was enough similarity between the signature on the affidavit and the signature on the buy ticket that the jury could reasonably infer that the signature on the buy ticket was genuine.\n2. Firearms and Other Weapons\u2014possession of by felon\u2014sufficient evidence of possession\nThe trial court did not err in a possession of a firearm by a felon case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. The State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant actively possessed the gun which was sold to the pawn shop.\n3. Firearms and Other Weapons\u2014possession of by felon\u2014jury instructions\u2014prior conviction\u2014not plain error\nAlthough the trial court erroneously instructed the jury in a possession of a firearm by a felon case that defendant had previously been convicted of the same crime, in light of the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, the trial court\u2019s statement did not have a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered on or about 19 February 2013 by Judge R. Allen Baddour in Superior Court, Durham County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 January 2014.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Melody Hairston, for the State.\nAnne Bleyman, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0268-01", "first_page_order": 278, "last_page_order": 283 }