{ "id": 12169055, "name": "JIMMY HILL, Employee, Plaintiff v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (SEDWICK CMS, Third Party Administrator), Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Hill v. Federal Express Corp.", "decision_date": "2014-07-01", "docket_number": "No. COA 14-60", "first_page": "488", "last_page": "502", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 N.C. App. 488" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "654 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640028 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams, 349 N.C. at 680, 509 S.E.2d at 413 (internal quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/654/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633952 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492", "parenthetical": "quoting Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149478 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323", "parenthetical": "citing Hassell v. Onslow Cty. Bd. ofEduc., 362 N.C. 299, 306-07, 661 S.E.2d 709, 715 (2008)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. App. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4179761 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "citing Hassell v. Onslow Cty. Bd. ofEduc., 362 N.C. 299, 306-07, 661 S.E.2d 709, 715 (2008)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/207/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E. 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615832 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8375343 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams, 349 N.C. at 680, 509 S.E.2d at 413 (internal quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617-18", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11434760 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "quoting Johnson v. Lowe's Cos., 143 N.C. App. 348, 350, 546 S.E.2d 616, 617-18 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560920 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 S.E.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "citing Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 280, 225 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 S.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3734786 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/205/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555285 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. App. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556183 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/11/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. App. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4348576 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/217/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779479 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574321 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E. 2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574993 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.E. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625913 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "quoting Hensley v. Cooperative, 246 N.C. 274, 278, 98 S.E. 2d 289, 292 (1957), and citing Pardue v. Tire Co., 260 N.C. 413, 132 S.E. 2d 747 (1963), and O'Mary v. Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 135 S.E. 2d 193 (1964)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548849 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26", "parenthetical": "quoting Hensley v. Cooperative, 246 N.C. 274, 278, 98 S.E. 2d 289, 292 (1957), and citing Pardue v. Tire Co., 260 N.C. 413, 132 S.E. 2d 747 (1963), and O'Mary v. Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 135 S.E. 2d 193 (1964)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569857 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788691 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43", "parenthetical": "quoting Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916614 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9187488 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "quoting Whitfield v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 158 N.C. App. 341, 350, 581 S.E.2d 778, 784 (2003), and Phillips v. U.S. Air, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 538, 541-42, 463 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470306 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475", "parenthetical": "quoting Whitfield v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 158 N.C. App. 341, 350, 581 S.E.2d 778, 784 (2003), and Phillips v. U.S. Air, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 538, 541-42, 463 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986640 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9185540 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1299, "char_count": 33651, "ocr_confidence": 0.712, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.560457787785445e-08, "percentile": 0.40212383038547805 }, "sha256": "a0af7fc828f6247be069a81acd958ec074ef5b6f78017760b3b84fc39c1854b0", "simhash": "1:42830c89372d1f46", "word_count": 5456 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:06.319137+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge DILLON concur." ], "parties": [ "JIMMY HILL, Employee, Plaintiff v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (SEDWICK CMS, Third Party Administrator), Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nThe Commission\u2019s findings of fact were supported by competent evidence and its findings supported its conclusions of law. The Commission did not abuse its discretion in its determinations of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and did not employ an overly narrow interpretation of the Workers Compensation Act in weighing the evidence.\nI. Factual and Procedural History\nJimmy Hill (plaintiff) was bom in 1953 and was 59 at the time of the hearing in this case. In December 2011 plaintiff had been employed as a courier for Federal Express Corporation (defendant) for over 13 years. His duties included loading and delivering packages. As a courier, plaintiff was required to lift 75 pound packages and delivered 80 to 90 packages a day. On 23 December 2011 plaintiff arrived at work shortly before 8:00 a.m. Upon arrival at work, plaintiff checked the lights and brakes in his tmck, performed stretching exercises, and began sorting and arranging the packages in his tmck.\nOn a normal day, couriers were required to deliver packages in order of priority, based on factors such as the need to deliver refrigerated medications in a timely manner or the fact that a customer had paid for express delivery. To accomplish this, plaintiff might drive past some delivery locations, and return to them after he completed the priority deliveries. On 23 December 2011, two factors led defendant to abandon its usual prioritizing. First, because it was the last business day before Christmas, plaintiff had so many deliveries that he had to place packages on the floor of his tmck. Secondly, a plane bringing packages for delivery was delayed, so that instead of leaving the warehouse at 8:15, plaintiff did not leave until about 9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs supervisor agreed that plaintiff should deliver packages on the floor as soon as possible, and that he could use a \u201cstraight line\u201d delivery route, stopping at each delivery location as he came to it, even if this resulted in delayed delivery of packages to customers who had contracted for early morning delivery.\nBetween 9:00 and 11:00 a.m., plaintiff delivered about 20 packages. Shortly after 11:00 a.m., plaintiff began experiencing impaired vision and significant difficulties with motor control. He was able to park at a nearby fire station, and was taken by ambulance to Moses Cone Hospital. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a stroke cause by a carotid dissection, which is a tear in a blood vessel. Plaintiff was treated in the hospital for about five days, followed by a period of rehabilitative therapy. Plaintiff made a good recovery, but as of the time of the hearing he was still experiencing cognitive and physical effects of the stroke, and had not been able to return to work.\nPlaintiff filed a claim for workers compensation benefits, which defendant denied on the grounds that plaintiff had experienced \u201cno work related accident resulting in injury.\u201d The Full Commission issued its Opinion and Award on 30 August 2013, denying plaintiff\u2019s claim for workers compensation benefits. The Commission concluded that \u201cplaintiff\u2019s job duties as a cornier for FedEx on December 23, 2011 were not a significant factor in his development of a carotid dissection and did not cause the carotid dissection that led to his stroke.\u201d\nPlaintiff appeals.\nII. Standard of Review\nAppellate review of an Industrial Commission order is \u201climited to reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law[.]\u201d Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). The Commission has sole responsibility for evaluating the weight and credibility to be given to the record evidence. Id. (citation omitted). Findings that are not challenged on appeal are \u201cpresumed to be supported by competent evidence\u201d and are \u201cconclusively established on appeal.\u201d Johnson v. Herbie\u2019s Place, 157 N.C. App. 168, 180, 579 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2003). The \u201cCommission\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.\" McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 701 (2004) (citation omitted).\nThe \u201cclaimant in a workers\u2019 compensation case bears the burden of initially proving \u2018each and every element of compensability\u2019... by a \u2018greater weight\u2019 of the evidence or a \u2018preponderance\u2019 of the evidence.