{
  "id": 12173073,
  "name": "4U HOMES & SALES, INC., Plaintiff v. HELEN EVETTE McCOY, Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "4U Homes & Sales, Inc. v. McCoy",
  "decision_date": "2014-08-05",
  "docket_number": "No. COA13-1450",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "4U HOMES & SALES, INC., Plaintiff v. HELEN EVETTE McCOY, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nPlaintiff 4U Homes & Sales, Inc., and Defendant Helen Evette McCoy appeal from a judgment entered by the trial court rejecting Plaintiff\u2019s request that Defendant be summarily ejected from a rental house owned by Plaintiff, awarding Defendant $3,705.00 in compensatory damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, and finding in Plaintiff\u2019s favor with respect to the unfair and deceptive trade practice and unfair debt collection practice claims that Defendant had asserted against Plaintiff. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that (1) the trial court\u2019s determination that Plaintiff had breached the implied warranty of habitability lacked adequate evidentiary support, (2) the trial court erred by determining that the fair rental value of the home as warranted was $495.00 per month, and (3) the trial court erred by failing to account for outstanding rent in calculating the amount of damages to be awarded to Plaintiff. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the trial court erred by determining that Defendant had not established that she was entitled to relief on the grounds that Plaintiff had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade and unfair debt collection practices. After careful consideration of the parties\u2019 challenges to the trial court\u2019s order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant\u2019s appeal from the magistrate\u2019s judgment, that the trial court\u2019s order must be vacated for lack of jurisdiction, and that this case must be remanded to the Mecklenburg County District Court for further remand to the magistrate for reinstatement of the magistrate\u2019s original judgment.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\n1. Plaintiff\u2019s Evidence\nCynthia Exum and her husband, Larry Exum, created Plaintiff in 1994 for the purpose of selling and leasing real property. At any given point in time, Plaintiff held from ten to twelve tracts of rental property.\nDefendant lived across the street from a property located on Rebanee Street, which Plaintiff had acquired in 2010. Although Defendant made inquiry of the Exums about renting the property, they initially declined to enter into such an arrangement with Defendant because they were not ready to rent the property. More specifically, the Exums wanted to have certain cosmetic work done prior to renting the property in order to get a higher monthly rent.\nAfter asking about the property for a year, Defendant told the Exums that she needed to rent the property given that she was about to become homeless due to a pending eviction. As a favor to Defendant, the Exums agreed to rent the property. Once Defendant indicated that she could only afford to pay $350.00 per month in rent, the Exums accepted Defendant\u2019s offer given that, in their opinion, the property was in good condition and the amount of rent that Defendant proposed appropriately reflected the property\u2019s value. For that reason, the Exums told Defendant that she could rent the property in its current condition for $350.00 or rent it for $650.00 after all repairs had been completed.\nAfter considering Plaintiffs offer, Defendant entered into a lease agreement with Plaintiff under which she agreed to rent the property for $350.00 per month from 6 July 2011 until 31 July 2012. In addition, consistently with Plaintiffs routine practice, the lease agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant provided for the payment of a $25.00 late fee. A comparison of the property in question with five other nearby properties on a per square foot basis indicated that the amount of rent that Plaintiff charged Defendant was comparable to that charged for other properties in the area.\nThe Exums conducted a walkthrough with Defendant prior to allowing her to occupy the property. During that process, Defendant failed to find anything that would tend to render the property unfit for human habitation. A ruptured pipe found on the premises was repaired before Defendant moved in. Although one of the windows was cracked, a replacement window was ordered and installed after Defendant occupied the property. Although Defendant acknowledged that the home was \u201cfit,\u201d she also indicated that it needed to be \u201cfixed.\u201d\nAny repair requests that Defendant made during the time that she occupied the property were honored. For example, when Defendant made Mr. Exum aware in September 2011 that the hot water heater needed repair, he ordered another one on the same day. In the course of fixing the water heater, Mr. Exum noticed that someone had removed the fuse box cover and he made the necessary repairs. In March 2012, Defendant reported a loose toilet to Mr. Exum. After he removed the toilet, Mr. Exum noticed that the subfloor did not suffice to support the toilet, so he replaced and reattached the subfloor and related vinyl tile. In addition, the Exums repaired a broken storm door on the same date. All of these repairs were completed within a few days of notification.