{ "id": 8551848, "name": "SANDRA KAY WHITAKER GRIFFETH v. EMILY LOFTIN WATTS, and RALPH COPPALA, LEONARD WILSON COPPALA, d/b/a COCHRAN & ROSS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Griffeth v. Watts", "decision_date": "1975-01-15", "docket_number": "No. 7426SC834", "first_page": "440", "last_page": "443", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "24 N.C. App. 440" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547955 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S.E. 2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626989 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 S.E. 2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563409 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E. 2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.C. App. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556602 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/21/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 N.C. L. Rev. 729", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560580 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0390-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 489, "char_count": 8581, "ocr_confidence": 0.567, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.275115718886884e-08, "percentile": 0.47881111987610087 }, "sha256": "a6e492152c7debdf55ee5991548f101c6c65ae5ddeb6aeab666876ef8117d321", "simhash": "1:cb64c0ab7c254a59", "word_count": 1427 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:40.635509+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Britt and Parker concur." ], "parties": [ "SANDRA KAY WHITAKER GRIFFETH v. EMILY LOFTIN WATTS, and RALPH COPPALA, LEONARD WILSON COPPALA, d/b/a COCHRAN & ROSS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BROCK, Chief Judge.\nWe believe that the directed verdict was improperly granted. In determining whether a motion for directed verdict should be granted, the test to be applied is whether the evidence, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, affords but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable men could have reached. See generally Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E. 2d 297; Louis, A Survey of Decisions Under The New North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 729 (1972). In applying this test, it is elementary that the trial court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Woodard v. McGee and Little v. McGee, 21 N.C. App. 487, 204 S.E. 2d 871; Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 201 S.E. 2d 897. \u201cWhether [this] evidence is sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury is solely a question of law to be determined by the court.\u201d Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, \u00a7 2524 (1971) ; see Cutts v. Casey, supra (concurring opinion).\n\u201cOrdinarily the mere fact of a collision with a vehicle ahead furnishes some evidence that the following motorist was negligent as to speed, was following too closely, or failed to keep a proper lookout.\u201d Clark v. Scheld, 253 N.C. 732, 737, 117 S.E. 2d 838, 842. We have held, however, that this is \u201cby no means an absolute rule to be mechanically applied in every rear-end collision case. Whether in a particular case there be sufficient evidence of negligence to carry that issue to the jury must still be determined by all of the unique circumstances of each individual case, the evidence of a rear-end collision being but one of those circumstances.\u201d Racine v. Boege, 6 N.C. App. 341, 345, 169 S.E. 2d 913, 916.\nIn the case at bar, the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, tends to show that plaintiff was stopped and had been stopped on Park Road \u201cfor quite a while\u201d with her left turn signal on; that traffic was heavy, and she was waiting for an opportunity to turn; that the road may have been wet; that plaintiff heard a loud horn, glanced into the rear-view mirror and may have seen defendant\u2019s car moving forward; and that the impact was substantial. As a result of the collision, plaintiff\u2019s evidence shows that plaintiff sustained both personal injuries for which she has been under treatment and property damage in that her car would no longer run properly. We believe that this evidence at least creates a legitimate inference that defendant may have been negligent in following too closely or in failing to keep a proper lookout. While it is possible that defendant was exercising every care which a reasonable and prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances confronting her, it appears that under plaintiff\u2019s evidence, reasonable and prudent men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach a different conclusion as to both defendant\u2019s negligence and plaintiff\u2019s damage. In such a case a directed verdict will not lie. We find plaintiffs\u2019 assignment of error to the trial judge\u2019s granting of the motion for directed verdict to be meritorious.\nPlaintiff has also assigned as error the trial court\u2019s failure to allow evidence of damage to the car on the ground that plaintiff failed to allege a separate cause of action for property damage. While we do not deem it necessary to reach the merits of plaintiff\u2019s contention in light of the holding above, we note that pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff may yet apply to the trial court for leave to amend her complaint.\nNew trial.