{ "id": 12168873, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF M.J.G.", "name_abbreviation": "In re M.J.G.", "decision_date": "2014-06-17", "docket_number": "No. COA13-1293", "first_page": "350", "last_page": "362", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 N.C. App. 350" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640943 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654-55", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 N.C. App. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/8/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571698 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497700 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9190967 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11913599 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790144 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158497 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560417 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900-901", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554614 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563177 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 636", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" }, { "page": "637" }, { "page": "739-40" }, { "page": "637", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "740" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "741" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 N.C. App. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4181733 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/209/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4172142 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1115, "char_count": 29492, "ocr_confidence": 0.722, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.3240109751572389 }, "sha256": "e919003fcdad22b5800e8be3c30c45905798bf4886d3b075f27d337f5bf9554d", "simhash": "1:9c2cf66a374ec954", "word_count": 4904 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:06.319137+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF M.J.G." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nThe juvenile appeals from an adjudication order finding him delinquent of misdemeanor assault and disorderly conduct at school and from a level one disposition order. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the orders of the trial court.\nI. Background\nOn 20 May 2013, two juvenile petitions were filed against M.J.G. (\u201cthe juvenile\u201d) in Brunswick County District Court alleging offenses of misdemeanor assault in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33(a) and disorderly conduct in violation of N.C. Gen. State \u00a7 14-288.4(a)(6).\nAn adjudication hearing was held on 25 June 2013. Evidence presented at the adjudication hearing indicated that on 26 April 2013, a fundraiser volleyball game was being held in the gymnasium at Waccamaw Elementary School (\u201cWaccamaw\u201d) in Brunswick County, North Carolina. Children from the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth grades were gathered in the gymnasium, watching the game. The juvenile was a sixth grade student at Waccamaw.\nEmily Long, a teacher at Waccamaw, testified that she saw two boys in the bleachers \u201cgetting ready to fight\u201d by having their \u201cfists clenched.\u201d As Ms. Long was approaching the two boys, they were removed from the gymnasium by two other teachers, including Ms. Meagan Potts. Ms. Long testified that prior to the two boys being escorted out, she had seen the juvenile sitting next to the boys, waving at Ms. Potts and \u201ctelling her no, don\u2019t stop it, go away.\u201d Ms. Long told the juvenile she wanted to talk to him about \u201cnot waving off a fight,\u201d not \u201cwaving the teachers off[,]\u201d and requested that he come off the bleachers to go outside with her. Ms. Long was on the floor of the gymnasium and the juvenile was on the second or third bleacher. Ms. Long testified as follows:\n[a]t that point [the juvenile] got angry, did not want to come with me. I probably repeated four or five times for him to come on. He stormed off the bleachers and Ms. [Susan Wood] had come up behind me and he stormed right over her, ran right over her, pushed out the gym door. I walked behind him to go ahead and talk with him and kept asking him to stop and let me talk to him.\nThe juvenile walked down a hallway and the school resource office, Deputy Christopher Barbour, approached the juvenile and Ms. Long. The juvenile began shouting, \u201cI\u2019m tired of this f mg school, these teachers lying on me, they\u2019re always lying on me.\u201d The juvenile put his finger less than an inch away from Long\u2019s face, \u201cpostured up chest to chest\u201d and said \u201c[especially you you mother-f***ing b****[.]\u201d Thereafter, the juvenile backed Ms. Potts against a wall and \u201cdid the exact same thing to her.\u201d\nSusan Wood, an emergency medical technician with Horry County Fire Rescue, testified that she was in the Waccamaw gymnasium on 26 April 2013. She was the parent of two children attending Waccamaw and decided to watch the game. After seeing a commotion, Wood walked over to Ms. Long\u2019s location to see if there was a medical issue that needed assistance. Wood testified to the following:\nWhen I got to [Ms. Long], she was asking [the juvenile] to come out of the stands. Once I realized that it wasn\u2019t a medical issue, he was doing this at her - shut up, shut your mouth, go away, we don\u2019t need you, go away, shut up, go away. And I -1 was shocked. ... I decided to stand and observe.