{ "id": 12175382, "name": "KAYLA J. INMAN v. CITY OF WHITEVILLE, a municipality incorporated under the laws of the State of North Carolina", "name_abbreviation": "Inman v. City of Whiteville", "decision_date": "2014-09-16", "docket_number": "NO. COA14-94", "first_page": "301", "last_page": "308", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "236 N.C. App. 301" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635611, 12635612 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767", "parenthetical": "declining to address exceptions to public duty doctrine where plaintiffs did not raise them" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0761-01", "/se2d/628/0761-02" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 686", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633045, 12633046, 12633047 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0686-01", "/se2d/613/0686-02", "/se2d/613/0686-03" ] }, { "cite": "626 S.E.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635149 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "\"When reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we treat a plaintiff's factual allegations as true.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/626/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "725 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52", "parenthetical": "\"It is not the duty of this Court to supplement an appellant's brief with legal authority or arguments not contained therein.\" (citation and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "499 S.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659768 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551270 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796760 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468-69", "parenthetical": "declining to address exceptions to public duty doctrine where plaintiffs did not raise them" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-166.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "requiring police department of city or town to investigate \"a reportable accident\" and \"make a written report of the accident within 24 hours of the accident\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794338, 3797134, 3793554, 3799955, 3800693, 3793723, 3804348, 3799101, 3801790 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0633-02", "/nc/359/0633-03", "/nc/359/0633-07", "/nc/359/0633-08", "/nc/359/0633-06", "/nc/359/0633-09", "/nc/359/0633-01", "/nc/359/0633-05", "/nc/359/0633-04" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" }, { "page": "694", "parenthetical": "describing officer's interview with parties involved in car accident as \"general investigatory dut[y]\"" }, { "page": "695", "parenthetical": "concluding that officer's management of accident scene \"fell completely within Durham's immunization of performing a public duty\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8469359 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" }, { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155717, 1155826, 1155731, 1155895, 1155679 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0474-05", "/nc/351/0474-04", "/nc/351/0474-01", "/nc/351/0474-03", "/nc/351/0474-02" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240122 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" }, { "parenthetical": "failure to prevent third party's criminal act on county property" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220182 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" }, { "parenthetical": "failure to prevent third party's criminal act on county property" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155962 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 S.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "890" }, { "page": "890" }, { "page": "890" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "892" }, { "page": "892", "parenthetical": "emphasis added and footnote omitted" }, { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. App. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4233959 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "508" }, { "page": "506-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/213/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" }, { "page": "902", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509910 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "691 S.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750-51" }, { "page": "750" }, { "page": "749-50" }, { "page": "750" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "\"Braswell and its progeny have not wavered from the general principle that when a police officer, acting to protect the general public, indirectly causes harm to an individual, the municipality that employs him or her is protected from liability.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. App. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176397 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/203/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that actionable negligence is predicated on the existence of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.\" (citation and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11653071 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791", "parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental that actionable negligence is predicated on the existence of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.\" (citation and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "746 S.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3791894 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325", "parenthetical": "\"When reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we treat a plaintiff's factual allegations as true.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0321-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 853, "char_count": 18181, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.24717020181485486 }, "sha256": "18e48fb41a0f75ab0bb0a041cc86acfb262e8ba4fc81fcdc30861c1c7f5bca0d", "simhash": "1:439154f88c6b0859", "word_count": 2914 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:41:07.458141+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, JR. and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "KAYLA J. INMAN v. CITY OF WHITEVILLE, a municipality incorporated under the laws of the State of North Carolina" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "DAVIS, Judge.