\nDefendant was behind on her rent payments during the entire lease period. Although the Exums allowed her to make partial payments, Defendant never paid her rent on time. Plaintiff collected a $25.00 late fee from Defendant in February 2012. The Exums declined to renew Defendant\u2019s lease at the end of the initial rental period and informed Plaintiff \u201cfrom time to time\u201d that she would eventually need to move out.\nIn September 2012, Plaintiff initiated a summary ejectment action against Defendant based upon her failure to make required rental payments. Although Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Defendant, the Exums, instead of taking possession of the property, informed Defendant that she would be evicted if she failed to keep her rent payments current. Subsequently, Plaintiff forgave four late fees that they were entitled to assess against Defendant under the terms of the lease agreement. However, Defendant failed to pay her rent for the following month in a timely manner.\nIn January of 2013, Defendant asked Mr. Exum to repair the heater. Two weeks later, the heater broke again. Although the Exums informed Defendant that they could come that Saturday to make the needed repairs, Defendant never returned their phone call. As a result, Mr. Exum went by the home on the following Monday to speak with Defendant and identify a time when he could repair the heater. However, Defendant replied that she would not be home until Thursday and refused to allow Mr. Exum to enter the premises in her absence.\nOn Thursday, 7 February 2013, the building code inspector inspected the home. After the inspection had been completed, Defendant gave Mr. Exum permission to fix the heater, a process which Mr. Exum completed in thirty minutes. The Exums also spoke with the inspector after the inspection had been completed. On the same date, Plaintiff notified Defendant that her month-to-month tenancy would be terminated and she would have to vacate the property within 45 days. The Exums sent the termination notice because of their belief that Defendant had purposely blocked the making of the needed heater repair and their conviction, in light of their experiences with Defendant, that a continuing landlord-tenant relationship with her would not be successful. According to the Exums, Defendant owes $1,196.93 in past due rent.\nA week later, the Exums received an inspection report that contained a list of code violations, with the unrepaired heater being fisted as the most critical violation. Although the report asserted that there were no smoke detectors in the home, such devices had been installed before Defendant occupied the residence. Even so, Mr. Exum installed new smoke detectors at the time that he repaired the heater. After receiving the inspection report, the Exums called Defendant to schedule the making of the necessary repairs. However, Defendant did not answer their calls. In spite of the fact that the parties\u2019 lease agreement allowed the Exums to enter the premises in order to make repairs, Defendant refused to allow Mr. Exum to enter the home or to take photographs of it. Instead, Defendant slammed the door on Mr. Exum\u2019s foot and called her attorney.\nIn April and May, Plaintiff communicated with Defendant\u2019s attorney in an attempt to obtain permission to enter the residence in order to make needed repairs. After Defendant obtained a new attorney in June, the Exums received authorization to enter the residence and replaced the ceiling, which was sagging, and the windowsills, which were decaying.\n2. Defendant\u2019s Evidence\nDefendant moved into the rental property in July 2011 and made her last rent payment in March 2013. At the time of the initial walkthrough, the home was dirty and smelled of animal urine and feces. In addition, the shower was dripping, the toilet was loose and unstable, and there appeared to be a hole in the floor in the vicinity of the toilet. Defendant requested that all of these conditions be repaired. Finally, Defendant informed the Exums that the ceiling appeared to be about to cave in; however, the ceiling was not repaired until after the February 2013 inspection. Although Defendant informed the Exums that there were no smoke or carbon monoxide detectors in the home immediately after occupying the premises, this deficiency was not rectified until after the February 2013 inspection as well. In spite of these problems, Defendant agreed to rent the property for a monthly amount of $350.00.\nDefendant called the inspector in February of 2013. The only violation identified by the inspector of which Defendant had not been previously aware was the fact that the breaker box did not comply with the applicable building code. On the evening following the inspection, Mr. Exum called Defendant to ask what violations had been identified. Although Mr. Exum stated that he had already known what the inspector\u2019s. findings would be, he indicated that the owner would not pay for the needed repairs given that the monthly rent was only $350.00.