\n[The juvenile] finally stood up after, you know, doing this motion at her, chopping at her face, and telling her to go away, get out of here, we don\u2019t need you. Stood up \u2014 there was plenty of room between Ms. Long and myself on either side and he was two or three bleachers up and came down the bleachers and body checked me. And the look on his face was very defiant, almost ha, ha.\nI ended up taking three or four steps\u2019 back to keep from falling.\nDeputy Christopher Barbour, the Waccamaw school resource officer, testified that he was standing in a hallway adjacent to the gymnasium when he spoke with Ms. Long. As Ms. Long was attempting to explain the situation to Deputy Barber, the juvenile \u201cturned around and [the juvenile] started walking back towards us and he was, you know, flaring his arms no, stop, don\u2019t, quit lying, you know, things of that nature.\u201d Deputy Barbour told the juvenile to leave the building but the juvenile \u201cjumped up, stomped his feet, and then he started cussing.\u201d Deputy Barbour further testified to the following:\nI originally thought he was going to go around me to go out the door because that was the direction in which he was headed. But he just moseyed on right around me and that\u2019s when he got into Ms. Long\u2019s face, began cursing her, cursing Ms. Potts and [another teacher.]\nDeputy Barbour \u201chad to physically put [his] hands on [the juvenile] to remove him from the hallway[.]\u201d Once the juvenile was outside of the building, he continued to \u201ccurse and holler and scream.\u201d The juvenile was escorted to the main office of the school.\nOn 10 July 2013, the trial court entered a \u201cJuvenile Adjudication Order\u201d finding the juvenile delinquent of both offenses. Following a disposition hearing held on 10 July 2013, the juvenile received a Level I disposition. The juvenile was ordered to be placed on probation for 12 months.\nThe juvenile appeals.\nII. Discussion\nOn appeal, the juvenile argues that the trial court erred by (A) failing to find that he was delinquent of the offense of misdemeanor assault beyond a reasonable doubt; (B) allowing Ms. Wood to characterize his expression as \u201cdefiant\u201d and alternatively, to deny his motion to dismiss the petition for misdemeanor assault; (C) denying his motion to dismiss the petition for disorderly conduct; and (D) holding a sham disposition hearing and violating the statutory mandate to allow the juvenile\u2019s parents to present evidence.\nA. Standard of Proof\nFirst, the juvenile argues that the trial court erred by failing to find in its adjudication order, that he was delinquent of the offense of misdemeanor assault beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.\nIt is well established that\n[t]he allegations of a petition alleging the juvenile is delinquent shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, [i]f the court finds that the allegations in the petition have been proved ..the court shall so state. ... [I]t is reversible error for a trial court to fail to state affirmatively that an adjudication of delinquency is based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn re D.K., 200 N.C. App. 785, 788, 684 S.E.2d 522, 525 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nSpecifically, the juvenile argues that the adjudication order does not include the conclusion of law that he committed assault beyond a reasonable doubt and that the adjudication order does not include findings of fact inferring such a conclusion. The juvenile relies on In re J.V.J., 209 N.C. App. 737, 707 S.E.2d 636 (2011), for his contentions. In J.V.J., the juvenile argued that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support the conclusion that the juvenile had committed the offense of assault on a government officer, and our Court agreed. Id. at 739, 707 S.E.2d at 637. Our Court noted that with respect to an adjudication order in the juvenile delinquency context, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2411 provided that\n[i]f the court finds that the allegations in the petition have been proved [beyond a reasonable doubt], the court shall so state in a written order of adjudication, which shall include, but not be limited to, the date of the offense, the misdemeanor or felony classification of the offense, and the date of adjudication.\nId. at 739-40, 707 S.E.2d at 637 (emphasis in original). In J.V.J., the trial court failed to address any of the allegations set out in the juvenile petition. It even failed to \u201csummarily aver that \u2018the allegations in the petition have been proved[.]\u2019 \u201d. Id. at 740, 707 S.E.2d at 638. Accordingly, our Court remanded the case to the trial court to make the statutorily mandated findings of fact as set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2411 (2009). Id. at 741, 707 S.E.2d at 638.\nIn the case sub judice, however, the facts are readily distinguishable. Our review indicates that the 10 July 2013 \u201cJuvenile Adjudication Order\u201d entered by the trial court states that the \u201cpetition(s) before the court\u201d included \u201cmisdemeanor assault.\u201d It also contains a blank space where the trial court is to state findings of fact which \u201chave been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d In this blank space, the trial court indicated \u201cplease see attached \u2018Adjudication Findings of.Fact.