{ "id": 8551885, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES KENLEY OXENDINE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Oxendine", "decision_date": "1975-01-15", "docket_number": "No. 7416SC822", "first_page": "444", "last_page": "447", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "24 N.C. App. 444" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "172 S.E. 2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561475 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555269 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 S.E. 2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576347 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571880 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0306-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 404, "char_count": 7275, "ocr_confidence": 0.584, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1937869685226118e-07, "percentile": 0.7743055676218961 }, "sha256": "0b0c95ade6c824e5cd65ca0aed46f25a81f55a6204f1a20cab3266a22925a870", "simhash": "1:0296500476be1947", "word_count": 1189 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:40.635509+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Morris and Arnold concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES KENLEY OXENDINE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nDefendant\u2019s first assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the testimony of Officer Luther Sanderson as to statements made to him by defendant after defendant had been taken into custody. Pursuant to defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the court conducted a voir dire examination to determine the competency of the challenged evidence. The evidence on voir dire tends to show, and the court found:\n\u201c . . . after the defendant had been taken into custody by Officer Luther Sanderson, Deputy Sheriff, and fully advised of his Constitutional Rights, as required by the Miranda Rule, the defendant declined to answer any questions asked by Officer Sanderson; that on the way to the jail the defendant made several spontaneous statements which were not in response to any questions asked by Officer Sanderson. The Court is of the opinion and finds and concludes that the spontaneous statements made by the defendant were freely and voluntarily made and are admissible in evidence. The Court finds that the defendant had been drinking but that he was not drunk and knew and understood what he was doing and saying.\u201d\nThe incriminating statement was thereupon admitted into evidence. It is settled law that the findings of the trial judge when supported by competent evidence, as here, are binding and conclusive in appellate courts in this jurisdiction. State v. Stepney, 280 N.C. 306, 185 S.E. 2d 844 (1972). Volunteered statements are competent evidence, and their admission is not barred under any theory of the law, state or federal. State v. Haddock, 281 N.C. 675, 190 S.E. 2d 208 (1972). No waiver is involved with respect to voluntary statements. State v. Haddock, supra. Nor does the mere fact of intoxication render inadmissible his statements which tended to incriminate him. . . . [T]he extent of his intoxication when the confession was made is relevant; and the weight, if any, to be given a confession under the circumstances disclosed is exclusively for determination by the jury.\u2019 [Citations.]\u201d State v. Beasley, 10 N.C. App. 663, 179 S.E. 2d 820 (1971). The assignment of error addressed to the admission of defendant\u2019s statements is overruled.\nDefendant excepts to the following portion of the charge:\n\u201c . . . upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of intentional killing with a deadly weapon, the law then casts upon the defendant the burden of satisfying the jury of \u2014 not beyond a reasonable doubt nor by the greater weight of the evidence, but simply satisfying the jury of facts and circumstances or provocation which would remove the elements of malice, that is, rebut it, and reduce the crime to manslaughter.\u201d\nThe defendant contends that the court\u2019s instruction \u201cdoes not seem to correctly state defendant\u2019s burden.\u201d He contends that his burden is to satisfy the jury that the intentional killing with a deadly weapon was without malice and not to satisfy the jury of facts and circumstances or- provocation which will remove the element of malice.\n\u201cWhen the State satisfies the jury from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally shot the deceased and thereby proximately caused his death, the law raises two presumptions against him: First, that the killing was unlawful; and, second, that it was done with malice; and an unlawful killing with malice is murder in the second degree. [Citations.] \u2018The law then casts upon the defendant the burden of showing to the satisfaction of the jury, if he can do so \u2014 not by the greater weight of the evidence nor beyond a reasonable doubt, but simply to the satisfaction of the jury \u2014 from all the evidence, facts and circumstances, the legal provocation that will rob the crime of malice and thus reduce it to manslaughter, or that will excuse it altogether upon the ground of self-defense .... The legal provocation that will rob the crime of malice and thus reduce it to manslaughter, and self-defense, are affirmative pleas, with the burden of satisfaction cast upon the defendant.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d State v. Barrow, 276 N.C. 381, 172 S.E. 2d 512 (1970).\nThus, the challenged instruction is supported by the decisions of our Supreme Court and defendant\u2019s exception thereto is overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges Morris and Arnold concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Raymond L. Yasser, for the State.", "McLean, Stacy, Henry & McLean, by H. E. Stacy, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES KENLEY OXENDINE\nNo. 7416SC822\n(Filed 15 January 1975)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 75\u2014 statements made by intoxicated defendant \u2014 vol-untariness\nThere was competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that statements made by defendant to an officer after he had been taken into custody were voluntary, and the mere fact of defendant\u2019s intoxication did not render inadmissible his statements which tended to incriminate him.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 24\u2014 second degree murder \u2014 instructions on burden of proof\nThe trial court in a second degree murder prosecution properly instructed the jury that \u201cupon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of intentional killing With a deadly weapon,\u201d the defendant had the bur-dent of satisfying the jury \u201cnot beyond a reasonable doubt nor by the greater weight of the evidence, but simply satisfying the jury of facts and circumstances or provocation which will remove the element of malice, that is, rebut it, and reduce the crime to manslaughter.\u201d\nAppeal by defendant from Hall, Judge, 3 June 1974 Criminal Session of Superior Court held in Robeson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 11 December 1974.\nDefendant was charg\u00e9d in a bill of indictment, proper in form, with the murder of Kenley Oxendine. At the call of the case for trial, the district attorney announced the State would accept a verdict no greater than murder in the second degree. The defendant pleaded not guilty.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that the deceased was at home with other members of his family when the defendant entered the house with a pistol in his belt. The deceased and defendant were both under the influence of alcoholic beverages. The deceased and defendant had some words. Defendant pushed the deceased to the floor and fired one shot away from the deceased. A struggle ensued between the two, and everyone else left the room. Two more shots were fired, and two or three minutes later defendant was seen in the room with a pistol in his hand approximately ten feet from the body of the deceased. Defendant remained in the room and went to sleep on a couch where he was later handcuffed by the arresting officer. He was taken immediately to the officer\u2019s car, advised of the charge against him, and advised of his constitutional rights. Defendant made no response to questions asked by the officer. On the way to jail defendant made several spontaneous statements that, \u201che was glad he killed the son of a bitch.\u201d\nDefendant offered no evidence.\nThe jury returned a verdict of murder in the second degree, and the court adjudged that defendant be imprisoned for a term of not less than seventeen years nor more than twenty years with credit of 109 days confinement pending trial.\nDefendant appealed, assigning errors.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Raymond L. Yasser, for the State.\nMcLean, Stacy, Henry & McLean, by H. E. Stacy, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0444-01", "first_page_order": 472, "last_page_order": 475 }