\nAccording to Defendant, a monthly rental payment of $350.00 did not reflect the fair market value of the home given the number of code violations that existed at the beginning of her tenancy. Had Defendant been aware of all of the code violations identified by the inspector, she would have only agreed to a $300.00 monthly rental payment. Although Defendant was charged a $25.00 late fee on multiple occasions and although the Exums claimed to have only collected one late fee, Plaintiff\u2019s ledger indicated that a late fee of $17.50 had been collected on six occasions. The first portion of any payment that Defendant made was applied to rent, with the remainder being attributed to any outstanding late fee amounts. In view of the fact that Defendant consistently failed to pay her rent on time, the late fee amounts that she was assessed were never actually collected.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 18 March 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to have Defendant summarily ejected from the property on the grounds that she had held over after the expiration of her tenancy and the recovery of $750.00 in past due rent. On 1 April 2013, Defendant filed an answer in which she denied the material allegations of the complaint and asserted counterclaims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, charging illegal rent, charging illegal fees, and engaging in unfair debt collection and unfair and deceptive trade practices. On 26 April 2013, the magistrate entered a judgment finding that Plaintiff\u2019s summary ejectment claim should be dismissed with prejudice, that Defendant had proven all of the counterclaims alleged in her responsive pleading, and that Defendant was entitled to recover a rent abatement in the amount of $5,000.00, which was the maximum that the magistrate could allow by law, and attorney\u2019s fees from Plaintiff.\nOn 1 May 2013, Defendant noted an appeal to the District Court from the magistrate\u2019s judgment. On 14 June 2013, Plaintiff filed a reply to the Defendant\u2019s counterclaims. The case came on for hearing before the trial court, sitting without a jury, at the 15 July 2013 civil session of the Mecklenburg County District Court. On 13 August 2013, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s claim for summary ejectment, finding in Plaintiff\u2019s favor with respect to Defendant\u2019s counterclaims for unfair debt collection and unfair and deceptive trade practices, and awarding Defendant $3,705.00 in compensatory damages for Plaintiff\u2019s breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Both parties noted appeals to this Court from the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nII. Legal Analysis\nIn its briefs, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by finding that Plaintiff breached the implied warranty of habitability, overruling Plaintiff\u2019s objection to Defendant\u2019s testimony concerning the value of the leased premises .as of the date upon which her occupancy began, improperly calculating the amount of damages that should be awarded to Defendant, and failing to find that Plaintiff\u2019s summary ejectment claim had been rendered moot by Defendant\u2019s surrender of the premises while Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to determine that Plaintiff had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade and unfair debt collection practices. As an initial matter, however, we must determine whether the trial court had the authority to enter the order from which both parties have appealed.\n\u201cA universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter axe a nullity.\u201d Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964). Put another way, \u201c[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is the indispensable foundation upon which valid judicial decisions rest, and in its absence a court has no power to act.\u201d In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 590, 636 S.E.2d 787, 790 (2006). In addition, \u201csubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and this Court has not only the power, but the duty to address the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion or ex mero motu.\" Rinna v. Steven B., 201 N.C. App. 532, 537, 687 S.E.2d 496, 500 (2009). Although filing an action in the District Court Division that should be brought in the Superior Court Division or vice versa does not ordinarily deprive the court in which the action is filed of subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of the existence of a statutory provision giving one or the other of these two components of the General Court of Justice exclusive jurisdiction over a particular type of claim, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-257 (stating that the \u201c[f]ailure of a party to move for transfer within the time prescribed is a waiver of any objection to the division\u201d; Peoples v. Peoples, 8 N.C. App. 136, 143, 174 S.E.2d 2, 7 (1970) (stating that \u201cno order of the district court may be overturned merely because it was not the proper division to enter the order\u201d), the same is not true of actions filed in the small claims court.\nAt the time that this case was pending in the trial courts, a small claim action was defined as a civil action where:\n(1) The amount in controversy, computed in accordance with [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 7A-243, does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000); and\n(2) The only principal relief prayed is monetary, or the recovery of specific personal property, or summary ejectment, or any combination of the foregoing in properly joined claims; and\n(3) The plaintiff has requested assignment to a magistrate in the manner provided in this Article.