{
  "id": 8550376,
  "name": "LORENZO BOBBY DANIELS, By His Next Friend, PAULINE DANIELS GOODSON v. SARAH FORD JOHNSON and NORWOOD RIGDON JOHNSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "Daniels ex rel. Goodson v. Johnson",
  "decision_date": "1975-03-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 7410SC1009",
  "first_page": "68",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:30:12.075015+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "LORENZO BOBBY DANIELS, By His Next Friend, PAULINE DANIELS GOODSON v. SARAH FORD JOHNSON and NORWOOD RIGDON JOHNSON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nDefendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence presents the question whether the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to justify a verdict in his favor. Summey v. Cauthen, 283 N.C. 640, 197 S.E. 2d 549 (1973). It is well-settled in this State that the presence of children on or near a highway is a warning signal to a motorist, who must bear in mind that children have less capacity to shun danger than adults and they are prone to act on impulse. Therefore, \u201cthe presence of children on or near the traveled portion of a highway whom a driver sees, or should see, places him under the duty to use due care to control the speed and movement of his vehicle and to keep a vigilant lookout to avoid injury.\u201d Brinson v. Mabry, 251 N.C. 435, 438, 111 S.E. 2d 540, 543 (1959).\nHowever, no presumption of actionable negligence arises from the mere fact that a motorist strikes and injuries a child who darts into the street or highway in the path of his approaching vehicle. Brewer v. Green, 254 N.C. 615, 119 S.E. 2d 610 (1961). There must be some evidence that the motorist could have avoided the accident by the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances. Until the driver has notice of the presence or likelihood of children near his line of travel, the rule as to the degree of care to be exercised with respect to children is the same as it is with respect to adults. 4 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice, (3d Ed. 1965) \u00a7 151.11.\nTaking as true the minor plaintiff\u2019s testimony that there were no vehicles on the street blocking his view to the north along S. East Street, it can be reasonably inferred that the defendant approaching along S. East Street from the north could have seen the plaintiff sometime during his passage from the east side of the street to the point where he was struck near the center of the southbound lane. However, when and where the plaintiff became visible to the defendant would depend on just where she was in relation to the plaintiff while he was trotting the twenty-seven feet from the east side of the street to where he was struck by the defendant\u2019s automobile.\nThere is no evidence in this record whatsoever as to where the defendant was at any particular time until she apparently applied her brakes five feet before striking the plaintiff. Thus, the evidence adduced at the trial does not provide the answer to the crucial question in the case, that is, whether defendant, in the exercise of due care, could have seen the plaintiff in sufficient time to anticipate his collision course and to have taken effective measures to avoid striking him. Left to speculation is where the defendant was when she saw or by the exercise of reasonable care should have seen the plaintiff.\nThe plaintiff not only had the burden of offering evidence of defendant\u2019s negligence, he also had the burden of offering evidence that the defendant\u2019s negligence was at least one of the proximate causes of the injury. Assuming that the defendant failed to keep a proper lookout, there is not sufficient evidence from which it may be inferred that her inattention was a proximate cause of the accident and that in the exercise of reasonable care she might have avoided it. See Winters v. Burch, 284 N.C. 205, 200 S.E. 2d 55 (1973) ; Badger v. Medley, 262 N.C. 742, 138 S.E. 2d 401 (1964).\nWe hold that the evidence in this case fails to establish actionable negligence on the part of defendant. Her motion for a directed verdict, therefore, was properly allowed.\nThe judgment appealed from is\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hatch, Little, Bunn, Jones, Few & Berry by John N. McClain, Jr., and David H. Permar for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Ragsdale and Liggett by George R. Ragsdale for defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "LORENZO BOBBY DANIELS, By His Next Friend, PAULINE DANIELS GOODSON v. SARAH FORD JOHNSON and NORWOOD RIGDON JOHNSON\nNo. 7410SC1009\n(Filed 5 March 1975)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 41\u2014 children near street \u2014 duty of motorist\nThe presence of children on or near the traveled portion of a highway whom a driver sees, or should see, places him under the duty to use due care to control the speed and movement of his vehicle and to keep a vigilant lookout to avoid injury.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 63\u2014 striking child \u2014 no presumption of negligence\nNo presumption of actionable negligence arises from the mere fact that a motorist strikes and injures a child who darts into the street in the path of his approaching vehicle, but there must be some evidence that the motorist could have avoided the accident by the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 63\u2014 striking child \u2014 insufficient evidence of negligence\nThe evidence failed to establish actionable negligence on the part of defendant motorist in striking a child who \u201ctrotted\u201d into the street where it failed to show where defendant was at any particular time until she applied her brakes five feet before striking the child and thus left to speculation where defendant was when she saw or should have seen the child.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Bailey, Judge. Judgment entered 20 September 1974 in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 February 1975.\nThis is a civil action wherein the plaintiff, Lorenzo Bobby Daniels, brought suit by his guardian ad litem, Pauline Daniels Goodson, to recover damages for personal injuries suffered on 20 January 1970 when he was struck by an automobile driven by Sarah Ford Johnson and owned by her husband, Norwood Rigdon Johnson.\nAt the trial, plaintiff offered evidence tending to show the following: East Street in Raleigh runs north and south and is approximately 36 feet wide. The 300 block of S. East Street, which is approximately 200 feet long, is straight and level and has a speed limit of 25 m.p.h. There are homes along the west side of the street and both homes and businesses along the east side of the street. The plaintiff\u2019s house, located in the middle of the block on the west side of the street, is directly across the street from the Rainbow cabstand.\nOn 20 January 1970 the plaintiff was eight years old. At about 5:15 p.m. plaintiff, returning home from Keith\u2019s grocery store, walked down the sidewalk on the east side of the street as far as the Rainbow cabstand. He stopped in the driveway leading from the street to the cabstand and checked the traffic in both directions. Plaintiff did not see any cars and began \u201ctrotting\u201d west across S. East Street toward his home. He was struck by the front part of defendant\u2019s car, which was traveling south, at a point nine feet from the west curb of S. East Street. Plaintiff testified that at the time of the accident it was \u201csort to\u201d getting dark outside and that he did not see the defendant\u2019s car until it was so close to him he was unable to avoid being hit. He did not remember hearing either the sound of a horn or the sound of brakes. Plaintiff further stated that there were no cars parked along the east side of S. East Street in the vicinity of the cabstand.\nPlaintiff\u2019s grandmother, Katy Daniels Lumford, testified that at the time of the accident there was a considerable amount of traffic on S. East Street and that immediately after the accident Mrs. Johnson said that she did not see the plaintiff.\nSergeant B. W. Peoples, the investigating officer, testified that the defendant\u2019s vehicle left \u201ctire impressions\u201d prior to the point of impact which were five feet in length and that the automobile traveled six feet after the collision before coming to a stop.\nAt the conclusion of the plaintiff\u2019s evidence, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff appealed.\nHatch, Little, Bunn, Jones, Few & Berry by John N. McClain, Jr., and David H. Permar for plaintiff appellant.\nRagsdale and Liggett by George R. Ragsdale for defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0068-01",
  "first_page_order": 96,
  "last_page_order": 99
}
