{ "id": 12174952, "name": "LULA SANDERS, CYNTHIA EURE, ANGELINE MCINERNY, JOSEPH C. MOBLEY, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. STATE PERSONNEL COMMISSION, a body politic; OFFICE OF STATE PERSONNEL, a body politic; LINDA COLEMAN, State Personnel Director (in her official capacity); TEACHERS' AND STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NORTH CAROLINA, a body politic and corporate; MICHAEL WILLIAMSON, Director of the Retirement System Division and Deputy Treasurer of the State of North Carolina (in his official capacity); JANET COWELL, Treasurer of The State of North Carolina and Chairman of The Board of Trustees of the Retirement System (in her official capacity); TEMPORARY SOLUTIONS, a subdivision of the Office of State Personnel, and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Sanders v. State Personnel Commission", "decision_date": "2014-09-02", "docket_number": "No. COA13-654", "first_page": "94", "last_page": "112", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "236 N.C. App. 94" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635848 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199", "parenthetical": "holding that \"appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to immediate appellate review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639732 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638288 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-263", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "permitting recovery of attorneys' fees where \"such award of costs [is] equitable and just\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53926 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521030 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3736480, 3742213, 3739401, 3745166, 3736526, 3742420, 3746556, 3741022 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0220-08", "/nc/361/0220-02", "/nc/361/0220-07", "/nc/361/0220-03", "/nc/361/0220-05", "/nc/361/0220-01", "/nc/361/0220-06", "/nc/361/0220-04" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8302972 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808", "parenthetical": "holding that \"appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to immediate appellate review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4349150 ], "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12129791 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "736 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "691 S.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 15, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Sanders II\"" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "320-21" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "187", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[b]ecause there is a breach of the rules under which the contract was formed, [Plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged a breach of contract claim and should have survived [Defendants' motion to dismiss\"" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167900 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Sanders II\"" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "320-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3742176, 3743427, 3745700, 3747429, 3737798, 3745647, 3746460, 3739327 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0696-02", "/nc/361/0696-08", "/nc/361/0696-03", "/nc/361/0696-04", "/nc/361/0696-07", "/nc/361/0696-06", "/nc/361/0696-01", "/nc/361/0696-05" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8201327 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640945 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639168 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "751 S.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "222 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423-24" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569569 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4157707 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546-47" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "\"It is an established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound public policy, that a state may not be sued in its own courts or elsewhere unless it has consented by statute to be sued or has otherwise waived its immunity from suit.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8956001 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "\"It is an established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound public policy, that a state may not be sued in its own courts or elsewhere unless it has consented by statute to be sued or has otherwise waived its immunity from suit.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736", "parenthetical": "stating that to meet the substantial right test for appealing interlocutory orders, \"the right itself must be substantial and the deprivation of that substantial right must potentially work injury ... if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307026 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726", "parenthetical": "stating that to meet the substantial right test for appealing interlocutory orders, \"the right itself must be substantial and the deprivation of that substantial right must potentially work injury ... if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has repeatedly held that appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.\" (quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249206 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has repeatedly held that appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.\" (quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "699 S.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660-61" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. App. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4179725 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/207/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "757 S.E.2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470-71", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks, citations, brackets, and footnote omitted" }, { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "\"A class exists when each of the members has an interest in either the same issue of law or of fact, and that issue predominates over issues affecting only individual class members.\"" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "255 S.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "standing for the proposition that, \"in a suit for damages for breach of contract, proof of the breach would entitle the plaintiff to nominal damages at least.\" (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549988 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490", "parenthetical": "standing for the proposition that, \"in a suit for damages for breach of contract, proof of the breach would entitle the plaintiff to nominal damages at least.\" (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524395 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553-54", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739573 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523-24" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-263", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" }, { "page": "320" }, { "page": "187", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[i]n a breach of contract action, a complainant must show that there is (1) existence of a valid contract, and (2) breach of the terms of that contract.