\u201d Adams v. Metals USA, 168 N.C. App. 469, 475, 608 S.E.2d 357, 361 (2005) (quoting Whitfield v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 158 N.C. App. 341, 350, 581 S.E.2d 778, 784 (2003), and Phillips v. U.S. Air, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 538, 541-42, 463 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1995)). \u201cTo establish \u2018compensability\u2019... a \u2018claimant must prove three elements: (1) [t]hat the injury was caused by an accident; (2) that the injury arose out of the employment; and (3) that the injury was sustained in the course of employment.\u2019\u201d Clark v. Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41, 43, 619 S.E.2d 491, 492 (2005) (quoting Gallimore v. Marilyn\u2019s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977)). In this case the parties disagree about whether plaintiff presented evidence that (1) his employment bore a causal relationship to his carotid dissection, and (2) whether on 23 December 2011 there was an interruption of plaintiff\u2019s normal work routine and the introduction of unexpected or unusual circumstances such that the Commission might find that he suffered an injury by \u201caccident.\u201d\n\u201cOur Supreme Court has defined the term \u2018accident\u2019 as used in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as \u2018an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury.\u2019 The elements of an \u2018accident\u2019 are the interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. Of course, if the employee is performing his regular duties in the \u2018usual and customary manner,\u2019 and is injured, there is no \u2018accident\u2019 and the injury is not compensable.\u201d Porter v. Shelby Knit, Inc., 46 N.C. App. 22, 26, 264 S.E. 2d 360, 363 (1980) (quoting Hensley v. Cooperative, 246 N.C. 274, 278, 98 S.E. 2d 289, 292 (1957), and citing Pardue v. Tire Co., 260 N.C. 413, 132 S.E. 2d 747 (1963), and O\u2019Mary v. Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 135 S.E. 2d 193 (1964)).\nIn Gunter v. Dayco Corp., 317 N.C. 670, 346 S.E.2d 395 (1986), our Supreme Court upheld a workers\u2019 compensation award where the claimant injured his arm while performing \u201ctwisting movements\u201d shortly after starting a new job requiring these unaccustomed movements. Similarly, in Salomon v. Oaks of Carolina, 217 N.C. App. 146, 718 S.E.2d 204 (2011), we upheld the Commission\u2019s determination that a nursing assistant suffered an injury by accident where her injury was caused by a patient\u2019s unusual and unexpected resistance to the plaintiff\u2019s care. However, an injury is not the result of an \u201caccident\u201d simply because it occurs during a challenging workday in which the claimant performs his or her usual duties under more difficult conditions. See, e.g., Southards v. Motor Lines, 11 N.C. App. 583, 585, 181 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1971) (holding the Commission\u2019s findings insufficient to support award, given that the \u201cfact that plaintiff was handling a different commodity than usual, without more, and that the weather was hot, are not enough to satisfy the requirement of an \u2018interruption of the work routine and the introduction of unusual conditions likely to result in unpredicted consequences [.]\u2019 . . . Nor is the mere fact that plaintiff was in a hurry[.]\u201d) (citing Gray v. Storage, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 668, 179 S.E.2d 883 (1971)).\nIII. Commission\u2019s Findings of Fact\nPlaintiff\u2019s first argument challenges the evidentiary support for the Commission\u2019s findings concerning whether the circumstances of plaintiff\u2019s employment on 23 December 2011 constituted \u201can unlooked for and untoward event\u201d or \u201cinterruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.\u201d Shay v. Rowan Salisbury Sch., 205 N.C. App. 620, 624, 696 S.E.2d 763, 766 (2010) (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred in making findings on this issue that were not supported by competent evidence. We disagree.\nThe Commission\u2019s findings about the circumstances of plaintiff\u2019s job on 23 December 2011 included the following:\n1. As of the date of the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, plaintiff was 59 years old and had been employed by defendant for 14 years as a courier[.]...\n2. As a courier, plaintiff was required to load his truck, deliver packages, and pick up packages. Plaintiff typically handled small and large packages of varying weights. He testified that he lifted packages weighing between 75 and 150 pounds, and it was not unusual for plaintiff to deliver 85 to 90 packages a day.\n4, In December 2011, plaintiff was driving a sprinter truck. ... [He] was familiar with the operation of the truck[.] ...\n5. Plaintiff had worked as a courier for defendant during the Christmas season for many years, and he testified that the Christmas season is always a busy time for FedEx couriers. Plaintiff had not driven the particular route he was driving on December 23, 2011 during prior Christmas seasons; however, he had been driving this particular route since his old route had been switched over to the new FedEx hub. The only difference between the two routes that plaintiff was able to identify at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner was that the route he was assigned sometime after Christmas 2010 was more residential than, his prior route.