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-210 (2011). However, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a77A-219 provides that:\n[n]o counterclaim, cross claim or third-party claim which would make the amount in controversy exceed the jurisdictional amount established by [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 7A-210(1) is permissible in a small claim action assigned to a magistrate. No determination of fact or law in an assigned small claim action estops a party thereto in any subsequent action which, except for this section, might have been asserted under the Code of Civil Procedure as a counterclaim in the small claim action. Notwithstanding [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 1A-1, Rule 13, failure by a defendant to file a counterclaim in a small claims action assigned to a magistrate, or failure by a defendant to appeal a judgment in a small claims action to district court, shall not bar such claims in a separate action.\nUnlike N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-243, which establishes the amount in controversy necessary to make an action \u201cproper\u201d in either the District or Superior Court divisions, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-219 absolutely bars the consideration of claims that exceed the \u201cjurisdictional amount\u201d in small claims court, rendering the amount in controversy applicable to actions assigned to the magistrate jurisdictional in nature. See also Fickley v. Greystone Enters., 140 N.C. App. 258, 261, 536 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2000) (noting that the \u201cplaintiffs [sought] damages in excess of $10,000, which exceeds the $3,000jurisdictional amount in small claim actions pursuant to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-210(1)\u201d in effect at that time).\nThe proper treatment of cases filed in the small, claims court in which counterclaims, some of which may be compulsory, seeking damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount are asserted, has been a source of legislative concern as well. In order to address this issue, the General Assembly gave litigants two options. First, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-220 provides that \u201cthe judge shall allow appropriate counterclaims\u201d \u201c[o]n appeal from the judgment of the magistrate for trial de novo before a district judge.\u201d Secondly, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-219 provides that, \u201c[n]othwithstanding [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 1A-1, Rule 13, failure by a defendant to file a counterclaim in a small claims action assigned to a magistrate, or failure by a defendant to appeal a judgment in a small claims action to district court, shall not bar such claims in a separate action.\u201d As a result, a defendant in a summary ejection action who wishes to assert counterclaims that have a value greater than the jurisdictional amount applicable in small claims court may either assert their claims on appeal to the District Court from an adverse decision by the magistrate or assert those claims in an entirely separate action. However, neither of these options was applicable in this case since Plaintiff did not appeal from the magistrate\u2019s adverse decision against it, and Defendant, instead, elected to assert counterclaims that the magistrate found exceeded applicable jurisdictional limits in the small claims court and then attempted to appeal the magistrate\u2019s judgment to the District Court despite the fact that the magistrate found in her favor and awarded her everything that he could have possibly awarded her.\n\u201cAfter final disposition before the magistrate, the sole remedy for an aggrieved party [to a small claims action] is appeal for trial de novo before a district court judge or a jury.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-228(a). As a result, the only party entitled to invoke the District Court\u2019s jurisdiction following a decision by the magistrate in small claims court is an \u201caggrieved party.\u201d Although neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of what constitutes an \u201caggrieved party\u201d for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-228(a), the Supreme Court has defined a \u201cperson aggrieved\u201d in the appellate context as a person \u201c \u2018adversely affected in respect of legal rights, or suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights.\u2019 \u201d In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 595, 131 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1963) (quoting 3 C.J.S. Aggrieved \u00a7 333 (1936)). As a result of the fact that Defendant submitted her counterclaims for the magistrate\u2019s consideration in small claims court and received the maximum amount of relief available in that forum, we are unable to see how any of her legal rights were adversely affected. Admittedly, as Defendant notes, \u201ca party who prevails at trial may appeal from a judgment that is only partly in its favor or is less favorable than the party thinks it should be.