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" }, { "page": "188-89" }, { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167900 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0314-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1362, "char_count": 47870, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.3290442801877638 }, "sha256": "416f28bf0213c8b24c9e21f19e93749b9203880135849bcb0dd07322ce47bed7", "simhash": "1:5ba9747216cf84dc", "word_count": 7446 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:41:07.458141+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge STROUD concurs." ], "parties": [ "LULA SANDERS, CYNTHIA EURE, ANGELINE MCINERNY, JOSEPH C. MOBLEY, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. STATE PERSONNEL COMMISSION, a body politic; OFFICE OF STATE PERSONNEL, a body politic; LINDA COLEMAN, State Personnel Director (in her official capacity); TEACHERS\u2019 AND STATE EMPLOYEES\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NORTH CAROLINA, a body politic and corporate; MICHAEL WILLIAMSON, Director of the Retirement System Division and Deputy Treasurer of the State of North Carolina (in his official capacity); JANET COWELL, Treasurer of The State of North Carolina and Chairman of The Board of Trustees of the Retirement System (in her official capacity); TEMPORARY SOLUTIONS, a subdivision of the Office of State Personnel, and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "DILLON, Judge.\nThis case was commenced in 2005 and has been on appeal before this Court twice previously. See Sanders v. State Personnel Comm\u2019n, 183 N.C. App. 15, 644 S.E.2d 10 (\"Sanders I\"), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 696, 652 S.E.2d 653 (2007); and Sanders v. State Personnel Comm\u2019n, 197 N.C. App. 314, 677 S.E.2d 182 (2009) (\"Sanders II\"), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 806, 691 S.E.2d 19 (2010).\nIn the present appeal, Plaintiffs Lula Sanders, et al. (\u201cPlaintiffs\u201d) challenge the trial court\u2019s order denying their motion for partial summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants State Personnel Commission, et al. (\u201cDefendants\u201d). Defendants, on the other hand, have filed a cross-appeal, challenging the trial court\u2019s award of costs, including attorneys\u2019 fees, in Plaintiffs\u2019 favor. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for-partial summary judgment and granting Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, and we affirm in part and dismiss in part the issues raised in Defendants\u2019 cross-appeal.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\nPursuant to its authority under the State Personnel Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-4 (2013), the State Personnel Commission (the \u201cCommission\u201d) has promulgated regulations establishing various types of appointments through which an individual may gain employment with the State of North Carolina. See 25 N.C.A.C. 1C.0400, et seq. For example, some individuals are hired as permanent employees with the State through a permanent appointment, see 26 N.C.A.C. 1C.0402, and others are hired as temporary employees through a temporary appointment, see 25 N.C.A.C. 1C.0405.\nThere \u00e1re two differences between temporary employees and permanent employees which are relevant to this case. First, while under the regulations the period of employment for a permanent employee is indefinite, the regulations stipulate that a person may not be employed as a temporary employee for a period \u201cexceed[ing] 12 consecutive months\u201d (hereinafter, the \u201cTwelve-Month Rule\u201d). 25 N.C.A.C. lC.0405(a). The second difference is that temporary employees are not eligible to receive certain benefits available to permanent employees, such as leave time, state service credit, health benefits, retirement credit, severance pay, or priority reemployment consideration. 25 N.C.A.C. lC.0405(b).\nEach Plaintiff was employed by the State of North Carolina as a temporary employee for a period exceeding twelve consecutive months, in violation of the Twelve-Month Rule. Plaintiffs commenced this action, alleging that because they had been employed as temporary employees for more than twelve consecutive months - in violation of the TwelveMonth Rule - they were entitled to the \u201crights, compensation, benefits, and status\u201d of permanent employees. Plaintiffs alleged claims for (1) violations of the North Carolina Administrative Code; (2) violations of the North Carolina Constitution; and (3) breach of contract. Based on these claims, Plaintiffs prayed for relief in the form of monetary damages and costs, including attorneys\u2019 fees, in addition to declaratory relief. Plaintiffs also sought class certification for inclusion of all similarly-situated individuals, i.e., those who had been employed by the State as temporary employees for more than twelve consecutive months.\nDefendants responded by moving to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) on grounds of Defendants\u2019 sovereign immunity, and pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. In Sanders I, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s Rule 12(b)(2) dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 claim based on violations of the North Carolina Administrative Code. 183 N.C. App. at 24, 644 S.E.2d at 16. In Sanders II, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional claims; however, we reversed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim and remanded the matter \u201cfor a declaratory judgment, to declare plaintiffs\u2019 status and rights pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.\u201d 197 N.C. App. at 323, 677 S.E.2d at 189. In analyzing Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim, we determined that the TwelveMonth Rule and the other \u201crelevant regulations of the [Commission] \u201d are part of Plaintiffs\u2019 employment contracts with Defendants, id. at 320-21, 677 S.E.2d at 187, noting as follows:\nThere is an agreement between the parties whose term is known and agreed. What is unknown is what are the legal relationships and status of the parties when the contract continues in effect after the expiration of the agreed upon terms.\nId. Accordingly, we instructed the trial court on remand to determine the legal relationship between the parties, including the precise terms of Plaintiffs\u2019 employment with Defendants as of the \u201ctwelve month and one day mark and beyond.\u201d Id. at 323, 677 S.E.2d at 188.\nOn remand from Sanders II, the parties engaged in extensive discovery regarding Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim, after which Plaintiffs filed motions seeking partial summary judgment on this claim; a declaratory judgment construing their rights under the contract pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253; and class action certification. Defendants likewise moved for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim.\nFollowing a hearing on these matters, the trial court entered an order on 18 December 2012 granting relief to both Plaintiffs and Defendants. Specifically, the trial court declared that Plaintiffs\u2019 status as temporary employees did not convert to that of permanent employees after twelve months and that they were entitled only to the wages for which they had bargained and already received for the period that they had worked as temporary employees beyond the permissible twelve-month period. Accordingly, the trial court granted Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim and denied Plaintiffs\u2019 motions for partial summary judgment and for class certification.\nThe trial court, however, also granted Plaintiffs certain relief; namely, the court enjoined Defendants from future violations of the Twelve-Month Rule; it directed the State Personnel Director and the Office of State Personnel to present to the trial court \u201ca comprehensive plan [hereinafter, the \u201cComprehensive Plan\u201d] to assure full compliance with the mandates of North Carolina General Statutes 126-3(b)(8) and (9)[;]\u201d and it taxed Defendants \u201cwith the costs of this action, including attorney fees as provided by law [hereinafter, \u201cAttorneys\u2019 Fees Award\u201d].\u201d\nIn the present appeal, Plaintiffs seek review of the trial court\u2019s order granting Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and denying their motions for partial summary judgment and for class certification. In Defendants\u2019 cross-appeal, Defendants seek review of the trial court\u2019s Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award.\nII. Jurisdiction\nThe threshold issue presented is whether and to what extent this Court has jurisdiction over the parties\u2019 appeals. \u201cGenerally, an interlocutory order is not immediately appealable.\u201d Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meeting Street Builders, LLC, _ N.C. App. _, _, 736 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2012). An order is interlocutory where it \u201cdoes not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). A party may immediately appeal from an interlocutory order, however, where the issue has been certified by the trial court for immediate appellate review pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b) or where the interlocutory order \u201cdeprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits.\u201d Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994) (internal citations omitted).\nIn the present case, the trial court order resolves the entire controversy except with respect to two matters. First, although the trial court has entered the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award, the court has not yet determined the amount of the Award. Second, further action is required with respect to the Comprehensive Plan, which the trial court has ordered certain Defendants to prepare and present to the court for review.\nOur Supreme Court has held that \u201c[a]n order that completely decides the merits of an action [] constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal even when the trial court reserves for later determination collateral issues such as attorney\u2019s fees and costs.\" Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 546, 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (emphasis added). Therefore, while our Supreme Court considers the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award a \u201ccollateral issue,\u201d it is unclear whether the presentation and review of the Comprehensive Plan also constitutes a \u201ccollateral issue.\u201d Notwithstanding, the trial court has certified the issues raised in Plaintiffs\u2019 appeal for immediate appellate review. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to address the issues raised in Plaintiffs\u2019 appeal.\nRegarding Defendants\u2019 cross-appeal, Defendants are not challenging the trial court\u2019s injunction prohibiting future violations of the TwelveMonth Rule or the directive to present the Comprehensive Plan to the court. Accordingly, we do not address the propriety of those portions of the order. Rather, Defendants only challenge the \u201ccollateral issue\u201d of the \u201cAttorneys\u2019 Fees Award.\u201d In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants\u2019 appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right.\nDefendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is \u201cin derogation of [Defendants\u2019] sovereign immunity.\u201d See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that \u201cappeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to immediate appellate review\u201d), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d 443 (2007). Accordingly, we review Defendants\u2019 appeal of the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award only to the extent that their challenge is based on sovereign immunity; however, we dismiss Defendants\u2019 appeal to the extent that Defendants\u2019 challenge is based on some other defense or upon the merits.\nIII. Analysis\nWe address the issues raised in Plaintiffs\u2019 appeal and the issue raised in Defendants\u2019 appeal, in turn, below.\nA. Plaintiffs\u2019Appeal\nPlaintiffs essentially make two arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in granting Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim; and (2) the trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s rulings on these issues.\n1. Summary Judgment\nIn their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had breached their employment agreements by failing to provide Plaintiffs, after twelve months of service, with the benefits generally provided to permanent employees. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court\u2019s order granting Defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion on Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim conflicts with our holding in Sanders II. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that our prior holding in that case establishes as a matter of law that Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for breach of contract, based on Defendants\u2019 admitted violation of the Twelve-Month Rule, and all that remained was for a jury to decide the issue of damages.\nPlaintiffs, however, misconstrue our holding in Sanders II. We did not hold in that case that the failure to adhere to the Twelve-Month Rule established Defendants\u2019 liability for breach of contract as a matter of law. We held only that the allegations in Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint were sufficient to survive Defendants\u2019 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Sanders II, 197 N.C. App. at 321, 677 S.E.2d at 187 (stating that \u201c[b]ecause there is a breach of the rules under which the contract was formed, [Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint sufficiently alleged a breach of contract claim and should have survived [Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss\u201d). The issue of whether Defendants were liable for breach of contract was not ripe for consideration at the time we decided Sanders II, as the issue then presented dealt only with the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint.\nIn Sanders II, we instructed the trial court on remand to determine \u201cthe legal relationships and status of the parties\u201d \u2014 including the terms of any agreements \u2014 \u201cat the twelve month and one day mark and beyond.\u201d Id. at 323, 677 S.E.2d at 188. We stated as follows:\n[I]t is clear that [PJlaintiffs accepted some sort of arrangement with [Defendants by accepting continued work and compensation, without a permanent appointment and without benefits. Whether that arrangement was discussed with [P]laintiffs individually or collectively and what [P]laintiffs understood about their status are relevant inquiries requiring further factual development.\nId. at 323, 677 S.E.2d at 189. On remand, the parties conducted extensive discovery, after which the trial court conducted a hearing and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim.\nWe believe that the trial court correctly concluded that Defendants did not breach their employment contracts with. Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Defendants had made any promises or inducements to Plaintiffs to cause them to continue their employment beyond twelve months, other than to continue paying their normal wages, which were, in fact, paid as agreed. There was no evidence presented to suggest that Defendants had represented to Plaintiffs that their employment status would convert to that of a permanent employee after twelve months of service. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Commission rules or the relevant law that contractually obligated Defendants to treat Plaintiffs as permanent employees after twelve months of service. Indeed, we held just the opposite in Sanders II, stating that if the trial court were to determine on remand that Plaintiffs\u2019 employment had automatically converted to permanent status, the trial court would be \u201cenact[ing] an employment scheme in direct contravention of the state constitution and other sections of the regulatory scheme.\u201d Id. at 322, 677 S.E.2d at 188; see also Cauthen v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 112 N.C. App. 238, 242, 435 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1993) (refusing to allow an employee with a permanent appointment to achieve tenure by tacking onto her current appointment period her previous periods of temporary employment, stating that in doing so we would effectively be creating \u201ca quasi-tenure system in temporary employment which neither the General Assembly nor the State Personnel Commission intended\u201d).\nPlaintiffs, however, argue that Defendants\u2019 \u201cbreach\u201d of the TwelveMonth Rule is sufficient to sustain their breach of contract claim, even if such breach entitles Plaintiffs only to nominal damages. We are unpersuaded. As this Court recognized in Sanders II, administrative regulations pertinent to a particular contractual arrangement between the State and its employees may properly be incorporated into, and govern, a State employment contract. 197 N.C. App. at 320-21, 677 S.E.2d at 187. The State, certainly, has an obligation to the public to conduct its affairs in accordance with its own regulations. We do not believe, however, that every instance in which a regulation incorporated into a State employment contract is ignored provides the employee with a breach of contract claim against the State.\nHere, Defendants ignored the Twelve Month Rule by permitting each Plaintiff to remain employed after twelve months. Likewise, each Plaintiff ignored the Twelve Month Rule by continuing to report to work beyond twelve months of employment. We do not condone Defendants\u2019 conduct in neglecting to comport with its own administrative regulations. However, we do not believe the trial court erred in granting Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim, where Defendants\u2019 conduct involved allowing Plaintiffs to continue working under their respective contracts when they were no longer eligible to continue performing under them \u2014 where the uncontradicted evidence showed that Plaintiffs were compensated as agreed and where there is no law requiring Defendants to confer any other benefit or status upon Plaintiffs after twelve months of service.\n2. Class Certification\nPlaintiffs further contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for class certification. Our Supreme Court has held that \u201c[t]he trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a case should proceed as a class action.\u201d Faulkenbury v. Teachers\u2019 and State Employees\u2019 Ret. Sys. Of N.C., 345 N.C. 683, 699, 483 S.E.2d 422, 432 (1997). Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion - given the circumstances presented and procedural posture of this case - in the trial court\u2019s decision to deny class certification.\nB. Defendants\u2019Appeal\nDefendants appeal from the trial court\u2019s Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award. As previously stated, since this appeal is interlocutory, we are compelled only to consider Defendants\u2019 contention that the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award is in derogation of its sovereign immunity, which we have held affects a substantial right.\nPlaintiffs argue that the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award is appropriate because the State has waived sovereign immunity in this context under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1, a provision which authorizes the court to award attorneys\u2019 fees to a prevailing party \u201cwho is contesting State action pursuant to G.S. 150B-43 or any other appropriate provisions of law[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1(a). Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award is appropriate under the Declaratory Judgment Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-263 (2013) (permitting recovery of attorneys\u2019 fees where \u201csuch award of costs [is] equitable and just\u201d), because the Award is based upon Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claims, which has already survived Defendants\u2019 sovereign immunity challenge.\nThe trial court\u2019s order does not specify a statutory basis for the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award. Rather, the order merely taxes Defendants \u201cwith the costs of this action, including attorney fees as provided by law.\u201d Because the order directs only that Defendants bear Plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys\u2019 fees \u201cas provided by law,\u201d and because the State has, in certain instances \u2014 e.g., under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1 \u2014 waived sovereign immunity with respect to claims for attorneys\u2019 fees, we cannot at this point conclude that the trial court committed reversible error based on the State\u2019s sovereign immunity defense. We, accordingly, affirm the portion of the trial court\u2019s order imposing the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award \u201cas provided by law\u201d based on the State\u2019s contention concerning its defense of sovereign immunity, but we do not reach the merits of the State\u2019s remaining contentions on this issue, as they are not predicated upon, and do not implicate, a substantial right of the State. We note that our holding in this respect should not be construed as precluding the State from raising sovereign immunity as a defense should the trial court enter a subsequent order awarding attorneys\u2019 fees on a particular, articulated basis.