\n6. On a \u2018regular\u2019 day, defendant operates on a priority schedule, such that priority overnight packages have to be delivered by 10:30 a.m_Because of the priority package delivery times, couriers would load their trucks and drive their route so that the priority packages could be delivered first and on time. This meant that a courier might drive past a stop that the courier would come back to later in the day.... [During the winter] the couriers typically rush to complete their deliveries . . . before it gets dark and becomes difficult to see the house numbers.\n7. As a courier, plaintiff would generally... start his route at approximately 8:00 or 8:10 am. However, if the plane bringing incoming freight was delayed, plaintiff would be delayed in starting his route.\n8. It was not unusual for planes to be delayed. To address this contingency, defendant had implemented protocols to address the delivery of packages, such as foregoing priority delivery and going to a \u2018straight line\u2019 delivery method, which involves the couriers making each stop on their route, rather than bypassing some stops in the route in order to go on to the next priority delivery....\n9. On December 23,2011, the plane bringing in the freight that had to be delivered that day was late to arrive. Plaintiff testified that this allowed him to spend some time lining up the freight that was already in his truck, and to swap off routes with other drivers.... When asked by his attorney whether a late plane put any pressure on him, plaintiff testified that it just means you will be in a different traffic pattern when you eventually start your route. Plaintiff testified that he left the hub at \u201c9:00 something\u201d on [that] morning[.]...\n10. Plaintiff testified that on December 23, 2011, he had large packages on his truck; however, he did not testify as to whether those packages were any larger than the packages he regularly had to deliver. Plaintiff also testified that he did not know how many packages he had on his truck when he left the hub on December 23, 2011, but that this day was different because of \u201cthe amount of packages that was there and the size and awkwardness of it[.]\u201d ... [That day] was the first time that he ever had to deliver a flat screen TV, but there was no testimony that the flat screen TV weighed any more than other packages he had delivered over the past 13 years. Finally, he testified that the floor of his truck was filled with packages and that he had to step over packages when he made his deliveries.\nBased on its findings concerning the circumstances of plaintiff\u2019s work on 23 December 2011, the Commission stated in Finding No. 21 that:\n21. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that plaintiff did not suffer an interruption of his regular work routine on December 23,2011. Plaintiff\u2019s job by its very nature requires that he rush to make timely deliveries. Plaintiff was very busy every Christmas season. The evidence of record does not support a finding that plaintiff was busier on December 23, 2011 than he had been at other times during the 2011 Christmas season or during past Christmas seasons. The evidence does not support a finding that the late arrival of the plane caused him to rush any more than usual. In fact, plaintiff had more time to organize his truck, and he did not have to complete the priority deliveries by 10:30. While his truck may have been very full, there is no evidence that having to step over packages on the floor or move awkwardly in the truck was not something he had had to do during past Christmas seasons.\nWe hold that the Commission\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence. In arguing for a contrary result, plaintiff challenges only a few excerpts from Findings of Fact 5,8, 9, and 21 which he contends were not supported by competent evidence. The remaining findings, which as discussed above are conclusively established given that they are not challenged, are sufficient to support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff was not subjected to any significant interruption of his work routine. Furthermore, our review reveals that the challenged excerpts are supported by competent evidence.\nPlaintiff first contends that the Commission erred in Finding No. 8 by finding that it was not unusual for planes to be late, and argues that the \u201crecord is devoid of any evidence that supports this finding.\u201d Plaintiff testified that defendant identified the situation of a delayed plane as a \u201ccode 43\u201d and that specific procedures were in place for the couriers to follow in response to delays. The Commission could reasonably find that the existence of a specific identification code and an alternative plan for use when planes were delayed was evidence that this occurrence was not unusual. This argument lacks merit.