\u201d Casado v. Melas Corp., 69 N.C. App. 630, 635, 318 S.E.2d 247, 250 (1984) (citing New Hanover Cnty. v. Burton, 65 N.C. App. 544, 547, 310 S.E.2d 72 74 (1983), and McCullock v. N.C. R.R. Co., 146 N.C. 316, 320, 59 S.E. 882, 884 (1907)). However, this principal applies in situations in which the court had the authority to grant the additional relief that the plaintiff sought to obtain rather than in situations in which the plaintiff requested the court to grant more relief than the court had power to award. In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction over this case ignores the fact that a tenant is required to assert the breach of the implied warranty of habitability as a defense in the summary ejectment action. Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Webster\u2019s Real Estate Law in North Carolina \u00a7 6.04[3] (6th ed. 2012) (stating that a \u201ctenant who is in default in making rent payments can raise the landlords\u2019 breach of the statutory warranty of habitability by way of recoupment, counterclaim, defense, or setoff\u2019). However, Defendant\u2019s argument overlooks the fact that the use of a breach of the warranty of habitability as a defense in a summary ejectment action does not preclude the assertion of that breach as a counterclaim on appeal to the District Court for a trial de novo in the event that the landlord prevails before the magistrate or in a separate action. As a result, neither of Defendant\u2019s attempts to explain why a party who pleads damages in excess of the amount available in a small claims action and then obtains all of the relief that he or she is able to obtain in the small claims court is an \u201caggrieved party\u201d with standing to seek additional relief on appeal to the District Court.\nAs a result, the record clearly reflects that Defendant had no standing to appeal the magistrate\u2019s judgment in small claims court. In view of that fact, we have no choice except to conclude that the District Court had no authority to hear and decide this case, a determination that renders the District Court\u2019s judgment void, requires us to vacate the District Court\u2019s judgment, e.g., Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1956) (holding that \u201c[a] judgment is void, when there is a want of jurisdiction by the court over the subject matter of the action\u201d), and necessitates a conclusion that the judgment entered by the magistrate was never properly challenged. As a result, the trial court\u2019s judgment must be vacated and this case remanded to the District Court for further remand to the small claims court for the reinstatement of the magistrate\u2019s judgment.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this case. As a result, the trial court\u2019s order should be, and hereby is, vacated and this case should be, and hereby is, remanded to the Mecklenburg County District Court for further remand to the magistrate with instructions that the original magistrate\u2019s judgment be reinstated.\nVACATED and REMANDED.\nJudges GEER and STEPHENS concur.\n. Although the Exums believed that the $350.00 amount reflected the current value of the property, Ms. Exum asserted that, if the home had simply been repainted and the carpet replaced, the home\u2019s rental value would have been $50.00 per month higher.\n. According to Defendant, the Exums consistently maintained that they did not own the property.\n. The General Assembly increased the jurisdictional limitation applicable to small claims actions to $10,000 for all actions filed on or after 1 August 2013. 2013 N.C. Sess. L. c. 159 s. 1 & 6.\n. We suggested this approach in Fickley, in which the defendant had filed two successful summary ejectment proceedings against the plaintiffs. Fickley, 140 N.C. App. at 259, 536 S.E.2d at 332. Instead of appealing the magistrate\u2019s decision in the summary ejectment actions, the plaintiffs instituted a separate action seeking damages for retaliatory eviction and unfair trade practices in the Superior Court. Id. In the Superior Court action, the defendant successfully asserted that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims constituted compulsory counterclaims that were barred because they had not been asserted before the magistrate. Id. at 259-60, 536 S.E.2d at 333. After agreeing that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims constituted compulsory counterclaims, id. at 260-61, 536 S.E.2d at 333, we noted that they could not have been properly asserted before the magistrate because the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional limit applicable in small claims court actions. Id. at 261, 536 S.E.2d at 333-34. As a result of the compulsory nature of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims and the fact that they could have been litigated in an appeal from the magistrate\u2019s decision, we determined that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims were barred and affirmed the trial court\u2019s order. Id. at 261-62,536 S.E.2d at 333-34; see also Cloer v. Smith, 132 N.C. App. 569, 575, 512 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1999) (holding that the correct course of action for a defendant who wishes to assert a counterclaim that exceeds the jurisdictional limit applicable to matters heard in the small claims court was to \u201cfile [the] action, if at all, with her appeal from the magistrate\u2019s decision to the district court\u201d).