\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs\u2019 motions for partial summary judgment and for class certification.\nWith respect to the issues raised in Defendants\u2019 cross-appeal, we affirm the Award, in part, based on Defendants\u2019 sovereign immunity argument; and we dismiss, in part, the Defendants\u2019 arguments concerning the Award not based on sovereign immunity.\nAFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.\nJudge STROUD concurs.\n. Under Duncan, an unresolved collateral issue does not render a judgment or order deciding the main issues interlocutory. However, an appeal of the collateral issue of attorney fees, itself, is interlocutory if the trial court has not set the amount to be awarded.", "type": "majority", "author": "DILLON, Judge." }, { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge,\ndissenting.\nI dissent from the majority\u2019s opinion concerning Plaintiffs\u2019 appeal and Defendants\u2019 appeal. In my view, Plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for breach of contract. I would also hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification. Finally, I would dismiss Defendants\u2019 appeal concerning attorneys\u2019 fees as interlocutory notwithstanding Defendants\u2019 claim of sovereign immunity. My views with respect to each appeal are addressed separately, in turn.\nA. Plaintiffs\u2019 Appeal\n1. Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs\u2019 Breach of Contract Claim\nDespite the existence of a temporary employment contract between the parties, the incorporation of the Twelve-Month Rule as a condition of that contract, and the admitted violation of the Twelve-Month Rule by Defendants, the trial court below, and the majority here, conclude that no breach of contract has occurred and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. I respectfully dissent.\n\u201c[The] standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that \u2018there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)).\nIn Sanders II, this Court said that the Twelve-Month Rule \u201chas the effect of law and is incorporated into the employment contract when employees are placed into a temporary assignment.\u201d Sanders II, 197 N.C. App. at 321, 677 S.E.2d at 187. Admissions by Defendants and discovery conducted below establish conclusively that Plaintiffs and thousands of additional state employees were placed in temporary appointments for more than twelve consecutive months with no change in employment status in violation of the Twelve-Month Rule. By doing so, Defendants breached an implied term of the temporary employment contract. See id. at 320, 677 S.E.2d at 187 (stating that \u201c[i]n a breach of contract action, a complainant must show that there is (1) existence of a valid contract, and (2) breach of the terms of that contract.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Notwithstanding the evident nature of this conclusion, the majority concludes that no breach of contract occurred and affirms summary judgment in favor of Defendants.\nAlthough not addressed by the majority, the trial court concluded that there could have been no breach of contract because \u201cthe acts of any hiring official in violating the [Twelve-Month Rule] .. . were clearly ultra vires and would not bind the State.\u201d Thus, the trial court went so far as to conclude that there was no valid contractual relationship between the parties after Plaintiffs had provided twelve months of service, resting its analysis on a defense to the contract\u2019s validity. However, the trial court\u2019s ultra vires argument must fail.\nThe temporary employment contracts were not ultra vires when they were entered into by the parties. Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to deny Defendants the ability to initially hire anyone for a temporary appointment with the State. Rather, the contract became ultra vires, if at all, because of Defendants breach of the Twelve-Month Rule. In an analogous context, we have stated that, as a general matter,\na municipality cannot be made liable for breach of an express contract for services when the official making the contract has exceeded his or her authority by entering into such a contract. And the city will not ordinarily be estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract made by an officer of limited authority when that authority has been exceeded.\nHowever, such a contract may become binding and enforceable upon the corporation through the doctrine of estoppel based upon the acts or conduct of officers of the corporation having authority to enter into the contract originally, as by receiving the benefits of the contract, or other grounds of equitable estoppel. A municipality cannot escape liability on a contract within its power to make, on the ground that the officers executing it in its behalf were not technically authorized in that regard, where they were proper officers to enter into such contracts.\nPritchard v. Elizabeth City, 81 N.C. App. 543, 553-54, 344 S.E.2d 821, 827 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Thus, there is a critical distinction between the complete absence of authority to enter into a contract and the later improper exercise of existing contractual authority. Here, Defendants had authority to enter into temporary employment contracts with Plaintiffs, but misused that authority in violating the Twelve-Month Rule. Consistent with Pritchard, I would hold that the defense of ultra vires is unavailable to Defendants.\nEven so, the majority concludes that even if the contractual relationship between the parties is valid, there has been no breach because Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence that \u201cDefendants had made any promises or inducements to Plaintiffs to cause them to continue their employment beyond twelve months, other than to continue paying their normal wages,\u201d or \u201cthat Defendants had represented to Plaintiffs that their employment status would convert to that of a permanent employee after twelve months of service.\u201d Ante, at _. The majority also notes that \u201cthere is nothing in the Commission rules or the relevant law that contractually obligated Defendants to treat Plaintiffs as permanent employees after twelve months of service.\u201d Ante, at _. At this point, I believe the majority mistakes the remedial question (i.e., the valuation of Plaintiffs damages based on Plaintiffs\u2019 expected compensation) with the underlying liability question (i.e., whether a breach of the Twelve-Month Rule occurred). I agree that, at least with respect to the named Plaintiffs, there was never an expectation of permanent employee benefits after Plaintiffs continued in their temporary appointments beyond the twelve month mark. Indeed, the trial court found as fact, unchallenged before this Court, that:\nThere is no allegation that the benefits sought by Plaintiffs were bargained for, or granted, when Plaintiffs began their employment. In fact, prior to employment in their \u201ctemporary appointment\u201d all of the Plaintiffs signed a statement acknowledging the provisions of 25 N.C.A.C. 1C.0405(b). Each of the Plaintiffs indicated in their depositions a desire for continued employment with the State beyond the twelve (12) month mark. Further, there are no allegations of promises or inducements made to Plaintiffs to cause them to continue their employment other than the payment of wages; and no allegations of representations, conduct, or acts of their employers indicating the employment would become permanent.