\nPlaintiff also argues that the Commission erred in Finding of Fact 5 by finding that the only difference plaintiff identified between his former delivery route and the route he was assigned in 2011 was that the newer route was more residential. Plaintiff asserts that this finding \u201cis quite contrary to the testimony in this matter and is not supported by competent evidence.\u201d However, plaintiff does not dispute that he testified that the newer route was more residential, and does not identify any other differences between the two delivery routes. Instead, he argues that other aspects of plaintiff\u2019s work day on 23 December 2011 were unusual. The Commission did not err by finding that the only difference plaintiff noted between his 2011 route and his route prior to Christmas 2010 was that the new route was more residential.\nIn addition, plaintiff argues that the Commission erred in Finding of Fact 9, by finding that the plane\u2019s delay allowed plaintiff additional time to arrange the freight in his truck, or to trade routes or deliveries with other drivers. Plaintiff asserts that this finding \u201cis completely contradicted by the testimony.\u201d However, when plaintiff was asked to discuss the effect of a late plane on his work day, he testified that:\nWe had a 43 at 8:05 I\u2019m thinking. It\u2019s on my timecard. A 43 is a delay for planes and really it -1 mean, you don\u2019t want a late plane but really that gave us time to line up what we had already there [in the truck.1 And then the couriers will swan off on the routes that\u2019s close to you, you know. \u201cCan you hit this on your way down to so-and-so because this the only one I\u2019ve got in that area?\u201d And we swapped off, you know dining that time and all, [and] finished loading our trucks[.]\u201d\n(emphasis added). This finding was clearly supported, rather than \u201ccompletely contradicted\u201d by the above-quoted testimony.\nPlaintiff also asserts that Finding No. 21 \u201cdemonstrates multiple examples of conclusions which are not supported by competent evidence.\u201d Plaintiff challenges the finding that \u201cthe evidence does not support a finding that the late arrival of the plane caused [plaintiff] to rush any more than usual,\u201d and asserts that plaintiff \u201cunequivocally testified that late planes wreak havoc on [his] normal job[.]\u201d Plaintiff testified that the delay gave him additional time to organize his route and trade deliveries with other couriers. Also, in response to the delay, defendant adjusted some of its normal policies; for example, couriers were permitted to deliver packages in a straight line, even if that meant that overnight deliveries were delayed. On the other hand, the late start gave plaintiff less time to complete the route before dark. Plaintiff was never asked whether overall his job was easier or harder when a plane was delayed, and he certainly never testified \u201cunequivocally\u201d that the situation \u201cwreaked havoc\u201d on his delivery schedule. In addition, plaintiff testified that he delivered 80 or 90 packages a day. He experienced stroke symptoms after working only two hours and delivering about 20 packages, a rate of delivery that was no faster than usual. We hold that the challenged portions of the Commission\u2019s findings were supported by competent evidence.\nPlaintiff also cites findings of fact made by the Deputy Commissioner and asserts that they illustrate \u201cthe abnormalities and unusual circumstances which Plaintiff faced on the day of his injury.\u201d However, \u201c[w]hether the full Commission conducts a hearing or reviews a cold record, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-85 places the ultimate fact-finding function with the Commission - not the hearing officer.\u201d Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998). \u201c[T]he Full Commission reviews appeals from the Deputy Commissioner de novo. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s findings are irrelevant and have no bearing on the instant case.\u201d Newnam v. New Hanover Regional Med. Ctr., _ N.C. App. _, _, 711 S.E.2d 194, 200 (2011) (citing Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 280, 225 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1976)).\nPlaintiff has also failed to articulate the legal or medical significance of the circumstances he posits as unusual. He offers no reasons why a delayed plane, busy time of year, or packages on the truck\u2019s floor might have resulted in his injury. We hold that the Commission\u2019s findings of fact were supported by competent evidence, and that they supported its conclusion that on 23 December 2011 plaintiff did not experience an interruption of his work routine. Plaintiff\u2019s arguments to the contrary lack merit.