\u2019 \u201d\nThe attached \u201cAdjudication Findings of Fact\u201d included the following findings of fact:\nThat on or about April 26, 2013, the Juvenile was a spectator of a fundraiser volleyball game inside the gymnasium of Waccamaw School in Ash, North Carolina. Waccamaw School is a public educational institution in Brunswick County. That during the volleyball game, which took place at the end of a half-day of school, a disturbance between two other juveniles began. After the disturbance, Ms. Emily Long, a teacher at Waccamaw School, asked the Juvenile to come down from the bleachers and leave the gymnasium as it appeared to her that he was instigating the potential fight between the other juveniles. The Juvenile at first resisted, but then came off the bleachers. While he was coming off the bleachers, he came into contact with Ms. Susan Wood, an EMT and parent of another student that was watching the volleyball game, by hitting Ms. Wood in her shoulder and chest area with his shoulder as he walked by her, causing Ms. Wood to move backwards.\nThat after the Juvenile left the gymnasium he went to an adjacent hallway to wait for Ms. Long. Classes were not in session in this hallway. The Juvenile, Ms. Long, Ms. Wood, two other teachers, one of the students involved in the original disturbance, two [vendors], and possibly other students were present in the hallway at this time. Deputy Chris Barbour, the School Resource Officer, was present shortly after the Juvenile entered the hallway. A confrontation occurred whereby the Juvenile became angry, erratic, and unresponsive to the requests of Dept. Barbour. The Juvenile began yelling at and directing profanity at several teachers, refused to leave the area when instructed to by Dept. Barbour, and only left the hallway after being [forced] to by Dept. Barbour. The students in the gymnasium could not hear this altercation in the hallway, but this conduct did disturb the peace, order, or discipline at Waccamaw School.\nThe \u201cJuvenile Adjudication Order\u201d also states that, \u201c[t]he Court concludes as a matter of law, that in regard to the allegations in the petition(s) before the Court\u201d the juvenile is delinquent. Here, the petition for misdemeanor assault alleged that juvenile committed simple assault by \u201cforcefully hitting the victim in her shoulder, breast, and chest area with his shoulder, causing the victim to move back a few steps.\u201d\nBased on the foregoing, we reject the juvenile\u2019s arguments that the trial court failed to find that he had committed misdemeanor assault beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the adjudication order of the trial court.\nB. Ms. Wood\u2019s Testimony and the Juvenile\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\nIn his second argument, the juvenile asserts that the trial court erroneously allowed Ms. Wood to testify that his expression was \u201cdefiant.\u201d Alternatively, the juvenile argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the petition for assault based on insufficiency of the evidence.\nAt the juvenile\u2019s adjudication hearing, Ms. Wood testified to the following:\n[The juvenile] finally stood up after, you know, doing this motion at [Ms. Long], chopping at her face, and telling her to go away, get out of here, we don\u2019t need you. Stood up \u2014 there was plenty of room between Ms. Long and myself on either side and he was two or three bleachers up and came down the bleachers and body checked me. And the look on his face was very defiant, almost ha, ha.\nThe juvenile objected to this testimony and the trial court overruled his objection.\nThe juvenile, relying on State v. Sanders, 295 N.C. 361, 245 S.E.2d 674 (1978) (citation omitted), argues that ordinarily, \u201ca witness\u2019s opinion of another person\u2019s intention on a particular occasion is generally held to be inadmissible.\u201d Id. at 369-70, 245 S.E.2d at 681 (citation omitted). Here, however, we believe that Ms. Wood\u2019s testimony is more appropriately characterized as describing the juvenile\u2019s demeanor on 26 April 2013.\nOur Court addressed this issue in State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 406 S.E.2d 876 (1991), by providing the following:\nOpinion evidence as to the demeanor of a criminal defendant is admissible into evidence. See State v. Moore, 276 N.C. 142, 171 S.E.2d 453 (1970). The rule has been stated as follows:\nThe instantaneous conclusions of the mind as to the appearance, condition, or mental or physical state of persons, animals, and things, derived from observation of a variety of facts presented to the senses at one and the same time, are, legally speaking, matters of fact, and are admissible in evidence.\nA witness may say that a man appeared intoxicated or angry or pleased. In one sense the statement is a conclusion or opinion of the witness, but in a legal sense, and within the meaning of the phrase, \u2018matter of fact,\u2019 as used in the law of evidence, it is not opinion, but is one of the class of things above mentioned, which are better regarded as matters of fact. The appearance of a man, his actions, his expression, his conversation - a series of things - go to make up the mental picture in the mind of the witness which leads to a knowledge which is as certain, and as much a matter of fact, as if he testified, from evidence presented to his eyes, to the color of a person\u2019s hair, or any other physical fact of like nature.