\nHowever, I believe these facts speak to value of Plaintiffs\u2019 expectation interest, not Defendants\u2019 underlying liability for breach of contract. In my view, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of nominal damages in recognition of the technical injury resulting from Defendants breach of the Twelve-Month Rule. See Cole v. Sorie, 41 N.C. App. 485, 490, 255 S.E.2d 271, 274 (1979) (standing for the proposition that, \u201cin a suit for damages for breach of contract, proof of the breach would entitle the plaintiff to nominal damages at least.\u201d (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)). Accordingly, I would grant partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for breach of contract in favor of Plaintiffs and remand for a determination of damages.\n2. Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion for Class Certification\nWith respect to the issue of class certification, I also dissent from the majority\u2019s opinion because I would hold that the trial court\u2019s decision to deny Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification is an abuse of discretion.\nRule 23 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, that \u201c [i]f persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued.\u201d N.C. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Our Supreme Court has recently explained the law with respect to class certification under Rule 23 as follows:\nFirst, parties seeking to employ the class action procedure pursuant to our Rule 23 must establish the existence of a class. A class exists when each of the members has an interest in either the same issue of law or of fact, and that issue predominates over issues affecting only individual class members. The party seeking to bring a class action also bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of other prerequisites:\n(1) the named representatives must establish that they will fairly and adequately represent the interests of all members of the class; (2) there must be no conflict of interest between the named representatives and members of the class; (3) the named representatives must have a genuine personal interest, not a mere technical interest, in the outcome of the case; (4) class representatives within this jurisdiction will adequately represent members outside the state; (5) class members are so numerous that it is impractical to bring them all before the court; and (6) adequate notice must be given to all members of the class.\nWhen all the prerequisites are met, it is left to the trial court\u2019s discretion whether a class action is superior to other available methods for the adjudication of the controversy. ... The touchstone for appellate review of a Rule 23 order ... is to honor the broad discretion allowed the trial court in all matters pertaining to class certification. Accordingly, we review the trial court\u2019s order denying class certification for abuse of discretion. The test for abuse of discretion is whether a decision is manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\nBeroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Transp., _ N.C. _, _, 757 S.E.2d 466, 470-71 (2014) (internal quotation marks, citations, brackets, and footnote omitted) (second alteration in original).\nHere, Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification defined the putative class as all persons\nwho have been or currently are employed by the State of North Carolina who are subject to the twelve-month limitation set forth in 25 N.C.A.C. lC.0405(a); and been placed in temporary appointment for more than twelve consecutive months in violation of 25 N.C.A.C. lC.0405(a) during the period of April 1, 2002 through the present; and have not received benefits including paid holidays, vacation leave, sick leave, health benefits, and when applicable, retirement benefits and longevity pay; excluding employees who work less than 20 hours per week and all employees of the sixteen institutions of the University of North Carolina system.\nThe trial court\u2019s order denying class certification concluded with respect to Plaintiffs\u2019 motion as follows:\nThe claims of the Plaintiffs and the putative class members have an interest in the same issue of law and fact; that class counsel and the Plaintiff will adequately represent the interests of all class members with no conflict of interest; that they have a genuine interest in the outcome of the action; and that class members are sufficiently numerous that joining them would be impractical. However, these factors do not outweigh the predominant issues affecting individual putative class members which are not capable of application of a general mathematical calculation, but would require extensive individual inquiry concerning class members\u2019 unique employment circumstances (i.e., discussions concerning employment status, requests or promises of benefits, higher pay in lieu of benefits, requests for permanent employment, etc.)[.]\n(Emphasis added). Thus, the trial court grounded its decision to deny class certification on the predominance requirement, concluding in effect that no \u201cclass\u201d exists under Rule 23. See Beroth, _ N.C. at _, 757 S.E.2d at 470 (\u201cA class exists when each of the members has an interest in either the same issue of law or of fact, and that issue predominates over issues affecting only individual class members.\u201d). Accordingly, the question presented to this Court by Plaintiffs\u2019 appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that no class existed based on the predominance inquiry. See id. at _, 757 S.E.2d at 470 n.2 (\u201cTherefore, we review the trial court\u2019s determination of whether plaintiffs established the actual existence of a class for abuse of discretion.\u201d).\nIn my view, the trial court abused its discretion in denying class certification because it conflated the remedial question concerning the calculation of damages with the underlying issue of liability for breach of contract. Specifically, the trial court\u2019s determination that \u201cextensive individual inquiry concerning class members\u2019 unique employment circumstances\u201d would be necessary, including \u201cdiscussions concerning employment status, requests or promises of benefits, higher pay in lieu of benefits, requests for permanent employment, etc.[,]\u201d is a concern for the expectation value of Plaintiffs\u2019 damages\u2014whether and what each putative class member expected to receive as compensation after the expiration of their twelve-month term. This is wholly separate from the underlying question of contract liability, a question common to all putative class members based on the narrowly defined class articulated by Plaintiffs, the incorporation of the Twelve-Month Rule into each employee\u2019s contract, and the admissions by Defendant that the TwelveMonth Rule was violated.