\nIV. Commission\u2019s Determinations on Weight, and Credibility\nPlaintiff\u2019s next argument challenges the Commission\u2019s findings concerning whether the medical evidence showed a causal relationship between his employment and his injury. This argument lacks merit.\nThe Commission concluded that the greater weight of the evidence showed that his job duties on 23 December 2011 \u201cwere not a significant factor in his development of a carotid dissection and did not cause the carotid dissection that led to his stroke.\u201d This conclusion was supported by its findings, including the following:\n11. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on December 23, 2011, after plaintiff had made 20 deliveries, he began to experience blurred and distorted vision[, and] ... difficulty with his fine motor skills[.] . . . [He] drove to a nearby fire station[, where a fireman] . . . called an ambulance to transport him to the hospital.\n12. Plaintiff was then transported to the Moses Cone Hospital Emergency Department where he was examined by Dr. Pramod P. Sethi[.] . . . [P]laintiff had a major occlusion of the internal carotid artery of the neck.... [Dr. Deveshwar] performed an emergency catheter angiogram [which]... revealed a carotid dissection],]... [and] used a balloon and a stent to open the dissected area and administered clot-busting medicine [.]...\n13. ... [Plaintiff] sustained a . . . stroke, secondary to . . . a left internal carotic artery occlusion from a left internal artery dissection. Plaintiff remained in the hospital until December 28, 2011. As of the date of his discharge, plaintiff continued to experience problems with his speech and motor movement on his right side. He was prescribed medication and referred to rehabilitation therapy[.],..\n14. A carotid dissection occurs when a rupture or tear develops in the inner layer of the carotid artery, causing blood to seep between the layers of the artery to cause an occlusion, which if left undetected causes a clot to develop, which in turn causes a stroke. No one knows how long it takes between the time the artery dissects and the time the patient begins to show symptoms of a stroke, but it is a multi-stage process which Dr. Coin believes could possibly take a few days to a week. Dr. Coin, a neurologist who reviewed plaintiffs medical records and testified as an expert at defendant\u2019s request, testified that it would be difficult for him to understand how it could all happen within three hoursf.] ... Dr. Daniel Gentry, plaintiffs family doctor, testified that a dissection \u201ccomes from a defect plus time.\u201d\n15. Dr. Sethi testified that several things can cause a carotid dissection, including \u201cminimal postural trauma\u201d ... or a hereditary condition^] . . . People who suffer from cardiovascular disease . . . are predisposed to suffer a carotid dissection. Advanced age (i.e., over 50) ... [is another] risk factor[] for developing a carotid dissection.\n16. With regard to trauma specifically, Dr. Sethi testified that any minor trauma can cause a dissection, but minor trauma will not cause a dissection in everyone. ... Dr. Sethi went on to explain that most acute traumatic events have a sudden and unexpected character, such as a quick blow to the neck or an abrupt turning of the head with lateral flexion of the neck. Dr. Coin testified that a dissection could be caused by obvious external trauma, such as a motor vehicle accident, or some trivial \u201ctrauma\u201d such as coughing, wrenching your neck or even simply turning the head from one side to the other. Dr. Gentry was of the opinion that no one can really \u201cput their finger on\u201d what causes a dissection in any given case, and that it would be impossible to say that an abrupt turning of the head caused a dissection. According to Dr. Gentry, there is no scientific or medical evidence that activity such as ... lifting packages in a truck could cause a dissection. He also disagreed with ... [the] suggestion that you would expect a dissection to come from some sort of unusual exertion.\n18. Prior to the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, plaintiff\u2019s counsel sent Dr. Sethi a letter setting forth questions regarding the cause of plaintiff\u2019s carotid dissection. The letter to Dr. Sethi included an affidavit signed by plaintiff which set forth several ways in which Plaintiff contends that his workday on December 23, 2011 was unusual. After reviewing the affidavit in which plaintiff stated that December 23, 2011 was an usually busy day during which he was rushing to make deliveries of unusually heavy packages of unusual shape in the time allotted, during which he had to contort his body into awkward positions, Dr. Sethi stated on the questionnaire that (1) plaintiff\u2019s job duties and responsibilities as a courier more likely than not [were] a significant factor in his suffering a left internal carotid artery occlusion resulting from dissection on December 23, 2011; and (2) plaintiff\u2019s left internal carotid artery dissection on D\u00e9cember 23, 2011 was more likely than not caused by a traumatic event, such as an abrupt turning of.the head with lateral flexion of the neck, when he was maneuvering himself in a crowded delivery truck and lifting heavy packages. However, when asked on cross-examination about his answers on the questionnaire, Dr. Sethi testified: \u201cI didn\u2019t say it caused. I said it could have contributed. It\u2019s possible that it played a role.