{ "id": 8553196, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES LANGLEY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Langley", "decision_date": "1975-04-02", "docket_number": "No. 744SC962", "first_page": "298", "last_page": "300", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "25 N.C. App. 298" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "378 U.S. 368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166505 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 U.S. 199", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167093 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206-207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/361/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 F. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1171059 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/499/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560620 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572889 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 222", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11712077 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0222-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 438, "char_count": 6514, "ocr_confidence": 0.599, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.27652758941816e-07, "percentile": 0.7843283527340783 }, "sha256": "66f88de338b2ec103c568c7a2916c6dc81a222b2702811bd0b40a4cb1de639d5", "simhash": "1:763ef2e476860cac", "word_count": 1076 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:30:12.075015+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Vaughn and Arnold concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES LANGLEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nAt the beginning of defendant\u2019s trial, defense counsel requested a voir dire examination to determine the admissibility of an alleged confession procured from defendant shortly after his arrest. It is unnecessary to give an account of the evidence adduced on voir dire except to say that it is conflicting in regard to whether the alleged confession was coerced and involuntary in fact. The trial court made no findings of fact but stated, \u201cIt is my opinion that because of the boy\u2019s lack of intelligence that he did not intelligently waive his right and I\u2019m going to exclude the alleged confession. Of course, as you know, if the boy testifies, then it might be used as rebuttal.\u201d At trial defendant testified in his own behalf, and the State used the alleged confession for purposes of impeachment.\nDefendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial. The main question on appeal is whether the trial judge committed error by permitting the district attorney to use defendant\u2019s prior out-of-court confession to the police for purposes of impeachment absent a judicial determination on its voluntariness where there was evidence already before the trial judge to the effect that the confession was coerced and involuntary in fact.\nIn Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 28 L.Ed. 2d 1, 91 S.Ct. 643 (1971), the Court held that an accused\u2019s prior inconsistent statements, which were not coerced or involuntary in fact but were made without counsel and without waiver of rights, although inadmissible to establish the prosecution\u2019s case in chief could properly be used to impeach the accused\u2019s testimony. The rule in Harris was adopted in State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 555, 187 S.E. 2d 111, 113 (1972). State v. Huntley, 284 N.C. 148, 200 S.E. 2d 21 (1973). However, neither Harris nor State v. Bryant, supra, affirmatively indicates that a confession may be used to impeach a defendant if barred by pre-Miranda law because it was induced by force, fear or hope of reward. See 2-Stansbury, N. C. Evidence (Brandis Revision), \u00a7 186, p. 82. Indeed, in Harris, \u201cthe Court was careful to point out that there was no claim that the confession had been coerced; its further insistence that the \u2018trustworthiness\u2019 of an impeaching statement satisfy \u2018legal standards\u2019 strongly implies that it would not favor the use of statements extracted by coercion.\u201d LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F. 2d 29 (1st Cir. 1974). Our interpretation of Harris finds support in a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on 19 March 1975 where the Court in applying Harris stated, \u201cIf, in a given case, the officer\u2019s conduct amounts to abuse, that case, like those involving coercion or duress, may be taken care of. when it arises measured by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness.\u201d Oregon v. Hass, (43 Law Week 4417).\nIn the present case, if defendant\u2019s confession was coerced or involuntary in fact due to the police interrogation, then it should have been barred from evidence altogether. In our opinion a coerced confession may not be used for impeachment purposes.\nInherent in our decision is the premise that the issue of voluntariness was for the trial judge to determine \u2014 not the jury.\n\u201cIt is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of involuntary confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of confessions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive, but also because of the \u2018strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will.\u2019 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-207, 4 L.ed. 2d 242, 248, 80 S.Ct. 274, and because of \u2018the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law ....\u2019\u201d Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L.Ed. 2d 908, 84 S.Ct. 1774 (1964).\nIf such an issue was left to the jury, then clearly there would be little deterrent to the use of coerced confessions, and a defendant would be forced to choose between remaining silent at trial or taking the stand with the possibility that a coerced confession would be placed before the jury.\nIn the case before us there is strong evidence that defendant\u2019s confession was induced by threat of physical force or fear. Furthermore, there is evidence of a lack of intelligence on defendant\u2019s part. Considering the whole record on appeal, it appears likely that the jury considered the evidence of defendant\u2019s confession as substantive evidence of his guilt since they were not instructed to the contrary. Under the foregoing circumstances, the admission into evidence of defendant\u2019s confession without a determination by the trial court as to its voluntariness is error entitling defendant to a new trial.\nNew trial.\nJudges Vaughn and Arnold concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William Woodward Webb, for the State.", "Chambers, Stein and Ferguson, by James E. Ferguson II, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES LANGLEY\nNo. 744SC962\n(Filed 2 April 1975)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 75\u2014 coerced confession \u2014 no admissibility for impeachment\nA coerced confession may not be used for impeachment purposes.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 75, 89\u2014 confession \u2014 no finding of voluntariness \u2014 admission for impeachment error\nWhere there was evidence that defendant\u2019s confession was induced by threat of physical force or fear and there was evidence of a lack of intelligence on defendant\u2019s part, the admission into evidence of the confession for the purpose of impeachment without a determination by the trial court as to its voluntariness was error entitling defendant to a new trial.\nAppeal by defendant from Cowper, Judge. Judgment entered 80 May 1974 in Superior Court, Onslow County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 10 February 1975.\nDefendant was charged in three separate bills of indictment with assault with intent to commit rape on a female child under the age of twelve years. Two of the alleged victims were six years of age and the other alleged victim was five years of age. The charges were consolidated for trial, and defendant, through his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to each charge.\nIn Case No. 74CR9523 the jury found defendant guilty of assault on a child under the age of twelve years, and in Cases Nos. 74CR9521 and 74CR9522 defendant was found guilty as charged. From judgments entered upon the verdicts, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William Woodward Webb, for the State.\nChambers, Stein and Ferguson, by James E. Ferguson II, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0298-01", "first_page_order": 326, "last_page_order": 328 }