\nIn Beroth, our Supreme Court stated that differences in the amount of damages owed to putative class members should not preclude class certification as long as the damages inquiry is not determinative of the underlying merits claim. Id. at _, 757 S.E.2d at 475. This generally comports with federal precedent interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. See generally 2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Glass Actions \u00a7 4:54, at 205-10 (5th ed. 2012) (collecting cases and stating that \u201cCourts in every circuit have . . . uniformly held that the 23(b)(3) predominance requirement is satisfied despite the need to make individualized damage determinations.\u201d).\nHere, the trial court acknowledged that \u201c[t]he claims of the Plaintiffs and the putative class members have an interest in the same issue of law and fact[,]\u201d yet denied class certification because of the possibility of individual damage calculations. Given the aforementioned precedent on this issue, I believe the trial court\u2019s action to be an abuse of discretion. I would certify the proposed class and grant partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the issue of liability for breach of contract.\nB. Defendants\u2019 Appeal\nWith respect to Defendants\u2019 appeal of the trial court\u2019s award of attorneys\u2019 fees to Plaintiffs, I agree with the majority that Defendants\u2019 appeal is interlocutory because the actual amount of attorneys\u2019 fees owed by Defendants has yet to be decided. Triad Women\u2019s Ctr., P.A. v. Rogers, 207 N.C. App. 353, 358, 699 S.E.2d 657, 660-61 (2010) (\u201cWe, therefore, specifically hold that an appeal from an award of attorneys\u2019 fees may not be brought until the trial court has finally determined the amount to be awarded. For this Court to have jurisdiction over an appeal brought prior to that point, the appellant would have to show that waiting for the final determination on the attorneys\u2019 fees issue would affect a substantial right.\u201d). Furthermore, I also agree that sovereign immunity is a substantial right for purposes of appellate review under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277(a) (2013). Kawai Am. Corp. v. Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 152 N.C. App. 163, 165, 567 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2002) (\u201cThis Court has repeatedly held that appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.\u201d (quotation marks and citation omitted)). However, I do not agree that Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity in this case and would therefore dismiss Defendants\u2019 appeal in its entirety. Because the majority goes beyond apure jurisdictional analysis and specifically affirms a portion of the trial court\u2019s order concerning attorneys\u2019 fees, I respectfully dissent.\nThe trial court\u2019s order states that \u201cDefendants are taxed with the costs of this action, including attorney fees as provided by law.\u201d (Emphasis added). As the majority opinion notes, the trial court\u2019s order does not specify the statutory authority for its action. Nevertheless, the parties concede that attorneys\u2019 fees can only be awarded in this case, if at all, pursuant to either N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1 or \u00a7 1-263. Thus, Defendants enjoy the right of sovereign immunity in this case only to the extent that such a claim can shield them from paying out attorney fees under these two statutes. If the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not shield Defendants from paying out attorney fees under the statutes, the trial court\u2019s order cannot \u201cdeprive\u201d Defendants of a substantial right nor \u201cwork injury\u201d if Defendants are forced to attend another hearing as to the amount owed. See Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990) (stating that to meet the substantial right test for appealing interlocutory orders, \u201cthe right itself must be substantial and the deprivation of that substantial right must potentially work injury ... if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.\u201d).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1, entitled \u201cAttorney\u2019s fees to parties appealing or defending against agency decision,\u201d provides that if certain prerequisites are met, \u201cthe court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney\u2019s fees,... to be taxed as court costs against the appropriate agency[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1(a) (2013). Thus, by its express terms, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1 allows a party who prevails on an underlying merits claim to recover attorneys\u2019 fees from the State. This is an implicit waiver of any claim that the State has sovereign immunity from paying attorney fees awarded under the statute. See Battle Ridge Cos. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 161 N.C. App. 156, 157, 587 S.E.2d 426, 427 (2003) (\u201cIt is an established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound public policy, that a state may not be sued in its own courts or elsewhere unless it has consented by statute to be sued or has otherwise waived its immunity from suit.\u201d (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to Defendants under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1 and this Court should therefore foreclose any further inquiry under the statute.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-263, entitled \u201cCosts,\u201d provides that \u201c[i]n any proceeding under [the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act] the court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-263. As is evident from the text, the statute does not expressly or impliedly waive the sovereign immunity of the State, and this Court has held that the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not act as a general waiver of the State\u2019s sovereign immunity in declaratory judgment actions. Petroleum Traders Corp. v. State, 190 N.C. App. 542, 546-47, 660 S.E.2d 662, 664 (2008). Nevertheless, it is well-established that the State\u2019s sovereign immunity is waived in \u201ccauses of action on contract,\u201d Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 320, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423-24 (1976), and this Court has recently interpreted that language to include \u201cdeclaratory relief actions seeking to ascertain the rights and obligations owed under an alleged contract.\u201d Atl. Coast Conference v. Univ. of Maryland, _ N.C. App. _, _, 751 S.E.2d 612, 621 (2013).\nHere, the Plaintiffs\u2019 declaratory judgment motion sought a declaration from the trial court concerning the parties\u2019 temporary employment contracts and the admitted violation of the Twelve-Month Rule. Plaintiffs\u2019 motion, and the trial court\u2019s subsequent order, were responsive to this Court\u2019s disposition in Sanders II when we remanded Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim with instructions for the trial court to \u201cassess the terms of [Plaintiffs\u2019 contracts with [Defendants at the twelve month and one day mark and beyond\u201d and \u201cto declare [Plaintiffs\u2019 status and rights\u201d under the temporary employment contracts. Sanders II, 197 N.C. App. at 323, 677 S.E.2d at 188-89. Thus, the declaratory relief at issue here concerns the \u201crights and obligations owed under an alleged contract.