\u201d With regard to his response to the question about an abrupt turning of the head, Dr. Sethi stated on cross-examination that \u201cthere\u2019s no possible answer here. I think it\u2019s possible it could have been caused by that.\u201d\n19. While plaintiff did testify at the hearing that he had to move awkwardly in the back of the truck on December 23, 2011 due to the number of packages on the floor and the location of the shelves, there is no evidence of record that, at any point, plaintiff had to abruptly turn his head.\n20. Dr. Coin testified that he considered Plaintiff\u2019s job duties to be a \u201ctrivial trauma in the same category of probably ... numerous things that could have happened in the week prior to his stroke and that you could not with a degree of certainty identify that as a significant factor for his dissection.\u201d Dr. Coin also testified that plaintiffs job duties did not place him at an increased risk of suffering a dissection. In this regard, Dr. Sethi testified that all FedEx drivers are not at an increased risk of having a dissection.\n21. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that plaintiff did not suffer an interruption of his regular work routine on December 23, 2011.... Moreover, there is no evidence that anything happened at any point to cause plaintiff to have to abruptly turn his head. At the time plaintiff experienced the onset of his stroke symptoms, he had only delivered 20 packages, when he was accustomed to delivering 85 to 90 packages a day.\n22. The Full Commission places greater weight on the testimony of Dr. Coin and Dr. Gentry with regard to the issue of whether anything Plaintiff did on December 23, 2011 caused his carotid dissection and subsequent stroke. Based upon a preponderance of the competent, credible evidence of record, the Full Commission finds that plaintiff\u2019s job duties as a courier for FedEx on December 23, 2011 were not a significant factor in his development of a carotid dissection and did not cause the carotid dissection that led to his stroke.\nThese findings are supported by competent evidence and support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident.\nIn arguing for a different result, plaintiff contends that the Commission \u201cerred in affording greater weight to Dr. Coin\u2019s testimony, as Dr. Coin was not competent to testify and his testimony was based upon mere conjecture and speculation.\u201d Plaintiff does not challenge Dr. Coin\u2019s qualification as an expert witness. Instead, he directs our attention to aspects of Dr. Coin\u2019s testimony that, in plaintiff\u2019s opinion, render it less compelling than other evidence. For example, plaintiff asserts that Dr. Coin\u2019s review of his medical history was incomplete and that some of Dr. Coin\u2019s opinions were contradicted by those of Dr. Gentry. Plaintiff also asserts as a \u201cfact\u201d that \u201cPlaintiff suffered minor trauma - a twist, a turn, a jolt - which dissected the carotid artery and led to the stroke,\u201d although plaintiff did not testify to any sudden movement and the expert witnesses did not agree that such an incident caused his injury. In essence, plaintiff is asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do:\nBecause it is the fact-finding body, the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The Commission\u2019s findings of fact axe conclusive on appeal if they are supported by any competent evidence. Accordingly, this Court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight.\nShaw v. US Airways, Inc., _ N.C. App. _, _, 720 S.E.2d 688, 690 (2011) (quoting Johnson v. Lowe\u2019s Cos., 143 N.C. App. 348, 350, 546 S.E.2d 616, 617-18 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Plaintiff\u2019s argument that Dr. Coin\u2019s testimony was \u201cincompetent\u201d and based solely on \u201cspeculation\u201d is without merit.\nV. Commission\u2019s Conclusions of Law\nPlaintiff argues next that the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are not supported by its findings of fact. Plaintiff does not assert that the Commission\u2019s conclusions do not logically rest upon its findings. Instead, he argues that the Commission should have made different findings, repeating earlier arguments, which we have rejected, concerning the evidentiary support for the Commission\u2019s findings. This argument is without merit.\nVI. Commission\u2019s Interpretation of Statutory Law\nFinally, plaintiff argues that \u201ccontrary to the well-settled law of the State of North Carolina, the Industrial Commission narrowly construed the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in detriment to the plaintiff.\u201d This argument lacks merit.