\nId. at 321, 406 S.E.2d at 900-901 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nMs. Wood\u2019s testimony that juvenile\u2019s \u201clook on his face\u201d was \u201cvery defiant\u201d related to her perception of the juvenile shortly after the alleged incident. Because this testimony stemmed from Ms. Wood\u2019s personal experience combined with Ms. Wood\u2019s observation of juvenile, it was admissible to shed light upon the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident, and thus, was relevant and admissible. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 and 402 (2013) (Rule 401 states that \u201crelevant evidence\u201d is \u201cevidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d Rule 402 states that \u201c[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible\u201d except as otherwise provided by the United States and North Carolina Constitutions, as well as an Act of Congress or the General Assembly, or by these rules). Therefore, we reject the juvenile\u2019s argument that the trial court erred by admitting this challenged testimony.\nIn the alternative, juvenile argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss because there was no other evidence to indicate that his act was intentional. We find the juvenile\u2019s arguments unpersuasive.\nWhere the juvenile moves to dismiss, the trial court must determine \u2018whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged,.. . and (2) of [juvenile\u2019s] being the peipetrator of such offense. In reviewing a motion to dismiss a juvenile petition, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, which is entitled to every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence.\nIn re S.M., 190 N.C. App. 579, 581, 660 S.E.2d 653, 654-55 (2008) (citations omitted). An assault is \u201can overt act or attempt, with force or violence, to do some immediate physical injuiy to the person of another, which is sufficient to put a person of reasonable firmness in fear of immediate physical injury.\u201d State v. Porter, 340 N.C. 320, 331, 457 S.E.2d 716, 721 (1995) (citation omitted).\nA thorough review of the record demonstrates that Ms. Wood\u2019s testimony that the juvenile was \u201cvery defiant\u201d is not the only evidence to establish that the juvenile acted with intent. Ms. Wood testified that the juvenile stood up after arguing with Ms. Long, and \u201cthere was plenty of room between Ms. Long and myself on either side and he was two or three bleachers up and came down the bleachers and body checked me.\u201d Ms. Wood also testified that she \u201cended up taking three or four steps back to keep from falling.\u201d Furthermore, Ms. Long testified that juvenile \u201cstormed off the bleachers and Ms. Woods [sic] had come up behind me and he stormed right over her, ran right over her, pushed out the gym door.\u201d\nIn a juvenile adjudication hearing, \u201cthe court is empowered to assign weight to the evidence presented at the trial as it deems appropriate. .. . [T]he trial judge acts as both judge and jury, thus resolving any conflicts in the evidence.\u201d In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 439, 473 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1996) (citations omitted). Reviewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that the juvenile\u2019s actions were intentional. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying the juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss the petition for misdemeanor assault.\nC. Motion to Dismiss Petition for Disorderly Conduct\nThe juvenile argues that his actions did not amount to disorderly conduct because there was insufficient evidence that juvenile\u2019s actions amounted to a disturbance of the peace, order, or discipline at his school when no students, classes, or programs were in any way affected and his actions minimally affected the staff\u2019s activities. Accordingly, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the petition for disorderly conduct. We disagree.\nSection 14-288.4(a)(6) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that:\n(a) Disorderly conduct is a public disturbance intentionally caused by any person who does any of the following:\n(6) Disrupts, disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students at any public or private educational institution or engages in conduct which disturbs the peace, order or discipline at any public or private educational institution or on the grounds adjacent thereto.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4(a)(6) (2013). \u201cOur Supreme Court has held that the conduct must cause a \u2018substantial interference with, disruption of and confusion of the operation of the school in its program of instruction and training of students there enrolled.\u2019 \u201d In re M.G., 156 N.C. App. 414, 416, 576 S.E.2d 398, 400 (2003) (citation omitted).