\nJudges Britt and Parker concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BROCK, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Edwards and Yates, by Reginald L. Yates, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Wade and Carmichael, by J. J. Wade, for defendant-appellee Emily Watts." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SANDRA KAY WHITAKER GRIFFETH v. EMILY LOFTIN WATTS, and RALPH COPPALA, LEONARD WILSON COPPALA, d/b/a COCHRAN & ROSS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY\nNo. 7426SC834\n(Filed 15 January 1975)\nAutomobiles \u00a7 56\u2014 rear-end collision \u2014 sufficiency of evidence of negligence\nIn an action growing out of a rear-end collision in which defendant alleged she was struck from the rear by a third party\u2019s truck and knocked into the rear of plaintiff\u2019s vehicle, plaintiff\u2019s evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant was negligent in following too closely or in failing to keep a proper lookout where it tended to show that plaintiff was stopped at a traffic light with her left turn signal on, plaintiff heard a loud horn, glanced into the rearview mirror and may have seen defendant\u2019s ear moving forward, defendant\u2019s car struck plaintiff\u2019s car from the rear with a substantial impact, and plaintiff sustained both personal injuries for which she has been under treatment and property damage in that her car will no longer run properly.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Falls, Judge, 10 June 1974 Session of Superior Court held in Mecklenburg County. Argued before the Court of Appeals 19 November 1974.\nThis is a civil action to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage sustained when plaintiff\u2019s 1961 Dodge was allegedly struck in the rear by defendant Emily Watts\u2019 automobile. The collision occurred on Monday morning, 8 May 1972, at the intersection of Park Road and Hillside Avenue in Charlotte. Park Road has two lanes for northbound and two lanes for southbound traffic. It rained on the day of the accident, but it was not clear whether the road was wet at the time of the collision.\nPlaintiff alleges that her injuries were caused by the negligence of defendant Emily Watts or defendant Cochran & Ross Construction Company in \u201cwilfully or recklessly or negligently\u201d driving \u201ca motor vehicle against the rear of Plaintiff\u2019s automobile as it was lawfully stopped for a city traffic light\u201d at the intersection of Park Road and Hillside Avenue. Defendant Emily Watts answered, alleging that she had come to a stop behind plaintiff\u2019s automobile on Park Road when her car was struck in the rear by a truck owned by defendant Cochran & Ross, knocking her car into plaintiff\u2019s automobile. Defendant Emily Watts (hereinafter referred to as defendant) asserts that any negligence on her part is completely insulated by the intervening negligence of defendant Cochran & Ross. Defendant Cochran & Ross apparently filed no answer to the complaint. The record on appeal does not disclose what disposition, if any, has been made of plaintiff\u2019s action against defendant Cochran & Ross.\nPlaintiff testified at trial that she was stopped in the left lane of traffic, about to turn left onto Hillside Avenue, when defendant\u2019s car struck her car in the rear. The traffic light was green, and traffic was heavy. As she waited for an opportunity to turn, plaintiff heard a loud horn and felt the impact of defendant\u2019s car. Plaintiff stated that she had been stopped \u201cfor quite a while\u201d on Park Road, with her left turn indicator on, before the impact. She could not say definitely whether defendant\u2019s car was moving when she heard the loud horn and glanced into the rearview mirror and saw defendant\u2019s car. Plaintiff testified that as a result of the collision she sustained injuries which caused her to miss twelve days at her parttime job, where she worked after school. Specifically, plaintiff stated that she suffers from pain, frequent headaches, and stiffness in her shoulders, back, and neck. Plaintiff visited two doctors who examined her but did not prescribe medicine or therapy for her. She then visited, in May 1973, R. Fletcher Keith, a doctor of Chiropractic, and has remained in his care since that time. Plaintiff testified that her 1961 Dodge has been parked since the collision. On cross-examination she admitted driving the car home immediately after the collision and, five minutes later, returning to the scene in the same car. Plaintiff also admitted having told the investigating officer at the collision that she had not been injured.\nBen Gregory, step-father of plaintiff, testified that the frame of the 1961 Dodge had been bent and that the drive line had been shoved forward into the transmission, causing a leak. Two fenders and a bumper were also damaged.\nDefendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, pursuant to Rule 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that plaintiff\u2019s evidence failed to disclose either negligence on the part of defendant Watts or damage sustained by plaintiff. The trial judge granted the motion for directed verdict, and plaintiff appealed to this Court.\nEdwards and Yates, by Reginald L. Yates, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWade and Carmichael, by J. J. Wade, for defendant-appellee Emily Watts." }, "file_name": "0440-01", "first_page_order": 468, "last_page_order": 471 }