\nPlaintiff notes that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act \u2018\u201cshould be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for injured employees or their dependents, and its benefits should not be denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction.\u2019 \u201d Billings v. General Parts, Inc., 187 N.C. App. 580, 584, 654 S.E.2d 254, 257 (2007) (quoting Adams, 349 N.C. at 680, 509 S.E.2d at 413 (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiff also points out that on appeal, in determining whether competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, the \u201cevidence tending to support plaintiff\u2019s claim is to be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.\u201d Adams at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414 (citing Doggett v. South Atl. Warehouse Co., 212 N.C. 599, 194 S.E. 111 (1937)).\nPlaintiff contends that the Commission failed to follow these principles when it stated in Finding of Fact 10 that plaintiff had testified that he had large packages in his truck on 23 December 2011, but that he \u201cdid not testify as to whether those packages were any larger than the packages he regularly had to deliver.\u201d Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of this characterization of his testimony at the hearing. Rather, he directs our attention to an affidavit signed by plaintiff stating that his truck held packages that were unusually heavy. Plaintiff appears to argue, without citation to authority, that when the Commission resolves contradictions in the evidence or issues of credibility, it must employ the standard applicable to appellate review, and that the Commission erred when it \u201cfailed to take Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit in the light most favorable to Plaintiff[.]\u201d However, \u201cit is well-established that the Commission may accept or reject the testimony and opinions of any witness, even if that testimony is uncontradicted. \u201d Nobles v. Coastal Power & Elec., Inc., 207 N.C. App. 683, 693, 701 S.E.2d 316, 323 (2010) (citing Hassell v. Onslow Cty. Bd. ofEduc., 362 N.C. 299, 306-07, 661 S.E.2d 709, 715 (2008)). This argument is without merit.\nFor the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the Industrial Commission did not err and that its Opinion and Award should be\nAFFIRMED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge DILLON concur.\n. We also note that plaintiff failed to offer evidence concerning the significance, if any, of the residential character of the new route. For example, he did not testify that it was harder to service a residential delivery route, or that it took longer.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Oocner Thomas & Permar, by Justin B. Wraight, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by Brooke M. Lewis, and M. Duane Jones, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JIMMY HILL, Employee, Plaintiff v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (SEDWICK CMS, Third Party Administrator), Defendant\nNo. COA 14-60\nFiled 1 July 2014\n1. Worker\u2019s Compensation\u2014no interruption of work routine\u2014findings\nThe evidence in a worker\u2019s compensation case supported the Industrial Commission\u2019s findings, which supported its conclusion that a Federal Express driver who suffered a carotid dissection while delivering packages on December 23 did not experience an interruption of his work routine. The challenged portions of the Commission\u2019s findings were supported by competent evidence, plaintiff failed to articulate the legal or medical significance of the circumstances he posited as unusual, and the full Commission reviews appeals from the deputy commissioner de novo.\n2. Worker\u2019s Compensation\u2014no injury by accident\u2014findings\u2014 standard of decision\u2014Commission\u2019s discretion\nThe findings of the Industrial Commission in a worker\u2019s compensation case were supported by competent evidence and supported the Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident where a Federal Express driver suffered a stroke while delivering packages on December 23. Plaintiff appeared to argue, without citation to authority, that when the Industrial Commission resolves contradictions in the evidence or issues of credibility, it must employ the standard applicable to appellate review, and that the Commission erred when it failed to take plaintiff\u2019s affidavit in the light most favorable to plaintiff. However, the Commission may accept or reject the testimony and opinions of any witness, even if that testimony is uncontradicted.\nAppeal by plaintiff from the Opinion and Award entered 30 August 2013 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 May 2014.\nOocner Thomas & Permar, by Justin B. Wraight, for plaintiff-appellant.\nHedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by Brooke M. Lewis, and M. Duane Jones, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0488-01", "first_page_order": 498, "last_page_order": 512 }