\n. Although we need not address the validity of this approach given that it was not used in this instance, another possible resolution of the problem discussed in the text of this opinion might be a request that the entire case be transferred from the small claims court to the District Court. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-257 (stating that \u201c[a]ny party may move for transfer between the trial divisions\u201d); see also Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 457, 215 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1975) (providing that, \u201c[although the case allocations of Chapter 7A are [mostly] administrative directives, a party may move, as a matter of right, for transfer of a case in accordance with the proper statutory allocation\u201d).\n. According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-210(1), the amount in controversy in small claims actions is computed in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-243. According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-243(2), \u201c[w]here monetary relief is prayed, the amount prayed for is in controversy unless the pleading in question shows to a legal certainty that the amount claimed cannot be recovered under the applicable measure of damages.\u201d As a result of the fact that Defendant alleged in her counterclaims that she was entitled to receive a $4,000.00 penalty for each of Plaintiff\u2019s violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-55 and claims that \u201cnumerous\u201d such violations occurred, it is clear from that portion of Defendant\u2019s counterclaims, without considering her additional claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, retaliatory eviction, the charging of illegal rents and fees, and unfair and deceptive trade practices, that the value of Defendant\u2019s counterclaims exceeded the applicable jurisdictional amount. Blitz v. Agean, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 296, 310, 677 S.E.2d 1, 10 (2009) (using a similar process to calculate the value of certain claims that a plaintiff attempted to assert in small claims court), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 800, 690 S.E.2d 530, (2010). The validity of this conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the magistrate found that he or she could not award Defendant the full value of the claims that she presented at the summary ejectment hearing.\n. In Holloway v. Holloway, _, N.C. App. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 198, 200 (2012), the defendant filed an unsuccessful summary ejectment action against the plaintiff. Although the defendant appealed from the judgment in the small claims court to the District Court, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on appeal as well. Id. In a subsequent damage action that the plaintiff filed against the defendant, the defendant claimed that the claims the plaintiff sought to assert should have been brought before the District Court on the theory that they were compulsory counterclaims. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 200-01. After noting the tension between the relevant statutory provisions in cases that involved compulsory counterclaims that were actually appealed from the small claims court to the District Court, id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 201-02, we held that, since the claims that the plaintiff sought to assert in the separate action had not been ripe at the time that the magistrate\u2019s judgment was appealed to the District Court, they were not required to be asserted before the District Court at that time. Id. at _, 726 S.E.2d at 202.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ERVIN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Leslie C. Rawls for Plaintiff.",
      "Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by Chadwick H. Crockford & Isaac W. Sturgill, and Legal Services of Southern Piedmont, by Edward P. Byron, for Defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "4U HOMES & SALES, INC., Plaintiff v. HELEN EVETTE McCOY, Defendant\nNo. COA13-1450\nFiled 5 August 2014\nJurisdiction\u2014standing\u2014aggrieved party\u2014appeal from small claims judgment\nThe trial court lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from a magistrate\u2019s judgment in a small claims action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Defendant was not an aggrieved party and thus had no standing to appeal the magistrate\u2019s judgment where defendant pled damages in excess of the amount available in a small claims action and then obtained all of the relief that defendant was able to obtain in the small claims court.\nAppeal by plaintiff and defendant from order entered 13 August 2013 by Judge Ty Hands in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2014.\nLeslie C. Rawls for Plaintiff.\nLegal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by Chadwick H. Crockford & Isaac W. Sturgill, and Legal Services of Southern Piedmont, by Edward P. Byron, for Defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0427-01",
  "first_page_order": 437,
  "last_page_order": 447
}