\nKayla J. Inman (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019) appeals from the trial court\u2019s order dismissing her complaint against the City of Whiteville (\u201cthe City\u201d) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint based on the public duty doctrine. After careful review, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nFactual Background\nWe have summarized the pertinent facts below using the statements contained in Plaintiff\u2019s complaint, which we treat as true when reviewing an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 360 N.C. 321, 325, 626 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2006) (\u201cWhen reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we treat a plaintiff\u2019s factual allegations as true.\u201d).\nOn 12 September 2011, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident near the intersection of South Madison Street and East Hayes Street in Whiteville, North Carolina. Plaintiff was \u201crun off the road\u201d by another motorist, and Plaintiff and her passenger suffered significant injuries arising from the accident. Officer Donnie Hedwin (\u201cOfficer Hedwin\u201d) of the Whiteville Police Department was called to the scene to investigate the accident. Officer Hedwin spoke with the other motorist but did not ascertain his identity or include his name in the accident report. When questioned about this omission, Officer Hedwin and his supervisor, Sergeant Mark McGee, both stated that the accident had not been investigated further because there had been no physical contact between the two vehicles.\nOn 30 April 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City in Columbus County Superior Court alleging that Officer Hedwin and Sergeant McGee, who were agents of the City acting in the course and scope of their employment, were negligent in their investigation of the accident, primarily because they failed to ascertain the identity of the other motorist. Plaintiff asserted that \u201c[b]ased upon the failure of the officers to properly and completely investigate, the identity of the party responsible for this accident has not been determined\u201d and that \u201c[b]ut for the negligent acts of [the City], by and through its employees, the plaintiff could have and would have maintained an action against the unknown driver of the second vehicle for her damages.\u201d\nOn 7 August 2012, the City filed an answer and motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The City\u2019s motion to dismiss came on for hearing on 15 July 2013, and the trial court entered an order dismissing Plaintiffs complaint on 2 August 2013. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.\nAnalysis\nWhen a party files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the question for the court is whether the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory, whether properly labeled or not. A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where (1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports a plaintiff\u2019s claim, (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim, or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats a plaintiff\u2019s claim. An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court\u2019s dismissal of an action under Rule 12(b)(6).\nHorne v. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., _ N.C. App. _, _, 746 S.E.2d 13, 16 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\nIn order to successfully assert a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant owed a legal duty to her. See Derwort v. Polk Cty., 129 N.C. App. 789, 791, 501 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1998) (\u201cIt is fundamental that actionable negligence is predicated on the existence of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.\u201d (citation and quotation marks omitted)). \u201c[I]n the absence of any such duty owed [to] the injured party by the defendant, there can be no liability [and] when the public duty doctrine applies, the government entity, as the defendant, owes no legal duty to the plaintiff.\u201d Scott v. City of Charlotte, 203 N.C. App. 460, 464, 691 S.E.2d 747, 750-51 (citations, quotation marks, brackets, and emphasis omitted), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 435, 702 S.E.2d 305 (2010).\nThe public duty doctrine, adopted by our Supreme Court in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991), provides that \u201cwhen a governmental entity owes a duty to the general public . . . individual plaintiffs may not enforce the duty in tort.\u201d Strickland v. Univ. of N. C. at Wilmington, 213 N.C. App. 506, 508, 712 S.E.2d 888, 890 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, _ N.C. _, 720 S.E.2d 677 (2012). Application of this doctrine has traditionally arisen in cases in which a plaintiff asserts a negligence claim alleging that a law enforcement officer breached his duty to protect a victim from a third party\u2019s criminal act and that this failure caused the victim\u2019s injury or death. Id. at 508-09, 712 S.E.2d at 890.\nIn such scenarios, the municipality is generally insulated from liability because in providing police protection, \u201c[the] municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals.\u201d Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370, 410 S.E.2d at 901. Accordingly, \u201cwhile the law enforcement agency owes a \u2018duty to protect\u2019 the public at large, individual members of the public as plaintiffs generally may not enforce that duty in tort.\u201d Strickland, 213 N.C. App. at 509, 712 S.E.2d at 890.\nThe Supreme Court has, however, recognized two specific exceptions to the public duty doctrine:\n(1) where there is a special relationship between the injured party and the police, for example a state\u2019s witness or informant who has aided law enforcement officers; and\n(2) when a municipality, through its police officers, creates a special duty by promising protection to an individual, the protection is not forthcoming, and the individual\u2019s reliance on the promise of protection is causally related to the injury suffered.\nBraswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902 (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nOur Supreme Court has made clear that with regard to local governments, the public duty doctrine only extends to actions taken in the exercise of their general duty to protect the public. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 461, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000) (\u201cWhile this Court has extended the public duty doctrine to state agencies required by statute to conduct inspections for the public\u2019s general protection, we have never expanded the public duty doctrine to any local government agencies other than law enforcement departments when they are exercising their general duty to protect the public.\u201d (internal citations omitted)); see also Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 169, 558 S.E.2d 490, 496 (2002) (explaining that public duty doctrine \u201cretains limited vitality, as applied to local government, within the context of government\u2019s duty to protect the public generally, which is necessarily limited by the resources of the local community\u201d (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). The public duty doctrine \u201cacknowledges the limited resources of law enforcement and works against judicial imposition of an overwhelming burden of liability.\u201d Little v. Atkinson, 136 N.C. App. 430, 432, 524 S.E.2d 378, 380, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 474, 543 S.E.2d 492 (2000).\nThis Court has applied the public duty doctrine to limit the liability of municipalities and their law enforcement agencies in circumstances beyond the \u201cclassic example of ... a negligence claim alleging a law enforcement agency\u2019s failure to protect a person from a third party\u2019s criminal act.\u201d Strickland, 213 N.C. App. at 508, 712 S.E.2d at 890. Indeed, we have applied the doctrine where \u2014 as here \u2014 the allegations of negligence stem from a law enforcement officer\u2019s handling of a motor vehicle accident. For example, in Lassiter v. Cohn, 168 N.C. App. 310, 607 S.E.2d 688, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 633, 613 S.E.2d 686 (2005), we concluded that the public duty doctrine shielded the City of Durham and one of its police officers from liability in an action arising out of the officer\u2019s allegedly negligent management and control of a multi-vehicle accident scene. We reasoned that imposing liability upon the city and its officer, who was \u201cfulfilling her general duties owed when responding to the many and synergistic elements of a traffic accident.... is exactly that which the public duty doctrine seeks to alleviate.\u201d Id. at 318, 607 S.E.2d at 693.\nIn Scott, we held that the public duty doctrine barred the plaintiff\u2019s negligence claim against the City of Charlotte where officers of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department had pulled over an individual, David Scott (\u201cMr. Scott\u201d), on suspicion of impaired driving, determined that he was \u201cphysically impaired in some respect,\u201d been informed that Mr. Scott had suffered a stroke during the past year, and failed to call for medical assistance. Scott, 203 N.C. App. at 464, 691 S.E.2d at 750. Mr. Scott later collapsed in the parking lot as he was waiting for the plaintiff, his wife, to pick him up and died the following day. Id. at 462-63, 691 S.E.2d at 749-50.\nThe plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Charlotte alleging that the officers were negligent in failing to summon medical assistance for Mr. Scott. Id. at 463, 691 S.E.2d at 750. We concluded that the City of Charlotte was entitled to summary judgment in its favor based on the public duty doctrine because the officers \u201cwere engaged in their general law enforcement duty to protect the public from an erratic driver who they believed could be intoxicated\u201d when they made the discretionary decision not to call for medical assistance, thereby indirectly harming Mr. Scott. Id. at 468, 691 S.E.2d at 752.\nIn both Lassiter and Scott, this Court recognized that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims arose from circumstances in which the local governments at issue, through their law enforcement officers, were engaged in their general duty of protecting the public and that, consequently, they were shielded from liability by the public duty doctrine. See id. at 467, 691 S.E.2d at 752 (\u201cBraswell and its progeny have not wavered from the general principle that when a police officer, acting to protect the general public, indirectly causes harm to an individual, the municipality that employs him or her is protected from liability.\u201d).\nHere, Plaintiff\u2019s negligence claim is premised on the maimer in which a motor vehicle accident was investigated by law enforcement officers. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that Officer Hedwin and his supervisor \u201cfailed in their obligation and duty to perform competent law enforcement services in that they failed to determine both the responsible party [for] this [accident] and the facts indicating his responsibility.\u201d The duty to investigate motor vehicle accidents and to prepare accident reports is a general law enforcement duty owed to the public as a whole. See Lassiter, 168 N.C. App. at 320, 607 S.E.2d at 694 (describing officer\u2019s interview with parties involved in car accident as \u201cgeneral investigatory dut[y]\u201d); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-166.1 (2013) (requiring police department of city or town to investigate \u201ca reportable accident\u201d and \u201cmake a written report of the accident within 24 hours of the accident\u201d). As such, the circumstances at issue in this case fall within the scope of the public duty doctrine.\nIn attempting to avoid the application of the public duty doctrine, Plaintiff relies heavily on our decision in Strickland. However, Strickland is clearly distinguishable from the present case.\nIn Strickland, the plaintiff\u2019s son (\u201cthe decedent\u201d) was mistakenly shot and killed by a member of the New Hanover County Emergency Response Team (the \u201cERT\u201d) during an attempt to serve a warrant for the decedent\u2019s arrest. The University of North Carolina at Wilmington Police Department (\u201cUNC-W Police Department\u201d) was investigating the decedent for an assault and theft on the university\u2019s campus and had requested the ERT\u2019s assistance in serving the arrest warrant on him. Strickland, 213 N.C. App. at 506-07, 712 S.E.2d at 889. The shooting occurred when an ERT member mistook for a gunshot the sound of a battering ram striking the door of the decedent\u2019s residence and fired his weapon into the residence. Id. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit against the University of North Carolina at Wilmington (\u201cUNC-W\u201d) and the UNC-W Police Department, alleging that officers of the UNC-W Police Department \u201cnegligently provided false, misleading, and irrelevant information to . . . ERT members\u201d in order to secure their assistance in executing the warrant. Id. at 507, 712 S.E.2d at 889. The plaintiff further alleged that this false information, which included statements that the decedent was involved in gang activity and known to be armed and dangerous, \u201cproximately caused [the decedent\u2019s] death by leading ERT members to believe that they were entering into ... a severely dangerous environment including heavily armed suspects with histories of intentional physical violence causing injuries to persons.\u201d Id.\nIn concluding that the public duty doctrine did not insulate UNC-W and its police department from liability, we explained that the duty of a law enforcement officer \u201cnot to negligently provide false and misleading information . . . during a criminal investigation\u201d did not \u201cresemble the types of duties to the general public for which the public duty doctrine normally precludes liability.\u201d Id. at 511-12, 712 S.E.2d at 892. In particular, we emphasized that\n[i]n all cases where the public duty doctrine has been held applicable, the breach of the alleged duty has involved the governmental entity\u2019s negligent control of an external injurious force or of the effects of such a force. See, e.g., Myers, 360 N.C. 460, 628 S.E.2d 761 (negligent control of a forest fire not started by fire fighting agency); Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 558 S.E.2d 490 (2002) (failure to prevent third party\u2019s criminal act on county property); Stone, 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711 (failure to ensure plant worker\u2019s ability to escape plant fire not started by inspection agency); Hunt, 348 N.C. 192, 499 S.E.2d 747 (negligent inspection of amusement ride prior to ride\u2019s malfunction, which was not caused by the inspection); Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (failure to prevent a third party\u2019s criminal act). In this case, however, the alleged breach is not a negligent action with respect to some external injurious force. Rather, the UNC-W police department\u2019s act of negligently providing misleading and inaccurate information was itself the injurious force.\nId. at 512, 712 S.E.2d at 892 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).\nHere, unlike in Strickland in which \u201cUNC-W police officers\u2019 negligent provision of inaccurate information brought about the ERT member\u2019s decision to fire his weapon through [the decedent\u2019s] front door,\u201d id. at 514, 712 S.E.2d at 893, Officer Hedwin\u2019s alleged negligence in failing to ascertain the other motorist\u2019s identity did not bring about the physical injuries, medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering alleged in Plaintiff\u2019s complaint. Instead, Plaintiff is alleging that Officer Hedwin negligently failed to properly investigate an accident caused by \u201can external injurious force\u201d \u2014 namely, the third-party motorist who ran her vehicle off the road. Accordingly, as in Lassiter, the public duty doctrine shields the City from liability arising from Officer Hedwin\u2019s investigation of the accident. See Lassiter, 168 N.C. App. at 321, 607 S.E.2d at 695 (concluding that officer\u2019s management of accident scene \u201cfell completely within Durham\u2019s immunization of performing a public duty\u201d).\nFinally, because Plaintiff has not alleged the applicability of either the special relationship exception or the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine, we decline to address the potential applicability of these exceptions. See Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 468-69, 628 S.E.2d 761, 767 (2006) (declining to address exceptions to public duty doctrine where plaintiffs did not raise them); Rev O, Inc. v. Woo, _ N.C. App. _, _, 725 S.E.2d 45, 52 (2012) (\u201cIt is not the duty of this Court to supplement an appellant\u2019s brief with legal authority or arguments not contained therein.\u201d (citation and quotation marks omitted)). As such, Plaintiffs negligence claim against the City is barred by the public duty doctrine, and the trial court therefore properly granted the City\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nConclusion\nFor the reasons stated above, the trial court\u2019s 2 August 2013 order is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges HUNTER, JR. and ERVIN concur.\nJudge HUNTER, JR. concurred in this opinion prior to 6 September 2014.", "type": "majority", "author": "DAVIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lee & Lee, Attorneys, by Junius B. Lee, III, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Crossley McIntosh Collier Hanley & Edes, PLLC, by Clay Allen Collier, and Williamson Walton & Scott, LLP, by Carlton F. Williamson, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KAYLA J. INMAN v. CITY OF WHITEVILLE, a municipality incorporated under the laws of the State of North Carolina\nNO. COA14-94\nFiled 16 September 2014\nNegligence\u2014public duty doctrine\u2014investigation of motor vehicle accident\u2014no duty to individual\nThe trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff\u2019s negligence claim against the City of Whiteville based on the public duty doctrine. The duty to investigate motor vehicle accidents and to prepare accident reports is a general law enforcement duty owed to the public as a whole. This case fell within the scope of the public duty doctrine and plaintiff did not allege the applicability of either the special relationship or the special duty exceptions to the public duty doctrine.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 2 August 2013 by Judge D. Jack Hooks, Jr. in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2014.\nLee & Lee, Attorneys, by Junius B. Lee, III, for plaintiff-appellant.\nCrossley McIntosh Collier Hanley & Edes, PLLC, by Clay Allen Collier, and Williamson Walton & Scott, LLP, by Carlton F. Williamson, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0301-01", "first_page_order": 309, "last_page_order": 316 }