\nThe juvenile cites to In re Eller, 331 N.C. 714, 417 S.E.2d 479 (1992) as providing guidance for identifying behavior which constitutes a violation ofN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4(a) (6). In Eller, the trial court adjudicated two students as delinquent of disorderly conduct. The respondent Greer, then a fourteen-year-old student at Beaver Creek High School, made a move toward another student with a carpenter\u2019s nail in her hand during a basic special education reading class. Id. at 715, 417. S.E.2d at 480. The other student dodged respondent Greer\u2019s move. This move was made while the teacher was giving a reading assignment at the chalkboard. Id. The teacher in the class approached respondent Greer after relating the assignment and asked her what was in respondent Greer\u2019s hand. Respondent Greer willingly gave the teacher the carpenter\u2019s nail. The other students in the class \u201cobserved the discussion and resumed their work when so requested by [the teacher]. \u201d Id. At a later date, respondent Greer and another fifteen-year-old student named Eller, were in a mathematics class. The respondents Greer and Eller were seated at the rear of the classroom with their peers when they at least once each, struck the metal shroud of a radiator \u201cmore than two or three times.\u201d Id. at 716, 417 S.E.2d at 480. Each strike produced a \u201crattling, metallic noise\u201d which caused their fellow peers to look \u201ctoward where the sound was coming from\u201d and caused the teacher to interrupt her lecture for fifteen to twenty seconds each time. Id. at 716, 417 S.E.2d at 481. Our Supreme Court held that the State had not produced substantial evidence that the respondents\u2019 behavior constituted a \u201csubstantial interference\u201d because, inter alia, \u201cthe radiator incident merited no intervention by the instructor other than glares of disapproval for a total of at most sixty seconds during the entire class period\u201d and \u201cother students were only modestly interrupted from their work and returned to their lesson upon being instructed to do so by their teacher\u201d after \u201cthe nail incident.\u201d Id. at 718, 417 S.E.2d at 482.\nThe Eller court cited to two cases to support its conclusion - State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967) and State v. Midgett, 8 N.C. App. 230, 174 S.E.2d 124 (1970). These two cases illustrate the level of interference necessary to sustain a conviction of disorderly conduct. The Wiggins court held that a motion for nonsuit was properly overruled by the trial court where student-defendants picketed on school grounds in front of a school building. Wiggins, 272 N.C. at 155, 158 S.E.2d at 43. The Wiggins court stated that \u201c[a]s a direct result of the [student-defendants\u2019] activities, the work of the class in bricklaying was terminated because the teacher could not retain the attention of his students, and disorder was created in the classrooms and hallways of the school building itself.\u201d Id. In Midgett, our Court affirmed the denial of a motion for nonsuit when twelve student-defendants entered the office of the secretary to the principal of a public school. Midgett, 8 N.C. App. at 233, 174 S.E.2d at 127. The student-defendants told the secretary that \u201cthey were going to interrupt us that day\u201d and \u201clocked the secretary out of her office, moved furniture about, scattered papers and dumped some books on the floor.\u201d Id. Because of the student-defendants\u2019 actions, the secretary, the principal, and another teacher \u201cwere drawn or kept away from their jobs or classes\u201d and school was dismissed early. Id. As such, our Court held that there was ample evidence to support all of the elements of disorderly conduct. Id. at 233, 174 S.E.2d at 128.\nThe juvenile argues that the circumstances of the present case are more similar to those found in Eller and distinguishable from the facts found in Wiggins and Midgett. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we disagree.\nMs. Long testified that there were 200 to 300 children in the gymnasium. Ms. Wood testified that \u201c[everybody was watching what was happening between the teacher[, Ms. Long,] and the [juvenile].\u201d Two students testified that while they were in the school\u2019s gymnasium, they witnessed the disturbance. Ms. Long was not able to supervise students or fulfill her duties in the gymnasium because she had to assist in escorting the juvenile out of the gymnasium. When the juvenile was in the hallway, shouting at Ms. Long and Ms. Potts, at least four other students were in the hallway. In addition, Ms. Wood testified that during the incident, \u201cthere was a lot of disjointed information going on\u201d as students \u201cwere being shoved on . . . busses.\u201d Significantly, \u201ca group of special needs students came into the office and because of everything that had just happened they had missed their bus.\u201d\nThe facts of the case sub judice, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, demonstrate that the juvenile\u2019s conduct caused a substantial interference with, disruption of, and confusion of the operation of the school. Unlike the circumstances found in Eller and comparable to the facts found in Midgett, the juvenile\u2019s conduct merited intervention by several teachers, the assistant principal, as well as the school resource officer. In addition, the juvenile\u2019s actions caused such disruption and disorder, similar to those found in Midgett and Wiggins, that a group of special needs students missed their buses. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying the juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of disorderly conduct.\nD. Disposition Hearing\nIn his final argument, the juvenile argues that several errors occurred at his disposition hearing.