\u201d By consequence, and consistent with this Court\u2019s opinion in All. Coast Conference, Defendants cannot assert sovereign immunity to shield themselves from an obligation to pay costs under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-263. The defense of sovereign immunity is therefore not available to Defendants under either of the statutes potentially implicated by Defendants\u2019 appeal.\nAccordingly, because the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to Defendants under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1 or \u00a7 1-263,1 would hold that Defendants have failed to meet the substantial right test and that we lack jurisdiction to hear Defendants\u2019 appeal at this time. Although the majority does not engage in a full merits analysis concerning whether the award was proper under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1 or \u00a7 1-263, the majority errs in affirming a portion of the order. I would dismiss Defendants\u2019 cross-appeal in its entirety as interlocutory.\n. Notably, the record in this case is devoid of any contention from Defendants that the actions of their hiring officials constituted ultra vires activity. Defendants\u2019 answer and motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, hearing arguments, and brief before this Court make no mention of the ultra vires doctrine or its application to this case. Instead, the doctrine first appears in the trial court\u2019s order.\n. In Sanders II, we stated that \u201cif the court below finds defendants automatically converted plaintiffs\u2019 positions from temporary to permanent on their own accord without appropriate classification and budgetary approval, they would have enacted an employment scheme in direct contravention of the state constitution and other sections of the regulatory scheme.\u201d Sanders II, 197 N.C. App. at 322, 677 S.E.2d at 188. Thus, the conclusion that Defendants misused their contractual authority in violating the Twelve-Month Rule has already been reached by this Court and this panel is bound by that decision. In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989).\n. The majority suggests that both parties are in breach of the employment contract, stating, \u201c[h]ere, Defendants ignored the Twelve Month Rule by permitting each Plaintiff to remain employed after twelve months. Likewise, each Plaintiff ignored the Twelve Month Rule by continuing to report to work beyond twelve months of employment.\u201d Ante, at _. However, the Twelve-Month Rule is a constraint on the State, not the employees. I would therefore hold that only Defendants are in breach.\n. The majority opinion states that \u201cwe review Defendants\u2019 appeal of the Attorneys\u2019 Pees Award only to the extent that their challenge is based on sovereign immunity; however, we dismiss Defendants\u2019 appeal to the extent that Defendants\u2019 challenge is based on some other defense or upon the merits.\u201d Ante, at _. While the majority opinion does not go so far as to decide whether the trial court\u2019s award was proper under either N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1 or \u00a7 1-263, it does decide, and explicitly affirms \u201cthe portion of the trial court\u2019s order imposing the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award \u2018as provided by law\u2019 based on the State\u2019s contention concerning its defense of sovereign immunity[.]\u201d Ante, at .", "type": "dissent", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, by Adam H. Chames, James H. Kelly, Jr., Susan H. Boyles, Richard D. Dietz, and Gregg E. McDougal, and North Carolina Justice Center, by Jack Holtzman, for Plaintiffs.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lars F. Nance and Special Deputy Attorney General Charles Gibson Whitehead, for Defendants.", "State Employees Association of North Carolina, by Thomas A. Harris, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LULA SANDERS, CYNTHIA EURE, ANGELINE MCINERNY, JOSEPH C. MOBLEY, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. STATE PERSONNEL COMMISSION, a body politic; OFFICE OF STATE PERSONNEL, a body politic; LINDA COLEMAN, State Personnel Director (in her official capacity); TEACHERS\u2019 AND STATE EMPLOYEES\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NORTH CAROLINA, a body politic and corporate; MICHAEL WILLIAMSON, Director of the Retirement System Division and Deputy Treasurer of the State of North Carolina (in his official capacity); JANET COWELL, Treasurer of The State of North Carolina and Chairman of The Board of Trustees of the Retirement System (in her official capacity); TEMPORARY SOLUTIONS, a subdivision of the Office of State Personnel, and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants\nNo. COA13-654\nFiled 2 September 2014\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014interlocutory orders and appeals\u2014 attorney fees\u2014sovereign immunity\u2014substantial right\nDefendants\u2019 appeal of the attorney fees award was granted only to the extent that their challenge was based on sovereign immunity since it affected a substantial right. However, defendants\u2019 appeal of attorney fees based on some other defense or upon the merits was dismissed.\n2. Contracts\u2014breach of contract\u2014summary judgment\u2014no promises or inducements\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether defendants had made any promises or inducements to plaintiffs to cause them to continue their employment beyond twelve months, other than to continue paying their normal wages, which were, in fact, paid as agreed.\n3. Class Actions\u2014denial of motion for class certification\u2014no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification given the circumstances presented and procedural posture of this case.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014interlocutory orders and appeals\u2014 attorney fees\u2014sovereign immunity\u2014substantial right\u2014 cross-appeal\u2014remaining issues not addressed\nWith respect to issues raised in defendants\u2019 cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the portion of the trial court\u2019s order imposing the attorney fees award \u201cas provided by law\u201d based on the State\u2019s contention concerning its defense of sovereign immunity. However, the merits of the State\u2019s remaining contentions on this issue were not reached since they were not predicated upon a substantial right of the State.\nJudge HUNTER, JR., Robert N. dissenting.\nAppeal by Plaintiffs from order entered 18 December 2012 by Judge Kenneth C. Titus in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 December 2013.\nKilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, by Adam H. Chames, James H. Kelly, Jr., Susan H. Boyles, Richard D. Dietz, and Gregg E. McDougal, and North Carolina Justice Center, by Jack Holtzman, for Plaintiffs.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lars F. Nance and Special Deputy Attorney General Charles Gibson Whitehead, for Defendants.\nState Employees Association of North Carolina, by Thomas A. Harris, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0094-01", "first_page_order": 102, "last_page_order": 120 }