\nFirst, the juvenile argues that the fact that his dispositional hearing on 10 July 2013 commenced at 9:47 a.m. and concluded twelve minutes later, necessarily leads to the conclusion that the conditions of juvenile\u2019s probation was signed by the trial court judge prior to the hearing, thus resulting in a \u201csham\u201d hearing. We note that the juvenile cites to no authority to support his assumption. Furthermore, the juvenile\u2019s assertion is unpersuasive as the trial court judge did not sign the disposition order until 12 July 2013, two days following the day of the hearing.\nIn his second argument, the juvenile contends that the trial court erred by allowing his mother to be heard only subsequent to the trial court entering his disposition. After careful review, we disagree.\nSection 7B-2501 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that \u201c(b) The juvenile and the juvenile\u2019s parent, guardian, or custodian shall have an opportunity to present evidence, and they may advise the court concerning the disposition they believe to be in the best interests of the juvenile.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2501 (2013).\nAt the disposition hearing, the trial court ordered, as a condition of the juvenile\u2019s disposition, that the juvenile\u2019s parents attend \u201cStrengthening Families\u201d parenting classes. Thereafter, the juvenile\u2019s counsel stated that the juvenile\u2019s mother \u201cdid want to say a few words.\u201d The trial court judge gave an opportunity to the juvenile\u2019s mother to speak. The following exchange took place:\nTHE COURT: ... I think you\u2019ll be a very beneficial member of the Strengthening Families team. I have found at that program it\u2019s very helpful to share experiences.\nAnd because you have that belief, I think you\u2019ll be a good leader possibly in that group and a good resource person and will be very beneficial not only for you but for others to see what it means to be supportive of your children and that sort of thing. And that\u2019s why I\u2019m asking that you not as - certainly not as punishment for you but I think it would be \u2014 that group is a very beneficial group overall. And \u2014\n[The juvenile\u2019s mother:] Maybe I can be a positive influence on somebody else.\nAssuming arguendo that the juvenile is correct in his contention that the trial court decided the terms of his disposition prior to allowing the juvenile\u2019s mother to be heard, we find this error to be harmless based on the fact that the juvenile\u2019s mother did not object to the condition of attending the \u201cStrengthening Families\u201d classes but effectively agreed with the trial court.\nIII. Conclusion\nWhere we find the juvenile\u2019s challenges to the adjudication and disposition orders unpersuasive, we affirm the orders of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C., and GEER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Susannah R Holloway, for the State.", "Mark Hayes for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF M.J.G.\nNo. COA13-1293\nFiled 17 June 2014\n1. Juveniles\u2014delinquency\u2014misdemeanor assault\nThe trial court did not err by failing to find that the juvenile was delinquent of the offense of misdemeanor assault beyond a reasonable doubt. The court relied on the petition that sufficiently alleged the juvenile committed simple assault by forcefully hitting the victim in her shoulder, breast, and chest area with his shoulder, causing the victim to move back a few steps.\n2. Evidence\u2014testimony\u2014juvenile\u2019s defiant expression\u2014relevancy\nThe trial court did not err by allowing a witness to characterize a juvenile\u2019s expression as \u201cdefiant\u201d and alternatively, by denying his motion to dismiss the petition for misdemeanor assault. Because this testimony stemmed from the witness\u2019s personal experience combined with her observation of the juvenile, it was admissible to shed fight upon the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident, and thus, was relevant and admissible. Further, there was sufficient evidence to determine that the juvenile\u2019s actions were intentional.\n3. Juveniles\u2014delinquency\u2014disorderly conduct\nThe trial court did not err by denying a juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss a petition for disorderly conduct. The facts of the case, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, demonstrated that the juvenile\u2019s conduct caused a substantial interference with, disruption of, and confusion of the operation of the school.\n4. Juveniles\u2014disposition hearing\u2014terms\u2014failure to cite authority\u2014harmless error\u2014failure to object\nThe trial court did not err by holding an alleged sham disposition hearing and allegedly violating the statutory mandate to allow the juvenile\u2019s parents to present evidence. The juvenile failed to cite to any authority to support his assumption of a sham hearing. Assuming arguendo that the trial court decided the terms of his disposition prior to allowing the juvenile\u2019s mother to be heard, any error was harmless based on the fact that the mother did not object to the condition of attending the family classes but effectively agreed with the trial court.\nAppeal by juvenile from adjudication and disposition orders entered 10 July 2013 and 12 July 2013, respectively, by Judge Sherry D. Prince in Brunswick County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 March 2014.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Susannah R Holloway, for the State.\nMark Hayes for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0350-01", "first_page_order": 360, "last_page_order": 372 }